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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the role of geography in the construction 
of economic attitudes and electoral behaviour in Britain during the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. Aggregate and individual level data are used to separate two 
specific time periods - the economic recovery of the 1980s and the 'new' 
recession of the early 1990s. The new recession also coincided with the long-
campaign leading to the 1992 General Election, when the Conservatives were 
returned for a fourth successive term. 
A two stage model of the relationship between social class, geography, 
economic attitudes and party support is constructed. Initially the link between 
geography and economic attitudes appears enigmatic. However, as the analysis 
progresses a clearer picture emerges of the geographic basis of prospective and 
retrospective, egocentric and sociotropic economic evaluations. 
Analysis of Variance and Multiple Classification Analysis techniques reveal the 
extent of the growing geographic divide in party support and certain economic 
attitudes during the 1980s. A particularly crucial theme emerges with the 
investigation of partisanship during inter-election periods. Groups that tend to 
form the core of the Conservative vote in Election years, are identified as 
reluctant Conservatives in non-election years. 
Important contextual effects are perceived in the analYSis of reported vote 
intention, geography and economic attitudes in the run-up to the 1992 General 
Election. As well as the orthodox personal economic expectations variable, 
ascription of economic responsibility and economic approval for the 
Government's programme are shown to be critical to levels of Government 
support - and are spatially variable. Ordinary Least Squares and Logistic 
regression analysis reveal the precise role of geography in economic attitudes 
and party support. Here the 'devil is in the detail' as the interactions effects of 
the dependent variables reveal that when an individual's economic evaluations 
clashes with their geographic context, the contextual effect either dilutes - or 
overcomes completely - the economic effect. The analysis of individual level 
data represents an advance for electoral geography and for the study of 
geographic milieux and local socialisation effects. 
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Introduction 
Figure 1: Evidence of the Popular Link Between Personal Economy and Voting Pat-
terns, 1959-92 (Sources; Butler, 1989 p . 17; Crewe & Gosschalk, 1995; pp. 53-4) . 
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Introduction 
It is no exaggeration to say that the state of the economy is the key to 
government electoral success in modern times. Both politicians and academic 
analysts of elections have long recognised that the ability to deliver a strong, 
growing economy and rising levels of affluence among the electorate is a vital 
skill for the party of government to acquire (or at least be perceived to acquire), 
Harold Macmillan's celebrated "you've never had it so good" election victory in 
1959 was won on a tide of growing public affluence which the incumbent 
government was able to present as the consequences of its policies (a pOint 
made humorously in a famous Trog cartoon, in which Mr Macmillan holds a post-
election de-briefing session with a room full of consumer durables: figure 1). In 
modern jargon, the 1959 election was a classic "feel good" election. Some 33 
years later, and in less propitious times for a government defending its economic 
record, the Conservatives recorded another notable election victory under John 
Major, despite a deep recession and a decline in consumer confidence. The 
party achieved this unlikely feat in part by playing on the economy. The clear 
message they presented to the electorate was "we know things are bad now, but 
they will get even worse if you elect anyone but us" (figure 1). The government 
managed a classic "feel bad" economic situation by playing on public 
perceptions that the other parties - especially Labour - were less reliable on 
economic matters than were the Conservatives. 
The 1959 and 1992 elections are not untypical of post-war British electoral 
competition. It is now generally accepted that, in order to win, a party must be 
perceived by the electorate as more likely to deliver affluence (or at least less 
likely to deliver declining living standards) than its rivals. Increasingly 
sophisticated analyses have linked voting to the state of the economy (through 
so-called economic voting models) and (even more importantly in recent years) 
to public perceptions of the economy. Furthermore, powerful models have been 
developed to account for the link between the economy and party support not 
only at election time but also in inter-election periods. 
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Despite the growth in the academic study of economic voting, with a few 
exceptions, there is a tendency in the literature to treat the economy as though it 
was an undifferentiated whole. Britain's economy is treated, more often than not, 
as a single unit. However, there are good grounds for challenging this view. 
Perhaps the most important challenge is that the British economy varies 
markedly from region to region. As many commentators have shown, some 
regions can be mired in recession while others bask in economic growth and 
affluence. In other words, public perceptions of the state of the economy, and of 
government economic policy, may well vary markedly from place to place, 
depending on the state of the local economy. Some analyses have taken this on 
board, and have built the geography of the economy into their economic voting 
models, with encouraging results. However, even these studies have so far 
concentrated almost exclusively on the geography of the economic vote at 
election time only. Equally important, but so far seriously under-researched, are 
the inter-election dynamics of the effects of economic geography upon party 
support. This thesis seeks to fill that gap in the literature through an analysis of 
the inter-election links between geography, the economy, and party support in 
the period from 1983 to 1992. 
The period 1979-92 saw major changes in Britain's economy, SOCiety and polity. 
Political change was in place from 1979, with the defeat of a Labour 
government, and the election of a new Conservative government committed to 
"rolling back the state" and breaking with the post-war consensus. The 
Conservatives went on to win (to date) four election victories in a row (an 
unprecedented feat in twentieth century British politics), culminating in their 1992 
victory. For the most part, the party was able to govern throughout the period 
largely untroubled by the Parliamentary Opposition, thanks to a series of 
landslide victories (created in part by the split in the opposition vote between 
Labour and the Liberal-SDP Alliance, and in part by the geography of party 
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support). Thanks to their secure parliamentary base, the Conservatives were 
able to implement their radical agenda for change which, although not based on 
a coherent philosophy which lasted the full thirteen years between 1979 and 
1992, drew on a belief in the need to reduce the economic power of the state 
and other interest groups (notable, but not only, the trades unions) and to create 
freer markets for capital. 
Implementation of that agenda saw major changes to many aspects of the 
country's social, economic and political infrastructure. Change occurred 
everywhere, as manufacturing industry rapidly reduced in importance as an 
employer, and service industries grew - though they suffered somewhat in the 
recession that set in after 1990. However, whereas in some parts of the country 
those changes countered each other, with manufacturing decline paralleled by 
service-sector growth, in others the former occurred without the latter. Thus an 
economic and social divide - frequently referred to in shorthand as the North-
South divide - opened up: the country was split between a relatively 
impoverished set of regions, mainly in the North, on the one hand, and an 
affluent set, mainly in the South-East, on the other. 
Was this economic and social divide also a political one? Did the voting habits 
of residents of different regions change to follow it? Much psephological work 
during the early 1980s and early 1990s has focused on the economic 
determinants of voting - what is sometimes termed the 'feel good factor'; those 
who benefit economically from Government policies are more likely to reward 
incumbents with their vote, whatever their class and other backgrounds, whereas 
those who suffer are more likely to punish the incumbents by voting for the 
opposition. A number of analysts have argued that this link exists, but their 
evidence - almost all of it drawn from aggregate level data - is circumstantial 
only, and so while there is implicit support for the case that spatial variation 
should be introduced to voting models, there is no explicit evidence which 
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provides unequivocal support. Making that explicit link is the purpose of this 
thesis, using two datasets that allow voting intentions to be linked with economic 
attitudes and regional location during both the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. 
The first task of this thesis is to identify the niche for the research conducted 
here. This involves the fusion of electoral geography, and elements of rational 
choice theory, social psychological models of electoral behaviour and 
econometric modelling. The central theme of this thesis concerns geographic 
variation in voting and in economic attitudes. This leads directly to the 
consideration of a number of interconnecting themes concerning why people 
vote they way they do, and why people from different parts of the country vote 
and apparently think differently from each other. 
There was a pronounced regional geography of recession and recovery in the 
1980s and 1990s. How well or badly the economy seemed to be depended very 
much on which part of the country was being investigated. As a consequence 
there were a priori grounds to expect that;the 1980s and 1990 would provide an 
excellent setting for this research, since the geographic context was especially 
pertinent to the nature of the economic revival of the 1983-9 period and the new 
downturn of the early 1990s. 
0.1 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter One sets up the frames of reference that the thesis revolves around. 
There are five themes of study identified in this chapter; the self-interest axiom 
(which introduces the concepts of egocentric and sociotropic voting), the reward-
punishment axiom (which includes a discussion of retrospective and prospective 
voting), the economy, economic perceptions and the spatial dimension. The third 
theme - the economy - is shown to be the linchpin between the other four. 
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The first chapter, then, attempts to show the interdependence of the five themes, 
and concludes that there are four faces of economic attitudes which ought to be 
studied; the egocentric and sociotropic, the retrospective and the prospective. 
All of these faces are important in the study of voting behaviour and all were 
likely to be spatially variable in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The next task is to lock the research into place. That is to make the political, 
economic and geographic context of the 1980s and 1990s clear. This is the task 
of Chapter Two. 
The political environment of this period included three consecutive Conservative 
election victories, a period of intense international crisis in the Gulf and a 
change in the leadership of the Conservative Party - and thus the premiership of 
the country. 
Economically, the country underwent a considerable recovery in the 1983-9 
period (as the service and financial sectors expanded rapidly) and a renewed 
slump in the 1990-2 period, as this expansion could not be sustained. 
Governments tend to be more confident about their chances of winning an 
Election if the electorate appears sanguine about the economic outlook. A 
recession - or indeed a spatially variable recovery - might spell trouble for an 
incumbent Government. The search for the 'feel good factor' associated with 
economic performance is seen as a crucial part of the recent electoral strategy 
of British Governments. 
The changing economic structure of Britain during this period brought with it a 
changing geographic reality. The 1980s economic recovery was based in the 
South of England - the depressed manufacturing sector which was concentrated 
in Scotland, Wales and the North missed out during the economic regeneration 
of the 1980s. Furthermore the 1990s economic recession - unlike the early 
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1980s recession hit the service sector - and thus the South of the country; 
unemployment impacted on previously protected parts of the economy (and 
parts of the country). Consequently the changing geographic context of the 
1980s and the 1990s is a crucial theme throughout the thesis, and is explored in 
detail in Chapter Two. 
Once the scene has been set, the next task is to introduce the link between 
geography and attitudes. There are competing theories concerning the 
transmission of attitudes via geographic criteria. The Chapter attempts to outline 
the themes of geographic milieux and a lifetime of learning, of compositional and 
contextual geographic effects, of regional and functional causation. 
Finally, the chapter outlines the hypothesised models of Government support, 
geography and economic attitudes. There are two types of geographic model -
set out in Chapter Two - measured throughout the empirical chapters of the 
thesis. These are the regional and functional operationalisations of geography. 
The former includes the familiar North-South cleavage, the latter stresses the 
essential socio-economic characteristics of a constituency and links similar 
constituencies from diverse parts of the country. 
Chapter Three is the first of the four empirical chapters. The aim of this chapter 
is to study the relationship between geography and attitudes towards the 
economy in the recovery between 1983 and 1990. This is achieved through the 
use of cross-tabulations. 
It is important to note that the local variance in certain economic attitudes will be 
greater than in others. For instance, there are sounder reasons for expecting 
geographic variation in attitudes towards unemployment than towards inflation. 
This is because the local context is more relevant to unemployment figures - with 
highly publicised local unemployment rates and real differences between 
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unemployment rates in different regions - than to the rate of inflation which is 
more likely to be seen as a strictly national phenomenon. Hence an integral 
section of Chapter Three refines the hypothesised relationships between various 
egocentric and sociotropic attitudes and the geographic context. 
A cursory look at this relationship is taken, using British Social Attitudes data 
from both panel cross-sectional surveys. An initial focus of this chapter is on 
party identification and on locating a place for geographic analysis in the 
modelling of party support. Attitudes studied in Chapter Three include 
perceptions of the state of the voter's home area, personal and family financial 
positions, attitudes to inflation, unemployment and the state of British industry. 
The pattern of changes over time in these attitudes and in party identification are 
analysed. Particular attention is paid to the differences in attitudes and party 
support in election years (1983 and 1987) and inter-election periods. 
The initial findings of Chapter Three are refined in Chapter Four which probes 
the relationship between partisanship, economic attitudes and space in the 
1980s recovery. A model of party support via economic attitudes, class and 
geography is tested using Analysis of Variance and Multiple Classification 
Analysis to dissect the differences in public attitudes to sociotropic issues (such 
as inflation, unemployment, industrial performance and efficiency and poverty) 
and egocentric issues (such as attitudes towards family income levels and 
personal wage expectations). The incidence of spatial variation in these 
attitudes is analysed thoroughly using the methods referred to above. 
Chapters Five and Six deal with the 1990s. They deal explicitly with the run-up 
to the 1992 election. This period covers three major shocks in the political arena. 
Firstly, the community charge (or poll tax) had been introduced to much public 
hostility. Secondly, a great international crisis was developing in the Gulf from 
the summer of 1990. This culminated in the United Nations sponsored war 
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against Iraq (and provided natural parallels to the Falklands War of 1982, and 
the literature on the subsequent Conservative electoral victory in 1983). Thirdly -
and probably most importantly for British politics - the governing party changed 
its leader in November 1990. How the British electorate would react to such 
rapid changes in the political environment was crucial to the understanding of 
British politics in the early 1990s and make this element of the research vital. 
The 1992 Election was the closest for nearly two decades. The fact that the 
Conservatives were returned with a comfortable majority of 21 seats is rather 
incidental to the fact that the common perception of the 1992 campaign was that 
either of the two main parties could win. As Alt (1979) states, when elections are 
closely fought voters' minds are likely to be concentrated on the economy. 
Harder economic times present a set of 
circumstances in which not only are competitive 
parties more likely to take up competing positions 
with respect to economic management but individuals 
are also more likely to have an incentive to pay 
attention to these competing claims, and to adhere to 
positions and preferences with regard to economic 
policy (1979; p. 12). 
This made the build up to the 1992 General Election particularly crucial for 
psephological study since the parties ability to manage the economy was the key 
electoral battleground, and the economic reality of the country was quite 
different from region to region. 
The impact of geography, and class on economic attitudes and on voting 
intentions during the early 1990s, is assessed in Chapter Five. The concept of 
blame for the recession is introduced - which offers an explanation for why the 
South East failed to turn on the Government despite the dynamics of the new 
recession. 
I) 
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The need to test for two economic models - the recovery and the new recession 
economic models is introduced in Chapter Five. The extent of the feel good 
factor in the run-up to the 1992 election is analysed, and a crucial theme in 
Chapter Five emerges with a discussion of the extent of and the incidence of 
blame for the recession, and sociotropic and egocentric approval of the 
Government's handling of the economy. Chapter Five culminates with a 
regression analysis of the effects of class, geography and the feel good factor on 
reported vote intention. 
Chapter Six builds on the findings in Chapter Five, breaking down the period into 
its component months. This enables a comparison between the Thatcher and 
Major premierships and electoral developments during the long campaign 
leading to the 1992 election are analysed thoroughly using Analysis of Variance, 
Multiple Classification Analysis, Ordinary Least Squares Regression and 
Logistic Regression analyses. The next stage of Chapter Six is to undertake 
regression analysis to more clearly isolate the impact of geography and class on 
the construction of economic attitudes and of all three on reported vote intention. 
A temporal dimension in the models of party support is constructed, which allows 
the testing of bandwagon and monthly models of reported vote intention, and the 
more rigorous exploration of the extent of Prime Minister Major's political 
honeymoon period. This chapter provides evidence to suggest why Conservative 
voters disadvantaged by the new recession did not turn against the Government 
in 1992. 
This final empirical chapter provides an opportunity to test the model of class, 
geography, economic attitudes and party support in a critical period of British 
politics. It also enables the rigorous testing of competing theories about the 
place of geography in the process of determining how individuals vote, providing 
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a discussion of the local context and a lifetime of learning, the regional milieux 
and the functional division of class. 
This thesis attempts to identify the sources of variation in attitudes towards the 
economy and the Government in the 1980s and 1990s by using geographic 
analyses. It presents a parsimonious model of party support using social class, 
two forms of geography and economic evaluations. The thesis fits neatly into a 
body of literature which uses econometric type models of Government support 
but introduces the crucial concept of geography and critically the geographic 
context of socialisation to the existing body of evidence about economic 
perceptions. The findings of this thesis underscore some of the knowledge about 
the geographic source of voting variation in the 1980s and add considerable 
weight to our understanding of how geography impacted upon economic 
attitudes during the 1980s recovery. The sections of the thesis dwaling with the 
early 1990s are critical to understanding the relationship between geography, 
the economy and party support during the new recession and contribute 
significantly to our understanding of the result of the General Election of April 
1992. 
11 
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Chapter One: Self-Interest, Reward-Punishment, The Economy, 
Economic Attitudes and Geography 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the tone of the two fields of research that this 
thesis seeks to synthesise - the economic concentration in voting behaviour and 
electoral geography. This synthesis ought to be particularly fruitful in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, since these two dimensions - economics and geography -
were of massive interest during this period. Indeed in everyday terms, both 
dimensions had developed a common currency as the public were probably more 
aware of economic policy and the so-called North-South divide than ever before. 
The downfall of Margaret Thatcher on 22 November 1990, marked the end of a 
particularly fascinating era in British politics. During her reign as Prime Minister 
between 1979 and 1990, her Governments overhauled the nature of British 
politics, winning three elections in the process. She remains the only British Prime 
Minister to have a coherent economic and political ideology named after her as 
Thatcherism became an identifiable set of values and attitudes. 
The tendency therefore is to see the three Thatcher Governments as an 
ideological crusade, with the explicit aim of transforming the values and attitudes of 
the British public. In 1979, the Thatcher-led Opposition ousted the incumbent 
Government led by James Callaghan. In 1983 it won a landslide victory over a 
dispirited Labour Party and a fledging third party Alliance. By 1987 a third Thatcher 
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Government was elected, again with an overall majority of over one hundred 
parliamentary seats. The three electoral victories of the Conservative Party led by 
Mrs Thatcher certainly reinforced the impression that 'Thatcherism' was being 
absorbed into the mainstream of British public attitudes and voting behaviour. 
There is evidence however, that the first Thatcher Government was an exercise in 
retaining power rather than an ideological crusade (see Bulpitt 1986), and it was 
only after the 1983 Election victory that the Thatcher administration developed the 
confidence to press on with its central ideological policies. This was certainly the 
case with the flagship of Thatcherite policies - privatisation - which began as a 
means of providing the Government with finance as public companies (like 
Amersham International) were offered to the private sector and developed into the 
championing of 'popular capitalism' with the general public being invited to own 
shares in the former nationalised companies, such as British Telecom and British 
Gas. 
This research concentrates on the Thatcher era between 1983 and 1990, and its 
immediate successor with the accession of John Major to the Conservative Party 
leadership and the premiership of Great Britain. Hence it ought to be in an 
excellent position to gauge transformations in public attitudes to the economy and 
electoral behaviour, since the historical context of the period promoted common 
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usage of notions of economic policy and the geographic development of the British 
polity. 
Many writers have made much of the divisive nature of ''Thatcherism'', claiming 
that the economic division between those who benefited from the years of 
Conservative Government and those who suffered under it resulted in a "two-
nation" identity (Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley & Ling 1988). Reinforcing this point has 
been the marked spatial distinction in British voting behaviour during the Thatcher 
Governments, with the South of England being the most identifiable as a centre of 
support for the Conservatives, while the North of England, Scotland and Wales 
exhibited a growing hostility to the Government. Moreover the attitudinal core of 
Thatcherism - the desire for lithe free economy and the strong state" (Gamble 
1988) had its impact restricted to certain classes and certain regions. In this light it 
seems strange that in the Thatcherite era, the study of electoral behaviour in 
Britain has painfully sought to retain and revise traditional concepts of occupational 
class (Crewe, Sarlvik & Alt 1977, Dunleavy 1979, 1980, 1987, Sarlvik & Crewe 
1983, Heath et al 1985, 1987, 1991) but has failed to absorb the notion of 
geographic variation into the mainstream of psephology. 
If the economic consequence of Thatcherism was the uneven development of 
regional economies then it would not be unreasonable to expect that the economic 
division would be expressed both electorally and attitudinally. If the Thatcher years 
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were divisive economically then the electorate would have its perceptions clouded 
by this very division; and if geography is the best aid for viewing the uneven 
development of Britain, then it is also likely to be the best aid for perceiving a 
division in public attitudes and voting behaviour, This then is the thrust behind this 
thesis for assessing the impact of spatial variation in public attitudes to the 
economy 
Moreover, the 1983-89 and 1990-92 periods permit comparative coverage across 
two distinct periods of British political history. The economic recovery of the mid-
1980s and the 'new' slump of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Needless to say it 
also enables much of the work on 'Thatcherism' to be set in a comparative context. 
Did Thatcherism transform public opinion and voting patterns? If so did it promote 
a once and for all change or were the much vaunted changes associated with 
Thatcherism dependent on the 'new economic miracle' of the Lawson boom or the 
premiership of Mrs. Thatcher herself? 
This chapter is split into five sections in its presentation, which may give the 
impression that each section relates to a topic of distinct and separate identity. In 
reality however, all five sections are in almost constant interchange. The first two 
categories, the self-interest axiom and the reward-punishment axiom, outline a 
traditional approach to electoral studies, encountering techniques and theories 
formulated in the 1950s. The fourth and fifth categories, dealing with economic 
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perceptions and the spatial dimension, are fairly recent developments in 
mainstream political science. The third category, the economy, is the linchpin 
between these two sets of categories. 
1.1 THE SELF-INTEREST AXIOM 
The self-interest axiom is a crucial strand running through the literature on political 
economy and the effects of economics on voting. It has influenced much of the 
rational choice approach to politics and economics from the 1950s onwards. 
Furthermore it has enjoyed a renaissance through recent developments in British 
psephology with the emergence of personal (rather than societal) economic 
expectations as objects of study. The self-interest axiom is outlined by Calhoun; 
The constitution of our nature which makes us feel more 
intensely what affects us directly than what affects us 
indirectly through others, necessarily leads to conflict 
between individuals. Each in consequence, has a greater 
regard for his own safety or happiness, than for the safety 
or happiness of others: and, where these come in 
opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to 
his own (1954; p. 15). 
This kind of Hobbesian war of all against all was picked up by Downs and 
extrapolated in his Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). In the Downsian model 
voters act as consumers and parties, acting as producers, compete for the favours 
of the electorate. It is crucial to note that both consumers and producers act 
primarily out of self-interest. 
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Thus the acid test of voting between an elector and a political party can be 
represented by the former asking one crucial question of the latter in the Downsian 
scenario - "what can you do for me?". It is not the aim here to deny the relevance 
of the phenomenon which American political science has termed "pocket-book 
voting" but it is the intention to tie this research into attempts to open up the debate 
and move it towards the possibility that motives other than self-interest may be 
equally important in the construction of attitudes and the procedure of voting 
behaviour. 
It is fair to say that the Downsian Model is ruled by the self-interest axiom; voters 
act out of self interest in choosing which party to vote for, parties act out of self 
interest in choosing which policies to set before the electorate in order to get 
elected. The actions of consumers are typified in the Downsian model as "rational 
behaviour directed towards selfish ends", while party members act "solely in order 
to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in Office," Hence 
politicians in this model never perceive office as a means to an end, but an end in 
itself. 
Their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office per 
se. They treat policies purely as means to the attainment 
of their private ends, which they can reach only by being 
elected (1957; p. 28). 
This process will usually result in political parties competing around a central policy 
position in order to maximise votes. Any movement by one party away from 
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consensual ground should precipitate an equal and opposite shift towards the 
centre by opposing parties. Citizens have opinions and parties try to compete for 
their votes. A common anecdote that illustrates the Downsian competition for 
voters is the Ice Cream Van analogy. Here two competing ice cream vans in a 
busy high street begin to sell their wares at opposite ends of the street. However, 
in order to maximise sales one van moves slightly towards the centre of the street 
in an attempt to attract more custom. Assuming the aggregate distribution of 
preferences is unimodal, this shift in the position in ice cream van 1 is noted by the 
owner of ice cream van 2 who reciprocates by moving his van further towards the 
centre of the street. By the end of the day, the two vans are positioned next to each 
other, exactly in the centre of the street's length. When political parties replace ice 
cream vans, the parties move towards the centre of the political mainstream in 
order, not to maximise sales, but to maximise votes. 
The attempt to achieve vote maximisation derives not from a desire to see policies 
implemented but in order to gain power. A cynic might claim that Downs portrays a 
kind of institutional megalomania, since the fundamental hypothesis of the 
Downsian model is that parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather 
than to win elections in order to formulate policies. 
In this type of orthodoxy then, the views of voters (in Downsian language, the 
choices of consumers) are paramount. Nevertheless it is important to note that 
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political parties and pOliticians themselves hold the real power, The electorate has 
a set of values which political parties have to react to by the formation of policy if 
they are to succeed at the polls, Furthermore, the electorate's values are pre-
determined by individual self-interest. Acting out of self-interest, voters can 
scarcely avoid holding economic values since it is here that parties can most 
readily directly affect the lives of the public, The implication to be drawn from this is 
that the self-interest axiom works via economic forces until "pocket book voting" 
can presume near pre-eminence within this type of electoral analysis. 
In their classic study of the effects of economic circumstances upon government 
popularity, Goodhart and Bhansali reach some rather curious conclusions. In their 
reluctance to abandon the Downsian model, Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) fail to 
ascribe any role to altruism in the determination of voting intentions. Faced with 
examples of erosion of support for the Government from voters not directly affected 
by unemployment themselves, they conclude that; 
our unemployment series was probably picking up the 
effects of all the other cyclical economic factors (such as 
opportunities for overtime working, rate of growth of 
earnings, etc.). It seems a plausible hypothesis that each 
voter would judge the economic record of the Government 
on the very narrowest and most selfish grounds, that is by 
the effect on their immediate family's income (1970: p. 
67). 
Thus the work of Goodhart and Bhansali is located neatly into a body of political 
economy literature which is hamstrung by its inability to move away from the 
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Downsian model of a self-interested rational acting electorate, Curiously the 
assertion that the voter remains selfish comes after Goodhart and Bhansali have 
made adjustments in their model for the concentration by the media on more 
obscure economic factors such as exchange rates and balance of payments. If 
voters are allowed to take their cue from media directives about the economy, then 
it seems senseless to suggest that their only motivation is self-interest since the 
media primarily deals with the aggregate rather than the individual level. 
Downs argued that a citizen would vote only if his perceived vote value exceeded 
zero. If the rational actor that Downs describes, were to make precise calculations 
on the value of his or her vote, it may be likely that upon the realisation that his or 
her vote will probably fail to influence the overall result of the election, the marginal 
value of the electors vote would be minimal. In such a case, the potential voter may 
well decide that the act of voting would simply be a waste of the shoe leather 
expended on walking to the polling station, and as a consequence, abstention 
rates would rise dramatically (Ferejohn & Fiorina 1974 make this point), 
The central concern here is that a theoretical cornerstone of Downsian modelling 
fails to stand up empirically. The most remarkable feature of most modern 
elections in the Downsian sense is how many people actually bother to vote at all. 
Moreover it seems likely that other cornerstones about the self-interest axiom and 
retrospective voting would be threatened when tested empirically. Few writers 
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have had difficulty in jettisoning this weakness in Downsian modelling, but fewer 
still have plucked up the courage to challenge the self-interest axiom or the 
retrospective bias inherent in the model (a notable exception to this tendency has 
been Dunleavy: see 1991: Chapters 4 & 5). 
A crucial concern then ought to be how to measure attitudes and voting behaviour 
within the self-interest axiom. Furthermore, isolating the self-interested vote from 
the altruistic vote is much harder than it might appear. 
In surveys asking questions about general feelings concerned with personal 
prosperity, the distinction between personal and societal advantage to be gained 
by partisanship is often blurred. In How Britain Votes (1985) Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice found that prospective and retrospective voter values followed party 
allegiance so much that Conservative supporters felt their interests were best 
served by past Conservative Governments and by the prospect of future 
Conservative Governments. Conversely they were inclined to feel that their 
interests would be most damaged by Labour Governments both historically and in 
the future. In addition, questions about the general performance of a government 
and the personal utility derived from a particular policy are invariably intertwined. 
Indeed, voters often seem to place societal values above their own benefit when 
surveyed about their vote preference, For instance Heath, Jowell and Curtice 
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discovered that the best predictor of voting choice in the 1983 British Election 
Study was the respondent's answer to the question 
"On the whole do you think the Conservative Government 
over the last four years has handled the problem of 
unemployment very well, fairly well, or not at all well?" 
(1983 British Election Study) 
By way of contrast, personal questions were poor predictors of voting allegiance. 
An example of such a question was 
"Which do you think threatens you and your family most -
the threat of rising prices or the threat of unemployment?" 
(1983 British Election Study) 
In one of the few empirical studies to directly challenge the egocentric view of 
voting (the self-interest axiom), Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) report that:-
voters who expressed unhappiness with their financial 
conditions were generally no more likely to support the 
opposition party than were the more economically secure 
voters (1981; p. 503). 
They consider that voters vote via their impressions of the national economy not 
through their own personal circumstances. That is voters are motivated by altruistic 
feelings about society - sociotropism - rather than egocentrism. 
Kinder and Kiewiet conclude that 
under ordinary circumstances, voters evidently do not 
make connections between their own personal economic 
experiences - however vivid, immediate and otherwise 
significant - and their political attitudes and preferences 
(1981; p. 522). 
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This view may be said to be the culmination of a movement within the literature 
(typically American) to introduce a sociotropic view of voting, altruism in action 
rather than the egocentrism of the self-interest axiom. 
To reiterate then, the essential debate here concerns egocentric and sociotropic 
models of voting and attitudes. The former varies very little from the classic 
Downsian paradigm; the latter - sociotropic voting - was championed by Kinder 
and Kiewiet (1981) who illustrated that respondents tend to report that they have 
put the interests of the nation over their own personal interests. In addition, 
Johnston and Pattie (1990a) have illustrated that there is a considerable overlap 
between egocentric and sociotropic ambitions; people tend to equate what is 
"good for them" personally with the interests of the country as a whole. 
The point here is that sociotropism, or altruism in the polling booth and in the 
construction of attitudinal structures must be possible and is worthy of further 
study. Data which allow the further exploration of the relationship between 
sociotropic and egocentric attitudes should be fully utilised. Typical opinion poll 
questions which deal, respectively, with egocentric and sociotropic values include: 
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Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of 
these statements: 
The Government's economic policies are good for me and my 
family; 
• Agree strongly 
• Agree 
• Neither 
• Disagree 
• Disagree Strongly 
• Don't know 
The Government's economic policies are good for Britain; 
• Agree strongly 
• Agree 
• Neither 
• Disagree 
• Disagree Strongly 
• Don't know 
(NOPINewsnight Poll January 1991 ) 
The analysis of both egocentric and sociotropic attitudes ought to identify distinct 
elements of public attitudes, even if they are hard to isolate at times. 
A note of caution should be sounded here. Sanders, Ward and Marsh have shown 
that the immediate research need in this field is for disaggregated data in order to 
test sociotropic rather than group-based or egocentric concerns (see for instance 
Marsh et al 1992). This is because where aggregate level analyses have been 
replaced by individual level studies, mostly in American studies, the evidence for 
economic influence upon voting has tended to disintegrate (Hibbs 1982) 
Nonetheless the point remains, this type of analysis is worthy in order to fully test 
the Downsian model and its exclusion of altruistic motivations for voting choice. 
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Both academic research and public opinion have added to a revival in the self-
interest axiom. Using a model derived from personal economic expectations, 
Sanders (1991) was able to predict the outcome of the 1992 Election with 
outstanding accuracy, This feat was all the more remarkable given the context in 
which the prediction was made; the common consensus of most academics and 
pollsters alike was that 1992 represented Labour's 'golden chance', 
The popular perception of the 1992 General Election may have aided the 
resuscitation of the self-interest axiom as an explanatory variable in British voting 
studies, Throughout the Election campaign, the polls placed Labour ahead of the 
Conservative Government. On the eve of polling day, all five of the major polling 
organisations were predicting an outright Labour victory or Labour to be the 
biggest single party in a hung parliament. In the event however, the Conservatives 
were returned to power with an overall majority in the House of Commons of 21 
seats. 
The commonest explanation for this unexpected Conservative victory was the 
Conservative tactic of concentrating upon Labour's taxation plans, Thus according 
to this explanation, electors acted selfishly in voting for the lower tax burden they 
thought would be imposed by the Conservatives. The polls had predicted that the 
electorate would vote sociotropically - the 'most important issues influencing my 
vote' identified by the pre-Election polls had been the National Health Service, 
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education and unemployment - but in the privacy of the polling booth, voters had 
succumbed to the more egocentric motivations identified by Downs. 
There will be further discussion of opinion polls and the 1992 General Election in 
Britain later in this research, but the essential point here is that many 
commentators from academic writers (see for instance Crewe 1992) through to the 
politicians themselves (witness the pronouncements of leading Conservatives in 
the aftermath of their victory) felt that "pocketbook voting" had reached its zenith in 
Britain in 1992. It is worthy of note that the identical tactic of emphasising the tax 
plans of the opposition failed to save the Republican President, George Bush, from 
defeat in the US Presidential Election in the same year, The crucial point here 
must be feasibility. The reality behind the 'tax scare' of the Conservatives in Britain 
was believed by a significant number of the British public, the same tactic could not 
save an unpopular American President who had himself reneged on his 'no new 
taxes' pledge, Egocentrism may remain an important part of the electoral process 
but it continues to be only one part, sociotropism may be relegated at certain 
elections but it might have a significant role to play in the formation of voting cues, 
This leads to the second generalisation in the rational choice and econometric 
literature under challenge here, the reward-punishment axiom. 
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1.2 THE REWARD-PUNISHMENT AXIOM 
An important facet of much writing on the subject of motivations behind voting 
behaviour is the reward-punishment axiom of voting. In this model, voters reward 
governments for satisfactory performance at election time and punish governments 
which have failed to deliver sufficient results when in power. Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice (1985) categorise this as "the performance theory" where 
recent experiences, based on short-term political events, 
provide the main source of electoral change (Heath, 
Jowell and Curtice, 1985 p.159). 
Many writers have succumbed to this type of model. Fiorina (1977) suggests that 
voting can provide 
a symbolic pat on the back or kick in the pants from an 
electorate (1977; p. 604). 
Key (1964) describes the electorate as a; 
rational God of vengeance and reward (1966; p. 568), 
while Weatherford believes that 
in the most straightforward way, the vote is an expression 
of approbation or anger, intended as reward or 
punishment (1986; p. 222). 
Clearly the self-interest axiom can be fitted into the reward-punishment axiom of 
voting if it can be successfully claimed that voters base their retrospective 
judgements on how well their own self interests were satisfied by an incumbent 
government. 
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The essential problem with the reward-punishment axiom is that it displays a 
marked tendency to construct a recursive model of voting behaviour, Key (1966) 
states that 
voters may reject what they have known; or they may 
approve what they have known (1966; p, 61); 
Key does not provide for the possibility that voters may positively choose that 
which they have yet to experience, The reward-punishment axiom lends weight to 
arguments which suggest that governments are capable of losing elections rather 
than opposition parties being capable of winning elections, This view should not go 
unchallenged, however: intuitively it seems that some elections must be won by 
Opposition policies rather than by any inherent fault in the government. For 
example, accounts of the 1945 British General Election, usually concentrate on the 
alternative policies proposed by the Labour Party rather than upon the deficiencies 
of the Conservative Party which had been in power prior to the war, and had 
provided the Prime Minister of the coalition Government, Winston Churchill (See 
Morgan 1984), 
The preoccupation with government policies rather than those of the opposition is 
a legacy of the over-concentration within the reward-punishment axiom on 
retrospective evaluation on the part of the electorate, To illustrate, Fiorina's (1978) 
study of the impact of economic circumstances upon voting behaviour is typical in 
28 
Chapter I: .\'elrlnterest. Reward-Punishment. Economics & Geography 
placing great weight in the past experience of voters rather than in prospective 
feelings about their economic position. 
Nonetheless, several writers have confused the retrospective and the prospective 
in their own arguments. Hibbing and Alford (1981) claim that 
those people who felt their personal financial condition 
was on the upswing would be more likely to support the 
party in power than would those who (felt that) their 
personal financial condition was declining (1981; p. 424). 
Likewise, Fiorina (1978) assessing the 1956 US Presidential vote talks of 
those who believe they were trending upward and those 
who believe they were trending downward voting for the 
incumbent, Eisenhower, and the challenger, Stevenson, 
respectively (1978; p. 431). 
Later, Fiorina writes of individuals' 
fears of financial duress or hopes for economic prosperity 
which have not as yet altered their personal economic 
circumstances (1978; p. 435 original emphasis). 
The point here is that in both of these studies the public were alleged to be 
involved in positioning their economic circumstances on a general scale. Such a 
process cannot fail to be at least in part prospective, and the language the authors 
use betrays their stated defence of the reward-punishment axiom. 
On these grounds it may be tempting to discard the reward-punishment axiom of 
voting since the paradigm case constructs a completely rational self-interested 
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electorate which fails to match the electorate empirical research has seemingly 
uncovered. However, Heath, Jowell and Curtice (1985) believe that the reward-
punishment axiom may be used to explain short-term changes in consensual 
issues, arguing that dissensus issues such as nationalisation and defence may be 
the sources of long-term continuities of support (1985; p. 160). 
Weatherford (1986) is surely correct in his assertion that 
economic voting is at least partly motivated by prospective 
considerations (p. 236). 
At the same time, Lockerbie has provided evidence of prospective voting among 
the American electorate in a series of articles (in particular see Lockerbie 1989, 
and 1992). An escape route from the recursive nature of the reward-punishment 
axiom is provided by the image of a Janus-faced electorate portrayed by Rose and 
McAllister (1990). 
Voters can also think prospectively, considering the 
promises that parties make about their future actions. The 
party that an individual calculates will make him or her 
better off in the future will then be supported. Judgements 
about the delivery of future rewards can be tempered by a 
retrospective assessment of past performance. An 
election becomes an auction in which both parties make 
more or less credible bids for popular support (1990; p. 
34). 
It is with this type of model in mind that progress should be made. 
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Furthermore, the modern consensus of modelling party support places public 
expectations above public recollections in salience terms for predicting levels of 
government support. Price and Sanders (1993) claim that in voters' minds political 
history is discounted very quickly and that voters are more likely to be influenced in 
their electoral choice by political (and crucially economic) expectations. 
voters may take several months to assimilate what is 
happening to the economy, but they also have a short 
'memory', so that current perceptions are given much 
higher weight than quite recent events (1993; p. 333). 
This type of view is synonymous with the assessment of the role of the economy in 
the formation of public attitudes and subsequently voting behaviour. The economy 
then is the third axiom on which to concentrate. 
1.3 THE ECONOMY 
In 1978 Tufte felt confident enough to assert that the link between the electoral 
fortunes of political parties and economic fortunes were synonymous. 
When you think economics, think elections. When you 
think elections, think economics (1978; p. 65). 
The notion that the economy is of critical importance to the British electorate when 
casting votes at a General Election has certainly filtered down from academia to 
politicians and parties themselves. In 1989 Margaret Thatcher confidently asserted 
that her third Government would stand or fall on its record on dealing with inflation, 
indeed the eleven years of Thatcherism could be typified by governmental 
31 
Chap(C'r I: ,)'eIF/merest, Reward-Punishment, Economics & Geography 
attempts to reduce inflation and reap the electoral reward. More generally, Harold 
Wilson was reported to have said to the Parliamentary Labour Party that 
All political history shows that the standing of a 
government and its ability to hold the confidence of the 
electorate at a General Election depend on the success of 
its economic policy. (Cited in Goodhart & Bhansali p. 45). 
Back in the academic field, Kramer (1983) asserts that the chances of an 
incumbent governments' re-election are largely dependent upon the state of the 
economy more or less immediately prior to the election (1983; pp. 92-111). 
Fiorina's (1981) individual-level analysis of economic voting purported to illustrate 
that short-term economic conditions and popular opinion of the incumbent 
government's efficacy at managing macroeconomics cause significant effects on 
satisfaction levels with the US President's performance and ultimately on voting 
choice (1981 p 120). 
Moreover, the economy and economic well being is a 'valence issue', That is that 
the goal is universal - everyone wants the economy to be performing well, the 
question is not whether to achieve economic success but how the goal is achieved 
(Norpoth, 1992; p. 53, but see also Butler and Stokes 1969; pp. 390-1). 
Research using survey data reveals that the British public has become 
increasingly concerned with economic matters. Hibbs (1982), using Gallup data, 
shows that between 1945 and 1980, when asked to prioritise the most urgent 
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problem facing the country, the British electorate has developed a marked 
tendency to give economic issues pre-eminence over domestic, political and social 
issues concerned with international affairs and defence (1982; p. 259~O). 
An atmosphere has developed in which writers have increasingly come to assert 
that due to the loosening of the social structural base of party support and the 
undermining of partisanship as a reliable predictor of voting choice, 
the fate of parties is increasingly determined by short and 
medium term forces (Clarke and Whiteley, 1990; p. 116). 
It would seem subsequently, that economic factors could bridge this gap in the 
voting cues of the public. If voters are to gain fewer directives about whom to vote 
for from their social position and their past party allegiance, it would seem 
reasonable to assume that economic factors may perform this formative role 
instead. 
The work of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) has been viewed as a pioneering study 
of the impact of economic factors on voting behaviour. Their basic aim was to 
assess how far swings in political popularity were affected by economic 
circumstances (1970; p. 45). 
Two of their conclusions have achieved a large degree of fame - or infamy - within 
econometric circles. Firstly they claimed that in the period covered by their study, 
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1947 -68, the British public became increasingly concerned with economic 
developments, 1959 being identified as the watershed year. Secondly Goodhart 
and Bhansali claimed to be able to quantify the effects of unemployment and 
inflation upon government popularity. To this end they asserted that 
for every increase in unemployment of 10,000 the 
government loses nearly one per cent of its popular lead 
(1970; p. 63). 
Further they suggest that governments would do well to follow this advice; 
if inflation is not existent and with other things being 
equal, a governing party which allows the level of 
unemployment, seasonally adjusted, to exceed 450 
thousand six months before the election is likely to lose, 
while if it can reduce unemployment below 400 thousand 
at this time it should win (1970; p. 64). 
A similar relationship existed between inflation and government support, although 
the public pain threshold for inflation seemed much more elastic than for 
unemployment, an increase of five per cent in inflation being equal in terms of lost 
support to an increase of one per cent in unemployment. 
It should be noted that the relationships noted by Goodhart and Bhansali were 
locked into place by temporal considerations; it is certainly true that the 1983 and 
1987 elections would have been lost by the Conservative Government had the 
relationship between unemployment and government support held - indeed the 
Conservative vote would have fallen into minus numbers. Alt (1979) believes that 
the onset of stagflation in world-wide economies in the 1970s displaced many of 
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the boundaries set up by Goodhart and Bhansali (Alt, 1979; Ch 13), Whiteley 
(1986) advocates that such macroeconomic models as that of Goodhart and 
Bhansali should be adjusted in the aftermath of the 1973 Oil Shock (Whiteley, 
1986; p. 77). In retrospect it seems that the boundaries shown by Goodhart and 
Bhansali existed only because they were limits of public expectations, and public 
expectations proved more elastic than Goodhart and Bhansali could have 
imagined. In 1979, Alt argued that the boundaries of what the public would let 
political parties "get away with" would be re-drawn to keeping unemployment down 
to one million and inflation to around ten per cent (Alt, 1979; p. 273). With 
hindsight, even Alt got this wrong, overestimating the British public's tolerance 
level of inflation (witness the fall in Conservative support, expressed in the polls 
whenever inflation rose above 8-9% in the last Thatcher Government) and 
underestimated the public's ability to stomach large scale unemployment. 
A way forward in theories of economic voting may be the asymmetrical approach. 
Bloom and Price (1975) advocate the study of separate conditions of the political 
business cycle. Periods of economic growth lead to smaller rewards for incumbent 
governments than the degree of electoral punishment metered out at times of 
economic recession according to their theory. Hibbing and Alford (1981) 
differentiate between types of election in the USA, Presidential, Congressional (at 
different times) and types of incumbent (by party, length of office, etc.). They find 
that the extent of economic voting varies across types of election (1981; p. 435). 
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Sanders, Ward and Marsh (1987) assert that while "macroeconomic factors were 
at the root of Mrs Thatcher's political revival in 1982" they move away from one-
dimensional studies of the impact of unemployment and inflation per se. In their 
model important routes of economic influence on voting include personal taxation 
levels, consumer spending, interest rates and short-time working (1987; p, 313). A 
similar move in the American literature has resulted in study of real per capita 
income rather than aggregate inflation and unemployment rates (Hibbing & Alford, 
1981; Kramer, 1971). 
1.4 PERSONAL ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS 
The economic goals about which there is general agreement, are in effect hard to 
combine. As Norpoth (1992) states, full employment, stable prices, economic 
growth and a strong economy are: 
impossible to maximise simultaneously (1992; p. 54). 
Moreover Alt (1979) claims that the public sense of economic literacy enables 
them to prioritise the economic criteria involved in the trade off between these 
goals. 
Harder economic times present a set of circumstances in 
which not only are competitive parties more likely to take 
up competing positions with respect to economic 
management but individuals are also more likely to have 
an incentive to pay attention to these competing claims, 
and to adhere to positions and preferences with regard to 
economic policy,(Alt, 1979; p. 12) 
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Thus by implication the economy should have been particularly relevant in the long 
campaign leading to the 1992 General Election, as the new recession heightened 
economic sensitivity of both parties and voters, 
The financial journalist Samuel Brittan (1977) firmly placed the issue of economic 
expectations on the political agenda. Put simply, perhaps oversimply, Brittan's 
case was that politicians in their search for votes promise to solve economic 
problems which are in fact insoluble. Not unnaturally, the electorate believe these 
election promises and as a consequence the public hold exaggerated views of 
what they can personally achieve economically over the short-term. 
Brittan's pessimism about the role of the public in the development of their 
personal economic expectations is not borne out by empirical work. Primarily 
Brittan's view of the 1970's economy was a snapshot of British expectations, and 
as such it failed to capture the dynamics of societal change. Brittan failed to see 
the gap between expectations and performance as self-correcting, whereas 
empirical evidence would seem to credit the public with a heightened sense of 
scepticism than Brittan could have noticed. Alt (1979), using data from both 1974 
elections in Britain, shows that the electorate tend to view wild election promises 
as part and parcel of the robust nature of politics. He argues that with improved 
education on economic matters, the electorate develops more realistic views on 
what is actually possible and urges commentators to note 
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the tendency for the popular sense of well-being to move 
closely with changes in the country's economy, and the 
probability that expectations of improvement were finite 
and declined rather than increased as things actually got 
better (1979; p, 265), 
In truth, when parties are guilty of promising to deliver the impossible, the chances 
are that the electorate will not believe them. Downsian theory pointed out that 
competing parties need to be reasonable in their offers since the voting public 
would soon learn not to trust unsustainable promises. In 1974, three-quarters of 
the electorate in Britain thought that inflation was an insoluble problem, no matter 
which party was in power. Himmelweit, Humphreys and Jaeger (1981) report the 
existence of "limits of inability" and noted widescale voter scepticism about the 
capability of any party to implement consensual policies such as arresting the rise 
in unemployment, managing to keep inflation low, holding down mortgage rates 
and increasing the efficiency of British industry (1981; p. 108). The work of Sarlvik 
and Crewe (1983) on the 1970s revealed a similar reluctance on the part of voters 
to believe the wildest claims of political parties. Even voters' confidence in their 
own party's ability to settle the problems of strikes, unemployment and inflation 
was "tellingly qualified" (1983; p. 157). 
All of this evidence from British psephology would seem to support Fiorina's (1981 ) 
assertion that the American electorate acquired sophisticated skills when listening 
to political parties. 
Citizens are not fools. Having often observed political 
equivocation, if not outright lying, should they listen 
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carefully to campaign promises? Having heard the 
economic, educational, sociological, defence, and foreign 
policy expert advisors disagree on both the effects of past 
policies and the prospect of future ones, should they pay 
close attention to policy debates? (1981; p. 5). 
As Alt has pointed out, Brittan confused desires, demands and expectations (1979; 
p. 265). By making much of the popular desire to raise personal living standards by 
one-fifth, Brittan assumed that this outcome is thought feasible by those 
respondents who merely reported it as desirable. The pay claims of the trade 
unions should be judged in the same light. Almost invariably the Unions accept 
settlements lower than their demands simply because their expectations do not, as 
Brittan seemed to think, equal their demands. 
At this stage there has been no break with the self-interest axiom identified by 
Calhoun since voters may be personally affected by the impact of economic forces 
such as increase in unemployment, inflation and mortgage rates. Furthermore, it 
would be pertinent to acknowledge that the impact of economic hardship is seldom 
distributed evenly throughout society. Much has been made of the uneven 
distribution of economic displacement suffered during times of unemployment as 
particular social classes are particularly prone to routine periods of unemployment 
in conjunction with the pOlitical business cycle (see Hibbs 1982). 
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Among others to have commented on the uneven dislocation caused by economic 
crises, Weatherford (1986) has commented on the particular hardship caused to 
the working class coinciding with downturns in the political business cycle. 
In recession, blue-collar workers are more likely than the 
overall national average to lose their jobs or to be placed 
on shortened hours, while middle class losses of 
employment and real income at the trough of the cycle are 
below those of the population as a whole. Similarly, 
working class occupations tend to recover more slowly 
and to make smaller new gains as the national economy 
rises toward its next cyclical peak (1986; p. 230). 
Certain writers obviously believe that economic well-being is the crucial factor in 
determining levels of government support, and that parties are themselves aware 
of the resultant need to "produce the goods" for the electorate. Clarke and 
Whiteley (1990) claim that their study of macroeconomic influences on party 
support revealed a significant impact of inflation and unemployment rates upon 
Conservative popularity between 1983 and 1987. They claim, that 
increases in both prices and joblessness were negatively 
associated with support for the governing party that had 
long made the battle against inflation its top 
macroeconomic pol icy priority (1990; p. 116). 
Additionally, some writers have claimed that government may take advantage of 
their privileged position of power and attempt to manipulate the economy in order 
to precipitate electoral victories. To this end Miller et a/ (1990) claim that the build-
up to a General Election is now split into two stages, the more orthodox traditional 
campaign during which parties openly compete for the public's favours and the 
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"long-campaign" - an ambiguous length of time during which the government uses 
its unique position of power in order to garner support in a distant election. Clarke 
and Whiteley (1990) feel that there is strong evidence to suggest that the 1983-87 
Conservative Government "manipulated the Money Supply in order to bolster its 
popularity" during such a long campaign, They suggest that; 
In early 1986 the government began a rapid inflation of 
the Money Supply. Assuming that Tory strategists 
accepted the proposition that a reflated economy and the 
political beliefs thereof are lagged functions of 
macroeconomic policy, it is reasonable to conclude that 
they used monetary policy to initiate their 1987 election 
campaign months before voters went to the polls (1990; 
pp, 116-7), 
Any attempt to gauge the impact of public perceptions towards the economy must 
pay a large debt of thanks to the work of Sanders, Ward and Marsh. In a series of 
articles, Sanders et al have illustrated the potential impact upon political support 
for parties of personal economic expectations. This marked a distinct departure 
from the reward-punishment axiom of voting behaviour, which threatened to 
achieve hegemonic status in psephological studies concerned with the public's 
economic attitudes, since Sanders et al offered the proposition that prospective 
attitudes could be just as important to the study of party support as retrospective 
attitudes. 
In an attempt to show that the Falklands War had a much lesser role in the 1983 
election victory of the Conservative Government, than had commonly been 
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supposed by commentators and psephologists alike, Sanders, Ward and Marsh 
(1987) identified the critical variable of personal economic expectations in 
determining levels of government support. Since the publication of this work, they 
have backtracked slightly on the direct influence of the Falklands War. 
Nevertheless the dye had been cast and the issue of personal economic 
expectations was firmly on the agenda for future research. 
Although previously he had found only a weak connection between personal 
economic circumstances and voting patterns at the individual level in the USA, 
Fiorina (1981) later claimed to show that personally experienced or perceived 
economic effects have indirect impact upon voting choice (1981; pp 73-101). A 
crucial aspect of the work of Sanders, Ward and Marsh was that it followed this 
line of prospective personal economic attitudes and permitted a model to be 
constructed using public perceptions. Primarily they ascribed a positive correlation 
between personal economic expectations and government support - if expectations 
rise so does government popularity. They assert that objective economic 
conditions give rise to subjective perceptions of the economic reality which in turn 
affect the readiness of the public to vote for the government (1987; p. 292). 
Furthermore, rather than relying on the more usual economic factors such as 
unemployment and inflation, Sanders, Ward and Marsh utilised more diverse 
surrogates of economic activity whereby government popularity could be affected 
by economic forces such as taxation, consumer spending, interest rates, and 
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working hours, through the proxy of personal economic expectations (1987; p. 
313). 
Clarke and Whiteley (1990) seem to have taken up the challenge, in their study of 
Conservative Government support during the 1983-87 period. Clarke and Whiteley 
concede that personal economic expectations consistently hold more salience in 
determining voters' support for an incumbent government, than political shocks in 
the shape of ongoing political events. Sanders, Ward and Marsh (1987) denies the 
long-term Falklands Factor which was often heralded as the underlying reason for 
Conservative success in 1983, Marsh, Ward, Sanders and Price (1992) profess to 
show the lack of electoral impact of the 1984 Miners' Strike. In the same period, 
Clarke and Whiteley control for two political events, the US bombing of Libya in 
1986 and the attempted assassination of the Thatcher Cabinet by the IRA in 
October 1984. The Libya and Brighton bombings had opposite effects, the former 
detracting from government support, the latter adding to it, but the crucial aspect of 
their effects is equally true of them both - their distinct lack of longevity, both being 
of essentially short-term salience in determining levels of government support. 
Here the pOint must be hammered home, in three different studies of incumbent 
government support in the 1980s, four of the most major political events of that 
time, the Falklands War, the Miners' Strike, the US Bombing of Libya and the 
Brighton Bombing all had less electoral impact than the public's personal economic 
expectations (however see Norpoth, 1987; and Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley, 
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1990; for accounts which propose alternative models). Moreover the personal 
expectations model successfully predicted (Sanders, 1991) and retrospectively 
justified (Sanders 1992, 1993) the outcome of the 1992 British General Election. 
A central theme of this thesis will be that the impact of political shocks has to be 
measured in tandem with economic attitudes. Studies of the Thatcher era in British 
politics claimed - time after time - that the economic had primacy in the tension 
between political shocks and economic attitudes; this thesis will attempt to verify 
this examination and then to replicate it in the post-Thatcher era. Moreover the 
most obvious political shock which should be studied in this debate is the fall of 
Mrs Thatcher and the succession of John Major to the British Premiership. Hence 
this will remain a key focal point of the analysis of the thesis. 
Typical opinion poll and survey questions which measure retrospective and 
prospective values include:-
"Overall, how much success do you think the Government has 
had over the past 12 years in tackling Britain's long-term 
economic problems?" (NOPINewsnight March 1991). 
"Looking ahead over the next year, do you think Britain's general 
industrial performance will improve a lot, improve a little, 
stay much the same, decline a little, or decline a lot?" 
(British Social Attitudes 1983). 
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1.5 THE GEOGRAPHIC DIMENSION 
A Janus-faced electorate capable of expressing sociotropic tendencies, and 
primarily concerned with economic perceptions is not the complete story however. 
Indeed it is the contention here that no picture of electoral behaviour could be 
viewed as complete without considerable attention to regional variation. 
Weatherford (1986) would seem to concur as he believes that 
the connection between real economic variables and 
election outcomes might be seen more clearly if 
communities or electoral districts with widely varying 
economic histories could be isolated and contrasted 
(1986; p. 229). 
While Harrop, Heath and Openshaw (1992) report that 
knowing peoples' addresses tells us at least as much 
about how s/he will vote as finding out his or her class or 
tenure. Electorally you are where you live (1992; p. 105). 
In Britain, Curtice and Steed (1982) identified an important change in the relative 
strength of the main parties and the development of two electoral cleavages; a 
North-South cleavage and an urban-rural cleavage. The significant feature of 
these cleavages is that their context is spatial. Curtice and Steed claim that the 
North-South cleavage began to emerge between the 1955 and 1959 elections, and 
the urban-rural cleavage gained its force between the 1959 and 1964 contests 
(1982; p. 256 see also Steed 1986). 
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Curtice and Steed concluded that these cleavages had emerged because of three 
trends: a change in distribution of social and economic characteristics of the 
electorate; the differential behaviour of voters of the same social group according 
to location; and the political impact of third parties. Furthermore Curtice and Steed 
saw no reason to predict the imminent demise of any of these contributory factors 
towards spatial cleavages (1982; p. 266). 
There seems to be a particularly relevant tie-in between economic perceptions and 
regional variation. Weatherford (1986) acknowledges that 
economic voting is conditioned by the social context in 
which it takes place ... The immediate geographic area 
provides the voter with one important source of 
information and opinion relevant to evaluating incumbent 
economic policy. The state of the local economy is known 
largely from direct personal experience ... contextual effects 
influence a number of political attitudes and behaviours 
including the public evaluation of macroeconomic policy 
(1986, p. 255). 
Moreover electoral geography accounts have shown that public perceptions of 
economic circumstances will differ according to geographic location - even after 
other contextual criteria have been controlled for (see for example Johnston, Pattie 
and Allsopp, 1988; Johnston and Pattie 1989a - but compare to Rose and 
McAllister 1990, McAllister and Studlar 1992). There is strong evidence for an 
autonomous geographic cleavage in the British electorate. 
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It can be extrapolated from this that if economic conditions have a variable impact 
upon social classes and as a result re-shape policy preferences among particular 
classes, then if certain economic factors were to have a variable impact upon 
different regions the result might be to re-shape policy preferences among 
particular regions. 
Marsh et al (1992) identify a separate part of this uneven dislocation, Not only can 
certain social classes suffer disproportionately in times of recession, but a spatial 
dimension may also be evident. They assert that 
it is quite plausible that, if unemployment has an effect on 
either government popularity or personal expectations, it 
is local or regional rather than aggregate national 
unemployment that is important (1992; p. 96). 
According to Alt (1979), the uneven economic dislocation caused by 
unemployment led to an uneven distribution of concern for the problems of 
unemployment in the 1970s (1979; p. 271). In times of austerity, Alt asserts that 
the public internalise their economic expectations to a greater degree than in times 
of economic prosperity. 
It appears that people have to feel well off before they can 
be persuaded to be generous towards others in their 
social outlook (1979; p. 272). 
But here he is wide of the mark. If this case were to hold, why are the super-rich 
sections of society not shown by empirical research to be the super-
compassionate sections of society? Moreover, studies of the impact of 
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Thatcherism upon Britain have shown that the region which prospered the most 
from Thatcherite policies in the 1980s - the South of England - did not develop a 
particularly caring character which set it apart from the rest of the UK. Indeed 
regions which were marginalised under Thatcherism seem to have undergone a 
communal socialisation exhibiting greater concern for the problems besetting the 
region, even among social classes which are relatively unaffected by the problems 
affecting the region as a whole (Johnston & Pattie 1990b). 
Further to this point, much can be made of regional analysis, especially if attention 
is paid to disaggregated data. In particular, although the inflation rate is a national 
constant (even though surrogates for inflationary pressure such as housing prices 
are not), rates of economic growth and unemployment are liable to vary 
dramatically from region to region. To this end Weatherford (1986) is optimistic 
about the way forward for political research; 
Research on contextual effects, social networks, and the 
interpersonal processes of political influence are 
especially promising of new insights into issue voting 
(1986; p. 257). 
In a comprehensive study of the electoral map of Britain, Johnston, Pattie and 
Allsopp (1988) report that in the 1983 and 1987 elections, economic optimism was 
associated with Conservative voting (that is, incumbent support) but that this 
statement should be qualified by reference to regional impact. For example by 
1987, the economically optimistic were increasingly likely to support Labour in 
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London, Urban Northern and Scottish and Welsh constituencies but remained 
loyal Conservatives in the South and the Midlands (1988; p. 254). 
Further to this point, in 1979 on the evaluation of a Labour government, relatively 
few of those respondents who described themselves as economically optimistic 
were prepared to exhibit incumbent party support in their voting choice. In the 
South of England, the opposition Conservative Party even managed to gain a 
plurality of votes among such a section of the electorate. As Johnston, Pattie and 
Allsopp report 
even when economic evaluations were held constant, 
substantial regional variations in voting patterns remained 
(1988; p. 254). 
The point here is that it is beginning to become clear how electoral geography and 
spatial location is worthy of study in itself, and as an input to voting direction 
should become a critical part of the model to explain party choice at an election. 
In 1983 although the Conservative Government received widespread support 
among those respondents who felt they had benefited under Thatcherism, the 
party fared markedly better in the South and in London than elsewhere in Britain. 
In 1987 although a shift away from the broad base of Conservative support was 
evident, a regional dimension remained. 
Less than half the optimists voted Conservative (in 
London, the urban North and in Scotland and Wales), and 
in all three of (these regions) Labour out-polled the 
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incumbent party of government among those whose 
situations had remained unaltered (1988; pp. 254-55). 
Economic viewpoints failed to account for a significant degree of variance in voting 
patterns. By way of contrast, region managed to bridge much of this gap. Even 
when the effects of class were controlled for Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp reveal a 
large and growing spatial variation in voting patterns in Britain (1988; Ch 6). 
In conclusion, recent work in mainstream political geography has shown that in the 
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s there was a marked discontinuity in the 
economic development of the UK (Harvey 1982; Smith 1984; Massey 1984; Martin 
1988). For example the parts of the country which suffered the least from the 
recession of the early 1980s were the first and the main beneficiaries of the 
economic upturn in the late 1980s (Pattie and Johnston 1990a). In short there was 
a spatial variation in the economic development of the UK. Further this has fed into 
spatial variation in voting patterns and attitudinal structures. The South of England 
which in relative terms prospered under the first wave of Thatcherism became 
almost a hot-bed of pro-Thatcherite sentiment and, even when class and various 
other factors were controlled for, showed a disproportionate tendency to vote 
Conservative as a result. The North of England and the Celtic fringe, which 
suffered disproportionately during the years of the Thatcher Governments, proved 
more resilient to Thatcherite values and became more likely to vote for non-
Conservative parties at election times, other things being equal. 
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Additionally the dynamics of the new recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
brought with them a 'new geography', as the South was hit the hardest of all the 
regions by the downturn in the service sector of the economy. Labour made 
inroads into the Conservative vote in the 1992 Election (although often less 
marked than expected - or sufficient to win seats). Conversely the Conservative 
vote rallied in its hitherto weakest areas such as Scotland, where the economic 
dislocation caused by the new recession, had had relatively little impact. 
Further ground can be made here by returning to the merger between sociotropic 
and egocentric values. Many writers have commented on the uneven impact of 
certain issues across social classes. It is often claimed that unemployment in 
particular causes variable economic dislocation across social classes and leads to 
an uneven distribution of concern for the issue of unemployment as a result. In 
times of austerity the public are often said to internalise their economic perceptions 
to a greater degree and hence it could be expected that only those sections of the 
public with the most precarious job security prospects would be unduly concerned 
by the problem of unemployment (Alt 1979; Hibbs 1981). The implication is that 
only those directly threatened by the imposition of increased joblessness will 
heighten their sensitivity to the issue. Unemployment will only be an important 
issue to those voters directly affected or threatened by it. 
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This highly egocentric account can be improved if the overlap between sectional 
and universal interests is better perceived. Crucially the introdudion of a 
geographic perspective would considerably aid the operation to clear the muddy 
waters. Primarily it should be re-iterated that sectional class interests may be 
overridden by perceptions of regional development; for example, the petit-
bourgeoisie of economically depressed regions may come to realise that their 
sectional interests in conservative social and economic attitudes are irrelevant if 
their business interests require a greater degree of general prosperity than is 
actually present in the region. Hence sectional interests may prove secondary to a 
more general geographic consideration as a class-regional alliance is formed (see 
Harrop 1981?? ?S). Furthermore, even if the egocentric bias inherent in this 
argument is accepted, a more geographic slant may aid understanding. If 
unemployment has an uneven impact according to social class then the economic 
development of the 1980s shows that unemployment also has an uneven impact 
according to region. If the economic incidence of unemployment has a variable 
impact upon social classes and as a result reshapes policy preferences among 
those affected classes then certain economic factors with a variable impact across 
regions might result in the re-shaping of policy preferences among respondents in 
affected regions. Voters in areas characterised by high levels of unemployment 
may be more inclined to consider unemployment an important issue in deciding 
how to vote than their cohorts from areas characterised by low levels of 
unemployment, regardless of their individual job security. 
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If prospective values are important and economic realities suggest that there is a 
significant spatial variation in economic performance which is replicated in public 
attitudes and voting intentions, then it would be reasonable to expect spatial 
variation in the prospective judgements of electors subject to regional identities. It 
could be predicted that respondents living in regions where economic development 
has been relatively favourable would be more optimistic than respondents from 
economically depressed regions, even when other factors such as class, age and 
gender are controlled for. In this light it would be expected that respondents in the 
South of England would be more optimistic about their future under the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s, and this optimism would be diluted in the 
North of England and in Scotland and Wales. 
Meanwhile the new recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s would see the 
fracture of this North-South divide; since the downturn in the economy hit the 
Conservative heartlands in the South harder than the Labour heartlands in the 
North and the Celtic regions. It would be expected that the Conservative vote and 
the level of economic optimism in the South would be atrophied by the new 
economic reality. Conversely Labour would find it hard to improve on its 1987 
position in its heartlands where the relative impact of the new recession was 
reduced. 
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1 ,6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Political parties, academics and the public alike are convinced of the importance of 
economics in popular voting choice. Academic interest in the economy's effect 
upon electoral behaviour was stimulated by the apparent failure of sociological and 
psychological models of voting, and a desire to bridge the theory gap. Seminal but 
essentially unrefined work was witnessed, and its progress traced into the very 
sophisticated but controversial, econometric modelling of today, all of which aims 
to locate the position of the economic in the voting process. 
A particularly important facet of this is economic perceptions. Expectations about 
the economic future have been on the political agenda since the 19705 in Britain 
but recent work has revitalised it as a salient issue in psephology. It would appear 
that governments seem to acknowledge the importance of public perceptions of 
the economy, and it was noted that some authors are convinced that the 
government manipulates the economy to its own advantage, using the political 
business cycle and the advantages of incumbency throughout the long campaign. 
It has been argued that a new model of voting should account for the role of 
perceptions of economic progress and expectations for the future. 
In the discussion of the self-interest axiom, outlined earlier the inherent selfishness 
adopted by Downsian modelling of democracy and voting was encountered. 
Authors with a chance to set a new agenda in psephology have often failed to 
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progress because of their reluctance to challenge this model. A long overdue 
challenge to the selfish actor paradigm has now been launched however, in the 
form of sociotropic voting theories. 
Inherent in most rational choice models of voting (including Downsian modelling) is 
the reward-punishment axiom. As pOinted out earlier, the essential problem with 
this is that the axiom tries to explain a non-recursive activity in recursive terms. 
Furthermore, it has been noted that accounts from within the reward-punishment 
axiom have often fallen due to contextual error, their authors all too easily slipping 
outside the framework of the retrospective voter. There is an obvious need for a 
synthesised model which does not destroy the Downsian self-interest axiom or the 
reward-punishment axiom but replaces them with the possibility of an altruistic and 
forward thinking electorate. 
Finally, a revitalised part of political theory was discussed, one which now looms 
large in any discussion of the way forward for mainstream electoral behaviour 
studies, the spatial context. The apparent demise of the old cleavage systems in 
providing cues for voters in the electoral process, has led to a search for new 
cleavages, and a return to older theories such as the neighbourhood effect. With a 
particular affinity to the economic dimension in the literature, and with a firm part to 
play in any future research using disaggregated data, it is clear that spatial 
variation accounts for some part of the process of determining who votes and for 
55 
('Iwple/" I: ,""ell~/ntereSl, Rell'a/"cI-Punis/lll1enf. Econolllics & Geography 
whom. Determining the exact nature of this role is the next task of electoral 
geography. The five themes of this chapter form the basis for the discussion in the 
remainder of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Setting the Context of Research 
The 1980s and early 1990s were critical periods in recent British economic and 
electoral history. The 1980s saw the first recession of the Thatcher era, and the 
Lawson boom towards the end of the decade: This was followed - at the turn of 
the decade - by the overheating of the economy and the second recession of 
the Thatcher era. Electorally this period saw the Conservatives maintain their 
grip on power - winning elections in 1983, 1987 and 1992, although Mrs 
Thatcher had been disposed of before the 1992 victory. The 1980s saw a 
widening gulf in the regional patterns of party support; but this gulf narrowed 
slightly by 1992 in the teeth of the new recession. Crucially these events had 
differential impacts upon different parts of the country, and this chapter 
stresses the importance of the geographic context for an understanding of the 
political and economic events during this time. The contention here is that 
where an individual lived had an autonomous influence on the construction of 
his or her own economic attitudes and subsequently voting behaviour. 
This chapter seeks to locate the geographic context of electoral behaviour in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Its premier task is to specify a theoretical model 
which will form the basis for the empirical research reported in later chapters. It 
achieves this by constructing a full model of the relationship between class, 
geography , economic attitudes and party support, and a half stage model 
which hypothesises about the relationship between class geography and 
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economic attitudes. It also provides testable hypotheses which are used in the 
subsequent analysis chapters. 
Whereas the previous chapter set the parameters which guide this research - the 
self-interest axiom, the reward-punishment axiom, the economy, personal 
economic expectations and the geographic dimension - the purpose of this chapter 
is to secure the place of the geographic dimension at the heart of this thesis. The 
intention is to show that the geographic dimension holds together the central 
notions of class and voting and the construction of attitudinal beliefs in the 1980s 
and the 1990s. As such it is essential that an understanding of voting behaviour in 
this period takes account of the geographic variation in both voting behaviour and 
in the attitudes which help form voting trends. 
This procedure involves the separation of the original model into two stages - the 
full model which assesses impact of class, economic attitudes and geography upon 
vote patterns or partisanship, and the half-stage model which examines the impact 
of class and geography upon the formation of economic attitudes. These are the 
models that are scrutinised in the following four results chapters of this thesis. 
The connections between class and economic issue voting and between 
geography and the economic context of the 1980s and 1990s are discussed. The 
purpose here was to identify that during this period, the role of the economy was 
critical in understanding the political environment of the period and that the spatial 
unevenness of the economy resulted in a particular geographic skew to the 
58 
Chapter 2: Setting the Context of Research 
political context of voting behaviour in the 1980s and early 1990s. This requires 
discussion of attitudes and geography, compositional and contextual effects, and 
the competing themes of geographic milieux and a lifetime learning model. 
The background to this research is laid by a discussion of the political environment 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Crucially this involves the changing geography of the 
1980s boom and the 1990s recession. This discussion enables the formal 
composition of a set of hypotheses which forms the core of the thesis. Critically it 
shows that the propensity of an area to be identified with support for or hostility to a 
particular party may alter according to the economic reality of the time. 
This chapter discusses the data and methods used for operationalising the model. 
Two distinct time periods have been examined by using two distinct data sources; 
survey data for the annual inspection of sociotropic and egocentric attitudes 
between 1983 and 1989, and poll data for the more detailed inspection of changes 
in personal economic expectations in the run up to the 1992 General Election. A 
critical feature of these sets of data was how they could be used to measure social 
class and geographic variation. 
The first task of this chapter is to show how the link between economic attitudes 
and voting behaviour have been forged in recent elections- via the reward-
punishment axiom (or in popular terms via the 'feel good factor'). 
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2.1 THE HISTORICAL LINK BETWEEN THE 'FEEL GOOD FACTOR' AND 
VOTING BEHAVIOUR 
Much political wisdom centres on the need for Governments to reap the benefit 
of the 'feel good factor'. Accordingly, electorates that feel good about their 
economic circumstances are supposed to return incumbent Governments, 
those who feel bad are inclined to 'throw the rascals out'. The major task facing 
any Government therefore is to manufacture a sufficiently large 'feel good 
factor' in order to ensure their re-election. This simplistic feature of the reward-
punishment axiom withstands historical investigation. 
The percentages in Table 2.1 are derived from the British Election Study series 
of surveys. They show that voters' partisanship at three General Elections -
1979, 1983 and 1987 - were closely associated with their economic attitudes. 
In each election those respondents who claimed to have voted for the 
incumbent party were more likely to 'feel good' about their personal economic 
circumstances over the past year than were supporters of the main opposition 
party. In 1979 enough voters felt unhappy with the ability of the Labour 
Government to deliver economic prosperity to ensure a Conservative majority 
(for discussions of the 1979 Election see Norpoth 1993, Whiteley 1983). In 
1983 and 1987 the Conservative Government managed to keep enough of the 
electorate happy and were returned to power with very comfortably majorities. 
The important point here may be that the feel good factor only works in the 
expected fashion if the electorate is willing to praise or blame the Government 
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for the delivery of economic prosperity or austerity - and that the Opposition is 
a viable alternative Government. Labour certainly suffered from a deficit of 
public faith in the 1983 Election under Michael Foot (see Butler & Kavanagh 
1983, Heath et al 1985, Shaw 1994), and a campaign against Neil Kinnock and 
his shadow treasury team led by John Smith was mounted in 1992 (see Butler 
& Kavanagh 1992, Scammell 1995; p.265-7), although the effect of this 
campaign in 1992 was indeterminate. A more fundamental step in the reward-
punishment axiom is responsibility; before the electorate can punish a 
Government which presides over economic failure, it must first apportion blame 
for failure to the Government. This thesis presents evidence to suggest that 
large sections of the electorate failed to punish the Conservatives in the run up 
to the 1992 Election because they did not hold the Government sufficiently 
responsible for the recession. 
Table 2.1: Reported Vote at General Elections by Perceptions of Personal Economic 
Circumstances over the Previous Twelve Months 
Vote Lot Better Little Bette Same Little Wors Lot Worse 
1979 
Con 22 24 30 39 45 
Lbr 50 45 35 23 18 
1983 
Con 72 60 45 23 10 
Lbr 09 12 21 37 48 
1987 
Con 63 51 35 15 08 
Lbr 09 18 31 50 55 
Source: Crewe, Day & Fox 1991 
One of the main challenges of this chapter is to ascertain whether the reward-
punishment axiom continued to be a fruitful explanation of partisanship and 
Government support in the 'long campaign' leading up to the 1992 General 
Election. 
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For four General Elections from February 1974 until 1983, British Election 
Study respondents were asked to assess their evaluations of personal living 
standards over the next twelve months. Responses fell into three categories, 
pessimists who felt that their own living standards would fall behind prices, 
neutrals who felt that their living standards would keep up with prices, and 
optimists who felt that their living standards would rise more than prices. 
There were a number of problems with this set of questions that eventually led 
to their discontinuation in the 1987 British Election Study. Firstly they confused 
the issue of economic optimism and pessimism with the contentious issue of 
inflation. Chapters 3 and 4 shows that questions which require respondents to 
gauge inflation levels often result in universal levels of pessimism. In the period 
of super-inflation sparked by the 1973 Oil Crisis, this could have seriously 
contaminated the data. Secondly asking prospective questions after the 
incidence of an Election is liable to open up the possibility that the data 
measures partisanship rather than optimism or pessimism. Advocates of the 
winning party are liable to be more optimistic after the Election than those who 
voted for the losing party. 
This explains the conundrum in Table 2.2 which appears to show that 
pessimists were more likely to vote for the Government in 1979 than in other 
elections, and were more prone to support the Government than economic 
optimists. However, it is important to bear in mind that this question was posed 
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after the election - not during the campaign. Once the alternation of power was 
accounted for, the evaluations of personal living standards are closely 
associated with voting behaviour; those who felt good tended to support the 
party in power, those who felt bad tended to support their main opposition. 
Table 2.2: Evaluations of Personal Standard of Living over the Next Twelve Months by 
Reported Vote at General Elections 1974 - 1983 
Feb 1974 Oct 1974 1979 1983 
Own Living Standards Will Con Lbr Con Lbr Con Lbr Con Lbr 
Fall Behind Prices 47 43 61 52 49 72 30 67 
Keep up with Prices 46 52 36 43 44 24 58 27 
Rise More than Prices 08 05 03 05 07 04 12 06 
Source: Crewe, Day & Fox 1991 
It is now necessary to examine retrospective economic attitudes. The example 
to be used here required respondents drawn from the General Elections of 
October 1974, 1979 and 1983 to assess how their standard of living changed 
over the last year in relation to changes in prices. 
Table 2.3: Evaluations of Personal Standard of Living over the Previous Twelve Months by 
Reported Vote at General Elections 1974 - 1983 
Oct 1974 1979 1983 
Own Living Standards Have Con Lbr Con Lbr Con Lbr 
Fallen Behind Prices 53 49 60 59 36 66 
Kept up with Prices 42 45 34 34 54 29 
Risen More than Prices 05 06 06 07 11 05 
Source: Crewe, Day & Fox 1991 
There was virtually no difference in the ability of the two main parties to garner 
support from economic optimists and pessimists in October 1974 and 1979 
(Table 2.3). In 1983 however, as Labour support haemorrhaged, they drew 
much more support from the 'feel bad' electors and the Conservatives 
benefitted from the 'feel good factor'. It might be said that the 1983 contest 
represented an electoral watershed - the beginning of strong egocentric voting 
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patterns. The next five years provide the focus for the research into the years 
of economic recovery in Chapters 3 and 4. 
This section has shown that, at the rudimentary level at least, a recent link 
between voters' choice and the extent of the 'feel good factor' was forged. A 
core theme of the empirical research here will be concerned with identifying 
this link throughout the 1983-9 recovery and the 1990-92 recession. It will seek 
to do this through the concepts of class and geography. 
2.2 CLASS AND ECONOMICS 
2.2.1 DEALlGNMENT AND THE RISE OF ECONOMIC ISSUE VOTING 
The concept of class has dominated British psephology. The epitome of this 
domination is provided by Pulzer (1967; p. 68) who claimed that the study of British 
politics was essentially the study of class, all else being "embellishment and 
detail". 
Nevertheless, by the elections of the 1970s, it became clear that the Simplistic 
notion of the divide between the manual and non-manual sections of the electorate 
had lost a large degree of its explanatory force. 
None of the major occupational groups now provide the 
same degree of solid and consistent support for one of the 
two major parties as was the case in the earlier post-war 
era (Sarlvik & Crewe 1983; p. 32). 
More recently Franklin (1985; p. 104) hypothesised that 
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class voting goes up when Labour does well, and down 
when it does poorly. 
This would imply that as the period 1964-83 was a period of Labour decline (their 
electoral victories in 1966 and 1974 notwithstanding), it was also reflected in a 
decreasing class cleavage. Labour's partial recovery in 1987 and 1992 might have 
been reflected by a re-emergence of the class basis of voting, but the nature of this 
recovery - in Labour's traditional heartlands in 1987, and the geographic disparity 
therein - was only cold comfort for both Labour and the class voting theorists, while 
Labour made inroads into the Midlands vote in 1992 but failed to make sufficient 
gains in the South. 
Opponents of the dealignment thesis have stressed that a change in the 
sociological nature of modern SOCiety rendered the old meaning of class obsolete. 
Moreover, once class has been satisfactorily redefined, the artefact of class 
dealignment disappears. They have countered that although the importance of 
class in providing individuals with voting cues has changed over time, the pattern 
of this change has not been straightforward, Rather than class dealignment they 
suggest that the salience of class in determining voting patterns is one of 
"trend less fluctuation" (Heath et a/1987). 
Heath et a/ created widespread controversy with the publication of How Britain 
Votes (1985), Amid a flurry of activity in the discussion pages of political science 
journals, the focal point of this controversy was the contention of Heath et a/ that 
class dealignment was not evident in the British electorate (see Crewe 1986, 
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Heath et a/ 1987, Dunleavy 1987). After a degree of backtracking and the 
publication of a new set of absolute voting figures, Heath et a/ (1987) interpreted 
their analysis as revealing no overall trend in the incidence of class voting between 
1964 and 1983. Further they claimed that if dealignment had occurred in the 
electorate Sarlvik and Crewe (1983) and Robertson (1984) were incorrect to 
concentrate on this process in the working class; there was no evidence to suggest 
that dealignment affected anyone class more than any another. That is while a 
decline in absolute class voting had occurred (due to a real sociological change in 
the nature of class) there was no evidence to suggest a decline in relative class 
voting - those who remained in the new, much smaller, working class were still 
likely to support Labour. 
Although Weakliem (1989) has broadly supported the case made by Heath et ai, 
claiming that the association between class and party declined between 1964 and 
1970 but remained relatively constant afterwards, other independent empirical 
studies of this debate tend to conclude that the actual pattern of the importance of 
class in the construction of voting and attitudinal cleavages has more in common 
with the dealignment theory than with trendless fluctuation (see for example 
Johnston, Pattie and Russell 1992). 
Support for the thesis that class voting was in decline was provided by an in-depth 
study of the impact of class upon the British electorate by Franklin (1985). He 
concluded that class could no longer be regarded as the primary motivational force 
in determining British electoral behaviour. Moreover this motivational feature had 
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been assumed by the rise in issue voting. Hence voters form values about issues 
that are constantly updated in changing social, political and economic 
circumstances. Dunleavy became associated with the argument that a 
consumption cleavage was replacing class as the primary motivation in British 
voting behaviour (Dunleavy, 1979, 1980, 1987, Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985). 
The point here is that if class has declined in importance in structuring voting 
patterns, then some other cue must have filled the vacuum left by that decline in 
class voting. If one variable has lost salience in the equation of which party an 
individual should support, then an alternative variable may have increased in 
relative importance in the same equation. 
Heath et a/ (1985), Robertson (1984) and Scarbrough (1984) have all explored the 
attitudinal structure of the British electorate and its impact upon voting behaviour. 
Heath et al clearly established a connection between attitudes and votes, 
concluding that each party drew from a "heartland" of support situated along two 
sets of axes - the libertarian-authoritarian and the left-right. 
While Rose and McAllister (1986) argued that attitudes accounted for a quarter of 
the variance associated with voting patterns, Johnston and Pattie (1988a), using 
discriminant analysis, demonstrated that it was possible to predict voting patterns 
based upon knowledge of electors' attitudes. 
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This interest in attitudes as a means to predicting electoral behaviour and as an 
end in themselves results in the virtual interchangeability between the themes of 
vote and attitudinal structure. It is the contention here that the critical issue in 
forming attitudinal structures and influencing voting patterns is public attitudes to 
the economy. 
It is important to note that while the impact of class on voting behaviour may have 
declined - and that this decline may have precipitated a rise in economic issue 
voting - class still provides an essential cue in the construction of voting patterns. 
The aim of this research then, is to augment class voting rather than replace it. 
2.3 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT 
If class dealignment has occurred, or even if as Heath et al believe the impact of 
class upon voting patterns is uncertain, then the context in which voters formulate 
attitudes and cast votes becomes vital. 
The dealignment thesis suggests that people have a 
clearly defined set of political attitudes, but that which 
party they vote for is no longer so clearly determined by 
those attitudes as was the case in the past. Instead they 
evaluate each party, its policies and its leaders, in the 
context of their attitudes and their interpretation of 
contemporary circumstances. Those contemporary 
circumstances may be spatially variable, and so produce 
spatially varying evaluations and voting (Johnston, Pattie 
& Allsop 1988; p. 59). 
The classic work of Butler and Stokes (1969) presented an opportunity to gauge 
the impact of the local constituency environment upon voting patterns. Butler and 
Stokes (1969; p. 129-30) found that the ability of particular parties to mobilise 
68 
Chapter 2: Selling the Context of Research 
voters at constituency level over and above the national rate of mobilisation, could 
be attributed to the reinforcing effects of the local environment. Johnston et a/ 
concur: 
Mobilisation is a locality based strategy ... Where it 
succeeds in creating a local environment very much 
skewed towards support for one party, then the ongoing 
processes of socialisation will sustain that party's 
dominance, across all classes (1988; p. 60). 
Miller's (1977) work on the 1966 General Election hypothesised a contagion 
process at work within local environments. A network of social contact - the 
neighbourhood effect - precipitated the solidarity of local voting patterns regardless 
of the class of individual voters; 
those who speak together vote together (1977; p. 65). 
Critically, Miller drew attention to a paradox within the local environment in which 
voting occurred. As class became less important in structuring an individual's 
voting behaviour, the impact of class differences between distinct areas became 
more important to the voting behaviour of the constituency as a whole. 
The class characteristics of the social environment have 
more effect on constituency partisanship than class 
differences themselves. The partisanship of individuals is 
influenced more by where they live than what they do 
(1977; p. 65). 
In other words, the environment in which attitudes were formed and voting took 
place seemed to be an important feature of the electoral behaviour of the locality. 
Those constituencies that might be characterised as 'working class' tended to 
exhibit an even stronger affinity to Labour than the extent of their 'working 
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classness' would give cause to believe. This exaggerative quality is a key feature 
of the contagion process inherent in much of electoral geography, voters are 
influenced by the overall environment in which they live. Moreover this 
environment may cause them to disregard their personal class interests. Hence the 
bourgeoisie of a very working class community might develop solidaristic attitudes 
and pro-Labour voting patterns which override their 'natural' class interests 
because the local context overrules the personal context and the former demands 
a more universal outlook than the latter. So for instance, shop-keepers from 
depressed regions, who require vibrant local economies with low unemployment 
rates in order for their business to thrive might develop more solidaristic outlooks 
than their counterparts in economically buoyant areas. 
Curtice and Steed (1982) identified the 1955 Election as the key contest in British 
post-war electoral history. Since then, they assert, long-term shifts in patterns of 
support for the two main British parties have been characterised by two major 
divides - the North-South and the urban-rural: 
A North-South cleavage began to emerge in the 1955-59 
swing ... While the urban-rural cleavage became clearly 
evident in the 1959-64 swing (p. 256). 
The initiatory work of Curtice and Steed (1982, 1986) established the concept of 
spatial cleavages in the British electorate but was less successful in establishing 
causation. They offered three possible reasons. Firstly the growth in importance of 
the North-South and urban-rural cleavages might reflect changes in the class 
composition of constituencies across the nation as a whole. Hence the apparent 
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importance of region in determining voting behaviour could be seen merely as a 
cloak for class voting in a different circumstance. This explanation can be refuted, 
at least partially, since the amount of constituency change necessary to account for 
the extent of spatial differences in voting trends simply did not occur. Secondly 
Curtice and Steed thought that differences in electoral behaviour of otherwise 
socially similar voters might be due to essential characteristic differences between 
constituencies. Hence the relative weakness of trade unionism in rural areas and 
small towns might explain Labour's difficulty in mobilising voters in these regions. 
However this implies that social change occurred to bring about the haemorrhage 
of Labour support in these areas, whereas Labour previously gained a great deal 
of support in areas where unionisation was low. While it may account for present 
day low level Labour support in rural areas, this explanation fails to account for the 
historically high levels of Labour support that these areas were responsible for. 
Thirdly, Curtice and Steed suggest that the growth of third parties (namely the 
Liberals and the Nationalists) may have influenced the electoral geography of 
Britain. A resurgent third party may squeeze out the weaker of its two main rivals, 
thus altering on a long-term basis, the electoral environment of that constituency. 
This third explanation appears to be the most watertight of the three. The rise of 
the Liberal vote in the late 1970s and the strength of the Alliance throughout the 
General Elections of the 1980s was particularly harmful to the soft Labour vote in 
constituencies where they were in second place behind the Conservatives -
although the divide between Conservative and Labour voters had its genesis in the 
1960s. The evidence of the 1992 Election would suggest that Labour has not 
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overcome its difficulty in mobilising in many of these constituencies particularly in 
the rural South of England. 
2.4 THE GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC ATTITUDES 
The economic conditions of the 1980s and early 1990s were spatially variable; the 
manufacturing recession of the early 1980s hit the North, the 1980s recovery 
benefited the South, and the new recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
caused most distress in the service sector and the South. In other words the 
economic conditions of the 19805 and 19905 ought to have had a differential 
impact according to the geographic location of an individual voter, and according to 
the timing of the interview. 
For this reason, economic issues ought to be seen in the geographic context. If 
geography is important in explaining variation in voting patterns, it ought to be 
important in explaining variation in those attitudes which also help structure voting 
behaviour. If the local environment is the milieu in which information is internalised, 
then the local economic position ought to influence the economic attitudes of 
individuals. 
Some authors have rejected the notion of the direct influence of geography on 
attitudinal structure. They reject the contagion process of regional influence in 
favour of a compositional effect of regional variation. McAllister and Studlar (1992; 
p. 192) claim that regions are the 'arena' in which other variables affect voting 
patterns but do not exert an independent causal role themselves. 
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They further assert that local economic conditions are merely a surrogate for class 
conditions; 
Regional voting is a functional rather than a territorial 
division: it is caused by the concentration of individuals 
with certain social and economic characteristics in 
particular geographic areas (1992, p. 175 - my emphasis), 
This precipitates two research design problems. Firstly a functional definition of 
geography needs to be used in conjunction with - and in comparison to - a regional 
definition. This would make it possible to ascertain whether the geographic location 
or the kind of economic context of a constituency that determines the voting 
behaviour of its inhabitants, and Miller's paradox which sees the class basis of a 
constituency as a multiplier in the class voting patterns of a locality. Secondly the 
relationship between geography and vote, and geography and attitudes must be 
explored in two separate stages, since the case for suggesting that economic 
conditions affect vote patterns is similar - but not identical to - the case for 
suggesting that regional variations in economic conditions contribute to variation in 
economic attitudes. A full and half-stage model needs to be constructed. 
This thesis then, needs to reinforce the position of geographical analysis in the 
mainstream of psephological study. The crucial part of this procedure is the 
imposition of regional considerations alongside those concerning social class. This 
goes some way to redress the balance inherent in most of British psephology 
which despite the supposed decreasing influence of class, has tended in recent 
years to concentrate on the subject of class voting (Dunleavy 1979, 1980, 1987; 
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Sarlvik & Crewe 1983; Heath et al 1985, 1991) or has endeavoured to discount 
geographic considerations by erroneously specifying its incidence of impact in a 
"lifetime learning process" (Rose & McAllister 1990). It is important to note that the 
issue of space should be added to the equation before economic attitudes since it 
is a major contention here that spatial considerations contribute to the process of 
the construction of economic attitudes. Hence this chapter attempts to avoid some 
of the temporal errors made in other accounts which fail to see that theoretically 
the imposition of a regional identity must predate the construction by respondents 
of attitudinal structures. 
Moreover it is crucial to realise that the effects of spatial impact may manifest 
themselves in a number of different manners. The uneven economic development 
of Britain under Thatcherism generated a considerable amount of interest in the 
apparent division between "Northern" and "Southern" parts of the country - and this 
distinction plays its part in the analysis put forward here - but it would seem 
plausible that factors other than nominal region may play a part in the spatial 
variation in attitudes and partisanship. A competing claim about the compositional 
nature of geographic variation stresses the economic character of a region, so that 
the use to which space is put rather than its geographic location is important. A 
critical part of the regional dimension of this thesis is that two different spatial 
distinctions are tested, the so called 'North/South divide' of nominal regions and 
the functional utility of space divide which groups together similar constituencies in 
disparate parts of the country. 
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Towards these ends, the attitudes and partisanship of respondents may be looked 
at in two ways; firstly respondents may be divided into subgroups by a simple 
notion of region, such as Scotland, Wales, North England, Midlands, South 
England & London; secondly they may be analysed by groups characterised by 
common features of their constituency, for example a high incidence of local 
authority housing could be used to create a group consisting of respondents from 
nominally diverse regions, say Plymouth Devonport and Middlesbrough, or a group 
whose main characteristic was a high incidence of New Commonwealth 
immigration may link respondents in the East of London with respondents in the 
East Midlands. 
2.4.1 GEOGRAPHIC MILIEUX VS LIFETIME LEARNING 
Critics of the contagion effect in electoral geography suggest that the geographic 
impact upon voting behaviour is merely a feature of the combined characteristics of 
the different regions. Hence the North-South divide is merely a function of the 
different class composition of Northern and Southern constituencies; the North is 
simply more working class than the South. 
Rose and McAllister (1986, 1990) dispute many of the central tenets of electoral 
geography. In their second account of voting behaviour, their 'lifetime learning 
model' purports to show that after constant features such as respondent's class 
and individual characteristics such as pOlitical values are controlled for, the 
regional impact on voting behaviour disappears. 
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Where a person lives is of little electoral relevance. 
Individuals do not express a sentiment that is place 
specific; what they express is derived from an 
accumulation of experiences. Once we control for prior 
influences in a lifetime of learning, then urbanisation, 
regional differences, national differences and differences 
in the socio-economic composition of a constituency 
altogether account for less than one per cent of the 
variance in voting ... What an individual learns in the South 
of England or the North may be different but it is different 
because it reflects nationwide socio-economic differences 
and political values rather than a distinctive regional 
culture. Controlling for previous experiences show that 
context reinforces what has already been learned; it does 
not alter how an ordinary person votes (Rose & McAllister 
1990; p. 124 - my emphasis). 
The crux of the issue here is that the Rose and McAllister model misspecifies the 
point at which geography should be added to the equation. If local communities, 
constituencies and regions are the miliuex in which attitudes are formed - the 
context in which political information is internalised - then they ought to be 
controlled for prior to the consideration of the attitudes that they help form. Rose 
and McAllister's model which considers geography after it considers attitudes is 
therefore seriously flawed. 
Rose and McAllister fail to provide evidence to support their assertion that family 
loyalties, socio-economic interest and political values are learnt prior to knowledge 
of regional conditions. Furthermore, the regional environment cannot merely 
'reinforce what has already been learned' since it cannot be divorced from the 
socialisation process than an individual undergoes as a whole. The impact of the 
local environment does not suddenly arrive when an elector reaches the age of 
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eighteen, or on the day of polling. It has to be as constant an influence on political 
(and economic) values as family loyalties and socio-economic interests. 
Thus the model that this research seeks to build must avoid this erroneous 
placement of geographic considerations. Hence geography and class predate the 
formation of economic attitudes in the half stage model, and all three feed into the 
production of voting trends in the full model of partisanship. 
2.5 SPECIFYING THE MODEL 
The previous chapter attempted to set the tone for this research; this chapter 
narrows the focus sufficiently in order to see the impact of economic attitudes and 
geographic variation on voting behaviour in the 1980s and the early 1990s. The 
first task in this operation is the specification of the model under scrutiny. 
This thesis aims to suggest that three factors are crucial to understanding levels of 
party support during the period 1983-1992. These are class, economic attitudes 
and geography - and all three feed directly into vote outcomes (see Figure 2.1). 
This is not to suggest that these three factors are the sole determinants of levels of 
party support but they should represent a parsimonious account of partisanship 
with a decent amount of explanatory force. 
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Figure 2.1: The Relationship Between Class, Economic Attitudes, Geography and 
Partisanship 
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However it is important to note that economic attitudes are derived from other 
factors - they are the product of the environment and socialisation process in which 
they are formed. Moreover class and geographic backgrounds are intrinsic parts of 
this environment. Thus, contrary to the claims of some authors, class and 
geography must predate the incidence of economic attitudes in the model (see 
Figure 2.2, compare to Rose & McAllister, 1990). 
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Figure 2.2: The Combined Relationship Between Class. Economic Attitudes. 
Geography and Partisanship 
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The next stage of this research involves the separation of the original model into 
two phases. In phase one, class and geography feed into attitudes (Figure 2.2) and 
all three variables contribute to the outcome of government support. In the half 
stage model of economic attitudes (Figure 2.3), class and geography combine to 
produce an autonomous impact in the formation of economic attitudes. 
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Figure 2.3: The Half Stage Model: The Relationship Between Class. Economic 
Attitudes and Geography 
In order to explore the relationship between class, region and attitudes fully it was 
necessary to dissect the concept of economic attitudes. For this purpose the next 
phase of the research was the careful investigation of four types of economic 
attitudes as each dependent variable. Hence it was possible to gauge the effect of 
spatial and class distinctions upon egocentric, sociotropic, retrospective and 
prospective economic values. 
Research from the late 1970s and 1980s opened up the debate in two ways; firstly 
it introduced the concept of region to the whole equation; secondly it tested for the 
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influence of class and region upon other interactions of economic attitudes -
prospective, sociotropic values, retrospective, egocentric values and retrospective, 
50ciotropic values. The research into the 19905 and the long campaign of the 1992 
Election concentrated on the relationship between personal egocentric values and 
party support. 
2.6 THE CONTEXT OF RESEARCH: A CHANGING ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 
It is now necessary to briefly sketch the political context which provided the 
background against which this thesis is set. The crucial theme to bear in mind is 
that the political and economic developments of the period were consistently 
entangled with geography. It has been noted that the recession associated with the 
first Thatcher government had been spatially variable. It is also true however, that 
the recovery of the second and third Thatcher governments and the overheating 
economy that caused the new recession at the end of the decade were also 
associated with differential regional impact. 
2.6.1 THE 1980s BOOM 
As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, continuing the work of his 
predecessor Geoffrey Howe (see Young, 1990, Barnes & Cockett, 1994), presided 
over a substantial boost in consumer confidence and spending. By further relaxing 
credit controls and introducing deregulation to large financial institutions -
especially to the City of London and the stock market that benefited from the 
revolution of trading methods (the Big Bang) and the Government's privatisation 
programme which resulted in widespread share ownership and large profits for 
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hitherto nationalised corporations - the Lawson Chancellorship of the mid 1980s 
was characterised by immense institutional change and financial prosperity. 
Nevertheless, the development of financial institutions and the City necessarily 
brought with it an uneven geographic dimension since these institutions - and the 
people who worked in them - were based in the capital and the South-East. 
The nature of this change and prosperity was thus limited in scope since its base 
lay in the financial markets and the service sector rather than in existing staple 
industry. Hence the parts of the country that suffered most from the decline in the 
manufacturing sector in the early 1980s were not the most obvious beneficiaries of 
the 'Lawson Boom'. In what the Chancellor himself called "our own economic 
miracle" (Lawson 1993; p. 685). Britain's manufacturing base was not resuscitated 
and the recovery was far from orthodox - having its origin in new areas of the 
economy rather than in manufacturing renewal. 
The service sector economy - which was concentrated in the South East of the 
country - expanded rapidly, but the manufacturing sector failed to respond to the 
economic recovery (see for example Lewis & Townsend 1989). Unemployment 
levels fell sharpest in those areas where they were already relatively low; living 
standards rose most sharply for those individuals - and in those regions - that were 
already economically secure (Pattie & Johnston 1990a, 1990c). The Lawson Boom 
then, accentuated the existing North-South and functional space divisions in British 
society. It would be unsurprising if these expanded divides found articulation in 
patterns of voting. 
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A crucial tenet of the 'Lawson Boom' was the impetus to the markets and consumer 
spending given by his Budgets in March of 1986 and 1987. These budgets were 
widely perceived as the cornerstone of Conservative electoral strategy increasing 
personal disposal income and vastly increasing the supply of money (after a period 
of its strict regulation during the early Budgets of Lawson and his predecessor 
Geoffrey Howe). In particular this was achieved by the use of cuts in taxation, 
especially to those members of the public identified as prone to Conservative 
support - and who of course tended to be concentrated in the buoyant economic 
regions. 
Although the Lawson budgets of the mid-1980s were weighted in favour of those 
sections of society that were already far from poor, the general atmosphere 
generated by them was to suggest all round prosperity made possible by the new 
sectors of the economy - the service sector and the new financial institutions. 
Those sections of society that benefited from the prevailing Government policy 
were further rewarded by Lawson's tax policy in his budgets. Those sections that 
did not greatly benefit from these policies were less well assisted by the 
Chancellor's Budgetary programme. 
Hence the spatial disparity of economic decline and recovery was accentuated by 
the Lawson Boom. The boom notwithstanding, we might expect that, throughout 
the 1980s voters from the industrial North of Britain would be less enthusiastic 
about their economic outlook than voters from the relatively prosperous South. 
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2.6.2 THE 1990s BUST 
In the aftermath of Lawson's expansionary budget of 1988, the economic 'miracle' 
had slowed down significantly. By the following year it was obvious that the 
economy was in decline. 
The changing geographic context of the two recessions meant that the regions 
hit hardest by the first recession were less affected by the second recession 
(see Table 2.4 and Figure 2.4). Between 1989 and 1991 the dynamics of 
recession changed dramatically; unemployment rose 3.1 percentage points in 
the South East, but actually fell by 0.6 percentage points in Scotland (Table 
2.4). Moreover the rate of unemployment increases throughout the 
Conservative heartlands outstripped unemployment increases in the North of 
Britain. If the Government were popularly held to be culpable for the new 
recession, the Conservative regime faced a huge challenge in their search for 
re-election. 
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Figure 2.4: The Rise in Unemployment in th e 19905 Recession; Percentage Change in 
Unemployment, March 1990 to October 1992 (Source: Martin 1993; Figure 3) 
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Table 2.4: The Changing Regional Geography of Unemployment 1983-91 (Source: Regional 
Trends 1992, Table 7.16) 
% % point change % point change % point change 
Unemployment in in in 
1991 Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment 
1983-6 1987-9 1989-91 
Scotland 8.7 1.0 -3.7 -0.6 
Wales 8.7 0.6 -4.7 1.4 
North England 10.4 0.7 -4.2 0.5 
North West 9.4 0.4 -4.0 0.9 
Yorks & Humb 8.7 1.1 -5.1 1.3 
East Midlands 7.2 0.5 -3.6 1.8 
West Midlands 8.6 0.0 -4.8 2.0 
East Anglia 5.8 0.5 -3.7 2.2 
South West 7.1 0.8 -3.6 2.6 
South East 7.0 0.6 -2.9 3.1 
The Chancellor's 'one-club' tactic of economic management - manipulating interest 
rates - had seen them rise to 15 per cent for a whole year between 1989 and 1990. 
Mortgage holders found this crippling to such an extent that the housing boom 
came to an abrupt end; record levels of house purchase were supplanted by 
record levels of house repossession. The South of the country suffered from a new 
phenomenon - negative equity - as the value of houses fell below their purchase 
price. 
The boom in the housing market in the 1980s collapsed at the turn of the 
decade. House-buyers in the South East were particularly hard hit (Table 2.5). 
By 199321 per cent of all mortgage holders were the victims of negative equity 
( in London and the outer South East the average was nearly 40 per cent). The 
slump in the housing market and the new geography of unemployment 
combined to make the prognosis for Government re-election rather poor. 
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Table 2.5: Average Property Prices, 1991 and Proportion of Households with Negative Equity, 
Third Quarter 1993, by Geographic Region (Source: Pattie, Dorling & Johnston 1995) 
Property % Change in % Change in % Change in % Negative 
Price 1991 Property Property Property Equity 1993 
(£'OOOs) Price 1983-6 Price 1987-9 Price 1989-
91 
Stratchclyde 42.44 13.39 19.65 11.95 6.66 
E Cent Scot 47.01 12.25 26.16 8.66 1.12 
Rural Scot 39.19 8.60 27.98 23.06 2.07 
Rural North 51.81 21.43 47.02 6.29 11.08 
Industrial N E 38.27 12.98 31.S9 6.83 S.S3 
Merseyside 46.99 8.31 44.01 22.17 8.72 
Gtr M'chester 48.68 17.82 48.97 4.98 8.0S 
Rest of NW 57.04 20.32 51.06 11.22 10.83 
W Yorks 47.34 14.40 49.49 9.33 5.89 
S Yorks 41.10 12.35 43.16 12.01 6.27 
Rural Wales 45.05 13.14 49.18 2.26 10.05 
Ind'l S Wales 43.61 21.54 35.99 -0.82 4.14 
W Mid Conb 51.86 18.15 47.39 6.36 9.81 
Rest W Mids 59.68 23.85 52.84 3.07 19.39 
E Mids 51.71 28.32 44.24 3.70 28.13 
East Anglia 57.02 40.31 31.15 -12.91 27.34 
Dev & Corn'lI 59.27 30.71 46.52 -10.72 33.66 
Wessex 63.94 37.02 32.99 -6.11 36.53 
Inner L'don 78.15 62.34 13.14 1.81 39.83 
Outer L'don 86.38 56.72 16.19 -3.38 39.36 
Outer Metrop 84.86 50.91 25.37 -6.91 34.29 
Outer SE 68.78 43.38 32.60 -10.90 38.79 
GB 59.20 30.18 35.01 2.19 21.04 
The key point to this downturn was that - as Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show - that those 
sections of the electorate (and those regions) that were the most recent 
beneficiaries of the Lawson boom were the first in the firing line when the slump set 
in. 
The Conservatives who had benefited from the 'feel good' factor in the 1987 
election, now suffered from a tangible 'feel bad' factor. Moreover those electors 
who felt worse were typically those who had previously felt good, as unemployment 
began to rise in the heartlands of Conservatism in the South East and the service 
sector economy. As the personal expectations of a natural community of 
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Conservatives worsened, there was an obvious danger of a haemorrhage of 
Conservative support. 
By this time, the Prime Minister and her Chancellor were in open conflict over 
economic policy. She installed Sir Alan Waiters, a vociferous critic of Lawson, as 
her own economic advisor; and her refusal to sack Waiters led directly to Lawson's 
resignation in October 1989. He was replaced by John Major who was forced to 
admit in the autumn of 1989 that Britain was in the midst of a deep rooted 
recession (see Norton 1993). 
The recession continued for much longer than the Government had anticipated; 
and it continued to hit the natural Conservative communities in the South and the 
service sector. With John Major's accession to the Premiership in November 1990, 
the new regime inherited a serious economic malaise. Furthermore its impact was 
disproportional geographically and almost wholly to the Conservatives' 
disadvantage. 
The economic upturn was supplanted by the reality of the 
recession deepening. Unemployment continued to rise, 
the housing market was stagnant and economic growth 
was lower in 1991 than in 1990. Small businesses 
continued to struggle. In 1991 44,000 of them went out of 
business. The recession hit particularly hard in the South 
of England, the heartland of Conservative support (Norton 
1993; p. 64). 
The Conservatives had survived the electoral impact of a severe recession before, 
when the first Thatcher Government oversaw a sharp decline in Britain's 
manufacturing base. However, the threatened sector of the electorate had been 
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based in their main opponent's natural communities - the industrial North. Now the 
Conservatives were faced with a deep and lengthy recession that attacked their 
own supporters - the very sections of the electorate that had returned them to 
power in 1987. This represented the biggest test for the Conservative Government 
in the run up to the 1992 election. Their success in 1992 suggests that they 
managed to overcome these electoral disadvantages in the South of England. The 
analysis of the long-campaign up to the 1992 Election attempts to see how and 
why this success was accomplished. 
2.7 HYPOTHESES 
2.7.1 CLASS 
It is necessary to hypothesise about the direction that the models specified earlier 
will take. The specified model of class and voting should remain fairly constant 
throughout the thesis. The higher up the social scale people are, the more likely 
that they will support the Conservative government throughout the period 1983-
1992. The lower down the scale individuals reside, the more likely they are to 
support the Labour party. The testable null hypothesis for class voting then is that 
there is no difference in the patterns of partisanship attributable to the incidence of 
social class. 
Likewise it should be the case that the relationship between social class and 
personal economic attitudes remains more or less constant throughout the period 
1983-1992. Individuals from the higher echelons of society are likely to be more 
optimistic about their economic future and more satisfied with their economic past 
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than their counterparts from lower down the social scale. The testable null 
hypothesis for class and economic attitudes then is that there is no discernible 
difference in the construction of economic attitudes across all social classes. 
2.7.2 ECONOMIC ATIITUDES 
The expected pattern of economic attitudes comes directly from the reward-
punishment and self-interest axioms, and the possibility of prospective and 
altruistic voting presented in the previous chapter. Put simply the more satisfied 
individuals are with their economic position or prospects, the more likely they are to 
support the incumbent government. This relationship ought to hold throughout the 
years 1983-1992, but it is crucial to note that the respondents who fit this profile 
may change significantly. 
The testable null hypothesis for economic attitudes and voting is that voting 
patterns are not affected by the relative economic optimism or pessimism, 
economic satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the electorate. Furthermore the 
likelihood that an individual will support a particular party will not be altered by their 
personal or societal, recollections or predictions. 
2.7.3 GEOGRAPHY 
Given that the time period 1983-1992 was characterised by geographic 
fluctuations, it would be reasonable to expect that the economic attitudes and 
voting behaviour of individuals would be dependent on their geographic location. 
During the 1980s Britain suffered from a tangible slump in the manufacturing base 
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of the economy, but then recovered in the service sector economy. There was of 
course a real geographic dimension to this. During this period, electors from the 
North and constituencies identified with manufacturing industry would tend to be 
less optimistic about their economic future and less pleased with their economic 
past than those electors from the South and constituencies identified with service 
sector employment. 
By implication the state of an individual's economic outlook might predetermine 
their propensity to support the government. Those who were optimistic about the 
future or pleased about the past would be natural government supporters, if they 
deemed the government to be responsible for the economic conditions. Those who 
were pessimistic or dissatisfied would be unlikely to support the incumbent regime. 
Throughout the 1980s, those electors from areas that suffered the most from the 
early 1980s recession - the North and Scotland and Wales and the industrial 
sector of the economy would - ceteris paribus - be the least likely of all respondents 
to support the incumbent Conservative administration. The Conservative heartland 
of support would thus be the South of the country and the service sector economy 
which benefited the most from the economic upturn in the middle of the decade. 
The changing economic reality of the late 1980s and early 1990s however, would 
be expected to alter the geographic pattern of party support. It would be 
reasonable to assume that as the new recession hit the South-East of the country 
and the service sector of the economy hardest of all, then the new geography of 
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recession would feed into a change in the familiar North-South divide in voting 
behaviour and attitudinal structure. 
The narrowing of the North-South divide in economic performance might be 
reflected in a narrowing of the North-South divide in economic attitudes; electors in 
the South-East and the service sector would be less likely to be sanguine about 
their economic future or pleased with their recent economic past than they had 
been previously. Furthermore they might be less likely to support the Conservative 
government in the new recession than in the previous recession or the Lawson 
boom. The North-South and functional cleavages of voting behaviour might not 
disappear completely but they might narrow - or at least stop growing. 
The testable null hypothesis throughout this period is that geography, however 
measured, has no influence upon the attitudinal structure or the voting patterns of 
electors. 
2.8 OPERATIONALlSING THE MODEL I 
2.8.1 DATA AND METHODS 
2.8.1.1 THE BRITISH SOCIAL A TTITUDES SERIES 
In order to give greater depth to the analysis of the 1980s, the British Social 
Attitudes series of surveys was used for this research. The British Social Attitudes 
series used here comprises six separate surveys running from 1983 until 1989, 
with the Comparative European Study of the 1988 British Social Attitudes omitted 
from this thesis. There was also a panel survey in the series which assessed 
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attitudes of respondents between 1983 and 1986. The sample size of the British 
Social Attitudes surveys was consistently around 2500 and once again the surveys 
were designed to yield representative cross-sections of the adult populations of 
England, Scotland, Wales. Essentially there is much continuity in the British Social 
Attitudes series and their concentration upon attitudes enables extensive analysis 
of economic outlooks. 
The British Social Attitudes series facilitate a more detailed analysis of public 
attitudes to the economy over a shorter period of time than the British Election 
Study. Being conducted on an inter-Election basis, and throughout the 1987 
campaign, the British Social Attitudes series does not offer the same theoretical 
problems which the British Election Study series does over the timing of 
questionnaires, although it does have some problems associated with its temporal 
incidence (see below). 
A potential problem with the British Social Attitudes series was its use of the party 
identification variable. Theoretically the import of Party Identification from the USA 
has proved troublesome (see Robertson 1976). In particular it should be noted that 
Party Identification ought to prove more resilient to change than voting allegiance 
since the theory suggests that voters retain an identification with a party over and 
above short term shifts in party popularity. Empirically however, outside the USA 
the notion of Party Identification has failed to exhibit a great degree of strength 
over and above last reported vote. In fact, the empirical evidence would suggest 
that, as a consequence, the meaning of party identification to non-American 
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respondents is close enough to the meaning of the concept of party support to 
justify the use of the former as a surrogate for the latter in this research. Indeed 
there is strong evidence to suggest that the Party Identification variable measured 
by the British Social Attitudes series can be considered approximate to the vote 
intention question asked by the NOPlNewsnight series of opinion polls. 
The British Social Attitudes series allowed a widespread interpretation of the impact 
of spatial variation upon economic attitudes and upon voting behaviour. In both 
cases, coding by area is by constituency identification which permitted the 
recoding of respondents by region into a number of categories according to 
theoretical needs. Firstly respondents were disaggregated by standard region, a 
compressed version involved five categories, Scotland and Wales, North of 
England, the Midlands, Greater London and the South of England: this 
categorisation would permit robust examination of the distinctions between the 
"North" and "South" of the country. Secondly respondents were recoded into 
constituency type variables following the work of Webber (1978), and CACI Market 
Analysis in order to examine the thesis that the important distinction, in geographic 
terms, of public perceptions of the economy and of voting behaviour was between 
different functional areas (see also Crewe and Fox 1984). In this manner it was 
possible to cluster respondents' location by constituency type in order to test the 
functional division of space theory for surveys conducted after the constituency 
boundary changes which were first used in the 1983 Election in Britain, the year of 
the first British Social Attitudes survey. 
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According to the British Social Attitudes series Handbooks, sampling typically 
occurred over a number of months. In fact it usually took place between January 
and late February, but crucially in 1986 and 1987 the time period for sampling 
coincided with the timing of the Budget. In these two years, interviewers were in the 
field until late March and early April respectively. This would of course make little 
difference to most analyses using the British Social Attitudes series. However, for 
the analysis of economic attitudes, this may be a critical consideration. 
If it could be shown that those members of the public who exhibited a marked 
disinclination to economic optimism were interviewed before the Budget and those 
respondents who were relatively optimistic about their predictions for family income 
levels were interviewed after the budget, then the previously held contention that 
optimism and pessimism were associated with spatial differences would be 
nullified. Instead the likelihood that the differences in relative optimism or 
pessimism was caused by temporal considerations could not be refuted. 
Although it is not strictly true that the data which forms the British Social Attitudes 
series was collected region by region, the nature of national data collection raises 
a suspicion that each area of Britain may be surveyed separately. This suspicion is 
confirmed by analysis of the date of each interview. Scottish respondents are 
typically dated as being interviewed before those respondents from London. 
Although interview dates for all regions span the whole data collection period, the 
suspicion that the subtle differences in average deviations from the Grand Mean 
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across the country, can be associated as readily with interview timing as with 
spatial placement remains too strong for comfort. 
Although this section has concentrated on the incidence of one particular political 
event, the spring Budget, and indeed two particular budgets by a particular 
Chancellor, in truth, the measurement of economic attitudes may be prone to 
distortion from a number of political events which may be effect response to 
questions related to the coming year. The Chancellor's Autumn Statement 
(although now unified with the Budget) and the ending of the Tax Year are two 
annual events which might influence economic attitudes if respondents were asked 
to forecast personal income levels directly after their incidence. Furthermore 
specialised one-off events might affect expectations: the very first community 
charge bills, trade wars and currency devaluation are all examples of political 
shocks which may impact upon economic expectations. 
The fault may not lie with the question itself, but in the manner in which it is posed. 
Forecasts of economic expectations may fluctuate over the course of anyone year 
to such an extent that one annual question could not hope to measure the true 
dynamics of the relationship between personal economic forecasts and political 
events. In this case it would be as well to measure economic attitudes more 
regularly than the annual question posed by the British Social Attitudes series. 
The two considerations here, that the economic evaluations of respondents may 
be contaminated by temporal sampling procedures and that in any case the 
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process of formulating economic attitudes may be much more dynamic than a 
static annual question could ever hope to pick up upon, lead to a major upheaval in 
the research strategy behind this thesis. 
2.8.1.2 THE NOPINEWSNIGHT SET OF OPINION POLLS 
Access was also obtained to the NOPlNewsnight set of opinion polls which 
comprised a monthly poll of public opinion from January 1990 until February 1992 
inclusive. Sample sizes for these polls vary but the usual number of respondents 
was in the region of 1500 interviewees. The NOPINewsnight polls were designed 
to be representative of the country as a whole and their small sample size means 
that their representativeness of the regions was impaired. Nevertheless, the sheer 
number of polls and their tendency to replicate questions month after month, meant 
that this data source lent itself exceptionally well to in-depth analysis of spatial 
variation in economic attitudes and partisanship in the early 1990s and over a 
crucial period of time in British politics - the long campaign leading to the 1992 
General Election. 
Once again the data were constructed by the use of constituency codes which 
permitted the recoding into suitable variables to test the North/South - urban/rural, 
and functional area effects. The essential flaw in the NOPINewsnight data, 
however, was that the monthly poll data were culled from a much smaller sample 
size than the British Social Attitudes series. The result of this is that the size of 
each cell or subgroup was less than would be required in order to assume the 
required statistical representational qualities for each region. Nevertheless it was 
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still possible to construct a five fold regional schema. However the under 
representation of inner-metropolitan areas in the poll series required a 
reconstruction of the constituency type schema (see below). 
2.9 THE USE OF OPINION POLL DATA IN THE LIGHT OF THE 1992 GENERAL 
ELECTION 
2.9.1 THE CASE FOR OPINION POLLS 
In order to assess economic attitudes, and particularly personal expectations, 
survey data such as that provided by the British Social Attitudes series would have 
to be replaced by a more regular examination of the issue. Opinion Polls often ask 
respondents about economic issues. Typically they sample far fewer respondents 
but nevertheless obtain a representative sample of the nation, which may be 
disaggregated by certain criteria including class, region and constituency type. The 
quota sampling technique of opinion polls means that polling is usually complete 
within one or two days (unlike the complex and time-consuming random sampling 
used for survey data). Hence the temporal contamination which may be evident in 
survey data should not be present in poll data. Furthermore, the knowledge that 
Britain was gearing up for a General Election, and the subsequent proliferation of 
opinion polls gave an unique opportunity to measure attitudes in the period of time 
identified by Miller et al as "The Long Campaign" (1990). 
When the decision to use Opinion Poll data was first made and the 
NOPINewsnight series obtained, the use of Opinion Poll data did not appear to be 
contentious. The Opinion Polls had performed well throughout the 1987-92 
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parliament, while the NOPINewsnight polls commissioned by the BBC had 
received lavish praise for their performance in predicting the outcomes of by-
elections. 
With hindsight, it might be claimed that the reliability of Opinion Poll data was first 
brought into question by the Langbaurgh by-election of November 1991. All the 
polls, including an NOP exit poll, indicated a sweeping victory for the Labour 
candidate Dr Ashok Kumar in the Conservative held seat. However, although 
Labour won the by-election they did so with a much smaller majority than the polls 
had predicted, and the final statistics were outside the accepted margin of error of 
plus or minus three per cent. 
The failure of the polls to gauge, within the acceptable margin of error, the extent of 
the Labour victory at Langbaurgh in 1991 was popularly ascribed to the Labour 
candidate's ethnicity. Many traditional working class Labour voters and potential 
defectors from other parties were said to be unwillingly to vote for a Black 
candidate, even given his party affiliation. Moreover although such racist attitudes 
were supposedly prevalent among potential Labour voters, they remained covert 
rather than overt. Put simply many voters lied to pollsters about their stated 
intention to vote Labour. This theme was rehearsed over and over again in the 
aftermath of the General Election of 1992, when the general failure by all Opinion 
Polls to correctly predict the outcome of the national election was ascribed to the 
'shame' factor involved in respondents admitting to vote Conservative (Crewe 
1992; also see Butler and Kavanagh 1992; Worcester 1995). 
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2.9.2 THE POLLS AND THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTION 
Opinion polls are designed to reflect public opinion. Their most high profile usage 
is in predicting the outcome of elections. In April 1992, the British polls failed their 
acid test, overestimating Labour support and underestimating the Conservative 
vote. Most polls gave the impression that there would probably be a hung 
parliament - with Labour as the biggest party. At the very least, the Conservative 
government would lose its overall majority. In the event the Conservatives were 
returned with a 21 seat majority. The discrepancy between predicted vote patterns 
and the actual result was so great that no piece of academic research which aims 
to utilise Opinion Poll data, collected at the time of or in the run up to the 1992 
British General Election, can proceed without some discussion of the performance 
of the polls in 1992 (For a more detailed discussion of the polls in 1992 see 
Broughton, 1995, Wailer, 1995, Wybrow, 1995 and Worcester, 1995). 
The attempts to explain John Major's victory have fallen into two schools of 
thought: Either the pollsters were talking to the wrong people (they had a 
misspecified sample), or they were talking to the right people who were not telling 
the truth. The next step here has to be to examine what this means to the research 
presented here using Opinion Poll data. 
2.9.2.1 UNREPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES 
If the pollsters in the 1992 British General Election were talking to the wrong 
people, conducting research among a misspecified population, then it is 
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remarkable that all the polling organisations were equally wrong and that the bias 
in the polls occurred in the same direction, inflating Labour and deflating 
Conservative support. Clearly, if bias was inherent in the sampling scheme of the 
polling organisations then it was systematic and not random bias. 
Although the Market Research Society Enquiry denied that poll tax evasion was a 
significant contributory cause to the sample misspecification of the polls, Smith and 
McLean (1994) have suggested however, that the de-registration of voters which 
was encouraged by the poll tax, may have been partly responsible for the 
Conservative victory. 
Comparing the 1991 Census data with the existing electoral register, Smith and 
McLean report that the rate of unregistered electors was regionally variable. Hence 
while only six per cent of people on the census failed to be on the electoral register 
in the metropolitan areas outside London, twenty per cent of those present on the 
inner London census were absent from the electoral register (1994; p. 234 - also 
see McLean & Smith 1995). Thus the MRS enquiry could have overlooked the 
spatial variation in the effects of poll tax evasion. Nationally it might not have been 
a significant factor but in certain localities and in certain constituencies, 
disenrolment from the electoral register due to the poll tax, may have been enough 
to make a real difference to the outcome of particular seats. 
Smith and McLean conclude that if the opposition parties had captured only forty 
per cent of the deregistered vote (and there are good grounds for assuming that 
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poll tax evaders were not naturally Conservative voters) they would have captured 
an additional ten seats and thus reduced the Conservative majority in the House of 
Commons to one seat (1994; p. 240). 
It is possible that those respondents who refused to participate in polls were 
concentrated in groups of the electorate which tended to support the 
Conservatives - for example Curtice (1995) considers the differential refusal of 
elderly women voters. There was limited evidence to suggest that refusal to 
answer the 'who would you vote for?' question, or to be interviewed at all, 
increased in 1992. However, the real problem here is how to measure such a 
phenomenon since no hard facts exist about the profile of non-respondents. 
Suspicions that non-respondents are usually Conservative voters must remain 
suspicions rather than evidence. However, a more central geographic problem 
about differential refusal was not addressed by the MRS. If the so-called 'shame 
factor' was particularly marked in 1992, then it would be probably be concentrated 
in certain regions where voting Conservative might be seen as acting against local 
interests. For instance, voters from East Anglia and the South East might have 
been especially reluctant to identify themselves as Conservative supporters given 
the state of the recession in those areas in the run-up to 1992. 
A consistent criticism of opinion polls is that they had an inadequate sample size. 
However, the evidence from 1992 suggests that size did not matter after all. Polls 
of just over 1,000 respondents fared no worse than those of over 2,000 or even 
leMs 10,000 sample survey for the Press Association. Nevertheless weekend and 
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in-home interviewing techniques were used by only one organisation, Harris, which 
quickly abandoned the practice after two polls suggested a significant 
Conservative lead (Wailer, 1995). With hindsight it might be said that the unease 
of the Harris organisation with these results was misplaced, and that the more 
orthodox interview techniques miss significant seams of Conservative support. 
The most publicised of all the outcomes from the Market Research Society enquiry 
into the performance of Opinion Polls in the run up to the 1992 Election was the 
assertion that there may have been errors in sampling which created a pro-Labour 
bias in polling since 1959. This however, may be less worrying for research 
purposes than first impressions might suppose. The systematic over-estimation of 
Labour support still permits analysis of relative changes in party support, Only 
study of absolute levels of support would be denigrated by this systematic error. 
2.9.2.2 UNRELIABLE RESPONSES 
The second common explanatory factor in the failure of the polls in 1992 concerns 
the possibility that the population as a whole was correctly specified, but that a 
significant number of respondents chose to misinform the pollsters; that Britain had 
become a 'nation of liars' (Crewe, 1992). 
The misinformation thesis may have its roots in two phenomena. Either an 
exceptionally late swing, in the very last days of the election campaign, caused 
most of the pre-election polls to be skewed towards Labour, or the Conservative 
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lead in the public at large was deliberately hidden by Conservative voters - that 
Conservatives were 'ashamed' to admit their partisanship. 
Two points are central about the 'late swing' theory. Firstly, the late swing effect 
must have been very late indeed since the final day polls were also incorrect (as 
were the exit polls). Secondly, the late swing effect can only be a legitimate 
phenomenon if the timing of the election was crucial to the late swing itself. Would 
the result have been different if the Election had been held earlier? If a late swing 
towards the incumbent party of government was inevitable, this represents a huge 
dilemma for the future of Opinion Polls. After all, what was the point of asking 
respondents how they would vote if there was a General Election tomorrow if their 
responses could not be relied upon? If the act of focusing attention on the choice 
between alternative governments occurs only when there will be a General 
Election tomorrow, the validity of the standard vote intention question is thrown into 
doubt. 
Moreover some analysts have virtually dismissed the significance of late swing in 
1992. Using the panel study element built into the 1992 British General Election 
Study - which combined a pre-election interview and a post-election interview, 
Heath Jowell, Curtice & Clifford (1994) report that Labour were never in a position 
to win the 1992 Election. Indeed they contest that Labour were undamaged by late 
swing and conclude that the polls never accurately reflected the state of the parties 
in the 1992 Election campaign (1994 pp. 116-27). 
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The 'shame factor' theory also causes problems. Why should Conservative 
supporters be less likely to admit to their partisan preference than non-
Conservatives in 1992 and Conservatives in previous elections? Some authors 
believe the Conservative domination of 'selfish' issues such as taxation, and 
Labour's concentration on 'moral' issues such as welfare, fuelled the fire of the 
shame factor (see Wailer 1995). The crucial proposition here is that the public 
perception of the way that they ought to vote fell out of step with the way they 
wanted to vote. Again this is problematic since it is virtually impossible to quantify. 
In truth, any notion of shame cannot be assumed to be unidirectional and can only 
be applied to specific elections. The shame factor simply restates the case for 
treating 1992 as an aberrant election. If the 1992 General Election had some 
special qualities that made it different from all other Elections in post war Britain, 
then this would have direct implications for research. 
2.9.3 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1992 ELECTION FOR OPINION POLL 
BASED RESEARCH 
There are then two basic forms of explanation for the poor predictive power of the 
pre-election Opinion Polls during the 1992 General Election campaign. Either the 
polling organisations misspecified the population so badly that the results thrown 
up by analysis of the data cannot be trusted, or else the correctly specified 
population were highly selective with the facts they chose to divulge to the 
pollsters. Both types of explanation have wider ramifications for the role of Opinion 
Poll data in research in general and for this study in particular. Nevertheless the 
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contention here is that this research is not critically damaged by the debacle of the 
1992 Election. 
If the polling organisations continually contacted the wrong people, then at least it 
can be safely assumed that they did so consistently. If the Market Research 
Society enquiry was right in asserting that polls have fundamentally been guilty of 
overestimating Labour support, then this will be of negligible interest to the 
modelling of changes in party or government support. While the overestimation of 
Labour and underestimation of Conservative support remains constant, studies 
aiming to assess relative changes in support over a series of months are less 
seriously fractured than studies that aim to assess and predict absolute values of 
support. 
If the correct population was defined, then the likelihood is that any serious 
explanation for their duplicity will, revert to the claim that the 1992 Election was in 
some way extraordinary. If the Election itself was itself responsible for what Denver 
(1994; p. 131) called the 'self-falsifying' factor in the discrepancy between poll 
predictions and the election result, and especially if the late swing theories are 
correct, then studies that concentrate on the 'long-campaign' are less likely to fall 
foul of the same contamination process. The NOP/ Newsnight dataset which 
begins in January 1990 and ends in February 1992 will escape much of this 
contamination since the need to deceive pollsters, for whatever reason, would only 
be heightened by the immediate focal point provided by an impending General 
Election. 
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Finally and most crucially, the type of information provided by opinion polls remain 
the best information available. They provide a means by which fluid and volatile 
attitude structures can be analysed faster and more reliably than by the use of 
survey data. As long as the sampling procedure provided by the polls remains 
valid, the debate on the future of Opinion Polls has centred on the use of the vote 
intention question. No parallel suggestions that attitudinal measures are equally 
flawed by the shame factor have been articulated, indeed the Market Research 
Society enquiry even suggested that problems with vote intention questions could 
be overcome by the use of secondary questions about attitudes (see also Wailer, 
1995, p. 180). 
Monthly political information over the time in which Britain's longest serving Prime 
Minister this century was ousted by her own party, and replaced by a relatively 
unknown quantity, would be worthy of study in its own right. Its coincidence with 
the build-up to the Election in 1992 when the new Major administration was forced 
to face the electorate in the middle of a deep economic recession, makes it 
indispensable. 
2.10 OPERA TIONALlSING THE MODEL 11 
2.10.1 HOW TO MEASURE CLASS 
2.10.1.1 THE FIVE-FOLD CLASS SCHEMA 
As indicated earlier, the classic concept of class in psephological studies drew 
from a dichotomous cleavage between manual and non-manual sectors of the 
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workforce. In rejecting the general thrust of the dealignment literature. Heath et al 
(1985) argued that a fundamental reassessment of the concept of class was 
necessary. Using the schema invented by Goldthorpe and Llewellyn for their 
sociological study of social mobility (in Goldthorpe & Hope 1974) they developed a 
more complex picture of class based upon the position in the workplace. In this 
manner three broad sectors of the electorate were identified; a middle class of 
managerial and salaried classes. a smaller than usual core working class, and a 
small but important group of intermediate classes. 
The class schema of Heath et al was borne from a frustration with the 
concentration on income levels and life-styles that epitomised the two-class model 
endemic in the 1960s and 1970s. Collapsing the seven fold schema of Goldthorpe 
& Llewellyn. Heath et al formulated a five band scheme of class based on 
economic interest covering three basic groupings. the middle class, an 
intermediate class and a residual working class. 
The key asset of the five fold schema is its identification of small but important 
electoral groups. For example. Heath et al argued that the self-employed were 
constantly overlooked by studies that graded them according to their 
heterogeneous lifestyle or income attributes but the economic interests of this 
group were homogeneous, and their attitudes and voting instincts were very similar 
as a result. 
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The five fold schema encompasses the following classes: the salariat, routine non-
manual, the petty bourgeoisie, foremen and technicians, and the working class. 
Each of these classes has important and distinct economic interests. 
The salariat consist of managers and administrators, professionals and semi-
professionals. These are occupations that afford long-term job security and involve 
either the exercise of authority over others or a high degree of autonomy in the 
workplace. It should be noted that following the work of Dunleavy (1980) on the 
political implications of the growth of the public sector, several studies have sought 
to disaggregate this group according to sectoral employment. In this way 
differences in the attitudinal structures and voting patterns between those 
members of the salariat employed in the public and the private sectors have been 
noted (Johnston & Pattie, 1988b). 
Routine non-manual workers such as clerks and secretaries are usually 
subordinate to the sa lariat. Heath et a/ describe them as 
a kind of white-collar labour force (1985; p. 16). 
The petty bourgeoisie are a small section of the electorate drawn from a very wide 
base. What they have in common is a position as independents reliant upon their 
own business acumen to save them from the full force of the free market. They also 
have direct control over their own business affairs. 
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Foremen and technicians are a small group of workers who nevertheless exhibit 
distinct differences in their economic outlook to the rest of the working class. This 
is probably a result of their key position in the workforce independent of the shop 
floor but not quite in management. Usually they have a degree of autonomy and 
supervisory duties. 
The working class are a residual group. They consist of the rest of the workforce 
and although they represent a large number of people, it is important to note that 
the size of working class on the terms of Heath et a/ is significantly smaller than is 
the case in most conventional schemata. Income from working class occupations 
may be quite high but the key issue in their definition is the high degree of 
economic vulnerability and the subordinate nature of these jobs. 
Whatever the faults in the conceptional analysis in How Britain Votes, the 
construction of the five-fold class schema has been widely welcomed and used 
elsewhere (see for example, Johnston & Pattie, 1990; Russell et at, 1992). When 
using the British Social Attitudes survey data it is possible to follow the procedures 
outlined in How Britain Votes for the construction of the five class schema used by 
Heath et a/. Hence this schema will be utilised for the survey data involved in this 
thesis, providing an opportunity to measure the impact of social class using the 
most sophisticated of class designs. 
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2.10.1.2 THE ABC1/C2DE SCALE 
It was not possible however, to follow the procedures set out by Heath et al when 
analysing the NOPlNewsnight sample data. This is because the Opinion Poll data 
hold a great deal less information about respondents' positions in the workforce 
than the much more detailed British Social Attitudes series. Therefore the analysis 
of the sample data will have to revolve around the original classification of social 
groups found in the polls. These classify respondents according to the class 
schema developed by the Market Research Society (MRS, 1963; Monk, 1968) 
usually referred to as the ABC 1/C2DE scale. 
This scale initially divides the electorate into two groups - the middle and the 
working classes - depending on whether their stated occupation involves manual 
work. Each class is then further separated into three subdivisions. Class A, the 
upper middle class, includes company directors and higher professionals; Class B 
comprises those in junior executive and management positions; Class C1, the 
lower middle class, includes high esteem clerical staff such as bank workers and 
the supervisors of manual workers; Class C2, skilled manual workers, denotes the 
first working class group (examples of occupations that qualify as C2 include 
electricians and machinists). Class D, the semi-skilled, and Class E, the unskilled, 
complete the scale. Economically inactive respondents are usually classified by 
spouse's occupation unless they themselves are unemployed or wholly reliant 
upon state benefits. In this case, respondents are placed into the lowest strata, 
Class E. The analyses presented here usually links together Classes A and Band 
Classes D and E in order to increase the size of comparison groups. 
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An important point to make about the MRS scheme is that its continued use has 
masked an important demographic change. In 1970 GALLUP calculated that the 
ABC1 groups comprised 37 per cent of the total electorate. By 1987 the proportion 
of non-manual workers in the electorate had risen to 41 per cent of the total (Rose 
& McAllister 1990, p. 65). 
Although the ABC1 scale is less robust than the five-fold class schema derived 
from Goldthorpe, it nevertheless represents the best data available for analysis of 
a critical period in British politics. This enforced use of this imperfect class schema 
remains a drawback rather than a critical flaw. This research has a primary interest 
in the incidence of spatial variation in the economic attitudes and voting behaviour 
of the British electorate, during the Thatcher and immediately post-Thatcher era. 
Social class plays a part in this analysis but its role is secondary to the geographic 
aspect of this research. The availability of this data makes its use imperative 
regardless of the demerits of the class schema it enforces. 
2.10.2 HOW TO MEASURE GEOGRAPHY 
2.10.2.1 DEFINING REGION AND CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Two spatial classifications are to be used for the analysis in this thesis. These are 
geographic region and functional region. 
Geographic region is the most obvious of the two classifications relying on relative 
location as its defining characteristic. Numerous accounts have employed the 
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geographic regions used by the Government's office of Population Censuses and 
Surveys that divided Britain into 10 standard regions, while others used the 22 
region schema employed by The Economist for their analysis of British Elections, 
The full list of Standard Regions and Economist regions are given in Table 2.6. 
All data analysed here is disaggregated by constituency. Therefore the 
classification by standard region or Economist region was possible. However, the 
nature of the sampling technique employed for the British Social Attitudes survey 
and the NOPINewsnight opinion polls necessitated the collapsing of region into a 
manageable set of five regions so that all cells could have sufficient numbers in 
order to be statistically representative of the region as well as the country as a 
whole. 
113 
Chapter 2: ."'·effing the Context of Research 
Table 2.6 Economist Regions and Collapsed Geographic Regions 
Economist Region Collapsed Region 
01 Strathclyde 
02 East Central Scotland 
03 Rural Scotland SCOTLANDIWALES 
04 Rural Wales 
05 Industrial South Wales 
06 Rural North 
07 Industrial Northeast 
08 Merseyside 
09 Greater Manchester NORTH ENGLAND 
10 Rest of Northwest 
11 West Yorkshire 
12 South Yorkshire 
13 West Midlands Conurbation 
14 Rest of West Midlands MIDLANDS 
15 East Midlands 
16 Inner London 
17 Outer London GREATER LONDON 
18 Outer Metropolitan 
19 Devon and Cornwall 
20 East Anglia REST OF 
21 Wessex SOUTH ENGLAND 
22 Outer Southeast 
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Table 2.7 CACI Groupings and Collapsed Functional Regions 
CACI Functional Regions Collapsed Groups 
01 Metropolitan Inner City with Immigrants 
02 Industrial Areas with Immigrants 
03 Poorest Immigrant Areas DEPRESSED 
04 Intermediate Industrial Areas AREAS WITH 
05 Old Industrial and Mining Towns IMMIGRATION 
06 Textile Areas 
07 Poorest Domestic Conditions 
08 Conurbation Local Authority Housing 
09 Black Country 
10 Maritime Industrial Areas POOR CONDITION 
11 Poor Inner-City Council Housing LOCAL AUTHORITY 
12 Clydeside HOUSING 
13 Scottish Industrial 
14 Scottish Rural 
15 High Status Inner Metropolitan 
16 Inner Metropolitan INNER 
17 Outer London Suburbia METROPOLITAN 
18 Very High-Status 
19 Conurbation White-Collar 
20 City Constituency Service Employment 
21 Resort and Retirement AFFLUENT, SERVICE 
22 Recent Growth and Modem Housing EMPLOYMENT 
23 Stable Industrial Towns 
24 Small Manuf.Towns Rural Hinteriands 
25 Southern Urban 
26 Manuf Towns Commuter Hinterlands 
27 Metropolitan Industrial PROSPEROUS, 
28 Modestly Affluent Urban Scotland OWNER OCCUPATION 
29 Areas of Rapid Growth LOW UNEMPLOYMENT 
30 Prosperous Towns Little Industry 
31 Agricultural 
Functional regionalisation depends on criteria other than simple relative location. 
The British Census of 1981 enabled the grouping of constituencies according to 
population and housing characteristics. The market research organisation CACI 
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Inc. constructed a functional schema that was adopted by Crewe and Fox (1984) in 
their account of British Parliamentary Constituencies. This schema comprised 41 
variables covering demographic characteristics, such as age structure, household 
structure and ethnic structure, the occupational structure and housing 
characteristics, such as age, tenure and availability of amenities, of each 
constituency. This information is then used to produce the 31 functional groups 
shown in Table 2.7. 
The use of both sets of schema can be problematic when used with surveys, 
however. Although surveys and polls are designed to be representative of the 
nation as a whole, no such claim can be made for smaller sections of the sample. 
For example, the NOPINewsnight polls may be representative of the class, age 
and gender structures of mainland Britain, but it is unlikely that they reflect the 
correct mix of classes, ages and gender of respondents from Wessex or City 
Constituencies with Service Employment. In other words the small number of 
cases in each cell does not provide confidence that each sub-sample would be a 
truly accurate depiction of the region or area that it represents. 
Therefore it was necessary to further collapse the functional regions. For the 
geographic variable this meant the construction of a five fold schema representing 
respondents from Scotland and Wales, the North of England, the Midlands, 
Greater London and the rest of the South of England. 
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The functional region scale was initially redrawn according to the procedure set out 
by CACI. This produced another five fold schema that categorised respondents 
into units described as Depressed areas with high levels of Immigration; areas with 
a high concentration of poor condition Local Authority Housing; Inner Metropolitan 
areas; Affluent areas with Service Employment; and Prosperous areas with high 
levels of Owner-Occupation and low levels of Unemployment. This procedure did 
not however increase the size of the Inner Metropolitan group sufficiently to 
eradicate fears of misrepresentation and required further modification. To this end 
the inner-metropolitan areas were reconsigned to other areas (according to the 
clustering strategy set out by Webber (1978) and Crewe and Fox (1984)) and a 
three fold schema designed for use with the NOPINewsnighf data. This three fold 
schema comprised depressed areas with high levels of immigration and local 
authority housing (usually referred to as the DEPLA group), areas characterised by 
service sector employment (the SERVICE group), and areas characterised by 
economic affluence (the AFFLUENT group). 
2.11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter sought to set the context in which an understanding of geographic 
matters becomes vital to developing an understanding of political and economic 
attitudes and voting behaviour in the period of the second and third Thatcher 
Governments and the new regime of John Major. 
In specifying the model under investigation, this chapter attempted to lock the 
geographic context into the assessment of economic attitudes and voting 
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behaviour. It has shown that the major electoral phenomena of recent times -
dealignment and economic issue voting - are also geographically variable, and has 
argued that an attempt to control for geographic effects must predate any attempt 
to control for attitudinal structures. 
The social, economic and political context of this research was also examined. This 
included a discussion of the 1980s boom and the 1990s recession, and the turmoil 
caused by the fracturing Thatcher administration in the late 1980s. The political 
and economic contexts were, of course, linked to the geographic context of Britain 
in the 1980s, and the geographic variability of the economic recovery between 
1983-9 is a vital strand of this chapter. 
A model has been specified which sees the three factors which contribute to voting 
behaviour; class, economic attitudes and geography as intrinsically linked in both 
the full and half stage models. Furthermore formal hypotheses have been set out 
which show the direction in which the expected relationships will work. A critical 
feature here is the new geographic variation associated with the new recession 
which began at the start of the decade. 
The hypotheses presented here and their associated null hypotheses provide the 
basis for the analysis in succeeding chapters. Critically this involves examination of 
the two definitions of geography, the impact of class, geography and economic 
attitudes on party support - and the half stage model with economic attitudes as the 
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dependent variable. This chapter has shown how these models will be 
operationalised via the schema used for class and geography. 
Finally this chapter has shown how the two distinct time periods - the 1980s 
recovery and the 1990s recession - will be addressed in the subsequent analysis 
chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 concern the 1980s recovery and use the British Social 
Attitudes survey data; Chapters 5 and 6 concern the 1990s recession and make 
use of the NOPINewsnight series of opinion polls. 
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Chapter 3: The 1980s; Egocentrism, Sociotropism & 
Tergiversating Tories 
There are two distinct time periods covered by this thesis, the Thatcherite recovery 
of 1983-1989 and the new recession of 1990-1992. These two time periods will be 
analysed separately and via two distinct data sets because they are distinct and 
require separate objects of analysis. This is the first of four results chapters in this 
thesis. The first set of two chapters deal with the 1983-1989 period; the second set 
of two chapters deal with the 1990-1992 period of British politics. In each case the 
first chapter sets the scene in a largely descriptive fashion; the second deals more 
robustly with the specific relationships identified by the former. The purpose, then, of 
this chapter is to set the scene for the period between 1983 until 1989, opening the 
way for a more detailed analysis of the same period in the next chapter. Finally it 
serves as a comparative chapter parallel to the first results chapter for the 1990-
1992 period. 
The two previous chapters of this thesis have identified the need to synthesise the 
literature on voting behaviour and electoral geography, and have suggested that this 
might be done through the analysis of economic expectations. This will provide the 
focus for this chapter, which concentrates on the impact of geography and economic 
attitudes upon partisanship during the sustained economic recovery between 1983 
and 1989. 
As the impact of class declines, certain issues become more important in influencing 
how electors decide between the political parties at election times. Electoral 
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geography has shown that throughout the 1980s, geographic variation was 
significant in how individuals made this choice. Mainstream political science has 
hinted that the crucial issue in voting choice concerns economic issues. The next 
stage, and the aim of this chapter, is to find a role for geographic explanation in 
accounting for the variation in not just voting patterns, but also in economic attitudes 
between 1983 and 1989. 
3.1 ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND CONSERVATIVE DOMINATION 1983-89 
It is necessary to set the scene for this section of the thesis dealing with the 1980s. 
For the most part, the 1983-9 period was clearly defined by two distinctive features; 
economically the period was characterised by sustained economic recovery; 
electorally the Conservative Party retained their dominance of the British electoral 
system. Moreover, both features were spatially skewed; neither the economic 
recovery nor the electoral hegemony of the Conservatives were common to all parts 
of the country. 
In 1983, the Conservatives were returned with a landslide majority of 144 seats and 
44 per cent of the vote in mainland Britain, while the opposition parties closely 
contested second place with Labour taking 28 per cent and the Alliance 26 per cent 
of the popular vote. In 1987 the Conservatives were again victorious - with a majority 
of 102 seats in the Commons while collecting 43 per cent of the popular vote -
although Labour comfortably reasserted themselves as the other major party, 
particularly in their heartlands of traditional support such as the industrial North of 
England and the Celtic fringe. Nationally the Labour share of the vote in 1987 
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increased to 32 per cent, the Alliance vote fell to 23 per cent (Butler & Kavanagh, 
1988, Heath et a/ 1990). The geographic variation in Labour's share of the vote 
meant that they were able to pile up seats in their heartlands, while the uniformity of 
the Alliance vote across all constituencies, put them at a distinct disadvantage in 
translating votes into seats. 
The spatial variation in party support was crucial during this period. Primarily the 
Government was able to consolidate power thanks to a divided opposition and a 
hefty core of support in the South-East of the country and among service sector 
employees. Secondly, Labour were able to avoid parliamentary obliteration in 1983 
thanks to the geographic base of their support; the Single-Member Single Plurality 
electoral system benefits parties with large heartlands of support concentrated in 
certain constituencies and areas, and disadvantages parties whose support is 
geographically heterogeneous (see Rae 1971, Reeve & Ware 1992) 
Moreover, as voting behaviour was spatially disaggregated, so too were political 
attitudes. The heartlands of Thatcherism were also the cornerstone of faith in the 
free market and a strong defence policy (Johnston & Pattie, 1990a; Fieldhouse, 
1995). Thus in order to study the impact of Thatcherism, the geographic dimension 
is integral, and this time period represents the epitome of the Thatcherite 
programme - as the Government embarked on its first privatisation programmes with 
the flagship British Telecom in 1984, and high profile privatisation of British Gas in 
1986, British Airways and British Petroleum in 1987, British Steel in 1988 and the 
Water and Sewerage companies of England and Wales in 1989. The programme of 
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assisted sale of council houses to tenants was in full swing, the Falklands War had 
been won in 1982 and the striking miners were defeated after a long and bitter 
dispute in 1984-85. Hence if Thatcherism ever represented an ideological project or 
the Great Moving Right Show (Hall, 1988), then it is in this period that its impact 
upon the attitudes of the British public should have been at its height, when the 
political agenda was dominated by talk of popular capitalism and share owning 
democracies, of the enemy without and the enemy within. Nevertheless there is little 
evidence to suggest that, at the national level, the public embraced the ideological 
tenets of Thatcherism to a great extent (see Heath 1991; Crewe 1988; Crewe and 
Searing 1988; Garrett 1994). Indeed it appears that it was the ability of the 
Conservative Government in the Thatcher era to deliver economic success -
particularly the recovery after 1983 - rather than the ideological nature of 
Thatcherism that lay at the heart of their continued success (see Hahn 1988; 
Minford 1988 ). 
One of the most interesting themes throughout the period is the position of the third 
party. In 1983, the Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance came very close to usurping 
Labour as the main party of opposition - at least in terms of the popular vote if not in 
seats gained. In 1987 however, they were unable to capitalise on this and were 
beaten back to third place by a resurgent Labour party. Directly after the 1987 
General Election the Liberal and Social Democratic parties embarked upon a bitter 
and acrimonious merger which resulted in a breakaway led by the SDP leader David 
Owen and a significant dip in support for the newly merged party - known originally 
as the Democrats and later as the Liberal Democrats. In 1989, the Liberal 
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Democrats were beaten into fourth place by Labour, the Conservatives and the 
Greens in the European Elections in Britain, This is the context in which 1983-89 
should be viewed as the third party support surged and declined radically 
throughout the period, Moreover, the level of Liberal Democrat support at the end of 
the 1980s was significantly suppressed due to the merger debacle, hence the anti-
Government opposition became increasingly focused upon the Labour party, albeit 
as a temporary phenomena. 
3,2 THE BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES SERIES DATA 
The dataset used for this analysis was the British Social Attitudes series of surveys 
which were carried out annually between 1983 and 1989 (with the exception of 
1988), The series also included a panel survey between 1983 and 1986, Its design 
allowed the comprehensive analysis of both political partisanship (though not voting 
behaviour) and economic attitudes and the inter-relationship between the two, The 
central thrust of this thesis is that variations in economic attitudes have fed into 
political partisanship (and ultimately voting behaviour), 
3.2,1 THE PANEL STUDY 
An important element in the British Social Attitudes series of surveys is the panel 
study, Between 1983 and 1986, the surveyors returned to the same respondents in 
order to assess the extent of real individual change in attitudes and political 
behaviour, 
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A serious problem with panel studies is the atrophy of respondents. Each new 
attempt to contact members of the panel would be likely to encounter decreasing 
numbers of original members as respondents become uncontactable. To this end, 
responses were weighted for the years subsequent to 1983. Nevertheless, the panel 
is likely to be represented by an ever decreasing sample size unless attempts are 
made to replace respondents who have died, have moved, or have become 
otherwise uncontactable. There may be a problem of representativeness if the panel 
members who fall out of the survey are vital for the construction of a representative 
sample. On the other hand, however, the fact that the analysis here does not 
present obvious differences between the attitudes of the panel and of the members 
of the general survey suggests that the British Social Attitudes panel was not 
significantly different from the annual survey and that sample atrophy was not a 
critical problem. 
3.3 PARTISANSHIP; THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
3.3.1 PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
The links between economic and political choice ought to be present between as 
well as in election years. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the period 1983-1989 was 
particularly crucial to the economic and electoral climate as economic recovery (in 
some regions only) coincided with the continued political dominance of the 
Conservatives. The culmination of this interest in the inter-election periods as well 
as the 1983 and 1987 Elections is that this thesis requires the use of some 
surrogate measure of voting choice rather than voting behaviour per se. Hence the 
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analysis of the British Social Attitudes dataset between 1983 and 1989 concentrated 
upon partisan identification rather than vote itself. 
Partisan identification may be defined as the affinity an elector feels towards a 
political party, enabling the voter to cope with the vast array of political information 
with which he or she is inundated, as partisan identification provides the cue to the 
formation of attitudes (see Campbell et a/ 1960). Moreover partisan identification 
strengthens over time as voters embark on a learning process of voting. Crucially 
electors may switch between vote preferences in the short-term without affecting 
their partisan identification. As such it should be a more permanent feature of party 
fealty than actual voting behaviour which could be offset by any number of should-
term phenomena. The proliferation of split-ticket voting in the USA has been seen as 
evidence of the relevance of partisan identification as a theoretical tool for political 
analysis, since voters who identify themselves as supporters of one party seem to 
have little difficulty in voting for individual candidates of the other party. In this way 
many Democrat identifiers may have voted for the Republican candidate 
Eisenhower in the 1952 and 1956 Presidential Elections, or for Reagan in the 1980 
and 1984 Presidential contests - without having to realign their self-identification with 
the Democratic Party. 
The primary thing to note about this is that partisan identification is not identical to 
vote - and its use as a surrogate variable for voting behaviour studies should 
proceed cautiously with this in mind. Indeed a central theme running throughout the 
partisan identification literature was that partisan identification was distinct from 
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voting behaviour per se. Campbell et al (1960) stressed that partisan identification 
was a different phenomena entirely to how an elector casts his or her vote. 
As a theoretical tool however, partisan identification has not survived intact its export 
from the USA Butler and Stokes (1969) for instance found that while 90 per cent of 
British voters had a 'partisan self-image' between 1963 and 1966, British voters 
were less likely than their American counterparts to switch voting behaviour without 
also changing their partisan identification. 
In the main, partisan self-images and electoral 
preferences travel together in Britain far more than in 
America (1969; p. 40), 
Robertson (1976) considers the theoretical concept of partisan identification to be 
seriously flawed and numerous studies have demonstrated its lack of explanatory 
force as a cross-national concept (see for instance, Thomassen 1976, Le Duc 1981, 
Mughan 1981). Nevertheless it remains a curious feature of mainstream political 
science that although partisan identification fails to stand up as a theoretical 
concept, it does survive empirically. Harrop and Miller (1987) believe that it provides 
a useful baseline of support for political parties 'natural' electorates. Thus 1983 
could be characterised as an aberrant rather than a realigning Election since 
although Labour support fell significantly, its level of party identifiers held reasonably 
well. Heath and MacDonald (1988) believe that empirically the notion survives partly 
due to its habitual use in surveys. In short its presence lends itself to analysis even if 
that which it measures cannot be isolated satisfactorily. 
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The presence of partisan identification in this analysis can be defended on two 
fronts. Firstly if as Butler and Stokes claim, the distinction between partisan 
identification and actual voting behaviour is blurred in the British case, then this 
does not necessarily harm the purpose of the analysis here which is after a" a study 
of voting behaviour in elections and vote intention in inter-election periods. 
Secondly, party identification represents the best available variable to measure party 
support across a period which covers two election years and four inter-election 
years. 
Party Identification varies markedly by region (Table 3.1 reports data from the panel 
study, and Table 3.2 reports data from the annual cross-section). This data derives 
from the British Social Attitudes 1983-86 panel and the full series of cross-sectional 
series between 1983 and 1989 respectively. The first feature to note is that even 
'Ivt1en the atrophy of panel members is recognised there is very little variation in the 
expressed partisanship of panel member respondents from the entire British Social 
Attitudes series. This would seem to indicates that there was little evidence to 
support the notion that panel members quickly become atypical respondents due to 
their constant investigation by survey organisations. 
The regional pattern of party identification throughout the entire British Social 
Attitudes series (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2) shows little change in the relative 
propensities of respondents to identify with a particular party. Scottish and Welsh 
respondents 'NSre among the most hostile of all respondents to Conservative 
identification throughout the period 1983-89, and the most inclined of all 
respondents to express identification with the Labour Party. Mean'v'A"lile respondents 
from the South 'NSre typically pro-Conservative and anti-Labour in their identification 
tendencies. 
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TABLE 3.1: PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY REGION 
Scotland & Wales 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 31 29 29 27 
Labour 65 64 60 55 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 04 08 10 18 
North 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 33 27 25 26 
Labour 51 54 54 50 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 16 18 21 24 
Midlands 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 64 58 61 47 
Labour 30 31 26 31 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 06 11 13 22 
Greater London 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 48 44 32 34 
Labour 33 28 32 32 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 19 28 36 34 
South 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 56 57 55 50 
Labour 25 24 22 21 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 20 19 23 29 
Source; BSA Panel Study 
TABLE 3.2 PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY REGION 
Scotland & Wales 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 32 34 29 27 27 32 
Labour 57 54 54 55 49 56 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 12 13 17 17 24 12 
North 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 37 38 30 30 38 41 
Labour 48 49 51 51 42 50 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 16 13 19 19 20 09 
Midlands 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 52 54 39 48 50 49 
Labour 35 35 45 28 29 38 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 13 11 17 17 20 13 
Greater London 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 46 45 27 39 47 45 
Labour 37 42 54 43 35 42 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 17 13 19 18 18 13 
South 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 53 50 49 48 55 58 
Labour 24 28 24 27 21 25 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 23 22 27 25 24 17 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
The next set of Tables 3.3 (panel data) and 3.4 (cross-section data) reveal a similar 
story for the fivefold constituency type schema which is the second measurement of 
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geography in the analysis of party identification and economic attitudes. Despite 
some very big variations over time - most notably the drop in inner metropolitan 
Conservatism between 1984 and 1985 - the Conservative Government were able to 
count a strong base of support concentrated in constituencies typified by white-collar 
and agricultural employment. Conversely, they fared poorest in areas typified by 
industrial decline and a high proportion of council housing, where respondents were 
prone to support Labour. This variation in party identification formed the basis of the 
winning electoral strategy the Conservatives built among voters from the South and 
the service sector throughout the 1980s. 
TABLE 3.3 PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depression/Immigration 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 34 30 26 28 
Labour 50 56 51 48 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 17 14 23 24 
Council Housing 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 29 22 23 24 
Labour 66 69 68 63 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 35 10 09 13 
Innermetropolitan 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 38 21 15 17 
Labour 38 29 46 42 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 25 50 38 42 
White Collar 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 55 55 52 48 
Labour 29 21 22 17 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 16 24 27 35 
Buoyant/Agriculture 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Conservative 59 55 51 44 
Labour 26 27 25 25 
Liberal-SDP Alliance 15 18 24 30 
Source; BSA Panel Study 
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TABLE 3.4 PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depression/Immigration 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 35 35 24 28 34 36 
Labour 52 54 62 56 48 55 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 14 11 14 16 18 08 
Council Housing 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 32 31 22 30 29 25 
Labour 57 57 60 53 48 69 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 11 12 18 17 24 06 
Innermetropolitan 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 40 44 17 31 31 36 
Labour 38 41 64 58 54 57 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 21 16 19 11 15 07 
White Collar 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 48 52 49 48 60 58 
Labour 33 34 25 28 18 27 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 19 14 26 23 22 15 
Buoyant/Agriculture 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Conservative 55 52 44 46 50 52 
Labour 25 28 33 30 26 30 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats 20 20 23 23 25 17 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
This fits neatly into the existing body of knowledge about British politics during this 
period. Firstly support for the Conservative Government held firm in the Southern 
sections of the electorate and among constituencies typified by service sector and 
agricultural employment. Labour support (although not necessarily party 
identification) haemorrhaged in 1983 and although Labour consolidated its support 
in its traditional heartlands, it failed to break through in the South, hence Labour's 
relative strength in the Celtic regions and the North, in depressed regions and areas 
typified by high intensity council housing in the 1987 British Social Attitudes survey. 
Since the information known about the Election years of 1983 and 1987 fits with the 
findings of this analysis for those election years, the next question must concern the 
inter-election periods between 1983 and 1987 and 1987 and 1989. In fact, for the 
most part the pattern of Government and opposition parties' identification is 
131 
Chapter 3: 111" /9?iOs: h~ocentrislll, 5;ociotropislII & Tergiversating Tories 
remarkably similar to that for election years. Conservative identification was 
particularly strong in the South, the Midlands and areas typified by white-collar or 
agricultural employment; it was weakest in areas of industrial depression and 
council housing and in the North and Scotland and Wales. 
3.3.2 TERGIVERSATION IN CONSERVATIVE IDENTIFICATION 
There is however, an interesting feature of Conservative identification highlighted by 
the geographic disaggregations of party identification in Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 
3.4. This is the inter-election tendency of certain sections of the electorate to desert 
identification with the governing party in non-election years, but their subsequent 
return to the fold in the years of a General Election. 
Voters from Greater London were more prone to vacillate between pro- and anti-
Government identification during the 1983-89 period (see Tables 3.2 and 3.4). In the 
two General Election years, 1983 and 1987, respondents from Greater London were 
particularly prone to express Conservative identification; in inter-election years their 
expressed Conservative identification was seriously diluted. In 1985 - the year the 
Greater London Council was abolished - respondents from the Greater London area 
were twice as likely to express Labour identification than Conservative identification. 
However by the year of the next Election, 1987, identification with the Labour party 
had withered among Greater Londoners and the in-built pro-Conservative bias had 
reasserted itself. A similar but not so pronounced tendency of anti-Government drift 
in identification in inter-election years was also discernible among respondents from 
the Midlands. 
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Although these tergiversating Tories seem to be particularly concentrated in the 
Greater London area, subsequent analysis will show that a similar trend for 
increased tendency to express Conservatism in General Election years also exists 
among foremen and technicians (see Chapter 4 below). As a phenomenon, they 
may be important electorally if it can be shown that they represent a target group of 
support for the Government in the run-up to an Election, particularly in what Miller et 
al (1990) call 'the long campaign'. Hence if the governing party set out specifically to 
elicit the support of (or to dilute the hostility of) sections of the electorate who 
otherwise exhibit hostility to them in Election years, then this may go some way to 
explaining the electoral durability of Thatcherism. In Chapters 5 and 6, evidence is 
provided to suggest that John Major's Government managed to manufacture its re-
election via an appeal to certain sections of the electorate. 
3.4 LOCATING A PLACE FOR GEOGRAPHY 
3.4.1 THE STATE OF THE AREA 
The connection between the geography of the recession and recovery of the 1980s 
and the geography of attitudes needs to be forged. An obvious way of achieving this 
is through attitudes to the area in which an individual lived. There were grounds for 
considering the geographic cleavage in the British electorate to be significant in the 
formation of attitudes. In 1983, British Social Attitudes respondents were asked for 
their interpretations of 'the state of the area' in which they live compared to two 
years before. It was noticeable that a far smaller proportion of Southerners thought 
that their area had 'worsened' than respondents from the Midlands or the North of 
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England (Table 3.5). In contrast, Midlanders were unlikely to express the feeling that 
their area had improved over the last two years in 1983, while respondents from the 
South of England were the most likely of all sections of the electorate to believe their 
area had improved. This matched the economic geography of the period; individuals 
were reacting in line with the real regional conditions. 
TABLE 3.5 STATE OF THE AREA SINCE TWO YEARS AGO BY REGION. 1983-86 PANEL 
1983 HAS STAYED HAS 
IMPROVED THE SAME WORSENED 
Scotland & Wales 12 68 21 
North 07 65 28 
Midlands 05 63 31 
Greater London 11 59 29 
South 15 76 10 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
It is important to note that respondents were not provided with any prompt 
concerning the specific meaning of area, and that the five sub-classifications of 
region used here were not necessarily identical to those which respondents may 
have had in mind when they answered the question. Hence it is not possible to 
ascertain whether respondents restricted their view of 'the area in which you live' to 
a notion of a few streets, a town, a city, a county, a nation or indeed some other idea 
of district. What is clear is that whichever notion of area was used, the analysis 
provided interesting results which were consistent with the regional economic vote 
model. 
A brief return to the partisanship of electors in 1983 reveals that the spatial pattern 
of an area's relative performance was not replicated in the analysis of partisan 
identification with the three major parties. It might have been assumed that those 
respondents who felt their area had fared badly in recent years would be unlikely to 
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express Government support, while those respondents who felt their area had done 
well would be likely to support and identify with the Government. However, this does 
not appear to be the case for 1983 - an Election year. The Midlands represented an 
apparent hot-bed of resentment to the recent changes in an area's prosperity (Table 
3,5), but Table 3.2 illustrated a marked inclination of respondents from the Midlands 
to identify themselves as Conservative in 1983. This apparent conundrum for the 
position of the geographic context of electoral politics in Britain requires attention. 
Geography was apparently important in explaining what individuals thought of their 
region but was significant in explaining their partisanship in a conflicting manner. A 
possible solution to this paradox may be found by reference to the construction of 
personal and economic attitudes presented in Table 3.6. If attitudes to the local area 
do not form the link between geography and vote, the next stage of this chapter has 
to scrutinise geographic variation in economic attitudes and perceptions of personal 
circumstances in the 1980s. 
3.4.2 ECONOMIC ATIITUDES 
The next step then is to scrutinise the economic attitudinal structure of the electorate 
between 1983 and 1989. This will involve personal financial positions, inflation, 
unemployment and attitudes to industry. This range is crucial since it involves not 
only sociotropic issues but also egocentriC ones; that is, economic issues which 
affect the country as a whole as well as the individual. Most of these attitudinal 
questions concerned the predictive forecasts of the public to changes in these 
economic items over the coming year - that is they are prospective rather than 
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retrospective. There were however a few retrospective evaluations of family income 
levels and industrial performance. 
3.4.2.1 PERSONAL FINANCIAL POSITIONS 
In 1983 - the same year as the perceptions of changes to the respondents area was 
gauged - the regional geography of personal economic recollections (Table 3.6) was 
similar to the geography of party identification rather than to the geography of 
perceptions of the area. patterns. Respondents were asked to compare the current 
financial status of their family to their status five years before. This is crucial for a 
number of reasons. Primarily, it concentrates the issue on personal economic 
attitudes; secondly the different time scale to the area change question (which 
required a two year recollection of the state of the area) presented respondents with 
different criteria on which to form opinions. Critically the period covering the previous 
five years invited comparison with the final year of the last Labour Government. 
TABLE 3.61983 FINANCIAL STATE OF FAMILY COMPARED TO FIVE YEARS AGO 
1983 HAS STAYED HAS 
IMPROVED THE SAME WORSENED 
Scotland & Wales 26 16 58 
North 31 22 47 
Midlands 27 43 30 
Greater London 25 26 49 
South 33 27 40 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
Midlanders were the least dissatisfied with their personal financial development 
under the Conservatives. In contrast, Scots and Welsh respondents were the most 
likely of all sections of the electorate to state their belief that their personal financial 
state had deteriorated over the period 1978-83. On the other hand the Southern 
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section of the electorate were the most impressed by the relative changes in 
personal wealth rates over the preceding five years. 
This general picture reflected the pattern of partisanship (Table 3.2) rather than the 
perceptions of changes to the respondent's area in the previous two years. Personal 
retrospective economic attitudes appear to form a link with partisanship between 
1983 and 1989 - the geographies of both being very similar. Moreover, economic 
perceptions provided a stronger association with party identification - and therefore 
voting choice - than the more obvious geographic variation in regional status. This 
then gives considerable hope for the central theme of the thesis, that economic 
evaluations are influenced by the local context, and that both are influences on 
voting behaviour. 
3.4.2.2 FAMILY INCOME LEVELS 
The next step is to move from retrospective to prospective judgements. 
Throughout the recovery period of 1984-89 very few respondents were willing to 
state that their personal positions would improve, but there were notable 
variations in the propensity of individuals to make pessimistic forecasts 
according to where they lived (Table 3.7). People from the South and Greater 
London were less likely to say that their personal economic fortunes would 
decline than their counterparts in Scotland and Wales or the North of England. 
This tendency was particularly marked in the Election year of 1987 when 48 per 
cent of Celts and 47 per cent of Northerners thought that their personal futures 
would decline compared to only 34 per cent of Greater Londoners and 35 per 
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cent of Southerners. Of course the regions where individuals felt that they were 
less likely to be disadvantaged formed the core of the Conservative vote in 
1987, and the hostile regions were the basis of the Labour Opposition vote in 
the General Election. 
TABLE 3.7 FORECASTS OF FAMILY INCOME BY REGION 
Scotland & Wales 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 08 05 06 08 11 
Stay the same 40 36 45 44 38 
Decline 52 59 48 48 51 
North 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 07 06 08 10 09 
Stay the same 43 36 40 43 44 
Decline 49 58 52 47 47 
Midlands 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 05 09 09 08 08 
Stay the same 46 45 43 50 43 
Decline 49 46 48 41 49 
Greater London 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 12 11 13 13 13 
Stay the same 49 38 50 53 43 
Decline 39 51 37 34 44 
South 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 09 11 10 11 11 
Stay the same 54 47 49 54 45 
Decline 37 42 41 35 45 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
The regional disaggregations for family income forecasts are presented in Table 3.7 
and the disaggregation of family income forecasts by the five fold constituency type 
schema is presented in Table 3.8. 
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TABLE 3.8 FORECASTS OF FAMILY INCOME BY CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depression/Immigration 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 06 07 06 08 10 
Stay the same 41 33 41 44 41 
Decline 53 60 54 48 49 
Council Housing 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 10 06 07 12 08 
Stay the same 36 36 44 41 39 
Decline 55 58 49 47 52 
Innermetropo/itan 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 16 10 17 14 12 
Stay the same 47 40 48 48 36 
Decline 38 50 35 38 53 
While Collar 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 09 11 11 14 11 
Stay the same 51 42 49 51 45 
Decline 39 46 40 35 44 
Buoyant/Agriculture 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 08 09 11 09 10 
Stay the same 53 46 46 53 44 
Decline 39 45 43 38 46 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
The most obvious phenomenon presented in these tables on which to comment on 
is that there is an in-built and manifest reluctance to assume an optimistic position 
among almost all respondents. It could well be the case that all questions which ask 
respondents to evaluate criteria involving finances and the cost of living are liable to 
suffer from this type of contamination. The family income levels questions which 
required respondents to evaluate their family standing in terms of either falling 
behind or keeping ahead of costs or prices would seem particular prone to this 
problem. 
Overall then, it might be surprising that there is any variation in family income 
forecasts according to geography. As they stand, there is a slight inclination for 
respondents from Scotland and Wales, the North, depressed and council housing 
dominated areas to express heightened pessimism. Throughout the series, these 
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respondents were more likely to express the view that their family incomes would 
worsen in relation to the cost of living than their counterparts in the South, and in 
white-collar and buoyant areas. The point here is that although the level of optimism 
is universally low, there are discernible differences in the rates of those respondents 
who thought that their relative position would decline or stay the same. Southerners 
and respondents from white-collar and buoyant areas were just as likely to eschew 
optimism about their family finances but seemed more likely to adopt neutral 
positions than their peers in the North and in areas typified by council house 
provision. 
A final point to comment on here, is that both Tables 3.7 and 3.8 appear to illustrate 
a slight flattening of any regional disparity in 1989 - the last year of the British Social 
Attitudes, as the relative propensity of respondents to express pessimism, neutrality 
and optimism about their family income levels became virtually unanimous across all 
regions and constituency types. This might be at least in part explained by the 
dynamics of the 'new' recession which had begun to bite in 1989. Moreover it would 
be surprising if the reality of the 'new' recession which struck the service sector and 
the South of England disproportionately was not picked up by a 'flattening out' of the 
regional disparities in economic expectations. 
3.4.2.3 INFLATION 
As was te case with predictions of income levels, throughout the 1983-89 economic 
recovery, the British public remained pessimistic about inflation, unemployment and 
Britain's industrial performance. They were especially reluctant to exhibit optimism 
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about the prospect of falling inflation, even though these attitudes were expressed in 
the context of real economic recovery (Tables 3.9). 
TABLE 3.9 INFLATION FORECASTS 
Inflation: in a year from now, do you expect prices generally to have gone up, to have stayed the 
same. or to have gone down? 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
To have gone up by a lot 24 31 40 26 26 45 
To have gone up by a little 56 52 48 49 52 43 
To have stayed the same 12 13 08 17 17 08 
To have gone down by a little 05 03 02 06 03 03 
To have gone down by a lot 01 00 01 01 00 00 
DK/NA 02 02 01 01 02 01 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
When the reluctance to anticipate a decrease in prices over the next year was 
disaggregated regionally, it was clear that pessimism about the future levels of 
prices did not seem to be more prevalent in some regions than in others (Table 
3.10). Among panel members, the period 1983-86 saw an almost unflinching 
pessimism in relation to their forecasts about rising prices. Respondents from 
Scotland and Wales seemed as likely to think that prices would go up as 
respondents from the Southern heartlands of Conservative support. Furthermore 
this picture was replicated by the non-panel element of the British Social Attitudes 
series (Table 3.11). For the whole of the British Social Attitudes series from 1983 
until 1989, respondents from areas characterised by disproportional levels of Labour 
identification - the Celtic fringe and the North, were just as likely to be either 
pessimistic or optimistic about the future levels of prices as were respondents from 
regions typified by strong Government identification such as the South of England. 
However, the lack of spatial variation in attitudes to inflation is not in itself surprising. 
Although a core element of the economic context, inflation is far less likely to vary 
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across regions than other criteria such as unemployment. Even when local 
inflationary pressures can exhibit independence from national trends- for example 
the local housing market - they cannot conform to the normal constraints of inflation 
(normally retail prices do not fluctuate in the same way that house values did 
throughout the 1980s). Moreover while much of the media interest in economic 
criteria such as unemployment is focused on the local level, inflation is almost 
always represented as a national phenomenon. As a result, the context in which 
inflation is internalised is likely to be national rather than local; spatial variation in 
attitudes to inflation is therefore highly unlikely. 
TABLE 3.101983-86 PANEL MEMBERS; INFLATION FORECASTS BY REGION 
Scot/and & Wales 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Go Down 06 03 02 01 
Stay the Same 11 09 05 15 
Go Up 84 89 93 85 
North 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Go Down 05 03 02 02 
Stay the Same 10 07 09 09 
Go Up 85 90 79 79 
Midlands 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Go Down 03 02 01 01 
Stay the Same 15 20 17 25 
Go Up 83 78 83 75 
Greater London 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Go Down 06 02 02 01 
Stay the Same 10 07 04 09 
Go Up 84 91 94 89 
South 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Go Down 08 01 02 04 
Stay the Same 12 09 11 19 
GoUp 81 90 87 77 
Source; BSA Panel Study 
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TABLE 3.11 FORECASTS OF INFLATION BY REGION 
Scotland & Wales 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 06 04 03 08 04 03 
Stay the same 11 12 05 19 16 06 
Go up 82 85 91 73 79 91 
North 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 05 04 03 04 03 04 
Stay the same 10 11 07 16 16 07 
Go up 85 85 90 79 80 89 
Midlands 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 05 01 03 08 03 03 
Stay the same 16 13 10 16 17 08 
Go up 79 86 87 76 78 89 
Greater London 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 05 02 03 07 02 02 
Stay the same 09 12 08 18 17 09 
Go up 86 86 90 75 81 89 
South 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 05 02 03 07 03 04 
Stay the same 15 16 08 19 17 09 
Go up 80 82 89 75 80 87 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
When the focus of analysis was switched from geographic regions to functional 
areas, that is away from regional disaggregations and towards disaggregations 
based on constituency type, a similar story emerged (Table 3.12). Throughout the 
whole of the British Social Attitudes series, respondents from areas typified by 
economic buoyancy and white collar employment were as likely to be pessimistic 
about the levels of future prices than respondents from area typified by industrial 
depression and high intensity council housing. There is, however, a very slight 
tendency for respondents from buoyant areas to express ambivalence about the 
future levels of prices - stating that prices would stay much the same over the next 
twelve months - compared to respondents from depressed areas or from areas 
typified by high levels of local authority housing tenure. 
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TABLE 3.12 FORECASTS OF INFLATION BY CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depressionllmmigration 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 05 03 04 05 03 03 
Stay the same 12 12 07 14 14 07 
Go up 82 85 89 80 83 90 
Council Housing 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 06 04 04 06 04 03 
Stay the same 09 11 05 17 14 03 
Go up 84 84 81 76 82 95 
Innermetropolitan 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 04 03 03 07 01 02 
Stay the same 09 10 14 14 19 07 
Go up 87 87 81 76 82 91 
White Collar 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 04 04 03 06 03 03 
Stay the same 14 13 09 19 17 08 
Go up 82 84 88 75 80 89 
Buoyant/Agriculture 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 06 02 02 08 03 04 
Stay the same 13 15 09 20 19 09 
Go up 81 83 90 72 78 87 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
On the whole however, it would be extremely unwise to claim that a discernible 
geographic variation occurred between 1983 and 1989 in the attitudes of 
respondents towards inflation. This may be due to a problem of question wording -
confusing inflation (the rate at which prices rise) and the phenomena of rising prices 
per se, or it may reflect a universal reluctance to express optimism about sociotropic 
phenomena - such as inflation - which impact upon personal finances. It may be 
considered good practice in future to shy away from analysis of these types of 
question - which confuse technical terms with everyday concepts, and merge 
knowledge of national phenomena with personal consequences - in favour of more 
specific questions about egocentric or sociotropic values and attitudes. Alternatively 
the issue could be simpler. As a national phenomenon, geographic differences need 
not be expected in attitudes to inflation. 
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Even if inflation forecasts between 1983 and 1989 were not spatially variable, that in 
itself does not represent a defeat for the regional economic vote model since 
inflation might not in itself be disaggregated to the local level. Indeed most people's 
perception of the inflation rate would probably be a national prediction rather than a 
local one. Thus it would be surprising if geographic variation in inflation forecasts did 
exist. 
3.4.2.4 UNEMPLOYMENT 
The British public seemed reluctant to exhibit optimism about the prospect of falling 
unemployment in the early 1980s. By the end of the decade however, they had 
steadily grown more optimistic about the prospect of defeating unemployment (Table 
3.13). This makes sense as headline unemployment declined from 1986 onwards. 
TABLE 3.13 UNEMPLOYMENT FORECASTS 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
To have gone up by a lot 31 25 33 29 17 10 
To have gone up by a little 37 31 34 29 23 16 
To have stayed the same 17 31 23 37 32 37 
To have gone down by a little 13 11 08 25 23 30 
To have gone down by a lot 01 01 01 07 02 05 
DK/NA 02 02 02 01 03 02 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
In reality of course, the incidence of unemployment had been spatially variable 
throughout the 1980s (see Chapter 2). As a consequence, it ought to be the case 
that attitudes to unemployment would also be spatially variable. 
A rudimentary analysis of a phenomena such as inflation which is usually reported 
as a national figure exposed little variation according to geographic criteria. A similar 
analysis of unemployment forecasts, however, does expose significant variation 
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according to spatial dimensions. This may be because although absolute 
unemployment figures are usually quoted as a national figure or rate, there is also 
wide reporting of local levels of unemployment in Britain in the mass and local media 
- and also because unemployment does vary significantly from region to region. In 
short, respondents are used to disaggregating unemployment figures from the 
national to the local; people may be aware of the national picture but their overall 
attitude to unemployment may be tempered by their notion of the local picture. 
Moreover during the period of the British Social Attitudes series there were real 
differences in unemployment rates according to geographic criteria. Respondents in 
the South of England were much less likely to be unemployed themselves or know 
unemployed people than their counterparts in the industrial North. In short, the more 
regional context of unemployment is likely to be the milieu in which notions of 
unemployment are internalised by the public. Hence it would be surprising if this did 
not feed into a regional disparity in attitudes towards unemployment among 
respondents from disparate parts of the country. 
The analysis of both panel members between 1983 and 1986 and the whole British 
Social Attitudes surveys between 1983 and 1989 reveal tangible distinctions in the 
forecasts of unemployment levels of respondents according to regional placement 
Table 3.14 shows that throughout the panel element of the British Social Attitudes 
series, respondents from Scotland and Wales, were more likely to exhibit pessimism 
about the future level of unemployment than respondents from the South of 
England. Conversely respondents from the South and from the Midlands were the 
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most likely of all panel members to forecast a reduction in unemployment rates of 
the next year. 
TABLE 3.14 UNEMPLOYMENT FORECASTS BY REGION 1983-86 PANEL 
Scot/and & Wales 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Will Decrease 10 03 03 04 
Will Stay the Same 15 30 21 26 
Will Increase 75 67 75 70 
North 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Will Decrease 16 13 07 09 
Will Stay the Same 14 28 19 20 
Will Increase 70 59 74 71 
Midlands 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Will Decrease 19 22 08 08 
Will Stay the Same 17 31 43 31 
Will Increase 64 47 50 61 
Greater London 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Will Decrease 13 07 04 09 
Will Stay the Same 17 28 29 22 
Will Increase 70 65 67 70 
South 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Will Decrease 16 13 10 10 
Will Stay the Same 15 37 26 19 
Will Increase 69 50 64 71 
Source; BSA Panel Study 
A cursory glance at the forecasts for unemployment by geographic region for the 
whole of the British Social Attitudes studies between 1983 and 1989 (Table 3.15) 
reveals, firstly, that the overall picture between 1983 and 1986 was virtually identical 
to that identified in the panel element of the survey. Secondly, it reveals a manifest 
increase in overall levels of optimism about the future levels of unemployment 
beginning in the Election year of 1987 and compounded in 1989. This is 
unsurprising since the recovery was underway by 1987 and the consequences of 
the Lawson boom were fully apparent by the time of the British Social Attitudes 
sampling in early 1989. Nevertheless the regional disparities in unemployment 
forecasts evident in the 1983-6 period was maintained thereafter. Although Scots 
and Welsh respondents had become significantly more optimistic overall about the 
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future level of unemployment by 1989, their optimism was still a diluted version of 
the optimism expressed by respondents from the South of England and the capital. 
TABLE 3.15 FORECASTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BY REGION 
Scot/and & Wales 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 10 12 05 06 23 32 
Stay the same 16 28 15 27 30 32 
Go up 74 60 80 67 46 36 
North 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 13 14 09 08 23 35 
Stay the same 15 27 22 25 30 36 
Go up 71 59 69 67 46 28 
Midlands 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 17 16 09 10 26 34 
Stay the same 20 31 21 24 33 42 
Go up 63 54 70 66 36 24 
Greater London 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 14 11 08 08 34 40 
Stay the same 15 27 18 23 31 35 
Go up 70 63 74 69 45 25 
South 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 13 11 10 07 28 38 
Stay the same 19 38 32 28 36 42 
Go up 68 51 58 65 35 20 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
The analysis of the impact of constituency type upon unemployment forecasts 
(Table 3.16) essentially tells the same story. Primarily there is a definite leap in the 
levels of optimism about unemployment forecasts in 1987 across all constituency 
types. Furthermore this leap in levels of optimism is compounded by a further 
increase in 1989. Hence the 1989 electorate was markedly less pessimistic about 
the level of unemployment over the coming year than the electorate had been prior 
to the 1987 Election. 
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TABLE 3.16 FORECASTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BY CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depression/Immigration 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 14 15 08 07 22 35 
Stay the same 15 27 20 24 32 36 
Go up 72 58 72 68 46 29 
Council Housing 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 11 15 10 06 25 27 
Stay the same 13 28 12 23 24 32 
Go up 76 57 78 71 51 42 
Inner metropolitan 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 17 18 14 10 21 32 
Stay the same 11 18 23 24 25 35 
Go up 72 64 63 65 53 32 
White Collar 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 10 12 09 07 30 38 
Stay the same 20 34 23 24 35 40 
Go up 71 54 68 68 35 22 
Buo yant/ Agriculture 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Go down 15 10 09 09 26 38 
Stay the same 20 35 26 28 35 40 
Go up 65 55 65 63 36 22 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
Nevertheless it is also true that the disaggregation of unemployment forecasts by 
constituency type shows that despite the overall increased optimism in the 
electorate the geographic disparities in forecasts identified by constituency type 
remained intact with respondents from constituencies typified by a large proportion 
of council houses still being relatively less optimistic than respondents from areas 
typified by economic buoyancy or agriculture or constituencies characterised by 
white collar employment. 
The direction of the relationship between unemployment forecasts and geography 
fits with the general model of the economic recovery in the 1980s. Respondents 
from those regions with low rates of unemployment, tended to be optimistic about 
the future level of unemployment while respondents from those areas which failed to 
149 
( 'hal'/er 3: nil' 1\1.\11.\, I',:\!,()( (,II/ri,\/II ....... (}c/(ilrupislI/ & I('rgil'erso/ing Tories 
recover from the barrage of industrial recession prior to 1983 were the most 
pessimistic about future levels of unemployment. 
3.4.2.5 INDUSTRY 
Despite the reality of economic recovery in the 1980s, respondents throughout 
Britain were reluctant to say that Britain's general industrial performance would 
"improve a lot" (Table 3.17). The numbers who felt it would "improve a little" 
steadily declined through the 1983-89 period - from about 40 per cent to 25 per 
cent of all respondents - but the proportion of respondents who felt that Britain's 
general industrial performance would decline (by either a little or a lot) remained 
fairly constant at around 13 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. Again this is 
unsurprising since industrial output did not match 1979 levels until 1990. 
TABLE 3.17 BRITAIN'S GENERAL INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE FORECASTS 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
To improve a lot 05 04 03 03 07 05 
To improve a little 39 34 25 22 29 25 
To stay much the same 34 41 44 47 41 47 
To decline a little 13 12 15 16 12 12 
To decline a lot 04 04 06 07 06 04 
DK/NA 06 06 07 06 07 07 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
Respondents were fairly willing to state the view that British industry was 
becoming more efficient. From 1986-1989, the proportion of the public who felt 
that the efficiency of British industry had improved over the past five years grew 
from 32 per cent to 44 per cent. Those who felt that industry had become less 
efficient declined by 10 percentage points to 14 per cent of the public by 1989 
(Table 3.18). If the public were willing to give the Government the credit for this 
perceived improvement in industrial efficiency then this would be a likely source 
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of electoral support for the Government via the reward-punishment axiom. 
Moreover forecasts for the next five years were as favourable for the 
Government as public recollections had been. By 1989 43 per cent of the public 
felt that British industry would become more efficient over the next five years, 
while only 7 per cent felt it would become less efficient over the next five years 
(Table 3.19). A model of Government support based on expectations looked as 
favourable for the Government in 1989 as the reward-punishment axiom did. 
TABLE 3.18 EFFICIENCY OF BRITISH INDUSTRY OVER LAST FIVE YEARS 
1986 1987 1989 
More efficient 32 39 44 
About the same 37 38 37 
Less efficient 24 18 14 
DK/NA 06 05 06 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
TABLE 3.19 EFFICIENCY OF BRITISH INDUSTRY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS 
1986 1987 1989 
More efficient 36 45 43 
About the same 42 40 41 
Less efficient 13 09 07 
DK/NA 08 07 09 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
The next step of this analysis is to look at attitudes to British industry by geography. 
A rudimentary analysis of the attitudes of the public towards the fate of industry 
illustrates a marked distinction in forecasts of industrial performance according to 
both region and constituency type reveals two trends (Table 3.20). Firstly, unlike the 
case with unemployment forecasts, the recovery of the late 1980s did not result in 
an across the board increase in optimistic industry forecasts. All that is clear is that 
there was a marked increase in relatively optimistic industrial forecasts in the 
Election year of 1987, particularly among respondents from the Midlands, from the 
capital and from the South of England. This leads directly to the second feature of 
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the industrial forecasts which is that throughout the 1983-9 British Social Attitudes 
series, There was an obvious difference in levels of optimism and pessimism 
according to geographic region. Furthermore, the direction of this variation was also 
in keeping with the expected hypothesis - as respondents from the Conservative 
heartlands in the South of the country were much more prone to express confidence 
in the ability of British industry to improve over the coming year than their 
counterparts in the more industrial Labour heartlands of the Celtic fringe and the 
North of England. Again there could be an objective basis for this spatial variation. 
The industrial restructuring of the 1980s pitted the "sunrise industries" of the South 
against the "rust-belt" industry in the North. A dislocation of attitudes towards the 
industrial economy according to where an individual lived would be a natural result 
of this conflict. 
TABLE 3.20 FORECASTS OF INDUSTRY BY REGION 
Scotland & Wales 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 41 34 24 23 34 32 
Stay the same 32 47 51 48 42 46 
Decline 27 19 25 30 23 22 
North 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 44 36 25 25 31 31 
Stay the same 34 43 48 49 46 51 
Decline 22 22 26 26 23 18 
Midlands 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 49 46 31 27 41 36 
Stay the same 34 41 50 53 46 50 
Decline 16 13 19 20 13 14 
Greater London 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 51 43 27 27 40 30 
Stay the same 33 46 43 48 42 49 
Decline 16 11 30 25 17 21 
South 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 47 43 38 29 45 30 
Stay the same 41 42 45 48 41 53 
Decline 12 15 18 22 14 17 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
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The differences in the industrial forecasts of respondents according to constituency 
type over the entire British Social Attitudes period of 1983-9 revealed a similar story 
(Table 3.21). The shift towards optimism in white collar and economically buoyant 
areas was again discernible, while respondents from inner-metropolitan areas, from 
areas characterised by a high proportion of council housing and from depressed 
constituencies were relatively immune from the 1987 Election year confidence of 
their higher status counterparts. 
TABLE 3.21 FORECASTS OF INDUSTRY BY CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depression/Immigration 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 43 37 22 23 33 31 
Stay the same 35 42 51 50 44 50 
Decline 22 21 27 26 33 19 
Council Housing 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 39 33 23 22 32 30 
Stay the same 29 46 46 44 41 41 
Decline 32 21 31 34 27 29 
Innermetropolitan 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 57 41 32 24 31 21 
Stay the same 24 45 51 48 44 49 
Decline 19 13 17 28 25 31 
White Collar 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 49 42 36 29 47 32 
Stay the same 35 45 43 46 38 52 
Decline 15 13 20 25 15 17 
Buoyant/Agriculture 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Improve 49 44 33 29 40 34 
Stay the same 39 42 47 51 46 52 
Decline 12 14 20 20 14 15 
Source; BSA Cross-Sectional Study 
Throughout the series respondents from depressed areas and constituencies 
typified by council housing were the less optimistic and more pessimistic about the 
future of Britain's industrial performance over the coming year than respondents 
from areas typified by white collar employment and by economic prosperity. This fits 
with the accepted knowledge of the dynamics of the recession and recovery of the 
Thatcher era, as the white collar and service sectors which suffered the least from 
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the initial recession of the early 1980s were also the biggest beneficiaries of the 
recovery in the mid-1980s. Meanwhile the industrial sector was hit the hardest by 
the first recession of the Thatcher premiership as Britain's manufacturing base was 
eroded, but failed to be in the vanguard of the recovery which was based on service 
sector employment (Lewis & Townsend 1989, Johnston & Pattie 1990b). The 
evidence of Table 3.21 would tend to support this knowledge as respondents from 
areas typified by service sector employment appeared less distressed about 
industrial prospects in the teeth of the recession and more optimistic in the 
subsequent recovery, than respondents from areas typified by industrial sector 
employment. Although the pessimism about industry in industrial areas speaks 
volumes about the economic restructuring of the 1980s. 
3.5 SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter geographic variations in both partisan preferences and attitudes to 
economic variables have been sought. However, it has been an introductory rather 
than a definitive exercise and much remains to be done. 
Initially there appears to be an evident disparity in the impact of geography upon 
economic attitudes. Questions which probe knowledge of inflation rates or the cost 
of living tended to elicit universally pessimistic responses. As a result, no general 
geographic variation in the responses to these questions were found - although the 
central premise that geographic variation should have been present is questionable. 
On the other hand however, apparent disparity associated with geographic variation 
was recorded in other areas of economic issues. This seemed to be particularly true 
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for those issues where the local context was as appropriate - or even more 
appropriate - as the national context for the public to form their views. Hence 
although most respondents might have had a firm notion of the national level of 
unemployment, it might be their local knowledge that forms their outlook on the issue 
of unemployment - regardless of whether or not the incidence of unemployment 
affects them directly. 
An important finding in this chapter was the phenomena of tergiversating Tories. 
These were groups of voters - from the Midlands and Greater London, and in 
supervisory job capacities - who were likely to support the Conservatives only in 
election years. In the inter-election period they seemed inclined to favour the 
opposition parties. This made them a key 'target' group of voters for the Government 
seeking re-election. The ability of the Government to persuade these voters to return 
to the fold in election years would form a crucial part of the Conservatives electoral 
strategy during the 1980s and beyond. 
This chapter has concentrated on the analysis of geography in isolation to other 
factors. This is of course seldom the case, as geography will in part reflect other 
significant cleavages. Moreover, several authors have concluded that after the 
effects of class have been controlled for, the North-South divide in voting behaviour 
disappears - that the North is more pro-Labour because it is more working class 
(see for instance Rose & McAllister, 1986, 1990). Consequently subsequent 
chapters will endeavour to measure the effects of geography in alliance with the 
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effects of class in order to control for any cointegration or interaction effects between 
the two. 
Finally this chapter has provided an introductory analysis of the place of geography 
in the study of economic attitudes. There is an obvious need to push this analysis 
further and the aim of the next chapter will be to test the association between 
geography, economic issues and party identification between 1983 and 1989 more 
robustly. 
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Chapter 4: Partisanship, Economic Attitudes & Space 
During the Recovery of the 1980s 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the relationship between economic attitudes and 
geography came under preliminary scrutiny. Evidence of a geographic divide in 
economic evaluations during the recovery of the 1980s was provided. This 
chapter has the aim of scrutinising the relationship between economic attitudes 
and geography in more detail and in a more robust statistical fashion. 
Furthermore it will adopt the fuller model of economic attitudes and 
partisanship outlined in Chapter 2. 
The hypothesised relationship between social class, geography, economic 
attitudes and partisanship is reiterated in Figure 4.1. An objective of this 
chapter is to measure the full model with party identification as the dependent 
variable and the half-stage model with economic evaluations as the dependent. 
The separation of economic attitudes into their component forms is now 
required so that a precise set of hypotheses can be formulated and tested. This 
requires the scrutiny of retrospective and prospective, and egocentric and 
sociotropic economic evaluations. The key point about the sociotropic 
economic attitudes measured here - attitudes towards inflation, unemployment 
and industrial performance - is that they are likely to be internalised by 
individual electors in different ways and thus have differential impacts 
depending on their relevance to the local context. Inflation for instance, can 
usually be seen as a national phenomenon and so it would not be reasonable 
to expect geographic variation in attitudes to inflation. On the other hand, other 
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economic issues such as unemployment and industrial decline tend to vary 
dramatically from region to region. Moreover the media attention placed upon 
them will often concentrate on the local context as the focal point for these 
issues. As a result regional variation would be much more likely. Finally the 
changes over time involved during the 1983-9 period - from slow to rapid 
recovery and slippage back into recession - would increase the likelihood that 
attitudes to all of these economic variables would fluctuate markedly. As 
already seen in Chapter 2, the cycle of recovery and recession varied 
according to where an individual lived. 
As well as the nuances in the economic evaluations used in this chapter, it is 
important to note that there are two types of geographic variation under 
investigation here; the nominal regional variation (geographic model 1) which 
could measure the North-South divide, and the variation according to different 
types of constituency (geographic model 2) which could be used to measure 
the functional cleavage in British electoral geography. 
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Figure 4.1: The Hypothesised Relationship Between Class, Geography, 
Economic Attitudes and Partisanship 
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4.2 DATA & METHODS 
The dataset used for this analysis was the British Social Attitudes series of 
surveys. The British Social Attitudes series was designed to 
chart movements in a wide range of social attitudes 
in Britain, including attitudes towards politics, the 
economy, the workplace, and other social and moral 
issues" (British Social Attitudes Technical Report 
1989; p.1). 
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The analyses adopted here are based on a recoding of responses in the British 
Social Attitudes data. All attitudinal responses were re coded into one of three 
possible categories. In each case a score of minus one represents any degree 
of dissatisfaction with current circumstances or pessimism about the future, a 
score of zero indicates a neutral response (including don't knows) and a score 
of plus one reflects any degree of satisfaction with current conditions or 
optimism about the future. Some British Social Attitudes questions originally 
offered respondents more choice than this but for the sake of consistency all 
were recoded into this threefold schema. The class and geographic variables 
used here are those identified in the previous chapters. 
4.3 PRESENTATION OF DATA 
This chapter involves the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Multiple 
Classification Analysis of the relationships between class, geography, 
economic attitudes and partisanship. The results are presented in the tables 
below. 
ANOVA enables scrutiny of two forms of variance, the relative importance of 
within - and between - group variaition, controlled for degrees of freedom 
(SPSS 1993, p.270-271). 
The null hypothesis for all ANOVA tests is that all groups have the same mean 
as the population, and is measured by the F-statistic. A value close to 1 would 
suggest that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In the tables in this chapter 
only those variables that have a F-statistic with an associated significance 
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below or equal to .05 are reported; an asterisk denotes the failure of the 
variable to meet this threshold. 
The within group variance is measured by the Beta coefficient reported by the 
Multiple Classification Analysis derived from the ANOVA technique. These 
coefficients are similar to the partial regression coefficient in standard multiple 
regression. They indicate the difference between the average respondent and 
the respondent in the identified category - as the co-variables are held 
constant. 
There are three types of table reported in this chapter: Table 4.1 shows the 
grand mean scores for all variables in this analYSis. That is the average 
position of respondents for each variable from the British Social Attitudes. For 
the identification variables the grand mean simply represents the level of 
identification each party gained. Hence the Conservative grand mean for 1983 
was 0.39 which can be translated as 39% of popular support. For the attitudinal 
variables, a grand mean of zero represents a neutral electorate, a negative 
score reflects a pessimistic or dissatisfied population and a positive score 
represents a relatively optimistic or satisfied electorate. The second type of 
table shows statistical significance and magnitude of explanatory force; the 
third type shows parameters of the model. The second type of table (of which 
Table 4.2 is an example) shows F-values and Beta coefficients derived from 
the Analysis of Variance statistical technique: F-values provide information 
about the relative importance of each independent variable in the analysis. 
Here the absolute magnitude of F-values may have been suppressed due to 
the loss of degrees of freedom necessitated by the collapSing of responses into 
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a threefold schema. The Beta coefficient is equivalent to the standardised 
partial regression coefficient for the independent variable. The third type of 
table (of which Table 4.4 is the first example) shows the average deviations 
from the Grand Mean associated with the disaggregations of the explanatory 
variable - ceteris paribus. A negative deviation represents a body of 
respondents who were less likely on average than all other respondents to 
favour a particular point of view; a positive deviation denotes that this group of 
respondents were more likely to favour this view than the average respondent. 
For example, Table 4.4 shows that the Scots and Welsh were the most hostile 
to Conservative identification in 1983 of all regional groups (with an average 
deviation from the Grand Mean of -.10); respondents from the Midlands were 
the most pro-Conservative (with an average deviation of +.08) others things 
being equal. 
Table 4.1: GRAND MEANS FOR VARIABLES USED IN THIS ANAL VSIS 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
Partisanship 
CON .39 .39 .32 .35 .39 .40 
LBR .32 .35 .36 .34 .28 .33 
LIB .16 .13 .18 .18 .19 .11 
Sociotropism 
INFFC -.76 -.80 -.86 -.69 -.76 -.85 
UMFC -.53 -.41 -.57 -.58 -.14 .10 
INDYFC .31 .22 .08 .00 .20 .13 
EFFCYL5Y .04 .10 .23 
EFFCY5FC .11 .18 .22 
POVL10Y -.17 -.17 
POV10FC -.15 -.14 
Egocentrism 
FAMYLY .50 -.48 .53 -.34 -.70 
FAMYFC .48 -.40 .49 -.29 -.65 
WAGEFC -.08 -.10 -.12 -.06 .00 -.12 
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The differences between classes and spatial variables are given in the third 
type of table. These differences derived from Multiple Classification Analysis, 
are the average deviations from the grand mean score of the dependent 
variable for each region, or for each constituency type and for each 
occupational class when the other variables in the model are held constant. 
In all types of table, an empty cell represents a year in which the appropriate 
question was not asked by the British Social Attitudes survey. An asterisk 
denotes that although the question was asked the data derived from the 
responses failed to meet the .05 level of statistical significance. 
There are three basic types of variables in the tables; partisanship and 
sociotropic and egocentric attitudes. The partisanship variables are self-
explanatory CON, LBR and LIB representing Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
partisan identifiers respectively. The sociotropic variables usually concern 
projections rather than recollections; one year forecasts of inflation (INFFC), 
unemployment (UMFC), and Britain's industrial performance (INDYFC); a five 
year forecast of the level of industrial efficiency in Britain (EFFCY5FC) and a 
ten year forecast of the level of poverty in Britain (POV10FC). There are 
however, two sociotropic variables which measure recollections rather than 
forecasts. These concern the level of industrial efficiency over the last five 
years (EFFCYL5Y) and levels of poverty over the last decade (POVL 1 OY). The 
egocentric variables concern family income levels forecast over the coming 
year (FAMYFC) and a recollection of them over the previous year (FAMYL V), 
and personal wage levels forecast for the next twelve months (WAGEFC). 
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The British public were very pessimistic throughout the 1980s about the 
prospects for falling inflation (revealed by the negative Grand Means in Table 
4.1). Personal wage forecasts were also predominantly negative, but the 
pessimism about unemployment rates fell sharply in the election year of 1987, 
by 1989 the average respondent thought unemployment would fall over the 
coming year. 
Overall, public opinion throughout the 1983-9 period altered over time. Views 
of the economy slumped then recovered: trends of unemployment and 
industrial forecasts in particular seemed to exhibit a 'lagged' feel good factor -
as the 'Good News' of economic recovery percolated down to the electorate 
rather slowly. 
4.4 PARTY IDENTIFICATION VARIABLES 
In the British Social Attitudes series, respondents were classified as identifying 
with a particular political party on one of three counts: supporters of the party, 
those respondents who classify themselves as closer to it than other parties, 
and those who are more likely to support it in the event of a General Election. 
These three groups are described respectively in the British Social Attitudes 
annual reports as 'partisans', 'sympathisers' and 'residual identifiers' and are 
then combined into a single group of 'identifiers'. Those respondents who 
indicated no party preference at all (that is not even residual identifiers) were 
classified as non-aligned. This variable was further compressed by the 
construction of identification variables for each of the main three political 
parties, the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. In the case of the 
Liberals, the identification variable includes identifiers for the Liberal Party, the 
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Social Democratic Party, the Alliance between the two and, in 1989, the Liberal 
Democrats. To be explicit then, in the following analysis identifiers refers to all 
types of identifiers highlighted by the British Social Attitudes series; partisans, 
sympathisers and residual identifiers. The variables were constructed by 
comparing all respondents who classified themselves - by whatever criteria - as 
identifiers with one particular party to those respondents who did not identify 
with that party. Therefore all respondents were included in each analysis since 
they fell into one of the two possible responses - either identification or non-
identification with the particular political party. An examination of the links 
between economic evaluations and the strength of party identification would be 
an illuminating further research project, but does not fit into the remit of this 
thesis. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the F values and Beta coefficients for each of the 
three party identification variables when the variance was analysed after 
controlling for the effects of class and space (as detailed in Chapter 2). Two 
measures of space were used, compressed region (Geographic Model 1) and 
constituency type (Geographic Model 2). These tables show that the effect of 
space, both in terms of region and its functional division was of increasing 
importance between 1983 and 1989, especially in the construction of 
Conservative and Labour identification. Typically the Beta coefficients in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 do not increase over time for the spatial variables but the F-
values do. Thus it can be claimed that the differences between regions and 
between constituency types became clearer although the extent of these 
differences was relatively unaffected. 
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Table 4.2: Tests for Geographic Model 1; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, Partisanship 
CON LABOUR LIBERAL 
f Beta f Beta f Beta 
REGION 
1983 6.3 13 8.4 15 3.2 10 
1984 6.2 12 10.0 16 5.1 12 
1985 11.0 16 16.5 19 3.5 9 
1986 17.4 15 27.6 19 5.0 8 
1987 22.0 17 21.0 17 * * 
1989 19.3 16 23.1 17 4.3 8 
CLASS 
1983 20.1 24 27.1 28 3.5 10 
1984 28.3 27 26.4 26 * * 
1985 25.2 24 29.7 26 4.7 11 
1986 44.3 24 50.8 26 4.6 8 
1987 31.1 21 35.2 22 4.8 8 
1989 42.8 24 48.1 25 3.2 7 
Table 4.3 :Tests for Geographic Model 2; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, Partisanship 
CON CON LABOUR LABOUR LIBERAL LIBERAL 
f Beta f Beta f Beta 
CTYPE 
1983 5.7 13 10.9 18 * * 
1984 4.5 11 12.5 18 2.8 9 
1985 12.1 17 21.0 22 2.8 8 
1986 16.3 15 30.0 20 5.6 9 
1987 28.0 20 30.0 20 3.7 7 
1989 22.5 17 34.1 22 10.5 12 
CLASS 
1983 19.2 24 23.5 26 3.4 10 
1984 25.6 26 23.6 24 2.5 8 
1985 20.0 22 22.7 23 4.2 10 
1986 41.3 23 47.9 25 4.1 8 
1987 29.4 20 32.9 21 4.6 8 
1989 38.9 23 44.7 23 3.1 7 
4.4.1 CONSERVATIVE IDENTIFICATION 
The average deviations in Conservative identification by region and class 
(Table 4.4) show that the hostility of respondents in Scotland and Wales to the 
Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher grew in intensity over the 
period of economic recovery between 1983 and 1989 - especially during the 
1987 election year and beyond. The North of England retained an anti-
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Conservative identification bias over this period, while the pro-Conservative 
bias of respondents in the Midlands and the South of England held firm. The 
most changeable region of Conservative support was Greater London. In the 
Election year of 1983, Greater Londoners showed a slight inclination to identify 
with the Conservative government, but this inclination was reversed in the 
following year and this new hostility to Conservative identification intensified in 
1985. Hence it could be claimed that after successfully wooing the voters of 
Greater London in 1983 the Conservative government failed to keep their 
support in the inter-election period, an interpretation apparently confirmed by 
local Elections in mid-term where in the aftermath of the abolition of the GLC, 
Labour made inroads into the capital's vote. By 1986, however, the hostility to 
the Conservative government in London appeared to be on the wane again. 
Moreover by the next Election in 1987, when the Conservative campaign 
sharply focused upon the alleged shortcomings of Labour's record in the 
capital, respondents in Greater London were, other things being equal, 
swinging away from Labour identification and back towards the Conservatives 
via overall neutrality. In 1989 respondents in Greater London had once more 
reverted to hostility to Conservative identification. This atrophy of Conservative 
support in Greater London between Elections but the ultimate identification with 
the Government of Londoners in Election years is a picture which was repeated 
in different classes and constituency types. 
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Table 4.4: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Conservative Identification by Region and Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
ScotlWale -.10 -.11 -.07 -.11 -.16 -.16 
North -.06 -.02 -.05 -.06 -.05 -.03 
Midlands .08 .08 .04 .07 .05 .05 
G L'don .01 -.05 -.11 -.01 .00 -.02 
South .05 .04 .09 .07 .09 .08 
CLASS 
Salariat .18 .18 .21 .20 .14 .15 
RNM .03 .05 .02 .03 .03 .05 
S-E .17 .29 .12 .08 .13 .11 
Foremen .00 -.09 -.11 -.12 -.03 -.04 
WIC -.14 -.16 -.12 -.13 -.13 -.16 
Table 4.5: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Conservative Identification by Constituency Type & 
Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep -.05 -.04 -.08 -.08 -.08 -.05 
Poor Cl -.10 -.11 -.13 -.09 -.17 -.20 
Innermetro .00 -.01 -.24 -.09 -.13 -.13 
Wh-Collar .01 .03 .09 .06 .13 .08 
Buoy IAgri .07 .04 .04 .06 .05 .05 
CLASS 
Salariat .18 .17 .19 .20 .15 .15 
RNM .03 .05 .01 .03 .03 .05 
S-E .16 .28 .11 .07 .12 .10 
Foremen .02 -.09 -.11 -.12 -.02 -.04 
WIC -.14 -.15 -.10 -.13 -.12 -.15 
Respondents from constituencies typified by high levels of immigration or 
depressed industry were generally constant in their antipathy to the 
Conservative government throughout the period 1983-1989. Anti-Conservatism 
was also prevalent in constituencies typified by large scale council housing and 
a relatively high degree of poverty; indeed this hostility intensified substantially 
between 1983 and 1989. The pro-Conservative sentiment shown by 
respondents in constituencies typified by buoyant economic conditions and 
agricultural land and those in regions where most respondents are employed in 
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white-collar occupations held firm in the recovery years, but were particularly 
strong in the Election years of 1983 and 1987 respectively. The biggest change 
in propensity to identify with the Conservative party occurred among 
respondents living in inner metropolitan areas. In 1983 these respondents 
exhibited no overall inclination towards or away from Conservative 
identification but in each subsequent year the inner metropolitan group was 
hostile to Conservative identification. Since 1985 these respondents displayed 
a marked disinclination to support the Conservatives. The peak of 
Conservative unpopularity within this group of respondents occurred in 1985 
but hostility to the Conservative government remained high in the subsequent 
surveys of 1986, 1987 and 1989. Inner metropolitan voters, like the voters in 
Greater London in the previous analysis, were relatively inclined towards 
Conservative support in the Election year of 1983, and like respondents in 
Greater London moved away from Conservatism in the inter-election period, 
but unlike respondents in Greater London, respondents in inner metropolitan 
areas were not successfully wooed back to Conservatism by the Election of 
1987. 
Due to the logistics of the British Social Attitudes' sampling procedure, there is 
a very heavy London bias in the construction of the inner metropOlitan grouping 
by the constituency type spatial schema. Theoretically the construction of this 
group did not exclude other cities such as Bristol, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, 
Liverpool and Manchester, but in practice the selection of respondents for 
interviewing who can then be recoded into an inner-city sub-group remained a 
predominantly London phenomenon. Thus if the inclusion of non-Londoners in 
the inner metropolitan grouping for each British Social Attitudes survey, can be 
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regarded as negligible, the distinction between this group and the previously 
constructed Greater London group needs further explanation. 
The essential difference between respondents in the inner metropOlitan area of 
the constituency type schema and those respondents identified as living in 
Greater London by the regional schema is that the London component of the 
inner metropolitan group excludes some of the poorest communities and the 
high status suburban areas of the capital. The regional grouping Greater 
London is inclusive of all of these constituencies. Hence although 
constituencies such as Lambeth, Holborn and St. Pancras, Islington North, 
Lewisham Deptford, Streatham, Tooting and Sattersea are categorised as inner 
metropolitan areas by the constituency type schema, other London 
constituencies have been allocated elsewhere by the CACI guide-lines. This 
allocation occurred in two directions. Firstly a number of constituencies have 
been placed in groups further down the numeric scale; hence Barking and 
Leyton and Walthamstow have been redefined into the first of the five CACI 
groups typified by high levels of immigration and depressed industry, while 
constituencies such as Peckham in Southwark were placed in CACl's second 
grouping characterised by a high ratio of council housing. Secondly higher 
status and less urbanised constituencies were relocated into a different group 
in the CACI five group schema. In this manner Sarnet, Uxbridge, Kingston upon 
Thames and Sutton and Cheam were allotted to groups characterised by white 
collar occupations and buoyant regions. 
The picture of Conservative identification according to class is essentially the 
same in both geographic models, because the interaction terms between class 
170 
Chapter -I: Partisanship, Economic Attitudes & Space During the 1980s 
and region in the first analysis (Table 4.4) and between class and constituency 
type (Table 4.5) were virtually identical. Therefore for the purposes of this 
description, the remarks about class distinctions in Conservative identification 
apply to both Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and both sets of analysis. The biggest relative 
sources of class support for the Conservatives in the period 1983-1989 were 
the Salariat and the self-employed. Respondents in routine Non-Manual 
occupations were less inclined to favour Conservative identification but were 
nevertheless consistently pro-Conservative in their outlook, while working class 
respondents were typically hostile to Conservatism throughout the period. 
Respondents characterised as Foremen and supervisors were usually anti-
Conservative in their identification but were prone to move towards 
Conservative identification in Election years. In 1983 foremen were typically 
pro-Conservative and were markedly less hostile to the Conservative 
government in 1987 than was usually the case in the inter-election period. 
Once again it appears that an important sector of the electorate may have been 
wooed by the Conservatives in Election years in the 1980s at least to the 
extent that their anti-Conservative sentiment was diluted in those years. 
4.4.2 LABOUR IDENTIFICATION 
The deviations from the grand mean in Labour identification by class and 
spatial considerations (Tables 4.6 and 4.7), reveal a similar story. Respondents 
from the Celtic fringe of mainland Britain and in the North of England were the 
typically the most prone to Labour identification throughout the period of 
economic recovery in the 1980s. Moreover, respondents in the Greater London 
area were also pro-Labour in their sentiment, although this sentiment was more 
variable and there was some evidence to suggest that Labour support in 
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Greater London withered during the build-up to the 1987 General Election. 
Respondents in the South of England were consistently hostile to Labour in the 
period 1983-1989, while respondents from the Midlands were relatively hostile 
to Labour in every year except 1985 when they expressed a slight relative pro-
Labour identification. 
When constituency type replaced region as the spatial control in the analysis 
(Tables 4.3 and 4.7) a more complex picture was revealed. Blocs of strong 
Labour support were constructed in areas with high immigrant populations and 
depressed industry and from areas with a high ratio of council housing. Blocs 
of hostility to Labour were apparent in white collar and buoyant or agricultural 
areas. Respondents living in inner metropolitan areas underwent a marked 
intensification of their pro-Labour sentiment. In the Election year of 1983 
respondents in inner metropolitan areas were only slightly pro-Labour, but in 
subsequent surveys this group expressed a much greater inclination to identify 
themselves as supporters of the Opposition throughout the years of economic 
recovery. Moreover not only did respondents in inner metropolitan areas 
become more prone to identify with the Labour Party in this period, they 
became assimilated into the heartland of Labour's support, their allegiance 
intensifying until the inner metropolitan areas have become among the most 
likely sources of relative Labour support. To highlight just how profitable the 
electorate of the inner cities became for the Labour party, it can be noted that 
since 1985, respondents in inner metropolitan areas were more likely, other 
things being equal, to identify with Labour than respondents in the North of 
England. This would seem to support theories which champion the urban-rural 
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cleavage over the North-South cleavage in spatial politics in Britain (see 
Curtice & Steed, 1982, 1986). 
Table 4.6: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Labour Identification by Region and Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
ScoVWale .08 .08 .04 .09 .10 .06 
North .07 .08 .08 .10 .06 .09 
Mids -.03 -.04 .01 -.06 -.05 -.03 
G L'don .04 .04 .10 .04 .03 .04 
South -.09 -.09 -.13 -.11 -.09 -.11 
CLASS 
Salariat -.15 -.13 -.17 -.15 -.11 -.12 
RNM -.07 -.08 -.05 -.06 -.05 -.08 
S-E -.20 -.23 -.17 -.13 -.11 -.08 
Foremen .03 .12 .05 .18 .05 .09 
W/C .16 .15 .15 .15 .13 .16 
Table 4.7: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Labour Identification by Constituency Type & Region 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep .08 .10 .15 .12 .10 .14 
Poor Cl .12 .10 .05 .06 .09 .11 
Innermetro .01 .09 .20 .15 .17 .12 
Wh- Collar -.03 -.05 -.10 -.06 -.10 -.08 
Buoy /Agri -.08 -.08 -.07 -.09 -.07 -.07 
CLASS 
Salariat -.14 -.12 -.15 -.15 -.12 -.11 
RNM -.06 -.07 -.05 -.06 -.05 -.07 
S-E -.17 -.22 -.15 -.11 -.09 -.07 
Foremen .02 .12 .05 .18 .04 .09 
W/C .15 .14 .14 .15 .13 .16 
Labour identification dissected by class revealed an unsurprising trend of 
hostility to Labour among the Sa lariat and the self-employed and of a more 
diluted hostility to Labour exhibited by respondents with jobs described as 
routine non-manual (Tables 4.6 and 4.7). Labour support was strongest among 
foremen and the working class. Once again however, it is pertinent to note that 
the allegiance to the Labour Party among those with supervisory 
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responsibilities appeared to slump in the General Election years of 1983 and 
1987 and grew again in inter-election periods. This might be because this 
relatively affluent group of workers were the most prone to Conservative 
pressure at Election time, and the most likely to desert Labour because of their 
taxation and home-ownership policies. 
4.4.3 LIBERAL IDENTIFICATION 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate that throughout the period 1983-1987, the 
Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance and more latterly the Liberal Democrats 
attracted their support more evenly across social classes and from all regions 
and constituency types than the other two mainstream political parties in 
Britain. This was shown in each year by the lower incidence of statistical 
significance of both types of spatial variables and of social class in these 
analyses. Moreover as Tables 4.2 and 4.3 illustrated, the between group and 
within group variance in Liberal identification explained by class and either of 
the geographic criteria, were consistently lower than for the other two main 
parties. Where regional variations did exist in the composition of Liberal 
identification it may be noted that respondents in the South of England, in 
buoyant and agricultural areas, and among those occupied in routine non 
manual occupations were the most prone of all groups to identify with 
Liberalism, while respondents in the Celtic fringe, the North of England, in 
depressed areas and areas with a high degree of council housing were less 
prone to exhibit pro-Liberal sentiment than respondents in the rest of the 
country. 
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Table 4.8: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Liberal Identification by Region and Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
ScotlWale -.04 -.03 -.03 -.02 * -.02 
North -.02 -.02 .00 -.03 * -.04 
Midlands -.03 -.03 -.04 .01 * .00 
G L'don -.01 -.02 -.03 -.04 * .00 
South .05 .06 .05 .04 * .03 
CLASS 
Salariat -.01 * -.01 .01 .01 .00 
RNM .04 * .04 .03 .03 .02 
S-E .03 * .01 -.02 -.03 .00 
Foremen -.06 * .08 -.06 .01 -.05 
W/C -.03 * -.05 -.03 -.04 -.02 
Table 4.9: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Liberal Identification by Constituency Type & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep * -.03 -.04 -.03 -.04 -.03 
Poor Cl * -.03 -.04 -.04 .00 -.04 
Innermetro * -.03 -.01 -.09 -.06 -.09 
Wh-Collar * -.01 .04 .03 .01 .03 
Buoy IAgri * .03 .02 .03 .03 .03 
CLASS 
Salariat -.01 -.03 -.02 .00 .01 .00 
RNM .05 .03 .04 .03 .03 .02 
S-E .02 -.02 .00 -.02 -.04 .00 
Foremen -.06 -.03 .08 -.06 .01 -.06 
W/C -.03 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.04 -.02 
4.5 ECONOMIC ATTITUDES 
In addition to the questions which permit the testing of partisan identification, 
the British Social Attitudes questionnaires have posed a number of economic 
attitude questions. By and large these can be characterised into two main sub-
groups: sociotropic questions and egocentric questions. When respondents 
were asked questions about the general economic performance of the country 
as a whole, then they were, in effect, asked for a sociotropic evaluation. 
Examples of this type of question from the British Social Attitudes series 
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concerned issues such as inflation, unemployment, industrial performance, 
efficiency and poverty. When respondents were probed for evaluations of their 
own personal position they were being asked for an egocentric evaluation. In 
the British Social Attitudes series this type of question tended to be couched in 
terms of financial positions or personal wealth. Examples of egocentric 
questions in the British Social Attitudes series involved the assessment of 
personal wage expectations and the assessment of family income fluctuations. 
It is important to note that both of these groups of questions - the sociotropic 
and egocentric - involved two types of evaluation, the prospective and the 
retrospective. That is respondents were required by the British Social Attitudes 
series not only to recollect the state of an economic phenomenon and compare 
it to the current state but also to forecast the change in that position over a 
similar period of time. In an example of this from the sociotropic set of 
questions, respondents were required to recollect the general state of 
efficiency in British industry compared to five years ago and compared to a 
prediction of the state of efficiency in British industry in five years time. From 
the egocentric set of British Social Attitudes questions, respondents were asked 
to compare their family's current level of income to that of last year (alongside 
controlling features such as the cost of living) and to the level of family income 
they expected to have over the next year. 
It was anticipated therefore, that the analysis of economic attitudes of the 
electorate during the years of the economic recovery between 1983 and 1989, 
would reveal not two distinct groups of economic attitudes the sociotropic and 
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egocentric, but a four-way split, sociotropic recollections, sociotropic 
expectations, egocentric recollections and egocentric expectations. 
4.5.1 SOCIOTROPIC EVALUATIONS 
Questions posed by the British Social Attitudes which can be used to measure 
sociotropic evaluations tended to over-emphasise forecasts at the expense of 
recollections. While respondents were required to forecast the rates of 
inflation, unemployment and the general state of Britain's industrial 
performance over the next year, they were not asked for their perceptions of 
inflation, unemployment or relative industrial performance over the previous 
year. While this makes intuitive sense for the inflation, since official inflation 
rates are well publicised and is unlikely to vary a great deal in the public's 
perceptions, it is less satisfactory in the case of unemployment and industrial 
performance. Firstly, unemployment varies significantly according to 
geography. Hence geographic variation in perceptions of past changes in 
unemployment would be highly likely. Secondly, official figures regarding 
industrial performance such as balance of trade figures and productivity rates 
are much less prominently portrayed in the media. Indeed respondents seem 
almost as likely to gain their cues about industrial performance from local 
media than from the national media and local media will be primarily concerned 
with parochial industrial performance. For example the closure of a local firm or 
factory would be more newsworthy at the regional than the national level and 
thus may impel respondents to give regionally skewed answers to questions of 
satisfaction with industrial performance. Hence it would be feasible to expect 
spatial variation in the public's responses to questions which chart their 
evaluations of industrial performance. 
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Table 4.10: Tests for Geographic Model 1; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, Sociotropism 
INFFC UMFC INDYFC 
f Beta f Beta f Beta 
REGION 
1983 • • • • 4.1 11 
1984 • • • • 3.2 9 
1985 • • 6.2 12 5.7 12 
1986 3.0 7 • * 2.4 6 
1987 • • 4.8 8 10.0 12 
1989 • * 4.0 8 2.8 6 
CLASS 
1983 * * • • 6.1 14 
1984 3.1 9 9.7 16 11.2 17 
1985 * * 4.6 10 9.0 15 
1986 5.7 10 9.5 12 4.0 8 
1987 2.9 7 15.6 16 12.6 14 
1989 2.8 6 13.9 14 • • 
EFCYL5Y EFCY5FC POVL10Y POV10FC 
f Beta f Beta f Beta f Beta 
REGION 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 • * * * * * • * 
1987 7.8 11 3.5 7 
1989 2.6 7 2.4 7 3.4 7 5.2 9 
CLASS 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 9.4 11 4.0 8 3.8 7 4.2 8 
1987 8.5 11 3.3 7 
1989 6.4 12 7.1 12 7.0 10 6.7 10 
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Table 4.11: Tests for Geographic Model 2; F-Values and Beta Coefficients; Sociotropism 
INFFC UMFC INDYFC 
f Beta f Beta f Beta 
CTYPE 
1983 * * * * 4.0 11 
1984 * • • * * * 
1985 * • * * 3.9 10 
1986 2.4 6 * * 4.8 09 
1987 * * 5.7 9 9.7 12 
1989 2.6 6 7.1 10 7.0 10 
CLASS 
1983 * • * * 5.7 13 
1984 3.1 9 10.1 17 10.8 17 
1985 * • 4.5 10 7.0 13 
1986 5.3 9 9.5 13 3.8 8 
1987 3.0 7 15.5 15 13.2 14 
1989 2.7 6 13.1 14 * * 
EFCYL5Y EFCY5FC POVL10Y POV10FC 
f Beta f Beta f Beta f 
CTYPE 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 * • * * 2.9 7 * 
1987 3.0 7 * * 
1989 2.7 8 2.7 8 3.4 7 4.1 
CLASS 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 9.3 12 4.1 8 3.5 7 4.1 
1987 8.7 11 3.5 7 
1989 5.1 10 5.9 11 6.1 9 7.7 
4.5.1.1 ATTITUDES TO INFLATION 
Throughout the British Social Attitudes series, respondents have been invited to 
forecast the direction of inflation over the following year. This question failed to 
yield any tangible results for this study, not least because reality seems to have 
taught respondents that prices will increase over any given period of time and 
they assume that prices will increase at a faster rate than before. This led to an 
in-built pessimism bias in the prediction of the cost of living across all regions, 
constituency types and classes. As already noted, the grand mean for inflation 
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forecasts in each survey was consistently negative (Table 4,1). With a 
maximum of one and a minimum of minus one, the average mean scores in the 
period of recovery from 1983 to 1989 were -.70, -.80, -.86, -.69, -.76 and -.85. 
In short, the vast majority of respondents tended to believe that inflation would 
worsen over the following period, and the distinction between rising prices and 
rates of increase may not have been successfully grasped by the public as 
inflation rates seem to be almost universally expected to rise. Furthermore this 
in-built pessimism about costs and inflation seemed to contaminate all other 
British Social Attitudes questions concerning the relationship between prices 
and other issues. 
Furthermore, as stated in the previous chapter, there are good grounds for 
assuming that respondents will take the cues that form their opinions about 
inflation from the national rather than the local context. Therefore inflation may 
not constitute a local issue where geographic variations would be a significant 
explanatory variable, unlike other issues that seem to be internalised at the 
local rather than the national level. 
For this reason there is a very high incidence of statistical insignificance in the 
analyses of inflation forecasts by region or constituency type and class (Tables 
4.10 and 4.11). Indeed Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show that where region and 
constituency type did achieve statistical significance at the .05 level (in 1986 
for both, and 1989 for constituency type, respectively) their F values and Beta 
coefficients were much lower than those for class in the same analysis. For the 
record, respondents in Scotland and Wales were the most optimistic about 
falling rates of inflation in 1986 while those from the North of England, from 
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depressed regions and from buoyant areas were the most pessimistic groups of 
society, other things being equal. Respondents living in areas typified by poor 
council housing were the most pessimistic about inflation in 1989, and those 
living in buoyant areas the least pessimistic. 
Table 4.12: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Inflation Forecasts By Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
ScotlWale * * * .06 * * 
North * * * -.06 * * 
Midlands * * * .00 * * 
G L'don * * * .01 * * 
South * * * .02 * * 
CLASS 
Salariat * .10 * .12 .05 .06 
RNM * -.01 * -.03 -.01 .00 
S-E * .03 * .11 .07 -.02 
Foremen * -.05 * .00 .05 -.01 
W/C * -.02 * -.02 -.02 -.02 
Table 4.13: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Inflation Forecasts by Constituency Type & Region 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep * * * -.05 * -.01 
Poor Cl * * * .01 * -.07 
Innermetro • * * -.01 * -.02 
Wh-Collar * * * -.01 * -.01 
BuoylAgri * * * -.04 * .02 
CLASS 
Sa lariat * .10 * .11 .05 .06 
RNM * -.01 * -.03 -.02 .00 
S-E * .03 * .11 .07 -.02 
Foremen * -.05 * .00 .05 -.01 
W/C * -.02 * -.02 -.03 -.02 
The class distinctions in the same analyses of variance achieve statistical 
significance much more often (although not consistently throughout the series). 
Here it was the Salariat - the section of society most immune from the effects of 
inflation - which was the most likely section of society to believe that inflation 
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would decrease over the coming year. The self-employed were also likely to 
predict a reduction in the rate of inflation as a rule, although this was not the 
case in 1989. The working class was consistently pessimistic about the 
prospect of falling inflation rates over the next year. It is crucial to bear in mind, 
however, that a deviation score should not be interpreted as an absolute 
propensity within that group to favour one particular response. Instead it shows 
that compared to other groups and with independent variables held constant 
that section of society deviates from the overall mean towards that direction. 
Table 4.1 shows that the grand mean for inflation forecasts was consistently 
negative. The largest grand mean, that is the year in which pessimism was at 
its least was 1986 (-.69), and it may be no coincidence that this was the only 
year that both types of spatial differences entered statistical significance at the 
0.05 level. 
Nevertheless a clear suggestion from the class differences in inflation forecasts 
can be drawn. The Conservative Government appeared to be able of 
convincing their 'natural supporters' - their electoral heartland of class support -
that they had inflation under control in the 1980s. Furthermore, they were also 
successful in convincing foremen and supervisors of this fact in 1987 - an 
election year. 
It should be remembered that in no way can these results for spatial 
considerations in the analysis of inflation forecasts be said to represent any 
trend at all. The null hypothesis that no difference in attitudes to inflation can 
be attributed to spatial variation cannot be rejected, although this might not 
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represent a defeat for the geographic thesis if inflation is perceived as a 
national rather than a local issue. 
4.5.1.2 ATTITUDES TO UNEMPLOYMENT 
Studies of the impact of unemployment upon electorates have revealed that 
only those sections of the population most affected or most threatened by the 
prospect of job loss, are likely to prioritise unemployment as an issue in an 
Election.(Alt 1979; Hibbs 1981) Thus as the industrial restructuring of Britain in 
the 1980s was spatially variable (see Pattie & Johnston 1990a), it might be 
reasonable to expect that respondents in areas most affected by economic 
displacement and industrial depression would tend to view industrial 
performance in less satisfactory terms than respondents from areas which have 
benefited from the economic reorganisation of the Thatcher period. In terms of 
direction, respondents from regions which suffered the most from the first 
recession of the 1980s, which were also the regions which were the slowest to 
recover during the economic upturn of the mid-late 1980s would be less 
satisfied with Britain's relative industrial performance than respondents living in 
areas which suffered least in the recession and were among the first to recover 
in the upturn. Levels of satisfaction would thus be greater in the South of 
England than in the North of England and the Celtic fringe, greater in buoyant 
areas than in inner-cities and depressed industrial regions. The exclusion of 
questions which charted recollections of industrial performance from the British 
Social Attitudes series results in the loss of a possible source of spatial 
variation from this analysis. 
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Forecasts of unemployment can also be gauged throughout the period 1983-
1989 by the British Social Attitudes series. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show that 
region and constituency type were more significant than they proved to be in 
the inflation forecast analyses, but still remained insignificant in one-half and 
two-thirds of all surveys respectively. In all analyses (except for 1985 where the 
F value for region outperformed that for class) even where spatial concerns 
were significant to the .05 level their impact in the analyses was considerably 
less than that of class, as shown by F values and Beta coefficients. 
Where significant at the .05 level, regional variations were much as expected. 
In all analyses deviations from the mean revealed that Scots and Welsh and 
Northern respondents were most prone to express pessimism on the future 
levels of unemployment, while Southerners tended to be the group most likely 
to express optimism in unemployment forecasts (Table 4.14). Respondents in 
both the Midlands and Greater London fluctuated between relative optimism 
and pessimism during the 1980s economic upturn. In 1985 Greater Londoners 
were, along with Scots and Welsh respondents, the most likely of all 
respondents to be peSSimistic about the future levels of unemployment in 
Britain. This pessimistic tendency had been diluted slightly by 1987 and by 
1989 Greater Londoners stood just behind Southern respondents as the most 
optimistically prone sections of society. The attitudes of Midlanders towards 
unemployment forecasts underwent a less coherent change during the 
economic recovery. In 1985 Midlanders were less likely to express optimism 
than the national mean but this had altered to a quite dramatic degree of 
relative optimism in 1987 and no overall deviation from the national mean in 
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1989. The optimism of Midlanders in 1987 might of course have been crucial to 
the Conservative success in the General Election. 
Table 4.14: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Unemployment Forecasts by Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
ScotlWale • * -.12 * -.08 -.11 
North * * -.03 * -.05 -.03 
Midlands * • -.01 * .06 .00 
G London * * -.08 * -.06 .04 
South • * .11 • .07 .06 
CLASS 
Salariat • .23 .10 .17 .24 .18 
RNM • .02 -.01 .01 -.03 .01 
S-E • .14 .09 -.01 .11 .16 
Foremen * -.09 .18 -.01 .05 -.07 
W/C * -.12 -.07 -.08 -.11 -.12 
Table 4.15: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Unemployment Forecasts By Constituency Type & 
Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Dep • • * • -.07 -.03 
Poor Cl • * * * -.10 -.22 
Innermetro • * • * -.12 -.07 
Wh-Coliar • * • • .08 .03 
Buoy IAgri • * • • .05 .05 
CLASS 
Salariat * .23 .10 .17 .24 .18 
RNM * .02 -.01 .01 -.03 .01 
S-E * .15 .10 -.02 .10 .15 
Foremen * -.09 .19 -.01 .07 -.07 
W/C * -.12 -.07 -.08 -.10 -.12 
In terms of constituency type (Table 4.15) respondents from high immigration, 
depressed industry intensive areas, from areas typified by poor council 
housing, and from inner metropolitan areas were the three groups who in 1987 
and 1989 inclined to negative deviations from the mean. That is these groups 
tended - ceteris paribus - to be the most pessimistic sections of society about 
the future levels of unemployment. In both analyses which were statistically 
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significant at the .05 level, respondents from areas dominated by white collar 
occupations and from buoyant or agricultural areas exhibited positive 
deviations from the mean; that is they tended to be more optimistic about the 
future level of unemployment than the national average. Once again 
comparison with Table 4.1 reveals that statistically significant spatial variations 
were at their greatest when the population as a whole were at their least 
pessimistic. Thus the highest grand means occurred in 1987 (-.14) and 1989 
(.10) the only surveys when both types of spatial variables were significant at 
the .05 level. 
This finding makes intuitive sense; as the recovery strengthens, only those in 
stagnant regions or in threatened occupations are directly concerned about 
unemployment. Hence at the height of the Lawson boom between 1987 and 
1989, geographic differences are at their most significant in explaining variation 
in attitudes towards unemployment. On the other hand, in the depths of 
recession, the gap in the optimism of respondents towards the prospect of 
unemployment may narrow, especially if the recession hits the hitherto 
protected sections of the economy and geographic areas of the country. Of 
course this was the dynamic of the new recession of the 1990s, and it might be 
expected that the geographic differences about attitudes towards 
unemployment might narrow significantly or disappear altogether. 
Class deviations in both sets of analyses revealed that the Salariat were the 
most confident about the prospect of a reduction in the level of unemployment. 
Some way behind the Salariat in their optimism were the self-employed who 
even flirted with pessimism in 1986. The group of respondents in routine non 
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manual occupations behaved almost as a barometer class, rarely deviating 
from the national mean of optimism/pessimism. The major exception to this was 
their relative pessimism in 1987. The tendencies of foremen switched direction 
in alternate surveys during the period of economic recovery. It is interesting to 
note that one of the years of relative optimism about unemployment occurred in 
the Election year of 1987. The class analysis of 1983 was statistically 
insignificant at the .05 level and thus the trend noted earlier among those in a 
supervisory position to lurch towards Conservatism in Election years can only 
be alluded to. Working class respondents consistently exhibited an average 
score which deviated negatively from the national mean. The size of these 
deviations meant that the working class tended to be the most pessimistic 
about the chances of reducing unemployment in the following year. 
Where the analyses for unemployment forecasts were statistically significant at 
the .05 level, they generally supported the thesis that those sections of society 
most prone to displacement by unemployment were the most prone to 
pessimism about the possibility of a reduction in its level. This meant the 
working class, Scots and Welsh respondents, Northern respondents, 
respondents from depressed areas, areas with high intensity poor council 
housing and inner metropolitan areas were more likely to express doubt that 
the level of unemployment over the next year would fall than the national 
average suggested should have been the case. On the other hand the Salariat 
and respondents from areas dominated by white collar occupations and from 
buoyant or agricultural areas were most likely to exhibit optimism in their 
assessment of the future levels of unemployment. The high incidence of 
insignificance in the regional and constituency type analyses of unemployment 
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forecasts could reflect the temporal dimension. Regional differences in 
unemployment forecasts are likely to fluctuate if the public take their cues from 
the local context which itself fluctuated during this period. 
An important trend has begun to emerge. Geography appears to have been at 
its most important when the population as a whole was at its most optimistic. 
The height of the Lawson boom was also the height of the geographic variation 
in unemployment forecasts; when the chances of an individual securing a job 
were very different in different parts of the country. The analysis for both 
inflation and unemployment forecasts have underlined this variable impact of 
spatial variables. 
4.5.1.3 ATTITUDES TO INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE 
Throughout the British Social Attitudes series respondents have been invited to 
forecast the fortunes of British industry over the coming year. They were not, 
however also invited to express their perceptions of the past year industrial 
performance and this remains a matter for regret in the search for spatial 
variation. 
Regional differences in the public perception of the likely future performance of 
British industry were statistically significant at the. 05 level in every year of the 
British Social Attitudes series (Tables 4.10 and 4.11). Constituency type was 
significant at the same level in each year except 1984. In both sets of analysis 
(region and class and constituency type and class) class differences failed to 
achieve significance at the .05 level in 1989. Indeed for the first time in this 
study, F values and Beta coefficients for regional and constituency type 
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differences are approximate to those for class differences and even outperform 
them at the end of the 19805. Thus the prognosis for testing the null hypothesis 
(that there were no spatial differences in forecasts of the fortunes of British 
industry) was better than so far witnessed in the study of sociotropic attitudes. 
Table 4.16: Parameters of Geographic Model 1 ; Industry Forecasts By Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
ScotlWale -.17 -.07 -.07 -.07 -.08 -.02 
North -.04 -.07 -.07 -.04 -.11 -.01 
Midlands .05 .10 .05 .05 .07 .09 
G London .07 .03 -.11 .00 .01 -.06 
South .06 .03 .10 .04 .09 -.01 
CLASS 
Salariat .15 .22 .22 .09 .18 * 
RNM -.03 .05 -.01 .00 -.05 * 
SeE .23 .08 .08 .04 .16 * 
Foremen .05 -.08 -.02 .12 .11 * 
W/C -.09 -.14 -.09 -.06 -.07 * 
Table 4.17: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Industry Forecasts By Constituency Type & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep -.02 * -.08 -.03 -.08 -.01 
Poor Cl -.20 * -.15 -.15 -.15 -.12 
Innermetro .14 * .02 -.06 -.13 -.22 
Wh-Collar .04 * .07 .01 .09 .01 
Buoy /Agri .05 • .04 .06 .06 .05 
CLASS 
Salariat .15 .22 .19 .09 .18 * 
RNM -.03 .05 -.01 .00 -.05 * 
SeE .21 .07 .08 .03 .15 * 
Foremen .06 -.09 -.01 .12 .12 * 
W/C -.08 -.14 -.08 -.06 -.07 * 
Deviations from the national mean were consistently negative for respondents 
from Scotland and Wales and from the North of England (Table 4.16). This 
meant that respondents from those area were less likely to express confidence 
in the ability of British industry to improve over the next year than the national 
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mean. Midlanders were among the most consistently optimistic respondents in 
terms of their forecasts for the fortunes of British industry. Southerners also 
exhibited a marked tendency to express confidence in the British industrial 
sector when compared to the national mean, the only exception being in 1989 
when a very slight negative deviation from the national mean occurred. Greater 
Londoners exhibited a fluctuating trend over the period. In 1983 and 1984 their 
average score deviated positively from the mean; that is Greater Londoners 
inclined towards relative optimism in their forecasts for British industry. But in 
1985 Greater Londoners were the most relatively pessimistic of all groups in 
their forecasts of British industrial performance. This relative pessimism lasted 
only one year as Greater Londoners reverted to the grand mean score in 1986. 
Nevertheless the circumstances had transformed again by 1989 when Greater 
Londoners were once again the most pessimistic in their views of Britain's 
industrial performance. This fluctuating trend of optimism and pessimism 
among respondents from Greater London may have contained a great deal of 
white noise combining two or more effects to show a confused picture. Once 
Greater Londoners are separated into inner-city respondents and other groups 
by the constituency type schema the picture of optimism/pessimism in forecasts 
of Britain's industrial performance became clearer. 
Where constituency type was statistically significant at the .05 level (every year 
of the British Social Attitudes series except 1984) two solid bases of relative 
pessimism emerged (Table 4.17). Respondents from areas typified by 
immigration or depressed industry, and from areas with a high proportion of 
council housing were consistently pessimistic in their forecasts for British 
industry. In all cases the relative pessimism of the latter group outstripped that 
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of the former. There also existed two blocs of relative optimism for the 
prospects of British industry in respondents residing in areas dominated by 
white collar occupations and in buoyant or agricultural areas. The most 
intriguing development shown up by the analysis of constituency type is the 
changing pattern of the industrial forecasts of respondents living in inner 
metropolitan areas. This group was the most prone of all groups to express 
optimism in 1983 but this optimism was steadily eroded over the rest of the 
decade. By 1985 the hitherto optimism of the inner metropolitan group had 
diminished when compared with the national mean and since 1986 it 
increasingly grew more pessimistic in relative terms, becoming the most 
pessimistic of all groups in 1989. It is likely that this shift in attitudes among the 
relatively small number of respondents that comprise the inner metropolitan 
group had been concealed by the inclusion of high status areas in the Greater 
London component in the analysis of regional differences above. 
As mentioned earlier, class was not statistically significant at the .05 level in 
analyses of both regional differences and constituency type differences in 
1989. Prior to then, however, the Salariat and the self-employed were identified 
as solid blocs of relative optimism in industrial forecasts. Foremen were 
relatively optimistic in 1983, 1986 and 1987 but relatively pessimistic in 1984 
and 1985. The routine non manual class fluctuated between optimism and 
pessimism in alternate surveys, while the working class were consistently 
relatively pessimistic about the future of British industrial performance. 
Clearly the null hypothesis here that there were no spatial differences at work 
in the construction of evaluations of industrial performance can be refuted with 
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some confidence. Over a period of time which spans the economic upturn of 
the mid-1980s and the beginning of the second recession of the Thatcher 
governments in the late 1980s clear spatial differences in the forecasting of 
British industrial performance were apparent. Not only did blocs of optimism 
(white collar areas, buoyant areas, the Midlands and the South) and relative 
pessimism (poor council housing areas, depressed industrial regions, Scotland 
and Wales, and the North of England) emerge but a transforming group (inner 
metropolitan respondents) where pessimism intensified over the period of 
economic recovery in the 1980s has clearly been identified 
4.5.1.4 ATTITUDES TO INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY 
In the last three British Social Attitudes surveys respondents were asked for 
their perceptions of the level of industrial efficiency in Britain compared to the 
level of efficiency five years previously and compared to the predicted level of 
efficiency five years in the future. 
looking at recollections of efficiency over the past five years, Tables 4.10 and 
4.11 showed that both types of spatial differences achieved statistical 
significance at the .05 level in the last two surveys of the British Social Attitudes 
(that is 1987 and 1989). Class differences were significant at the .05 level in all 
three British Social Attitudes surveys which posed the question. Moreover the F 
values and Beta coefficients revealed that class typically outperformed both 
concepts of spatial variation. 
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Table 4.18: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Recollections of Efficiency Over the Last Five 
Years by Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
ScotlWale * -.03 -.01 
North * -.04 .02 
Midlands * .03 .04 
G London * -.10 .03 
South * .07 -.04 
CLASS 
Salariat .14 .11 .08 
RNM -.02 -.01 -.01 
S-E -.03 .09 .08 
Foremen -.01 -.07 -.07 
W/C -.04 -.05 -.05 
Scots and Welsh respondents were inclined to be relatively dissatisfied with 
the current level of efficiency in British industry compared to five years ago, 
while respondents from the Midlands were inclined to be relatively satisfied by 
the same comparison (Table 4.18). All other regional differences had been 
subject to a change in relative direction of satisfaction/dissatisfaction which 
made for a rather confusing picture of evaluations of current efficiency 
standards compared with five years ago. However, the specificity of the 
question might have precipitated wild fluctuations in responses. It is not 
particularly likely that information about industrial efficiency is internalised at 
the local level rather than the national level - if at all. Hence the issue is hard to 
divorce from the general concept of industrial performance since respondents 
might not hold well formed opinions about the state of local industrial efficiency. 
As a result, the responses of the public might be inconsistent and be volatile 
from year to year. 
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Table 4.19: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Recollections of Efficiency Over the Last Five 
Years by Constituency Type & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep * -.02 -.01 
Poor Cl * -.03 -.06 
Innermetro * -.13 .07 
Wh-Collar * .02 -.03 
Buoy /Agri * .03 .03 
CLASS 
Salariat .14 .11 .07 
RNM -.02 -.01 -.01 
S-E -.04 .09 .06 
Foremen -.01 -.06 -.07 
WIC -.04 -.05 -.04 
The variations in Table 4.19 related to constituency type reveal that the inner 
metropolitan group which was the most dissatisfied of all groups in 1986 
became the most satisfied in 1989. Elsewhere dissatisfied sections of the 
population according to constituency type reside in council house intensive or 
depressed areas. 
In terms of class, the Salariat and, despite their relative dissatisfaction in 1986, 
the self-employed were again the cornerstones of relative satisfaction with the 
level of industrial efficiency compared to five years ago - and implicitly the key 
to support for the Conservative Government. Meanwhile, respondents from 
routine non manual, supervisory and working class occupations inclined 
towards relative dissatisfaction with the same comparison between efficiency 
levels now and five years ago. 
Respondents were also asked to assess the current level of efficiency in British 
industry and compare this with the level of efficiency they expected to be 
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prevalent in five years time. Scrutiny of this variable revealed very little about 
spatial variation in the construction of these forecasts. 
Regional differences were statistically significant at the .05 level twice in the 
three British Social Attitudes surveys that this question was asked, while 
constituency type differences achieved significance only once. Midlanders 
were the most prone to express optimism in their forecasts of efficiency (Table 
4.20). All other groups changed between pessimism and optimism in the two 
years that such evaluations entered statistical significance of the .05 level. Of 
course the most obvious connotation of 'industrial efficiency' was likely to 
concern the manufacturing sector - which was concentrated in the Celtic fringe, 
North and the Midlands. Moreover during the economic recovery of the 1980s 
the Midlands was the region where manufacturing renewal would be the most 
apparent - the South having precious little manufacturing industry - and the 
North did not really benefit from industrial regeneration. This might explain the 
optimism of Midlanders above all other regions on the question of industrial 
effiency. Furthermore it would be a helpful electoral boost to the Conservatives 
in the Election year of 1987. 
In 1989 poor council areas and white collar areas were the most pessimistic 
and inner metropolitan areas the most optimistic of all constituency types 
(Table 4.21). Class differences show that once again the Salariat and the self-
employed represented the most optimistic sections of society in their 
evaluations of modern efficiency compared to efficiency in five years time, the 
efficiency forecasts of respondents from routine non manual occupations 
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deviated little from the national mean, while foremen and working class 
respondents formed a bloc of relative pessimism. 
Table 4.20: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Forecasts of Efficiency over the Next Five Years by 
Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
Scot/Wale * -.05 -.01 
North * -.02 .01 
Midlands * .06 .04 
G London * -.03 .03 
South * .02 -.04 
CLASS 
Salariat ,08 .07 .09 
RNM -.01 .00 -,01 
S-E .01 ,01 ,08 
Foremen -.04 -.05 -.09 
WIC -.02 -.03 -.04 
Table 4.21: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Forecasts of Efficiency over the next Five Years by 
Constituency Type & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep * * -.02 
Poor Cl * * -.04 
Innermetro * * .06 
Wh-Collar * * -,03 
Buoy IAgri * * .03 
CLASS 
Salariat .08 .07 .08 
RNM -.01 .00 -.01 
S-E .00 .00 .06 
Foremen -.04 -.05 -.09 
WIC -.02 -.03 -.04 
4.5.1.5 ATTITUDES TO POVERTY 
Public perceptions of poverty were charted in the 1986 and 1989 British Social 
Attitudes surveys. This involved questions concerning the extent of poverty 
compared to its extent ten years ago and to its forecast extent ten years in the 
future. 
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As already shown, constituency type differences achieved statistical 
significance at the .05 level in both 1986 and 1989 in explaining attitudes to 
changes in the extent of poverty compared to a decade ago, while regional 
differences failed to match this level of significance in 1986 (Tables 4.10 and 
4.11). Class remained significant at the .05 level in both analyses in both 
years. 
Respondents from Scotland and Wales were the 'most dissatisfied' with the 
changes in the extent of poverty over the previous ten years in 1989, while 
respondents from the North and from Greater London were relatively satisfied 
(Table 4.22). Similarly respondents from depressed areas, from areas of high 
levels of council housing, and from inner metropolitan areas were likely to 
express dissatisfaction with the changes in poverty levels over the last decade 
(Table 4.23). Respondents from white collar and buoyant areas were inclined 
to be relatively satisfied with the same comparison. The class distinctions in the 
analyses of perceptions of changes in the level of poverty over the past decade 
were statistically significant at the .05 level in all cases. Moreover they 
revealed a core of satisfaction among the Sa lariat and dissatisfaction among 
working class and supervisory respondents. Interestingly the self-employed, 
who usually provided the government with a strong basis of support, failed to 
deliver relative satisfaction with changes in the level of poverty over the past 
decade in 1986, but became the strongest of all groups expressing satisfaction 
in 1989. 
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Table 4.22: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Perceptions of Changes in the Level of Poverty 
over the Past Ten Years by Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
Scat/Wale * -.09 
North * .03 
Midlands * -.01 
G London * .03 
South * .01 
CLASS 
Salariat .07 .06 
RNM .01 .02 
S-E -.04 .12 
Foremen -.07 -.10 
WIC -.04 -.06 
Table 4.23: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Perceptions of Changes in the Level of Poverty 
over the Past Ten Years by Constituency Type & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Dep -.04 -.02 
Poor Cl -.06 -.11 
Innermetro -.06 -.03 
Wh-Collar .04 .04 
Buoy IAgri .02 .02 
CLASS 
Salariat .07 .05 
RNM .01 .02 
S-E -.05 .11 
Foremen -.06 -.10 
W/C -.04 -.06 
In the same years that respondents were asked to recollect their evaluations of 
past poverty levels they were also invited to forecast the amount of change in 
the levels of poverty that could be expected over the next ten years. 
In 1986 regional and constituency differences failed to achieve statistical 
significance at the .05 level in the explanation of variation in the forecasting of 
levels of poverty over the next decade. However, in 1989 both spatial variables 
achieved statistical significance with reasonable explanatory force and sizeable 
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deviations between sub-groups (Tables 4.10 and 4.11). Class differences were 
significant when combined with either region or constituency type and proved 
to be the most robust explanatory variable in all analyses. 
By 1989 the new recession began to bite in the buoyant sections of the 
economy. It was also the only year in which spatial differences held 
independent from class were significant in explaining variation in the forecasts 
of poverty over the next decade. Respondents from Scotland and Wales were 
the most inclined to express pessimism in their forecasts. Respondents from 
the Midlands and the South deviated little from the grand mean but 
respondents from the North and from Greater London were relatively optimistic 
about the prospects for the alleviation of poverty (Table 4.24). Respondents 
from areas with high rates of council housing were by far the most prone of all 
constituency type groups to express pessimism in their evaluations of poverty 
over the next ten years (Table 4.25). Meanwhile respondents from areas 
dominated by white collar occupations were relatively prone to optimism by the 
same calculation. Class differences within poverty forecasts showed yet again 
that the Salariat and the self-employed were firmly optimistic while foremen and 
working class respondents were relatively pessimistic about the prospects for 
the easing of poverty. 
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Table 4.24: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Forecast of Poverty Levels over the Next Ten 
Years by Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
Scot/Wale * -.09 
North * .03 
Midlands * .00 
G London * .04 
South * .01 
CLASS 
Salariat .08 .07 
RNM -.01 .01 
S-E .03 .12 
Foremen -.05 -.02 
WIC -.03 -.07 
Table 4.25: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Forecasts of Poverty Levels over the Next Ten 
Years by Constituency Type & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Dep * .00 
Poor Cl * -.14 
Innermetro * -.01 
Wh-Collar * .03 
Buoy IAgri * .02 
CLASS 
Salariat .08 .06 
RNM -.01 .01 
S-E .03 .11 
Foremen -.05 -.03 
WIC -.03 -.06 
In conclusion to the measurement of sociotropic evaluations, clear class 
differences have been reported from most analyses with the Salariat and the 
self-employed seeming particularly prone to report either satisfaction with 
current positions or optimism about the future. Both these positions are 
consistent with disproportionate Conservative support during this period, which 
has been reported above. The working class, conversely, were inclined to 
express dissatisfaction and pessimism which would be consistent with the anti-
government stance reported by these respondents earlier. 
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As far as spatial differences were concerned, regional disaggregations showed 
that respondents from the North and from Scotland and Wales were typically 
dissatisfied and pessimistic in their sociotropic evaluations while Southerners, 
and often Midlanders, leaned towards satisfaction and optimism in their 
sociotropic evaluations. Again this is quite consistent with the levels of partisan 
support by regional differences reported earlier. 
Turning to consistency type disaggregations, the most interesting development 
here involved respondents from inner metropolitan areas. Respondents from 
inner metropolitan areas were subject to an attitudinal movement away from 
optimism and satisfaction and towards pessimism and dissatisfaction. The 
same period witnessed a movement away from relative Conservative 
identification in 1983 towards hostility to Conservatism in 1989 among those 
respondents. Solid blocs of pessimism and dissatisfaction were often identified 
among respondents from areas dominated by council housing and of 
optimism/satisfaction among respondent from high status white collar and 
buoyant areas. Again this was mirrored by trends in partisan identification as 
the former group were hostile to Conservatism and the latter group its strongest 
supporters. 
4.5.2 EGOCENTRIC EVALUATIONS 
As mentioned above the British Social Attitudes survey allows the measurement 
of personal and well as societal values, the charting of trends in egocentric 
attitudes as well as sociotropic values. Egocentrism is a well defined strand of 
mainstream psephological insight having its roots in the Downsian analysis of 
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the 1950s (Downs 1957). Although a central theme of this study is that 
sociotropic values also effect partisanship it should nevertheless be 
remembered that egocentric values are still valid as a cue to respondents in 
this structuring process. It is to egocentric values to which attention must now 
turn. 
Little analysis could be achieved for egocentric values from the British Social 
Attitudes survey series. The most explicitly personal questions posed 
concerned forecasts of personal wage levels and the forecasting and 
recollection of changes in family income levels. 
4.5.2.1 ATTITUDES TO FAMILY INCOME LEVELS 
Respondents were asked to record their degree of satisfaction with family 
income levels in every British Social Attitudes survey from 1984 on. In the 
evaluation of changes in family income over the past year, regional differences 
and constituency type differences when combined with class disaggregations 
were statistically significant at the .05 level in each year except 1983 and 1989 
(see Tables 4.26 and 4.27) although class consistently proved to be the most 
important explanatory variable of the two in each set of analysis. 
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Table 4.26: Tests for Geographic Model 1; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, Egocentrism 
FAMYLY FAMYFC WAGEFC 
f Beta f Beta f Beta 
REGION 
1983 3.8 10 
1984 • * 3.0 10 * * 
1985 6.0 12 8.1 14 5.2 11 
1986 6.6 10 3.4 7 * * 
1987 7.6 10 5.0 8 * * 
1989 * * * * * * 
CLASS 
1983 * * 
1984 6.5 14 3.7 11 2.9 9 
1985 15.6 19 13.9 18 5.2 11 
1986 11.0 14 13.0 15 21.3 17 
1987 18.2 16 19.7 17 15.3 15 
1989 15.8 22 16.7 22 14.4 14 
Table 4.27: Tests for Geographic Model 2; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, Egocentrism 
FAMYLY FAMYFC WAGEFC 
f Beta f Beta f Beta 
CTYPE 
1983 * * 
1984 * * 3.4 10 * * 
1985 4.5 10 4.5 11 4.7 11 
1986 6.6 10 2.9 7 * * 
1987 6.0 9 3.9 8 * * 
1989 * * * * * * 
CLASS 
1983 2.5 9 
1984 6.0 14 3.3 10 2.6 9 
1985 12.9 18 11.3 17 4.4 10 
1986 8.2 12 12.4 14 20.7 17 
1987 17.7 16 19.1 17 15.3 15 
1989 16.2 22 17.3 23 13.6 14 
When the average deviations from the grand mean were scrutinised (see Table 
4.28), for the degree of satisfaction with the changes in family income levels 
over the past year, no clear pattern emerged. Indeed in the last three surveys 
where regional disaggregations achieved statistical Significance at the .05 level 
_ 1985, 1986 and 1987 - the relative direction of satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
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changed for each group of respondents at least once, and in the case of 
respondents from Scotland and Wales, the North and the South, changed 
twice. The same analysis by constituency type disaggregations (Table 4.29) 
revealed that only respondents from areas typified by poor council housing 
were consistent in their relative dissatisfaction with their changes in family 
income over the past year. Both analyses of social class differences revealed a 
similar lack of consistency in the relative direction of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction throughout the series. For instance the Salariat, the self-
employed and foremen all exhibited massive fluctuations from the grand mean 
in both directions throughout the series. The volatility of these deviations made 
interpretation of these results very difficult indeed, but was in itself very 
interesting. The volatility of egocentric economic evaluations ought to be 
placed on the agenda for future research. 
Table 4.28: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Family Income Recollections by Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
Scot/Wale * -.05 .03 -.04 * 
North * -.09 .06 -.08 * 
Midlands * .03 .00 -.03 * 
G London * -.04 -.10 .08 * 
South * .09 -.04 .08 * 
CLASS 
Salariat -.08 .23 -.11 .17 .31 
RNM -.03 .00 -.02 .03 -.02 
S-E -.19 .13 -.06 .08 .22 
Foremen .03 .01 .07 .01 -.19 
W/C .08 -.12 .07 -.13 -.11 
A similar operation for the forecasting of changes in family income levels over 
the next year led to very similar conclusions. Tables 4.26 and 4.27 illustrate 
that regional and constituency type disaggregations when allied to class failed 
to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level in 1989. Throughout the 
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series, where both independent variables were statistically significant at the .05 
level, class outstripped geography in explanatory force. 
Table 4.29: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Family Income Recollections by Constituency Type 
& Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep * -.08 .08 -.09 * 
Poorel * -.06 -.02 -.03 * 
Innermetro * -.13 -.05 .06 * 
Wh-Collar * .09 -.05 .06 * 
Buoy /Agri * .03 -.03 .04 * 
CLASS 
Salariat -.08 .22 -.10 .17 .31 
RNM -.03 .00 -.02 .03 -.02 
S-E -.19 .13 -.05 .07 .22 
Foremen .03 .01 .06 .01 -.19 
W/C .08 -.11 .07 -.13 -.11 
A glance at the average deviations from the grand mean shown by Tables 4.30 
and 4.31 reveals that once again every group of respondents disaggregated by 
region and constituency type changed relative direction at least once in the 
series perhaps reflecting a change in the dynamics of the economy. Once 
again respondents in Scotland and Wales, the North, and the South were very 
volatile fluctuating between relative optimism and pessimism three times in the 
four surveys shown to be significant. Every group in the constituency type 
variable changed direction between relative optimism and pessimism three 
times, showing a high degree of volatility in the forecasting of changes in levels 
of family income over the next year. The class pattern interpreted from both 
analyses repeated the procedure for family income forecasts with the Salariat, 
the self-employed and foremen being prone to large swings in relative optimism 
and pessimism. 
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Table 4.30: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Family Income Forecasts by Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
Scot/Wale .05 -.11 .00 -.08 * 
North .04 -.10 .04 -.04 * 
Midlands .03 .05 .03 -.01 * 
G London -.02 .03 -.08 .09 * 
South -.07 .09 -.02 .04 * 
CLASS 
Salariat -.06 .23 -.11 .20 .34 
RNM -.03 -.03 -.02 .00 -.06 
S-E -.14 .17 -.10 .08 .18 
Foremen .05 -.06 .19 -.12 -.24 
W/C .06 -.09 .06 -.11 -.08 
Table 4.31: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Family Income Forecasts by Constituency Type & 
Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
CTYPE 
Imm/Oep .04 -.09 .05 -.06 * 
Poorel .10 -.10 .02 -.02 * 
Innermetro -.03 .03 -.08 .10 * 
Wh-Collar -.04 .07 -.02 .06 * 
Buoy /Agri -.04 .04 -.02 .02 * 
CLASS 
Salariat -.05 .21 -.11 .21 .35 
RNM -.03 -.03 -.02 .00 -.06 
S-E -.14 .16 -.09 .07 .19 
Foremen .06 -.07 .19 -.12 -.23 
W/C .05 -.08 .06 -.10 -.08 
No clear pattern emerged from these analysis although as implied earlier it may 
be the case that this British Social Attitudes question was contaminated by its 
linkage to evaluations of the cost of living. The massive fluctuations in the 
grand means of these variables, as witnessed in Table 4.1, might be taken to 
mean that measurement of attitudes to family income levels amounted to little 
more than the recording of 'white noise'; on the other hand it might represent 
the spread of waves of recovery dhrough the 1980s, and in different places at 
different times. 
206 
Chapter -I: Partisanship. F.:col1olllic Attitudes & ."'pace During (he 1980s 
4.5.2.2 ATTITUDES TO PERSONAL WAGE LEVELS 
A related question posed by the British Social Attitudes required respondents to 
gauge how well they would fare over the next year by comparing their forecasts 
of personal wage levels to their forecasts for the cost of living. Once more 
having noted a general tendency for all respondents to exhibit pessimism about 
the rising costs and inflation, and the inappropriateness of the local context as 
a barometer for attitudes to inflation, a lack of clear trends disaggregated by 
space or class should not have been surprising. 
Although class began to feature as an explanatory variable - as the economic 
upturn slowed down at the end of the decade - region and constituency type 
disaggregations flirted with statistical significance only twice and once 
respectively, in the six year series (Tables 4.26 and 4.27). Both types of 
geography briefly performed as well as class in 1985, and class 
disaggregations failed to be significant in 1983. 
Respondents in Scotland and Wales and the North of England were consistent 
in expressing relative pessimism in their forecasts of wage expectations on the 
two occasions that regional disaggregations ventured into statistical 
significance at the .05 level (Table 4.32). Respondents in Greater London and 
the Midlands were relatively optimistic in both years. 
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Table 4.32: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Wage Forecasts by Region & Class 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
REGION 
Scot/Wale -.02 * -.03 * * * 
North -.05 * -.08 * * * 
Midlands .06 * .03 * * * 
G London .10 * .05 * * * 
South -.01 * .05 * * * 
CLASS 
Safariat * .08 .11 .19 .14 .13 
RNM * -.01 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.01 
S-E * .08 .11 .06 .00 .12 
Foremen * .01 .01 -.01 .04 -.09 
WIC * -.03 -.03 .07 -.05 -.07 
Tabfe 4 33: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Wage Forecasts by Constituency Type & Cfass 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 
C TYPE 
fmm/Oep * * -.04 * * * 
Poor Cf * * .00 * * * 
fnnermetro * * .04 * * * 
Wh-Collar * * .12 * * * 
Buoy IAgri * * -.02 * * * 
CLASS 
Safariat .05 .08 .10 .19 .14 .13 
RNM -.01 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.01 
S-E .06 .08 .11 .06 .00 .11 
Foremen .05 .01 .00 -.21 .05 -.09 
WIC -.04 -.03 -.03 -.07 -.06 -.06 
The picture is less solid in terms of constituency type (Table 4.33) where 
respondents from depressed areas were most pessimistic about their prospects 
of wage increases keeping up with inflation in 1985 the only year where the 
variable proved significant. Respondents from inner metropolitan and white 
collar areas were relatively optimistic in 1985. The inclusion of inner 
metropolitan respondents here is not surprising since their relative optimism in 
1983 was much weaker than that of respondents from white-collar areas and at 
this time their partisanship was relatively pro-Conservative. The change in 
inner metropolitan sympathies noted elsewhere from satisfaction to 
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dissatisfaction, from optimism to pessimism and from pro-Conservatism to anti-
Conservatism in this report did not impinge upon the analysis of wage forecasts 
due to the failure of constituency type to enter statistical significance after the 
transformation had occurred. 
Class deviations reveal that while the Salariat and the self-employed were 
optimistic about their wage prospects, routine non-manual workers and the 
working class were always pessimistic in their evaluation of wage forecasts 
versus inflation forecasts. Foremen and supervisory workers were prone to 
fluctuate in their assessments of wage forecasts. 
To conclude this section on egocentric evaluations it must be said that no clear 
relationship was found between egocentric evaluations and region, 
constituency type, or even class. This may have been caused by the imperfect 
trade off between evaluations of the cost of living and personal economic well 
being, and the inappropriate nature of the local context in which matters related 
to inflation are judged. 
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that a two stage process was 
under examination. The basis for this thesis was that spatial variation had 
occurred in the economic attitudes of the public and that this had a causal role 
in the spatial variation in patterns of electoral behaviour within mainland 
Britain. 
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It should be clear after reading this chapter that the existence of spatial 
variation in partisanship has been illustrated by the use of the British Social 
Attitudes series. The null hypothesis that no such variation exists has been 
firmly rejected. Indeed the extent of this variation seemed to intensify over the 
period of economic recovery during the 1980s. 
As the economic restructuring of the 1980s gained momentum, the hostility 
towards the Conservative Government exhibited in Scotland and Wales, the 
North and in depressed areas stiffened. Meanwhile the resolve of the 
Conservative heartlands of the South and in the prosperous and service sector 
areas strengthened. At the same time the dimensions of Labour identification 
mirrored Conservative identification; relatively strong in the Celtic fringe, the 
North and in depressed areas with high proportions of council housing; weaker 
in areas typified by white-collar employment and the South; strongest among 
the working class electorate, weakest among the Salariat and the self-
employed. While the two main parties could be characterised as class and 
geographically based, the third party Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance gained 
its support across all social strata and all geographic criteria. 
However a much less clear picture emerged from the second stage of analysis, 
the search for the original and causal spatial variation in economic attitudes 
although encouraging signs were present in the analysis of sociotropic 
evaluations. 
There were not good grounds for believing that attitudes to inflation would be 
spatially variable - and indeed no such variation was identified through the 
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1983-9 period of economic recovery. However, where the relevance of the local 
context was important to the internalisation of economic issues (such as 
perceptions of unemployment and industry) significant variations were 
identifiable according to social class and spatial location. In summary, the 
Sa lariat and the self-employed, people from the South and from white-collar 
areas were the most sanguine of all respondents about the prospects for falling 
unemployment rates and the improvement of British industry. The working 
class, the Scots and Welsh, Northerners and those from areas with a high 
proportion of local authority housing were the most pessimistic of all sections of 
society by the same criteria. There were signs that foremen and supervisors 
and to a lesser extent Londoners and Midlanders were less peSSimistic (and 
thus less hostile to the Government) in General Election years than in the inter-
election periods of the 1980s. The ability to manufacture this type of electoral 
support is a vital theme of this thesis. As shall be demonstrated in Chapters 5 
and 6, the tergiversating Tories of the 1980s had their parallel in the 
subsequent analysis of the 19905. 
There was a less clear picture from the analysis of egocentric economic 
evaluations during the 1980s - such as income and personal wage forecasts 
and recollections. The link between egocentric evaluations and perceptions of 
inflation might have been the root cause here. After all if inflation is a national 
phenomenon, variations in perceptions related to it could not be expected -
notwithstanding the almost universal tendency to express pessimism about the 
cost of living. The trend less fluctuation in these variables might represent the 
different 'waves' of economic recovery and overheating in the 1983-9 period. A 
more dynamic approach to the 1990s recession could reveal a more precise 
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interpretation of how geography impacted upon egocentric economic 
evaluations. 
Another feature of this section of the thesis concerns the disproportionate 
impact of Geography according to the state of the country as a whole. 
Geographic variation was often at its most marked when the population as a 
whole was at its most optimistic. In other words, geographic variation emerged 
as an expression of the geographic variability of economic recovery. The 
Lawson boom may have been particularly important here, producing real 
differences in the wealth of the nation and also in the perceptions of the public 
- especially about inflation and unemployment prospects. 
A key difference in the way in which the public evaluates egocentric and 
sociotropic issues was suggested in this chapter. Attitudes to sociotropic issues 
were more spatially varied than egocentric issues. That is individuals' 
interpretations of society were more likely to be influenced by the context in 
which they lived than their judgements of personal matters. Furthermore the 
spatial variation in sociotropic issues mirrored the spatial variation in party 
identification. Labour areas were most pessimistic and dissatisfied areas of the 
country about unemployment, of poverty, and industrial efficiency. On the other 
hand, 'Conservative' areas were the most prone to exhibit optimism about 
these issues. An obvious conclusion might be that, once class is held constant, 
people are much more likely to reflect local and personal conditions in their 
attitudes and support for the Government than they are to reflect personal 
circumstances. 
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The remaining results chapters attempt to study a different time period, as the 
Lawson boom caved in and a new recession took hold - a recession which hit 
the sunrise industries and the Conservative hearltands rather than the 
industrial North and the manufacturing base of Britain from which Labour 
usually recruited. 
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Chapter 5: The New Recession of the 1990s and the 'Feel Good 
Factor' 
The previous two chapters focused on the economic recovery of the 1980s. The 
task of the remaining results chapters is to attempt to gauge the relationship 
between geography, class, economic attitudes and partisanship during a period 
of economic recession - the early 1990s. 
In the context of this thesis, the 'new' recession of the 1990s is particularly 
important since its impact was felt hardest in the geographic regions which 
constituted the heartlands of Conservative support during the heyday of 
Thatcherism; whereas the Labour heartlands of electoral support - which had 
never fully recovered from the manufacturing recession of the early 1980s - were 
relatively unaffected by the new economic downturn. By implication then, it might 
be reasonable to expect the North-South divide in partisanship and to a lesser 
extent in economic attitudes to have narrowed during the early 1990s - as the 
new recession 'evened out' the existing regional inequality in prosperity by 
pegging back the areas that had benefited most from the Lawson boom. There is 
evidence from the 1992 General Election that while the North-South divide had 
indeed narrowed, it also remained a significant influence on voting behaviour 
(see Pattie, Johnston & Fieldhouse 1993; Pattie, Johnston & Fieldhouse 1994). 
One of the major challenges for this thesis is to explain why the Southern 
heart lands of Conservative support for the most part remained Conservative 
during the run up to the 1992 General Election despite economic adversity. 
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This chapter looks at the 1990-2 period as a whole. The tables refer to the 
pooled NOPINewsnight data which ran form January 1990 until February 1992 
unless specifically broken down by month. Some analyses are specific to a 
particular month when a unique question was asked; indications of these are 
given in the text. Despite the fact that this chapter concentrates on the 1990-2 
period as a whole, Significant changes over time are discovered (this is 
especially true of the run-up to the 1992 Election). A more challenging set of 
analyses of changes over time will form the basis of the final results chapter. 
5.1 THE HYPOTHESES UNDER SCRUTINY 
The next stage of this analysis requires scrutiny of a new political environment -
the recession of the early 1990s rather than the recovery of the 1980s. This is 
likely to affect the expected relationships between explanatory and dependent 
variables, and will particularly affect the expected relationship between 
geography and economic attitudes. 
5.1.1 CLASS 
Due to the different methods of data collection used in the survey and opinion 
poll data, the class schema used for the 1990s differs from the schema used for 
the 1980s recovery period (see below). Nevertheless the expected relationship 
will remain unaltered; economic attitudes will depend upon social class in the 
orthodox manner. Those sections of the electorate from the higher echelons of 
society will be more satisfied with their economic circumstances and more 
optimistic about their personal economic futures than those sections of the 
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electorate from the lower echelons of society. In other words Class AB will be 
more satisfied and more optimistic than Class DE - and of course ultimately 
more prone to support the Conservative Government. By their very nature, 
recessions hit the working class harder than the middle class, and when they hit 
the middle class they do so especially hard in some regions. The new economic 
reality of the 1990s caused considerable discomfort for many members of the 
higher social classes but the impact of the new recession did not unduly alter 
this relationship between class and economic attitudes since the incidence of the 
recession was largely geographic. Hitting sectors of the economy which were 
geographically concentrated, its effects could be picked up by changes in the 
spatial relationship between geography and attitudes rather than through 
differences in economic attitudes according to social class. 
5.1.2 GEOGRAPHY: THE RECOVERY AND NEW RECESSION MODELS 
There are then two competing models of geographic variation in economic 
attitudes (and ultimately in voting behaviour) during the 1990s. The first follows 
the pattern of variation set during the economic recovery of the 1980s, the 
growing North-South and urban-rural divide familiar from accounts of 
Thatcherism and from the earlier analysis of the 1983-1989 period. However, the 
1990s brought with them an entirely different economic climate, as the service 
sector overheated and the Southern heartlands of Conservative support were 
damaged disproportionately by the new recession. 
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This 'Recovery Model' hypothesises that the gap between North and South, and 
between depressed and buoyant areas would continue to be relevant in the 
1990s. Moreover the pattern of these cleavages would give cause to think that 
they would bound to increase overtime. Hence not only would these cleavages 
remain important, but their importance would inevitably increase over time. 
On the other hand, the 'New Recession Model' hypothesises that although the 
general distinctions between North and South and between industrial depression 
and economic buoyancy might still play a role in explaining differences in 
economic attitudes: There would inevitably be a narrowing of the gaps between 
the traditional cleavages of Thatcherism because the heartlands of Conservative 
support were in the vanguard of the new recession. The new recession which hit 
the South and the service sector for the first time in the 1990s would inevitably 
account for a reduction in the level of satisfaction and optimism of respondents 
from these areas during this time. 
As other chapters have shown, the British Election Study data for the three 
General Elections of the post oil shock era support the central thesis of the 
reward punishment axiom of traditional psephology; voters reward Governments 
that deliver and if their own personal standards are not improved by the 
Government they are likely to 'throw the rascals out' (Norpoth 1993). The new 
economic reality of the early 1990s ought to have had a different electoral 
impact to that of the 1970s and 1980s. The sections of society which had 
benefited most from the Thatcherite era and which formed the basis of 
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Thatcherism's electoral support, might have started to turn against the 
Conservative Party due to the increased incidence of economic hardship if the 
Government were held responsible for economic austerity. 
5.2 ANALYSING ATTITUDES TO THE ECONOMY IN THE 1990S RECESSION 
Previous chapters have explored the relationship between economic attitudes 
and voting behaviour in the boom period of Thatcherism during 1983-1989; the 
next step is to measure the relationship between economic attitudes and 
electoral support in the recession of the early 1990s. The use of the British 
Election Study data for prospective economic attitudes however, proved 
unreliable since the timing of the British Election Study questionnaire appeared 
to affect the responses of both Government and opposition supporters. 
Moreover data which looked at the inter-election changes in public opinion 
would provide a valuable asset to the study of the 1990s recession. To this end 
the NOPINewsnight series of opinion polls which ran from January 1990 to 
February 1992 was obtained. 
With the NOPINewsnight data it was possible to reconstruct the relationship 
between economic attitudes and reported vote intention for the run up to the 
1992 General Election, substituting recollections with personal economic 
expectations. 
The NOPINewsnight series of opinion polls ran from January 1990 until 
February 1992. Thus it coincided with three crucial developments in the British 
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economic and political landscape; the fall of the longest serving Prime Minister 
in modern political history, the deepest recession since the war, and the longest 
of 'long campaigns' leading up to the April 1992 General Election. It remains an 
invaluable source of data for assessing the impact of economic attitudes upon 
partisanship and of spatial variation in those economic attitudes during the early 
1990s. 
5.2.1 EGOCENTRIC VALUES 
Since the academic earthquake caused by the publication of the original 
Sanders et al model (1987), much emphasis has been placed on the importance 
of the electorate's personal economic expectations in guiding electoral 
behaviour. From July 1990 until February 1992 inclusive the same personal 
economic expectations question was asked by the NOPINewsnight series of 
opinion polls. 
Over the next 12 months do you think the financial position of 
your household will get. .. 
• A lot better 
• A little better 
• Stay the Same 
• A little worse 
• A lot worse 
Responses to this question are given the acronym HHEGO here (derived from 
the egocentric prediction of the position of the Household). Usually responses 
were recoded into three simple categories 'better' 'same' or 'worse' - to represent 
personal economic optimists, neutrals and personal economic pessimists. 
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Occasionally respondents were also asked for their egocentric approval of the 
Government's economic policies through the following question. 
How strongly do you agree with this statement? 
The Government's economic pOlicies are good for me and my 
family. 
• Definitely agree 
• Tend to agree 
• Neither 
• Tend to disagree 
• Definitely disagree 
Again responses were often collapsed into three categories for coding purposes, 
EGOGD (those who definitely agreed or tended to agree), EGONEUT (those 
who did not know or gave a neutral response), and EGOBAD (those who 
definitely disagreed or tended to disagree). This enables a second facet of 
egocentrism to be measured (and one which can be tied directly to the reward-
punishment axiom). 
5.2.2 SOCIOTROPIC VALUES 
In the wake of the furore surrounding the Sanders et a/ model, the sociotropic 
dimension of public attitudes has often been relegated in importance compared 
to egocentric values. Nevertheless they remain a vital research source and the 
remaining results chapters will attempt to analyse the impact of sociotropism 
upon partisanship and Government support. 
There were two main ways in which respondents were permitted to express their 
sociotropic evaluations; by assessing the state of the British economy and by 
220 
Chaprer 5: the 1990s Recession & rhe 'feel Good FacIoI" 
assessing the societal impact of the Government's economic policies. The 
NOPINewsnight questions used here were:-
Which of these statements comes closest to your own view 
about the British economy? 
• The Economy is strong and doing well. 
• The Economy is basically strong but there are short-term 
problems. 
• The Economy is weak but on the mend. 
• The Economy is weak and doing badly. 
How strongly do you agree with this statement? 
The Government's economic pOlicies are good for Britain. 
• Definitely agree 
• Tend to agree 
• Neither 
• Tend to disagree 
• Definitely disagree 
Again responses were often collapsed into three categories for coding purposes, 
'strong' (satisfaction), 'neutrals' (including don't knows) and 'weak' 
(dissatisfaction) for the first question and into sac lOGO (those who definitely 
agreed or tended to agree), SOCIONEUT (those who did not know or gave a 
neutral response), and SOCIOBAD (those who definitely disagreed or tended to 
disagree) for the second. 
5.3 THE FEEL GOOD FACTOR AND THE SELF-INTEREST AXIOM 
A central theme running through much of the popular wisdom about elections is 
that the general public are motivated by economic self-interest (the self-interest 
axiom). In common terms, the fate of a Government depends on the strength of 
the 'feel good factor' in the electorate. If the public are satisfied with their current 
economic circumstances or optimistic about their economic future then this 'feel 
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good factor' is likely to translate directly into votes for the Government. On the 
other hand, a dissatisfied or peSSimistic electorate would turn on the incumbent 
regime and a 'feel bad factor' would rebound on the Government electorally. An 
exploration of the 'feel good factor' in the 1990s recession must be the basis of 
this analysis. 
Table 5.1: Reported Vote Intention by Perceptions of Personal Economic Circumstances over 
the Coming Year; July 1990 - February 1992 
Jul '90-Feb '92 Lot Better Little Better Stay the Same Little Worse Lot Worse 
Conservative 60 48 37 21 13 
Labour 22 27 35 46 53 
The historical relationship between economic attitudes and voting records 
identified in Chapter 2 (and through the 1980s in Chapters 3 and 4) was 
replicated by the analysis of reported vote intention in the run up to the 1992 
General Election (Table 5.1). The most pessimistic sections of society were also 
the least likely to express support for the incumbent Government. Conversely 
the most optimistic sections of society were the most likely to express support for 
the Conservative regime. 
The link between the so-called 'feel good factor' and Government support has 
been established by Table 5.1. Put simply, the greater the level of economic 
optimism, the greater the level of Government support throughout the 1990-1992 
period of economic downturn. Of all respondents who felt that their personal 
economic conditions would get 'a lot better' over the next year, between July 
1990 and February 1992, three-fifths were reported to be Conservative 
sympathisers, only a little over one-fifth claimed to be likely to vote Labour. 
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Moreover the pro-Government bias of optimists was repeated even when the 
level of optimism was diluted. A little under one half of those who felt their 
personal position would get 'a little better' also reported a Conservative vote 
intention. In this category Labour was able to claim just over one-quarter of 
respondents. However, Labour could claim a majority among the peSSimistic 
parts of the electorate. Approximately one half of respondents who expected 
their personal economic circumstances to get 'a little worse', and approximately 
55 per cent of those expecting their own position to get 'a lot worse', identified 
themselves as likely Labour voters The Conservatives found it difficult to recruit 
pessimistic voters. Of those who expected their personal economic condition to 
get 'a little worse' the Conservatives were able to garner the support of only 
about 15 per cent. Furthermore, increased pessimism led to a decreased 
propensity to support the Conservatives; the party of Government being able to 
recruit less than one-tenth of the section of the electorate that felt that their 
personal economic condition would get 'a lot worse' over the next twelve months. 
The solution to why economic optimists tended to be Conservatives might be 
glimpsed through the introduction of the notion of Government responsibility in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3. When egocentric approval was broken down by partisanship 
it revealed that of all Conservative identifiers, over two-thirds thought that the 
Conservative Government's economic policies were 'good' for them (Table 5.2). 
Less than one tenth of Labour supporters felt similarly. Conversely four-fifths of 
all Labour identifiers felt that the economic policies of the Conservative 
Government were 'bad for themselves and their families'. Only one fifth of 
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Conservative identifiers was prepared to stick to the Government despite feeling 
that their economic policies were 'bad' for them. 
Meanwhile, of all respondents who claimed that the economic policies of the 
Conservative Government were 'good for my family and myself, 70 per cent 
were Conservative supporters. Less than 10 per cent of this group intended to 
vote Labour (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.2: Egocentric Approval of the Government's Economic Policy by Reported Vote 
Intention. January 1990 - February 1992 
Good for Self Neither/OK Bad for Self & 
& FamilY_ Family 
Conservative 61 19 21 
Labour 08 12 80 
Table 5.3: Reported Vote Intention by Approval for Government's Economic Policy; January 
1990 - February 1992 
Conservative Labour 
Good for Self & Family 70 14 
Neither / Don't Know 30 35 
Bad for Self & Family 09 64 
These two tables confirm a central aspect of the economic voting thesis; the 
beneficiaries of Government economic policies tend to be Government 
supporters. The self-interest axiom and the feel good factor seem to be decent 
explanations of variations in Government support. 
When the analysis of personal expectations and reported vote intention is 
considered (see Tables 5.4) the trend for 'feel-good' Government support is 
further supported. In the whole period between January 1990 and February 
1992, a time of substantial downturn in economic fortunes as the deep recession 
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set in, only 17 per cent of all Conservative identifiers were pessimistic about 
their personal economic expectations over the coming year. Although a high 
proportion of potential Conservatives expressed neutrality or ambivalence on 
this issue, 41 per cent of all Conservatives in this period were optimistic about 
their personal economic prospects over the coming year. The breakdown of 
personal economic expectations by support for the major Opposition Party 
reveals the obverse side of the same coin. A little over one-fifth of all Labour 
voters were optimistic about their own personal economic fortunes over the next 
year; twice as many were pessimistic. Moreover there remains the distinct 
possibility that this gap is underestimated by the sampling mechanics of the 
polls. Throughout this period Labour led in the polls and it would be unsurprising 
if Labour partisans were more optimistic about their personal future - if they were 
expecting Labour to take office within the next twelve months - than would have 
been the case had the polls correctly forecast a Conservative victory in the 1992 
General Election. 
Table 5.4 Personal Economic Expectations By Reported Vote Intention: January 1990 - February 
1992 
Pessimism Neutrality Optimism 
Conservative 17 42 41 
Labour 43 37 21 
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The public did grow more optimistic towards the end of the 1990-2 period 
(Figure 5.1). In other words the Government may have stimulated a marked 'feel 
good factor' in late 1991 but that it did not directly relate to levels of Government 
support. Of course the boost to optimism in the run-up to the election (witness 
the massive 'blip' in optimism in October 1991) might take time to filter down into 
voting intentions. The challenge to the Government was thus to turn the boost in 
personal economic optimism into Government votes in April 1992. As 
Conservative identifiers seemed particular prone to be optimistic about their 
economic future, while Labour supporters - the general drive towards optimism 
notwithstanding - were more likely to be pessimistic about their personal 
economic future, the popular notion of 'feel-good factor' voting may have been 
the basis of the Conservatives' electoral recovery despite the long running and 
deepening economic recession of the early 1990s. 
5.4 CLASS & ATTITUDES TO THE ECONOMY 
The class dealignment debate has necessitated the search for alternative 
explanations to social class for enduring voting patterns. If economic attitudes 
can be shown to have an explanatory force equal to - or greater than - that of 
social class then the embellishment and detail hypothesis would be firmly 
rejected. 
Table 5.5 Personal Economic Expectations By Class: January 1990 - February 1992 
Pessimism Neutrality Optimism 
AB 23 41 36 
C1 28 39 34 
C2 34 38 27 
DE 39 38 22 
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Table 5.6 Approval of the Government's Economic Policy by Class. January 1990 - February 
1992 
EGOCENTRIC Good For Self & Neither/OK Bad for Self & 
Family Family 
AB 46 16 39 
C1 31 17 51 
C2 25 16 59 
OE 17 19 64 
SOCIOTROPIC Good for Britain Neither/OK Bad for Britain 
AB 49 13 38 
C1 39 18 42 
C2 32 19 50 
DE 24 23 54 
A strong association between economic attitudes and class structure was 
identified between July 1990 and February 1992 (Table 5.5). Respondents from 
the AB class were the most likely to exhibit personal economic optimism, while 
respondents from classes C2 and DE were likely to express pessimism in their 
economic expectations. Moreover, the relationship was 'linear' in that progress 
from Class AB to Class DE was accompanied by progressive personal economic 
pessimism. 
Approval for the Conservative Government's economic policies by social class 
defined by the ABIC 1 scale identified in Chapter 2, reveals the association 
between class and the personal benefit derived from Government policies (Table 
5.6). A marked distinction in egocentric attitudes to the Government's economic 
record according to social class was apparent. In each of the class categories 
except AB, a simple plurality of respondents felt that the Government's economic 
policies were 'bad' for themselves. Nevertheless the expected linear relationship 
between egocentric approval for the Government's economic policies and social 
class was upheld. 
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Analysis of sociotropic approval of Government policies revealed a similar story. 
The sociotropic evaluations of those in the AB class category were remarkably 
similar to their responses to the egocentric question. Once again the relationship 
between the sociotropic approval of the Government's economic poliCies and 
social class was virtually 'linear'. In other words, their perception of what is good 
for them was identical to their perception of what was good for the country as a 
whole. In the other classes, however, there were interesting distinctions between 
sociotropic and egocentric evaluations of the Government's economic policies. 
In terms of egocentric evaluations the C1 group seemed reluctant to back the 
Government but for their sociotropic evaluations, the figures for the C 1 class 
expressing the negative option fell from 51 per cent to 42 per cent. Further those 
C 1 respondents who expressed positive sociotropic perceptions outweighed the 
corresponding egocentric score by eight per cent. Respondents from the C2 and 
DE classes exhibited a similar reluctance to taint the Government's national 
record as 'bad' when compared to their egocentric perception of economic utility. 
This dilution of hostility to the Government's economic record across otherwise 
unfavourable classes may have been important in upholding the Conservative 
vote in their unexpected election victory of April 1992, if voters were inclined to 
think sociotropically rather than egocentrically when casting their vote. 
229 
Chapter 5: The 1990.1' Recession & the 'Feel Good Factor' 
Percentage 
~ ~ N N (..) W ~ ~ U1 U1 en en 
" U1 0 U1 0 U1 0 U1 0 U1 0 U1 0 U1 0 
jul '90 
aug 
sep 
oct 
nov 
-n 
(Cl 
dec c: 
+ 
..., 
CD 
(') 01 
lii' jan'91 t\.) VI 
VI 
» '"'0 CD 
~ , feb CD ..., Cl) 0 
(') ::J 
Cl) mar DJ VI 
VI Z 
(') 0 m ~ 
"tJ C1 
f apr "tJ 0 Q. ::J 
(') 0 
lii' may 3 VI 
VI (") (") 
N jun 0 ! "0 I ~ 
(") jul 3 lii' 
VI Cl) 
VI 3 0 
m aug OJ 
'< 
sep () 
Q) 
Cl) 
oct 
Cl) 
ncv 
jan'92 
feb 
230 
Chapter 5: The J 990s Recession & the 'feel Good FacioI' , 
The pattern of class variation in economic attitudes held throughout the 
NOPINewsnighf series. Crucially the relative pattern of economic expectations 
was left unaffected throughout polling (Figure 5.2). Not only did a general upturn 
in economic optimism occur in late 1991, in class terms it was particularly 
marked among the Conservatives' traditional supporters. The late 1991 boom in 
the feel good factor produced a widening class cleavage in levels of economic 
optimism. Voters from classes AB and C 1 may have remembered the upturn in 
optimism the following April, and formed the basis of the Conservative election 
victory. 
5.5 GEOGRAPHY & ATTITUDES TO THE ECONOMY 
There were then the expected class differences in 'feeling good' towards the end 
of the 1990-2 period. The next step is to consider whether these differences 
were also spatially variable and linked to the geography of the new recession. 
The disparate economic experience of different regions and different types of 
regions in Britain ought to be reflected in distinct spatial variation in those 
economic perceptions. A preliminary examination of the incidence of spatial 
variation in economic attitudes in Britain follows. 
This section attacks the core problem of analysing economic attitudes during the 
new recession in three stages. Firstly, it analyses the extent to which the 
electorate felt damaged by a recession. This is important since if attitudes about 
the extent of the recession were spatially variable, then the geographic effects of 
the economic downturn could themselves be modified or moderated. 
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The second stage is to analyse how well the electorate thought the government 
was dealing with the recession - how appropriate their economic policies were. 
Again an understanding electorate which recognised that the Government was 
doing all in its power to rectify the economic underperformance might be more 
forgiving than an electorate which felt that the Government's economic policies 
were inappropriate or inadequate, Furthermore a spatial variation in the public 
attitudes concerning the appropriateness of the government's economic policy 
would have important consequences for the ability of the government to be re-
elected. 
Thirdly, a direct link to the reward-punishment axiom will be analysed. If 
respondents are to punish a Government which presided over a recession, they 
must first hold the Government responsible for that recession. If on the other 
hand, the Government is absolved of blame for economic failure then there 
would be no reason for the electorate to act as Key's 'rational God of 
vengeance'. Crucially, the possibility that an individual's propensity to blame the 
Government for the 1990s recession was largely dependent upon where they 
happened to live will be examined. 
5.5.1 THE EXTENT OF THE RECESSION 
Perceptions of personal economic performance over the next twelve months by 
compressed region and constituency type, and controlling for reported vote 
intention are shown in Table 5.7. It also shows an Optimism - Pessimism index 
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for all respondents in each region and in each type of constituency. An Optimism 
- Pessimism index of 1 represents a neutral electorate, a score greater than 1 
represents an optimistic electorate, a score less than 1 represents a pessimistic 
electorate. 
Table 5.7 Perceptions of Personal Economic Performance over the Next Twelve Months By 
Region and Constituency Type and By Reported Vote Intention. January 1990-February 1992 
GET BETTER STAY SAME GET WORSE O:P INDEX 
Con Lbr Con Lbr Con Lbr 
Region 
ScotlWales 41 21 43 38 16 41 0.82 
North 40 20 43 38 17 42 0.84 
Midlands 42 21 41 36 18 43 0.92 
G London 40 21 41 35 19 44 0.90 
South 42 20 41 36 17 44 0.97 
C Type 
Oep/LA 40 20 43 38 17 41 0.80 
Service 41 22 41 35 18 44 0,97 
Prosperous 42 20 41 36 17 44 0.94 
All in all there appeared to be some substantial variation in partisan optimism 
and pessimism according to geographic location. The proportion of optimists and 
pessimists in the Conservative and Labour electorates were variable across all 
five compressed regions and across three constituency types. The South, 
Midlands and London, service and prosperous areas were characterised by 
higher degrees of economic optimism throughout the 1990-2 period (Table 5.7). 
The Celtic fringe, North and depressed areas were characterised by relative 
pessimism about their personal economic futures. The Optimism-Pessimism 
ratios in Table 5.7 clearly show the continued significance of a North-South 
divide - albeit a weaker divide than identified in the 1980s. This is perhaps 
unsurprising in the context of the new recession of the 1990s which effectively 
'narrowed' the real economic differences between regions. All in all, the new 
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recession evened out regional disparity and the narrowing of the gap between 
personal economic expectations according to region may have been the 
manifest result of the new economic reality. 
Spatial variation does appear to play a role in the construction of economic 
attitudes (the half stage model). The usual North-South and functional 
geography cleavages were replicated in the run-up to the 1992 General Election 
- the recovery model of the geography of economic attitudes performed better 
than the new recession model. Nevertheless the new recession hit the South 
and the service sector economy for the first time, turning then from heartlands of 
economic optimism into clusters of pessimism. The recovery of the 1980s failed 
to reach the traditional 'depressed areas' that were traumatised by the early 
1980s depression, since it was not based on a recovery in manufacturing 
industry. Consequently respondents from depressed areas typified by a high 
concentration of local authority housing could still be even more pessimistic than 
respondents from 'service' constituencies who were themselves more pessimistic 
than would traditionally have been the case. 
The greater significance of constituency type than regional schema might be 
interpreted as support for the assertion that the geographic cleavages in British 
electoral behaviour were the result of the character of regions rather than mere 
location. It is true that the class profile for respondents from those constituencies 
typified by work in the service sector is quite distinct from the class profile for 
respondents from constituencies typified by industrial depression and high rates 
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of local authority housing. This class distinction inherent in the constituency type 
schema may be enough to mask the effects of constituency type per se. Further 
work must be done in order to assess the competing claims about geographic 
variations in attitudinal structure. 
The half-stage model of personal economic attitudes as a function of both types 
of geography is presented in Table 5.B. Its most obvious feature is the lack of 
significant variation in the distributions of economic expectations according to 
either regional or type of location. All respondents were generally pessimistic 
about their personal economic outlook over the next twelve months, around one 
third of all respondents - regardless of their geographic location - thought their 
personal position would deteriorate. Nearly two-fifths of all respondents were 
neutral in their economic outlook, expecting their economic outlook to 'stay the 
same' over the course of the coming year. Only just over one-quarter of all 
respondents felt that their personal economic circumstances would improve over 
the next twelve months. 
Table 5.8 Economic Perceptions of Future by Region: All Respondents January 1990 - February 
1992 
GET BETTER STAY THE GET WORSE 
SAME 
COMPRESSED REGION 
Scot/Wales 27 41 33 
North 27 40 33 
Midlands 30 38 32 
Gtr London 30 38 33 
South 30 38 31 
CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depressed/LA 27 40 33 
Service 30 39 31 
Prosperous 30 39 32 
235 
Chapter 5: The 1990s Recession & the 'Feel Good Factor' 
There was very little geographic variation in personal economic expectations. 
Again the most pessimistic of all regions appeared to be Scotland and Wales, 
while respondents from the Midlands provided the most relatively optimistic of 
outlooks. Also respondents from areas typified by depressed industry and from 
areas with a high intensity of local authority housing tended to be slightly more 
pessimistic than other respondents but the levels of optimism and pessimism 
expressed by respondents from areas typified by the service sector and 
prosperous areas were barely distinguishable. However, these trends perceived 
in differences in levels of economic outlooks in Table 5.8 were slight and should 
only be viewed with caution. The relative lack of spatial variation may simply 
reflect the impact of the new recession in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the 
regional and constituency type variations in attitudes and ultimately voting 
behaviour began to even out due to the unusual impact of the economic 
downturn on hitherto prosperous areas. Although the South was experiencing 
recessionary pressure, it was not reflected in voters' attitudes (see Tables 5.6 
and 5.7). The willingness of Southerners to discount their recessionary 
experience may have been because they thought the recession temporary or 
nothing to do with the Government, whereas Northerners thought the recession 
permanent and the direct consequence of Government policy. This and later 
sections of this thesis contend that this was due to the reluctance of respondents 
from these areas to blame the Government for the recession. 
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The pictorial representation of regional variations in personal optimism and 
pessimism throughout the poll period (Figure 5.3) again revealed a fairly 
constant relative pattern of regional differences. In other words, the south and 
the Service sector (see Figure 5.4) failed to turn on the Government despite the 
new recession. Nonetheless critical geographic differences in personal optimism 
did exist (Figure 5.3). There was an upturn in optimism in the run-up to the 
Election in the Southern regions which was absent further north. The evidence is 
amassing to show that the major Government was able to convince potential 
waverers where it mattered. Just as the Thatcher Governments benefited from 
the tergiversating Tories of the 1980s, the Conservatives won in 1992 not least 
because of a widening spatial divide in economic optimism just when it mattered. 
This is underpinned by the long-term belief in the South of England that the 
recession there was temporary (see Table 5.9 below). 
All in all the 'recovery model' of geographic variation in attitudes to the economy 
failed to materialise in the run up to the 1992 General Election, and the lack of 
spatial variation in attitudes to the economy would seem to fit the 'new recession 
model' much better. The presence of significant geographic variation in the 
analysis of the 1980s electorate would seem to indicate that the new recession 
at the turn of the decade had a substantial electoral impact, diluting the degree 
of geographic variation in economic attitudes. 
Before the discussion of the incidence of blame for the economic recession and 
after the analysis of the sociotropic and egocentric approval for the 
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Government's economic policies, it is necessary to analyse the public perception 
of the state of the British economy. When respondents were asked to gauge the 
strength of the British economy they were reluctant to express positive views 
about the state of the British economy (Table 5.9). Typically, over twice as many 
respondents from all regions and constituency types felt the state of the 
economy was weak rather than strong. 
Table 5.9 Sociotropic Views on the Strength of the Economy By Geography: January 1990 -
February 1992 
Strong & Strong but None/OK Weak but On Weak & 
Doing Well Short-Term the Mend Doing Badly 
Problems 
COMP REGION 
ScoUWales 04 21 04 33 39 
North 02 35 03 24 37 
Midlands 02 34 03 28 34 
Gtr London 08 27 02 27 35 
South 12 24 02 29 33 
CONST TYPE 
Depressed/LA 02 30 03 35 38 
Service 08 27 03 22 34 
Prosperous 07 27 03 43 34 
An interesting distinction shown in Table 5.9 is that between respondents who 
felt that the British economy was 'strong and doing well' and those who felt the 
economy was basically 'strong but with some short-term problems'. Respondents 
from the South of England were six times more likely to think that the economy 
was 'strong and doing well', than their counterparts form the Midlands. Celtic 
respondents were the least satisfied of all voters with the state of the economy, 
almost two-fifths of them thinking that the economy was 'weak and doing badly'. 
There was also a marked disinclination among respondents from areas typified 
by industrial depression and high proportions of local authority housing to 
believe that the economy was 'strong and dOing well'. Conversely those from 
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areas identified as prosperous by the constituency type schema were 
particularly prone to express the view that the economy was 'weak but on the 
mend', being almost twice as likely to favour this option than their cohorts from 
areas typified by service sector employment. 
A key feature of the public's perception of the extent of the 1990s recession is 
that of the two types of geographic criteria, the regional schema outperforms 
constituency type. Only twenty five per cent of Scots and Welsh felt that the 
economy was 'strong', whereas thirty-six per cent of Southerners felt the same 
way. Moreover a full ten per cent more - and seventy-two per cent in total - Celts 
believed the economy was 'weak' than their counterparts in the South. The 
parallel analysis of constituency type fails to produce such significant differences 
between geographic criteria. This lends support to the notion that the geographic 
context was confined to the 'real' nature of geographic location rather than the 
more 'artificial' character of the constituency. The long-term belief in the South of 
England that the recession there was a temporary entity may have been the crux 
of the Conservative victory in April 1992. That Southerners were not in a 
permanently pessimistic state suggests that the contextual socialisation of 
Southerners (of which Conservative support was a part) was stronger than a few 
years of economic recession: A little local difficulty could not overcome their 
economic and political outlook. 
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5.5.2 THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE RECESSION 
Respondents in the NOPINewsnighf series of polls were asked to assess the 
Government's economic record in two ways; firstly egocentrically - whether the 
Government's economic policy was good for themselves personally; and 
secondly sociotropically - whether the Government's economic policy was 
favourable for the society as a whole. These assessments were carried out 
periodically in the NOPINewsnighf poll series and the data derived from them 
was combined into a large dataset covering the period January 1990 to February 
1992. 
5.5.2.1 EGOCENTRIC APPROVAL 
The distribution of approval, in personal terms, for the Government's economic 
policy by the standard eleven-fold regional schema and the construction of an 
Approval - Disapproval index similar to the Optimism - Pessimism index revealed 
some regional variation (Table 5.10). While all the regions exhibited an 
inclination to express overall disapproval for the Government's economic policy 
and the personal benefit derived from it, the Scots and Welsh were - on average 
- the most disapproving of the Government's policy, while respondents from the 
South were the least disapproving of all compressed regions. 
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Table 5.10 EGOCENTRIC Approval of the Government's Economic Policy by Geography. 
January 1990 - February 1992 
Good For Self Neither/OK Bad for Self & A:D Index 
& Family Family 
COMPRESSED REGION 
Scotland/Wales 23 17 61 .38 
North 27 16 57 .47 
Midlands 29 18 53 .55 
Gtr London 27 18 56 .48 
South 31 16 53 .58 
CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depressed/LA 25 16 59 .42 
Service 29 19 53 .56 
Prosperous 29 17 54 .54 
Analysis of the constituency type schema shows that respondents from areas 
typified by depressed industry and a high proportion of local authority housing 
were the most likely to express personal dissatisfaction with the Government. 
Respondents from areas typified by the service sector or prosperity were quite 
similar in their propensity to express personal dissatisfaction with the 
Government with Approval - Disapproval indices of between 0.5 and 0.6. 
5.5.2.2 SOCIOTROPIC APPROVAL 
The sociotropic approval rating of the Government's economic policy suggested 
that respondents were typically more sympathetic to the Government in terms of 
societal benefit than they are for their personal benefit derived from the 
Government's economic policies (Table 5.11). 
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Table 5.11 SOCIOTROPIC Approval of the Government's Economic Policy by Geography. 
January 1990 - February 1992 
Good For Neither/OK Bad for Britain A:D Index 
Britain 
COMPRESSED REGION 
ScotlandlWales 27 20 52 .52 
North 32 18 49 .65 
Midlands 37 18 45 .82 
Gtr London 34 20 47 .72 
South 37 18 44 .84 
CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Depressed/LA 30 19 51 .59 
Service 37 18 46 .80 
Prosperous 35 19 46 .76 
The general improvement in egocentric approval for the Government's economic 
policies notwithstanding, the relative pattern of approval and disapproval 
according to the regional schema held constant. Scottish and Welsh 
respondents had the lowest Approval - Disapproval index, respondents from the 
South of England the highest (Table 5.11). 
The relative pattern of variation in sociotropic approval for the Government's 
economic policies according to constituency type was upheld. The most 
disapproving of constituency types were typified by depressed industry and high 
proportions of local authority housing, while respondents from areas typified by 
service sector employment and by economic prosperity were less likely to 
express dissatisfaction. 
With the changed dynamics of the new recession in the 1990s, a critical feature 
of this research is the extent of electoral approval for the Government's policies. 
The next step of this chapter is a more robust discussion of how approval of the 
Government's economic record was broken down geographically. For the most 
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part this is achieved by mixing egocentric and sociotropic approval with the 
already familiar personal economic expectations variable and party support. 
Regional variation in egocentric approval of the Government's economic record 
and its manifestation via party support certainly existed (see Tables 5.12 and 
5.13). However a note of caution ought to be sounded before grandiose claims 
are made. Some of the percentages presented in Table 5.13 actually represent 
very few cases. Great care then should be taken when interpreting that 54 per 
cent of personally pessimistic Londoners who thought that that the Government's 
economic policies were good for them, were not Government supporters. 
Nevertheless there are important features of Table 5.13; notably Greater London 
and the South of England were significantly less anti-Conservative than the 
Celtic fringe and the North of England. Of the Southern electorate who thought 
that the Government's policy was good for them, and were personally optimistic 
about their economic future (perhaps because of the Government's action), a 
massive majority (87 per cent) were likely to vote Conservative. Conversely only 
three-quarters of Celts in the same personal position who approved of 
Government policy were likely to express a Conservative reported vote intention. 
Of course this group were predominantly pro-Government, but significantly less 
so than their counterparts in the heartland of Conservative support - and it is 
likely that the filter which reduces their propensity to vote Conservative was their 
geographic context. 
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Table 5.12 Egocentric Approval of Government's Economic Policy by Personal Economic 
Optimism and Government Support. 
HHEGO 
Pessimist Neutral Optimist 
non-Conservative 40 25 19 
Conservative 60 75 81 
Table 5.13 Egocentric Approval of Government's Economic Policy by Personal Economic 
Optimism, Region and Government Support. 
HHEGO 
Scot/Wales Pessimist Neutral Optimist 
non-Conservative 43 34 26 
Conservative 57 66 74 
North 
non-Conservative 39 27 22 
Conservative 61 73 78 
Midlands 
non-Conservative 33 26 18 
Conservative 67 75 82 
Gtr Ldon 
non-Conservative 54 27 21 
Conservative 46 73 79 
South 
non-Conservative 36 18 13 
Conservative 64 82 87 
Turning next to respondents who felt that the Government's economic policies 
were bad for themselves and families, a similar regional variation was apparent 
(although so was the concern about small numbers in a few cells). Respondents 
who were personally optimistic about their economic future but thought that the 
Government's economic policies were 'bad' for them had no reason to support 
the Government, presumably thinking that their positive economic outlook was 
not the result of any Government action. Personal optimism despite the 
Government's economic policies did not lead to Conservatism in Scotland and 
Wales - 98 per cent of this small group were non-Conservatives, but in the South 
and the capital, over a quarter of these respondents favoured the Government 
anyway (Table 5.14). In other words, the geographic location of respondents 
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affected their propensity to support the Government even if they felt that 
Governmental policies were harmful to them. 
Southerners tended to be more pro-Conservative than the rest of the electorate 
even though they had no apparent economic self-interest in being so. This is a 
conundrum that might be solved by paying attention to context. The little local 
difficulties resulting from the recession was insufficient to override the long-term 
socialisation of Southern voters. In other words the impact of geography was not 
locational per se - it was contextual. 
Table 5.14 Egocentric Disapproval of Government's Economic Policy by Personal Economic 
Optimism, Region and Government Support. 
HHEGO 
Scot/Wales Pessimist Neutral Optimist 
non-Conservative 94 92 98 
Conservative 6 7 2 
North 
non-Conservative 93 85 85 
Conservative 7 15 15 
Midlands 
non-Conservative 88 84 86 
Conservative 12 16 14 
Gtr Ldon 
non-Conservative 89 88 74 
Conservative 11 13 26 
South 
non-Conservative 89 87 73 
Conservative 11 13 27 
The analysis of sociotropic approval for the Government's economic policies told 
a similar story of the importance of the regional context in which voters lived 
(Table 5.15). One-third of personal optimists who felt that Government polices 
were good for the country as a whole were nevertheless non-Conservatives in 
the Celtic fringe of Scotland and Wales. On the other hand, nearly three-fifths of 
personal peSSimists from the South who felt that the Government was good for 
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the nation as a whole were Conservative supporters despite their personal 
economic outlook. 
Table 5.15 Sociotropic Approval of Government's Economic Policy by Personal Economic 
Optimism, Region and Government Support. 
HHEGO 
ScotlWales Pessimist Neutral Optimist 
non-Conservative 54 34 33 
Conservative 46 66 67 
North 
non-Conservative 46 30 24 
Conservative 54 70 76 
Midlands 
non-Conservative 45 26 24 
Conservative 55 75 76 
Gtr Ldon 
non-Conservative 61 29 22 
Conservative 39 71 78 
South 
non-Conservative 42 19 13 
Conservative 59 81 88 
Finally, the regional importance to partisanship is confirmed by the analysis of 
those sections of the electorate who felt that the Government's policies were 
'bad' for the country as a whole - that expressed sociotropic disapproval (Table 
5.16). Personal economic pessimism and sociotropic disapproval for the 
Government's economic policies resulted in a universal distaste for Government 
support, but the extent to which this could be offset by personal economic 
optimism was regionally variable. Ninety-six per cent of Scots and Welsh voters 
who were optimistic about their own economic prospects but who believed the 
Government was pursuing policies detrimental to the country as a whole, felt 
unable to endorse the Conservatives. However, 'only' seventy-eight per cent of 
personal optimists from the South who disapproved of the sociotropic impact of 
Government policies were non-Conservatives, twenty-three per cent of this 
group were proudly pro-Tory. Clearly the 'I'm alright Jack' syndrome was a more 
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potent electoral cue in the South than the Celtic fringe. This raises interesting 
questions about the context of the regions of Britain. Maybe Celts have more 
connections with their local context and were thus more open to sociotropic 
voting, Southerners were typically more isolated and hence more likely to look to 
the personal (egocentric) context to form their voting cues. It might be the case 
that voters in the North and the Celtic fringe have long been socialised to 
believe in the power of Government (the majority of nationalised industries and 
those - such as defence - which are reliant on Government contracts were 
overwhelming based there). On the other hand, voters in the South have more 
reliance on and faith in the market. The Thatcher Governments stoked this 
cultural divide and it remained in place during the 'Southern recession' of the 
early 1990s. Further research ought to pursue this line of thought. 
Table 5.16 Sociotropic Disapproval of Government's Economic Policy by Personal Economic 
Optimism, Region and Government Support. 
HHEGO 
Scot/Wales Pessimist Neutral Optimist 
non-Conservative 96 92 96 
Conservative 4 8 4 
North 
non-Conservative 94 89 87 
Conservative 6 11 13 
Midlands 
non-Conservative 89 86 90 
Conservative 11 14 10 
Gtr Ldon 
non-Conservative 90 90 88 
Conservative 10 10 12 
South 
non-Conservative 91 92 78 
Conservative 9 8 23 
5.5.3 GEOGRAPHY AND BLAME FOR THE RECESSION 
Despite the failure of regional criteria to account for variation in economic 
attitudes (the half-stage model), the significance of geography in the full model 
249 
rhapter 5: The 1990s Recession & the 'Feel Good Factor' 
of partisanship can begin to be understood with reference to geography. Put 
simply perceptions of the extent of Government culpability for the recession were 
spatially variable. Throughout this analysis it should be remembered that the 
cause of the early 1990s recession was under debate at the time, while the 
Opposition parties were keen to put the blame on the Government, the 
Conservatives were prone to stress that Britain had been caught up in a world 
recession which had consequences beyond their control. 
There was significant regional variation in the degree to which the Government 
were blamed for the new recession (Table 5.17). Nearly two-fifths of Celtic 
respondents felt the Government was a 'great deal' responsible for the recession 
compared to around one-half of all Southerners. Conversely Southerners and 
Greater Londoners were much more likely to absolve the Government of 
responsibility (ascribing them to only 'a little' blame or claiming they were 'not at 
all' to blame' for Britain's recession) than their counterparts from the North and 
the Celtic fringe. The point here is that if electors do not blame the Government 
for the recession, there is no logical reason for them to punish the Government 
at election times. Furthermore a large section of the Southern electorate failed to 
blame either the Government or world conditions for the recession (see tables 
5.17 and 5.18). If the 1990s recession was a blameless one then voters could 
hardly desert the Government. 
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Table 5.17 Government Blame for the Recession by Region: February 1992 
Government 
to Blame for 
Recession 
Gt Deal 
Fair Deal 
A Little 
Not at all 
DKlNA 
Pearson Chi-Sq 
OF 
Significance 
Scot/Wales North 
39 37 
38 34 
15 19 
06 07 
02 02 
Midlands 
37.2 
16 
.001 
28 
37 
25 
10 
0 
Gtr Ldon South 
28 26 
35 40 
25 24 
11 09 
0 01 
The analysis of public perceptions of the responsibility of world conditions for the 
British recession also revealed significant regional variation (Table 5.18). 
Respondents from the North of England were reluctant to blame the state of the 
world economy for the British recession - and prone to blame the Government 
(see Table 5.17) - but their counterparts in the South and the Capital were quite 
likely to blame world conditions for the recession (and absolve the Government 
while they were at it). 
Table 5.18 World Conditions to Blame for the Recession by Region February 1992 
World Conds 
to Blame for 
Recession 
Gt Deal 
Fair Deal 
A Little 
Not at all 
DKlNA 
Pearson Chi-Sq 
DF 
Significance 
Scat/Wales 
21 
42 
24 
08 
05 
North 
16 
47 
27 
06 
04 
32.8 
16 
.008 
Midlands 
23 
47 
27 
02 
01 
Gtr Ldon South 
25 28 
40 42 
23 23 
08 04 
04 03 
A similar story emerged from the analysis of variation in the Government's 
culpability for the recession by constituency type; 39 per cent of those from 
depressed areas blamed the Government 'a great deal' for the recession, 
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compared to only 28 per cent of those from areas typified by service sector 
employment and prosperity (Table 5.19). Conversely, while one-third of 
respondents from prosperous constituencies felt the Government were only 'a 
little' to blame for the recession, less than one-quarter of those from depressed 
areas were inclined to absolve the Government from this extent of responsibility. 
Table 5.19 Government Blame for the Recession by Constituency Type February 1992 
Government 
to Blame for 
Recession 
Gt Deal 
Fair Deal 
A Little 
Not at all 
DKlNA 
Pearson Chi-Sq 
OF 
Significance 
Depressed/ 
Local 
Authority 
39 
35 
17 
07 
03 
Service 
Sector 
Employment 
28 
38 
23 
10 
01 
Prosperous / 
32.8 
16 
.008 
Affluent 
28 
38 
25 
08 
0 
At the same time, although depressed areas were associated with a reluctance 
to blame world conditions for the receSSion, those from constituencies 
characterised by service sector employment (and hence in the front-line of the 
new recession) were the most likely to hold world conditions responsible for the 
recession (See Table 5.20). A major contention of this thesis is that this begins 
to explain the reluctance of this group of electors to punish the Conservative 
Government in 1992. They may have been the most 'hurt' by the new recession 
of all groups in society but they did not hold the Government responsible for 
their predicament. 
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Table 5.20 World Conditions to Blame for the Recession by Constituency Type February 1992 
World Conds 
to Blame for 
Recession 
Gt Deal 
Fair Deal 
A Little 
Not at all 
DKlNA 
Pearson Chi-Sq 
DF 
Significance 
Depressed / 
Local 
Authority 
17 
47 
25 
06 
05 
Service 
Sector 
Employment 
28 
42 
22 
04 
04 
Prosperous / 
18.3 
8 
.019 
Affluent 
24 
42 
26 
06 
02 
5.6 THE REGRESSION MODELS OF THE FEEL GOOD FACTOR AND 
REPORTED VOTE INTENTION: FEBRUARY 1992 
The regression tables used in this chapter report the regression coefficients, 
standard error and significance levels of the independent variables. As a general 
rule of thumb a B coefficient has to be twice the size of its own standard error in 
order to be statistically significant. Only those variables which assumed statistical 
significance at or below the .1 level are reported. An asterisk in a cell denotes an 
insignificant variable. The table also reports the appropriate diagnostic statistics; 
adjusted R2, Durbin-Watson, F and the significance of F. 
Where possible the independent variables have been dichotomised in order to 
ensure that the goodness of fit statistics could be calculated without falling below a 
critical value sufficient to fill each cell. The explanatory variables are class, region, 
constituency type, personal economic expectations and Government and world 
conditions blame for the British recession. 
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When dichotomies or dummy variables were used, one category for each of the 
independent variables was left out of the model. The reported coefficients for the 
other categories of each variable should be seen in relation to this comparator 
category. The comparator categories were Class DE, the South of England, Affluent 
areas, egocentric pessimism, Government not at all to blame for British recession 
and World conditions Not at all to blame for British recession. The B coefficient for 
Conservative reported vote intention presented in Table 5.21 for who felt that the 
Government was a GREAT DEAL to blame for the British recession was -.14. The 
direction of the coefficient shows that these respondents were less likely than those 
who felt the Government was NOT AT All to blame for the recession to express an 
intention of voting for the Conservative Party. The magnitude of the coefficient 
shows the intensity of this likelihood; so for instance the B coefficient of -.14 for the 
CEl T category and of -.12 for those who felt the Government was a FAIR DEAL 
responsible illustrates that both groups of respondents were less likely to express a 
reported vote intention for the Conservatives than the NOT AT All comparator 
category, but whereas the FAIR DEAL respondents were only twelve percentage 
points below the national Conservative share, the GREAT DEAL group were 
fourteen percentage points below the national average for Conservative reported 
vote intention, other things being equal. 
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Table 5.21: Regression Models of Feel-Good Factors: Optimism/Pessimism on Class, Region, 
Constituency Type and Blame for Britain's Recession: February 1992 
OPTIMISM NEUTRALITY PESSIMISM 
B E (8) SiQ B E (8) Sig B E(B) Sia 
CLASS AB * * * * * * -.07 .04 .035 
CLASS C1 .07 .03 .030 * * * -.13 .03 .000 
CLASS C2 * * * .07 .03 .049 * 
· 
. 
CELT * • . · · · · · * 
NORTH 
· 
* * • • 
· 
• • * 
MIDLANDS • * * * * * * * * 
GTR LOON * · * * * * • * * 
DEPLA * · * · · * * * * 
SERVICE 
· · 
. 
· 
* * * * * 
Govt Blame GT DEAL -.14 .04 .001 -.10 .05 .040 .26 .04 .000 
Gv Blame FAIR DEAL -.12 .04 .005 * * * .12 .04 .002 
Gv Blame LITTLE * * * * * * 
· · 
• 
World Conds GT DEAL .10 .05 . 031 .10 .05 .062 -.14 .05 .003 
W Conds FAIR DEAL .09 .04 .039 * * * -.13 .04 .003 
W Conds LITTLE .09 .04 .046 * * · -.09 .04 .037 
CONSTANT .25 .06 .000 .39 .07 000 .29 .06 .000 
OPTIM NEUTRALITY PESSSIM 
Adjusted RL 0.033 0.007 0.069 
F 4.2 1.7 7.9 
Significance 0.000 0.048 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.97 2.02 2.02 
The regression models of economic optimism reveal that the major determinant 
of economic evaluations was who was deemed to be - and to what extent -
responsible for the economic recession (Table 5.21). Moreover the relationships 
between class and geography with economic attitudes were also dominated by 
this feature - class exacting only a slight influence on the composition of 
personal economic evaluations, geography failed to be statistically significant in 
any analysiS of economic optimism, pessimism or neutrality. Nevertheless, the 
predictive power of the three models (especially neutrality) - as shown by the 
adjusted R2 - was rather poor. However, this eliminates the possibility that any 
regional variation in reported vote intention (Table 5.22 shows there was a not 
insubstantial amount of this) was the residual geographic variation in the feel 
good factor in for instance Table 5.14. The next, and final, step of this chapter is 
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to build a regression model for reported vote intention which controls for the 
effects of class, geography, blame for the recession and the feel good factor of 
personal economic optimism. 
The regression model of Conservative and Labour support for the February 
1992 poll illustrated that aspects of class, geography, economic attitudes and 
the extent of Government and world culpability for the recession were all 
significant in explaining variations in reported vote intention (Table 5.22). 
Table 5.22 Regression Model: Conservative and Labour reported vote intention on Class, 
Region, Constituency Type, Personal Economic Attitudes and Blame for Britain's Recession: 
February 1992. 
CONID LBRID 
B SE (B) Sig B SE (B) Sig 
CLASS AB .17 .03 .000 -.19 .04 .000 
CLASS C1 .05 .03 .064 -.15 .03 .000 
CLASS C2 .07 .03 .009 -.10 .03 .001 
CELT -.11 .04 .002 . . 
NORTH -.08 .03 .024 .10 .04 .006 
MIDLANDS . * * * * 
GREATER LONDON * * * * * 
DEPLA * * * .11 .03 .001 
SERVICE * * * * * 
Egocentric OPTIMISM . 12 .03 .000 * • 
Egocentric NEUTRALITY .07 .03 .002 * * 
Govt Blame GT DEAL -.61 .04 .000 .47 .04 .000 
Gv Blame FAIR DEAL -.43 .04 .000 .28 .04 .000 
Gv Blame LITTLE -.11 . 04 .005 • * 
World Conds GT DEAL .12 .04 .004 * * 
W Conds FAIR DEAL .08 .04 .049 * * 
W Conds LITTLE • • * * * 
CONSTANT .59 .05 .000 .16 .06 .006 
CONID LBRID 
Adjusted RL 0.322 0.248 
F 40.4 27.1 
Significance 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.98 1.92 
• 
* 
* 
• 
• 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
Social class works in the expected manner; CLASSAB were the most pro-
Conservative and anti-Labour group. The comparator class DE was the most 
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hostile to Conservatism and the most prone to report an inclination to support 
the labour Party. 
Regional geography may have failed to meet the accepted standard of statistical 
significance at the overall level, but some individual characteristics of 
regionalism did enter the regression equation. CELTS and NORTHERN 
respondents were significantly less likely to express Government support than 
the comparator SOUTHERN group; and NORTHERNERS were much more likely 
- ceteris paribus - to favour labour. Constituency type was also significant in the 
regression equation. Those from constituencies characterised by industrial 
depression and local authority housing (DEPlA) were markedly more labour 
than the AFFLUENT comparator group. All in all, the geographic coefficients 
produced by this analysis provided some support for the geographic context 
thesis rather than the argument of Rose and McAllister which would deny 
geographic significant effects once class characteristics had been controlled for. 
In the final results chapter this argument is taken further when the interaction 
terms between geography and economic attitudes - which have highly significant 
effects - are shown to rely more on the geographic context than the economic. 
Personal economic expectations have a significant impact upon the level of 
Conservatism (although tellingly not on labour reported vote intention). 
OPTIMISTS and NEUTRAlS were significantly more likely to favour the 
Government than the PESSIMIST comparator group. The size and direction of 
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the coefficients associated with personal economic expectations were in line with 
the expectation. 
It is with the notion of responsibility for the recession that this regression 
analysis comes alive. Those who blame the Government a GREAT DEAL had an 
associated b coefficient of -.61, (thus they were extremely less likely to support 
the Government) compared to those who felt the Government were NOT AT ALL 
responsible for the recession. Those who felt that the Government should 
shoulder A FAIR DEAL of blame for the recession had an effect of -0.43 on the 
regression curve - and therefore were a major drag on Government support. 
Finally even those who thought the Government were only A LITTLE to blame 
for the recession were significantly less likely to favour the Government than the 
comparator group. On the other hand, those who blamed the Government a 
GREAT DEAL (8 coefficient 0.47) and A FAIR DEAL (8 0.28) were significantly 
more Labour than the comparator group who absolved the Government of 
responsibility completely. There was no significant difference between the 
comparator group and those who blamed the Government A LITTLE in their 
propensity to express Labour support. 
Furthermore while there was no difference between groups ascribing different 
degrees of culpability for the recession to world conditions in their 
preponderance to express support for Labour, the Conservative model worked in 
the anticipated manner. Those who felt that world conditions were A GREAT 
DEAL to blame were the most likely group to exhibit a pro-Conservative bias; 
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those who felt that world conditions were A FAIR DEAL to blame were also more 
likely to support the Conservatives than those who felt that world conditions 
were NOT AT ALL responsible for the British recession. 
This type of regression analysis will become more familiar in the next chapter, as 
attempts will be made to observe the significant effects of geography in the 
construction of partisanship. Furthermore, analysis will build to dissect the 
interaction terms between geography and economic attitudes which for the most 
part secure the role of geography in economic attitudes and party support. 
5.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has provided a snapshot of the relationship between class and 
geography with economic attitudes in the early 1990s. The next stage has to tie 
this analysis to a more definite account of how this impacts upon voting 
behaviour - measured by reported vote intention. 
The expected hypothesised relationship between class and attitudes has been 
upheld by this preliminary analysis. Movement across the social class scale -
from Class DE towards Class AB - is associated with an increase in the absolute 
level of optimism about the future and satisfaction with the present. The new 
recession of the 1990s did little to affect this relationship substantially possibly 
because the new recession was seen by the people displaced by it as both 
temporary and blameless. 
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The competition between hypotheses about the relationship of geography and 
economic attitudes during the 1990s appeared to be one-sided. At first glance it 
appeared that regional differences in economic attitudes were less significant in 
the run-up to the 1992 General Election than throughout the 1980s, but the 
Conservative heartlands of the South and the service sector failed to turn 
against the Government as the dynamics of the new recession might have led us 
to believe. Furthermore they returned to economic optimism in late 1991 and 
Conservatism by April 1992. The work in this chapter on the extent of the 
recession, the sociotropic and egocentric approval for the Government's 
economic record, and the responsibility for the recession, suggested a viable 
thesis for why this might have been so - that all three features were spatially 
variable. In doing this it provided considerable support for viewing geography as 
a vital component of the miliuex in which attitudes and voting behaviour were 
formed, rather than the school of thought which viewed geography as the mere 
accumulation of class characteristics. Crucially, the spatial variation in these 
economic attitudes tended to reflect the 1980s recession rather than the early 
1990s recession; it was the resurgence of the old North-South divide rather than 
the reflection of a new geography of recession - the gap was wider than in 1979 
but narrower than in 1987. This suggests that the Conservatives benefited from 
a rejuvenation of old prejudices and from the apparently "temporary and 
blameless" nature of the new recession - and casts a new light on the 
Conservative electoral strategy during the 1992 Election which stressed the 
dangers of a Labour Government and must have been aimed at the Southern 
heart lands of Conservative support. 
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This chapter has looked at the 1990-2 period as a whole. Nonetheless 
significant changes over time were shown in the analysis of the feel good factor 
and reported vote intention. This is the central thrust of Chapter 6 which 
provides a more detailed discussion of the 1990s recession and the long-
campaign, and particularly the incidence of the recession and the geographic 
context in which economic attitudes were over-ruled when individuals chose how 
to vote. 
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Chapter 6: Modelling Reported Vote Intention, Class, 
Geography and Economic Optimism in the 1990s 
Recession and During the Long Campaign 
This chapter further explores the relationship between reported vote intention, class, 
geography and economic attitudes in the early 1990s. The aim of this chapter is to 
build on the preliminary findings of the previous chapter which explored the 
relationship between class, geography and economic attitudes on the aggregate 
scale, by exploring these relationships at the individual level. 
This chapter involves the use of Analysis of Variance and Multiple Classification 
Analysis statistical techniques which will form an obvious parallel to the exploration of 
attitudes and partisanship in the 1980s in Chapter 4. It also uses multiple linear and 
logistic regression techniques in order to specify the interactions between the 
independent variables. In order to take advantage of the nature of the NOPlNewsnight 
dataset it also builds a temporal dimension into the analysis. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to look at how geography and economic 
attitudes combine to influence partisanship. Two different geographic measures, 
compressed region and constituency type, and two aspects of political choice, 
Conservative and Labour reported vote intention are used here. It was not possible to 
analyse Liberal Democrat reported vote intention since the number of respondents 
willing to identify themselves as Liberal Democrat prospective voters was not always 
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sufficient to enable the analYSIS of the sub-cells involved in the class and geographic 
analysis. 
If the expected relationship is to hold then all three explanatory variables will prove to 
be significant in the explanation of partisanship, That is to say that class, geography 
and economic attitudes should all contribute to the variations in levels of party 
support. The null hypothesis under investigation was that there was no connection 
between, on the one hand, class, geography and economic attitudes and, on the other 
hand, between class, geography, economic attitudes and reported vote intention. 
As shown in Chapter Two, while the impact of class upon partisanship has diminished 
in recent years, the impact of geography on voting patterns has increased, as has the 
impact of economic attitudes. Moreover if the actual voting behaviour of the British 
electorate can be shown to be influenced by the geographic context in which it is 
placed, then it would be consistent to expect spatial variation in economic attitudes, 
and especially egocentric expectations since these too must be formed by voters in a 
distinct geographic context. 
It should thus be possible to develop a two stage model, where the contextual effects 
of class and geography have an a priori impact upon the formation of economic 
attitudes in voters' minds and where class, geography and economic attitudes affect 
the partisan preferences of the electorate. 
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The premier task of this chapter is to establish a link between class, geography, 
economic attitudes and reported vote intention (the overall model). A secondary aim is 
to establish a link between class, geography and economic attitudes - the half stage 
model. 
6.1 THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE IN REPORTED VOTE INTENTION AND 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES 
The initial analysis in this chapter replicates the analysis of the economic recovery of 
the 1980s in Chapter 4 for the period of the renewed recession in the 1990s. As such 
it involves Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Multiple Classification Analysis. A more 
detailed definition of these techniques was given in Chapter 4. The variables used in 
this analysis are identified in Chapter 5. The class variable is based on the four-fold 
ABC1 scale, geography is measured by the five-fold compressed regional schema 
and the three-fold constituency type schema, and personal economic optimism by the 
HHEGO variable which scores 1 for personal economic optimism, zero for economic 
neutrality and -1 for personal economic pessimism. The partisanship variables is 
reported vote intention. 
The tables presented for this section of the thesis are based on ANOVA and Multiple 
Classification Analyses. The presentation of these tables is the same as encountered 
in Chapter 4. There are two types of table derived from the ANOVA and Multiple 
Classification Analysis techniques; one shows Grand Means, information about the 
statistical significance and magnitude of explanatory force of the independent 
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variables; the other shows the parameters of the model. The former provides F-values 
and Beta coefficients derived from the Analysis of Variance statistical technique: F-
values provide information about the relative importance of each independent variable 
in the analysis. The latter shows the average deviations from the grand mean score of 
the dependent variable attributable to each category within the independent variable 
when the other variables in the model are held constant. 
All component F-value and Beta score are shown in the ANOVA and Multiple 
Classification Analysis tables. A single asterisk by a F-value indicates that the 
independent variable was not statistically significant in the explanation of variation in 
the dependent variable. A double asterisk indicates that although not significant at the 
.05 level, the independent variable did enter statistical significance at the 0.1 level. 
A figure in the ANOVA tables which is prefixed by an 'i' indicates that interaction terms 
between two or more of the independent variables were significant to the .05 level. 
Hence Table 6.3 shows that the incidence of personal economic expectations and 
social class interacted Significantly on the likelihood of reporting a vote intention for 
Labour in June and October 1991. 
The effects of variations in class, region and personal economic futures on 
Conservative and Labour reported vote intention in the separate analysis of individual 
polls between July 1990 and February 1992 are shown in Table 6.1. The penultimate 
column of Table 6.1 shows that the addition of class, region and personal economic 
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expectations can explain between nine and thirty-four per cent of the total variance in 
Conservative reported vote intention. Typically, a model which contains class regions 
and personal economic expectations accounts for around 10-15 per cent of the total 
variance in Conservative reported vote intention. 
The deviations in reported vote intention according to the class, regional and personal 
economic evaluation disaggregations were, for the most part, as hypothesised (Table 
6.2). Individuals from Class AB, from the South of England and who were optimistic 
about their economic future were the most pro-Conservative sections of the 
electorate; Labour's solid core of support came from individuals from Scotland and 
Wales, the North of England, from Class DE and those who were pessimistic about 
their economic future. 
When a different geographic dimension is used to explain the variance in 
Conservative reported vote intention, as the three-fold constituency type schema 
replaces the five compressed regions, (see Table 6.3) the total amount of variance 
explained tends to fall slightly for each individual poll i.e. the geographic milieux model 
tends to outperform the lifetime learning model. 
The analysis of the reported levels of Labour vote intention by class, geography and 
personal economic expectations was typically less impressive than the model of 
Conservative support. The total explained variance of Conservative reported vote 
intention shown by the R2 in Tables 6.1 and 6.3 exceeds the counterpart columns for 
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Labour reported vote intention throughout the poll period from July 1990 to February 
1992. This would seem to indicate that the model of partisanship is better suited to 
explaining levels of Conservative - or Government - support than for the major 
opposition party, This may be due to the electoral make-up of Britain, with the Liberal 
Democrats being the effective opposition to the Conservatives in many Southern 
seats. On the other hand, as the analysis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 illustrated, the 
Conservatives were able to claim 'ownership' of economic issues and hence the 
model of Conservative support was able to reap the benefit of a closer association 
with economic evaluations than the parallel Labour model. 
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Jul '90 
Aug'90 
Sep'90 
act '90 
Nov'90 
Oec'90 
Jan'91 
Feb'91 
Mar '91 
Apr '91 
May '91 
Jun '91 
Jul '91 
Aug '91 
Sep '91 
act '91 
Nov'91 
Jan'92 
Feb'92 
GM 
(Con) 
.323 
.307 
.333 
.313 
.363 
.409 
.385 
.401 
.339 
.357 
.322 
.323 
.349 
.327 
.351 
.347 
.349 
.354 
.336 
GM CLASS 
(Lbr) F (C) F (L) 
.421 29.1 26.9 
0406 47.3 34.7 
.370 21.1 25.7 
.381 32.2 23.5 
.382 32.0 29.3 
.362 38.7 31.2 
.381 29.3 23.0 
.358 43.2 32.6 
.329 21.3 24.9 
.337 25.4 22.4 
.380 28.7 24.0 
.386 25.2 25.9 
.362 21.8 21.1 
.366 32.4 29.0 
.341 24.4 31.9 
.367 40.4 35.0 
.327 18.1 23.5 
.344 19.0 29.7 
.361 21.6 25.3 
CLASS REGION 
I' (C) IJ (L) F (C) F (L) 
.15 .16 6.6 6.8 
.24 .20 6.9 8.3 
.16 .18 11.7 11.4 
.20 .17 3.3 7.8 
.21 .21 3.9 8.3 
.21 .19 15.1 18.5 
.20 .18 2.8 5.9 
.22 .20 7.3 9.2 
.16 .19 7.2 6.1 
.18 .18 8.4 10.2 
.19 .17 3.7 9.7 
.17 .19 5.5 10.3 
.16 .17 13.4 7.6 
.21 .20 7.0 14.1 
.16 .21 9.5 8.2 
.13 .13 6.6 5.8 
.15 .19 8.9 6.8 
.16 .21 4.7 5.6 
.17 .19 11.1 13.5 
REGION HHEGO HHEGO R2 R" 
P (C) Jlill F F (L) P (C) P (L) (Con) (Lbr) 
.12 .13 61.6 39.8 .27 .22 .135 .111 
.13 .14 23.2 21.0 .16 .16 .122 .103 
.17 .17 41.5 24.7 .22 .17 .110 .099 
.09 .14 33.5 14.0 .20 .13 .104 .078 
.09 .14 38.5 15.6 .21 .14 .108 .090 
.18 .20 40.5 20.5 .21 .15 .140 .117 
.08 .12 38.5 11.2 .22 .12 .104 .070 
.13 .14 57.1 26.3 .25 .17 .146 .106 
.13 .12 34.8 8.7 .20 .10 .095 .070 
.14 .16 25.2 6.4 .17 .09 .093 .072 
.09 .16 67.1 25.1 .27 .17 .129 .092 
.12 .16 48.0 18.3 .24 .15 .115 .094 
.17 .13 41.4 9.6 .22 .11 .117 .069 
.13 .19 26.4 15.2 .18 .14 .107 .104 
.16 .14 50.9 13.0 .25 .13 .124 .093 
.07 .09 321.3 193.0 .54 .44 .340 .250 
.15 .13 47.2 12.5 .24 .13 .112 .077 
.11 .13 31.7 14.1 .20 .14 .091 .091 
.16 .18 31.7 11.4 .20 .12 .111 .101 
J 
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Table 6.2: Parameters of Geographic Model 1; Conservative and Labour Reported Vole Intention by Class, Region and Economic Altitudes 
. 
Con Jul Aug Sep Dct Noy Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Dct Nov Jan Feb 
'90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '92 '92 
CLASS 
AB .11 .21 .12 .18 .19 .15 .14 .14 .12 .16 .14 .14 .12 .17 .13 .10 .11 .06 .16 
cl .06 .06 .05 .03 .05 .09 .07 .10 .04 .03 .05 .05 .05 .07 .06 .04 .06 .10 .01 
c2 -.03 -.07 -.01 -.04 -.05 -.05 .00 -.03 .00 -.02 .00 -.02 -.03 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.02 
DE -.08 -.10 -.09 -.09 -.10 -.12 -.13 -.14 -.10 -.09 -.11 -.10 -.09 -.10 -.06 -.07 -.06 -.10 -.06 
REGION 
Sct/Wal -.10 -.06 -.13 -.08 -.07 -.15 -.05 -.11 -.06 -.11 -.07 -.09 -.15 -.07 -.09 -.06 -.14 -.09 -.10 
North -.02 -.05 -.03 .01 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.02 -.05 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.07 -.07 .01 -.03 -.02 -.07 
Mids .02 .03 -.01 .00 .02 .02 .06 .02 .04 .07 .05 .03 -.01 .06 .10 .06 .03 -.02 .03 
Gtr l'don .00 .08 .05 .05 .04 .11 -.04 .09 .09 .06 .00 .06 .09 .02 -.03 .00 .06 .06 .04 
South .07 .05 .10 .02 .04 .07 .01 .04 .04 .05 .04 .05 .07 .06 .07 .00 .06 .05 .09 
HHEGO 
Pessimist -.13 -.10 -.12 -.12 -.14 -.16 -.13 -.15 -.13 -.13 -.19 -.18 -.16 -.12 -.09 -.29 -.17 -.13 -.15 
Neutral .06 .05 .06 .03 .04 .05 .05 .06 .01 .03 .02 .03 .02 .02 .02 -.27 .03 .01 .02 
Optimist .19 .06 .12 .11 .11 .10 .13 .15 .12 .06 .15 .12 .12 .10 .12 .23 .14 .14 .11 
labour Jul Aug Sep Dct Nay Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nav Jan Feb 
'90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '92 '92 
CLASS 
AB -.14 -.15 -.19 -.14 -.16 -.12 -.13 -.12 -.14 -.11 -.13 -.14 -.12 -.16 -.13 -.09 -.13 -.12 -.15 
cl -.06 -.08 -.02 -.06 -.06 -.09 -.07 -.09 -.06 -.09 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.07 -.10 -.05 -.09 -.10 -.06 
c2 .05 .03 .04 .05 .01 .04 .01 .03 .03 .06 .03 .02 .02 .04 .05 .02 .05 .02 .02 
DE .07 .12 .07 .08 .13 .11 .12 .12 .10 .08 .10 .11 .10 .10 .12 .09 .10 .13 .12 
REGION 
1-- _. 
-- -- ~O SctlWal .07 .00 .08 .09 .00 .10 .09 .05 .10 .05 .07 .06 .06 ~ .01 .06 .06 .07 - ~-- ~8 North .05 .09 .09 .06 .10 .09 .06 .05 .06 .06 .08 r-J1Z- .14 .06 .07 .06 .05 .11 -- ~3 Mitis .02 .03 .01 -.02 .03 .05 -.06 .01 -.04 .~Q... .01 .00 -.06 -.02 -.01 -.07 .03 -.02 
Glr l'doll -.01 -.03 -.07 ~8 -.10 -.06 .08 -.10 -.09 -.02 .01 -.05 -.02 -.05 -.02 -.02 -.06 -.03 -.07 
South -.09 -.09 -.10 -.07 -.06 -.13 -.06 -.07 -.05 -.09 -.11 -.10 -.09 -.09 -.08 -.05 -.04 -.06 -.10 
HHEGO 
.10 
Pessimist .12 .10 .10 .09 .09 .11 .06 .11 .07 .06 .11 .12 .06 .09 .10 .28 .06 .10 .10 
Neutral -.08 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.05 -.02 -.01 .00 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.01 .20 -.01 -.03 .03 
Optimist -.13 -.07 -.11 -.04 -.08 -.07 -.09 -.09 -.05 -.05 -.11 -.06 -.06 -.08 -.06 -.19 -.08 -.06 -.05 
0> 
CD 
N 
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An interesting feature of Table 6.3 is that it shows that on three occasions, the 
interactions effects between class and economic attitudes (in June and October 1991) 
and constituency type and economic attitudes (in August 1991) were significant to the 
.05 level. More robust modelling (see below) will explore these inter-relationships 
between independent variables more fully. 
6.1.1 CLASS & PARTISANSHIP 
6,1.1.1 CLASS AND CONSERVATIVE REPORTED VOTE INTENTION 
Class is the major explanatory factor in the variance in Conservative reported vote 
intentions throughout the NOPINewsnight series of opinion polls (see Table 6.1 and 
Table 6.3). The reported F-values in these tables show that class consistently 
outperformed either of the geographic classifications in the explanation of 
Conservative reported vote intention. Moreover class was always statistically 
significant to at least the 0.05 level in the analysis of variance in Conservative 
reported vote intentions. 
The average deviations between classes in their propensity to express a Conservative 
vote intention were all in the expected direction (see Table 6.2). Moreover they match 
the basic pattern set out in Chapters 3 and 4 for the British Social Attitudes dataset, 
which would suggest that the dynamics of the 'new' recession in the early 1990s did 
not alter the relative party preferences of the different classes in the electorate, and 
once again, the conventional class cleavage emerged. 
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6.1.1.2 CLASS AND LABOUR REPORTED VOTE INTENTION 
Differences between classes in their levels of reported vote intentions for Labour for 
the period between July 1990 and February 1992 also reached statistical significance 
in each opinion poll. In fact since the F-values for class were usually larger than those 
for region and constituency type and personal economic expectations, class was the 
most important of the co-variables in the analysis of variance in Labour reported vote 
intention (see Table 6.1 and Table 6,3), 
The average deviations from the Grand Mean for the sub-divisions of class in the 
analysis of Labour support illustrates the expected - and conventional - pattern of 
class support. Class AB was the most hostile of all sections of the electorate to Labour 
support, while Class DE was the most likely to favour Labour support throughout the 
period covered by the polls, The C1 class shied away from Labour support - shown by 
the negative deviations from the Grand Mean, although they were less hostile than 
Class AB. Class C2 had a marked inclination towards Labour support albeit a more 
diluted inclination than that of class DE. 
6.2 GEOGRAPHY & PARTISANSHIP 
6.2.1 COMPRESSED REGION AND REPORTED VOTE INTENTION 
The five-fold regional schema was statistically significant at the 0.05 level for every 
analysis of variance during the poll period between July 1990 and February 1992, 
when analysed in addition to class and personal economic expectations. 
Nevertheless, the explanatory force of compressed region was quite small when 
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compared to the impact of class and personal economic expectations in the 
explanation of levels of Conservative support - expressed by relatively low F-values in 
Table 6,1 - compared to those of the co-variables, Similarly the beta values for region 
tend to be smaller than those for class and personal economic expectations revealing 
less overall variation within the regional schema than that associated with class and 
personal economic expectations. 
The overall pattern of geographic variation in Conservative reported vote intention in 
the period between July 1990 and February 1992 was almost identical to that 
identified in Chapters 3 and 4 by analysis of partisan identification of respondents in 
the British Social Attitudes dataset (see Table 6,2). Respondents from Scotland and 
Wales and the North of England were the most hostile to Conservative support, while 
voters based in the South of England were typically the most ardent Conservative 
supporters and the most likely to identify themselves as probable Conservative voters, 
Meanwhile, the average deviations from the Grand Means shown in Table 6.2 
illustrate that regional characteristics affected the pattern of Labour support in the 
expected manner - with strong Labour support in the North of England and the Celtic 
fringe, and weaker Labour reported vote intention in the South of England. 
Respondents from the Greater London area were - ceteris paribus - less likely to 
support Labour than the average voter, but did flirt with a reported intention to vote 
Labour on a couple of occasions during the poll period - as they did in the inter-
election periods of the 19805 (see Chapters 3 and 4), However, the overall picture of 
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respondents from Greater London being relatively disinclined to favour Labour is hard 
to escape, 
The extent of variations over time in all regions in Table 6,2 would seem to reveal that 
the pattern of geographic support for the two major parties was not set in stone during 
the long-campaign leading up to the 1992 General Election. 
Despite this, however, the geographic variation in party support is crucial since it 
shows that the strength of the core of Conservative support in the Lawson-boom led 
economic recovery in the 1980s held firm during the 'new' recession of the early 
1990s. Southerners did not desert the Conservatives to any extent which would 
indicate that the economic downturn had upset the relative geographic equilibrium. 
That is the geographic gap in voting patterns, accentuated under the early Thatcher 
years and the Lawson boom, did not narrow significantly during the economic 
downturn (Pattie, Johnston & Fieldhouse, 1994 show that the regional divide 
narrowed between 1987 and 1992 but did not disappear). Moreover, the areas typified 
by the decline of staple industries and manufacturing, which had turned against 
Thatcherism during the 1980s, continued to express a relative disinclination to favour 
Conservatism. As a result, the geographic skew in the partisanship of the electorate 
identified throughout the 1980s via the British Social Attitudes dataset remained intact 
during the 19905, with the South embracing Conservatism and the North and Celtic 
regions eschewing it (see also Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp; 1988, Johnston & Pattie; 
1989a, Pattie and Johnston; 1990a). 
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Table 6.3: Tests for Geographic Model 2; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, 
Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention 
GM GM CLASS CTYPE 
Con Lbr F (C) F (L) Il (C) Il (L) F(C) F (L) ~l 
Jul '90 .323 .421 28.9 27.0 .15 .16 9.1 12.3 .09 
Aug '90 .307 .406 47.4 34.5 .24 .20 7.7 11.9 .09 
Sep '90 .333 .370 20.7 25.4 .15 .17 17.0 24.1 .14 
Oct '90 .313 .381 32.3 23.1 .20 .17 '"1.3 5.6 .04 
Noy'90 .363 .362 31.8 29.2 .20 .20 3.8 6.7 .07 
Oee '90 .409 .362 36.2 30.6 .21 .19 14.6 17.4 .13 
Jan '91 .365 .381 29.2 22.6 .19 .18 '"0.6 4.1 .03 
Feb'91 .401 .358 43.2 32.5 .21 .19 11.6 17.5 .12 
Mar '91 .339 .329 21.4 24.6 .15 .18 10.2 10.4 .11 
Apr '91 .357 .337 24.9 22.1 .17 .18 10.6 4.8 .11 
May '91 .322 .380 28.7 23.9 .18 .17 5.7 15.6 .08 
Jun '91 .323 .366 25.2 i25.7 .17 .18 3.6 10.1 .07 
Jul'91 .349 .362 21.5 20.9 .15 .17 7.4 4.4 .10 
Aug '91 .327 .366 32.2 28.6 .20 .18 7.7 i19.4 .10 
Sep'91 .351 .341 24.1 32.1 .16 .20 12.8 17.2 .12 
Oet '91 .347 .367 40.5 i34.9 .12 .13 17.3 16.1 .08 
NoY'91 .349 .327 17.9 23.3 .14 .18 11.4 10.9 .12 
Jan'92 .354 .344 19.0 29.3 .16 .21 13.7 12.3 .14 
Feb'92 .336 .361 20.9 25.6 .17 .18 15.3 31.6 .13 
-
HHEGO R2 
IlJL) F(C) F (L) JUCl 1\ (L) Con Lbr 
.11 60.2 38.3 .27 .22 .129 .108 
.12 21.5 20.3 .16 .16 .113 .097 
.17 38.1 22.3 .21 .16 .100 .098 
.09 33.6 13.6 .20 .13 .097 .066 
.09 39.6 15.5 .22 .14 .105 .076 
.14 42.6 22.5 .22 .16 .127 .096 
.07 36.2 10.5 .21 .12 .096 .060 
.14 57.4 27.1 .25 .16 .144 .106 
.11 35.0 9.1 .20 .11 .090 .069 
.07 24.0 6.2 .17 .09 .085 .053 
.14 68.2 24.3 .26 .17 .129 .087 
.12 48.0 i18.6 .24 .15 .106 .082 
.06 42.7 10.5 .23 .12 .097 .057 
.16 26.4 i15.0 .16 .14 .099 .094 
.14 47.9 12.6 .24 .13 .114 .094 
.09 318.9 i187.9 .54 .44 .342 .250 
.12 44.9 11.8 .24 .12 .102 .073 
.13 31.2 13.4 .20 .13 .096 .091 
.20 31.5 12.7 .21 .13 .103 .107 
'" Table 6.4: Parameters of Geographic Model 2; Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention by Class, Constituency Type and Economic Attitudes 
c:> 
0. 
0. 
- Con Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Jan Feb 
'90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '92 '92 
CLASS 
AB .11 .21 .11 .10 .10 .15 .13 .14 .11 .16 .13 .13 .12 .17 .13 .09 .11 .06 .16 
c1 .06 .06 Or. -~-- .05 .09 .U7 .09 .U4 .03 .05 .05 .05 .07 .05 .04 .06 .09 .01 . ;) .U3 
c2 -.03 -.07 -.01 -.04 -.05 -.05 .00 -.03 ~o -.02 .00 -.02 -.03 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.02 
DE -.08 -.10 -.09 -.09 -.10 -.11 -.13 -.13 -.10 -.09 -.11 -.09 -.08 -.10 -.08 -.07 -.08 -.09 -.08 
CTYPE 
Dep/LA -.05 -.06 -.09 -.02 -.05 -.08 -.02 -.06 -.06 -.07 -.05 -.04 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.07 -.09 -.09 
Service .01 .03 .03 -.01 .03 .04 .02 -.01 .07 .03 .00 .02 .01 .02 -.04 .00 .06 .03 .03 
-
-.-. 
-_._- -_. -_. 
----
-.-. 
--Affluent .05 .04 .06 .02 .03 .06 .01 .07 .02 .04 .04 .03 .05 .04 .07 .04 .03 .06 .05 
------------
--J-IHEGO 
Pessimist -.13 -.09 -.12 -.12 -.14 -.16 -.13 -.15 -.12 -.12 -.19 -.18 -.16 -.12 -.18 -.29 -.16 -.13 -.15 
Neutral .06 .05 .06 .02 .04 .05 .05 .06 .01 .03 .02 .03 .02 .02 .02 -.27 .03 .01 .02 
Optimist .19 .07 .12 .11 .11 .10 .13 .15 .12 .08 .15 .11 .12 .10 .12 .23 .14 .14 .11 
. 
. - . .. - ... . 
--
. 
Labour Jut Aug Sep Qct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Qct Noy Jan Feb 
'90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '92 '92 
--
--CLASS 
AB -.14 -.14 -.17 -.14 -.15 -.13 -.13 -.12 -.13 -.11 -.13 -.14 -.12 -.15 -.13 -.09 -.12 -.12 -.14 
cl -.06 -.08 -.02 -.06 -.06 -.09 -.06 -.08 -.06 -.09 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.07 -.10 -.05 -.08 -.09 -.06 
c2 .05 .02 .04 .05 .01 .04 .01 .03 .03 .06 .02 .01 .02 .04 .05 .02 .04 .02 .01 
DE .07 .12 .07 .09 .13 .11 .11 .12 .10 .08 .10 .11 .10 .10 .11 .08 .09 .13 .11 
CTYPE 
~6 --f---Oep/LA .07 .U7 .10 .05 .09 .U4 .08 .07 .04 .09 .07 .05 .10 .00 .06 .07 .08 .13 
Service -.05 -.U6 -.U9 -.U2 -.U4 -.07 -.01 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.02 -.06 -.02 -.07 .00 -.04 -.05 -.02 -.08 
Affluent -.04 ~4 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.05 -.03 -.07 -.04 -.02 -.06 -.03 -.03 -.05 -.07 -.03 -.04 -.06 -.06 
HHEGO 
Pessimist .12 .10 .09 .09 .09 .12 .06 .11 .07 .06 .11 .12 .08 .09 .10 .28 .08 .10 .10 
Neulral -.08 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.05 -.02 -.01 .00 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.01 .20 -.01 -.03 -.03 
Optimist -.16 -.07 -.10 -.04 -.00 -.07 -.09 -.09 -.05 -.05 -.12 -.06 -.06 -.08 -.06 -.19 -.08 -.06 -.05 
Chapter 6: Reporled "ole IlIlelllioll. ('lass, (ieography and Economic Optimism in the 1990s 
There was a deal of vacillation from respondents in Greater London - an area 
identified with tergiversating Tories in the 1980s - although this may at least in part be 
due to the sampling procedure in the metropolis (over-concentrating one month on 
inner-city areas, the next on outer-London suburban areas). Respondents from the 
Midlands were however also quite likely to alter their predilection for Conservative 
support from month to month. At the same time, Midlanders vacillated between 
relative Labour support and reluctance to report an intention to vote Labour in the next 
General Election, but the overall pattern of their propensity to support Labour was 
trendless, The Midlands were of course involved in the vanguard of both the Lawson 
boom recovery and the 'new' recession of the 1990s and represent an area 
characterised by both old style manufacturing industry in the West Midlands 
conurbation and the new style service sector more prominent in the East Midlands. As 
such it is hardly surprising that the level of support for Labour in this region should 
have no clear pattern during the poll period as the effects of the new recession wore 
on and bit into existing areas of prosperity. For the record, Labour made significant 
gains in the West Midlands in the General Election in April 1992 but failed to make the 
extensive inroads into the East Midlands vote that the party expected or indeed 
required in order to mount a serious challenge to the Conservative Government. 
6.2.2 CONSTITUENCY TYPE AND REPORTED VOTE INTENTION 
The three-fold constituency type schema was statistically significant at the 0,05 level 
in the explanation of Conservative reported vote intention for most - but not quite all -
of the analyses of variance conducted during the poll period between July 1990 and 
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February 1992, when analysed in addition to class and personal economic 
expectations. In the parallel explanation of Labour reported vote intention, the three-
fold constituency type schema was significant each month. However, the relatively 
small size of the F-scores reported in Table 6.3 reveal that the constituency type 
schema was the least forceful of the three co-variables in the analysis of variance in 
the explanation of party support. 
The Beta scores in the Conservative model were typically smaller than those for the 
other variables in the analysis - class and personal economic expectations. This 
means that the within group variance as well as the between group variance 
explained by constituency type is inferior to that explained by class and personal 
economic expectations. On the other hand, the associated Beta values for Labour 
reported vote intention show that the within group variance of the geographic variable 
was comparable to that provided by the class and personal economic expectations 
variables. 
The basic pattern of geographic variation in reported vote intention is identical to that 
expected from the general knowledge of the nature of party support in the 1980s and 
1990s. Respondents from areas typified by industrial depression and a high intenSity 
of local authority housing were much less likely to support the Conservatives and 
much more prone to support the Labour Party than the average respondent when the 
effects of class and personal economic expectations were controlled for. Those 
sections of the electorate residing In areas typified by service sector employment and 
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by affluence were likely - other things being equal - to eschew Labour support, At the 
same time, respondents from affluent areas were the most likely to support the 
Conservatives - ceteris paribus, Respondents from areas characterised by service 
sector employment may be typically inclined towards Conservative support but their 
pro-Conservative bias was diluted during the new recession of the early 1990s. 
This pattern of affluent and service sector affinity with the Government fits with two 
explanations of Conservative support during this period, Firstly it supports the reward-
punishment axiom which states that voters reward Governments that deliver 
prosperity; and various studies have shown that these respondents were the 'biggest 
winners' in the era of Thatcherism, (see Pattie and Johnston; 1990a, Pattie & 
Johnston 1990c) Secondly it supports a general thesis that prosperity per se delivers 
voters towards political conservatism regardless of the political colour of the 
Government. 
A critical feature of this pattern of Conservative support is that it fails to highlight the 
dynamiCS of the 'new' recession of the late 19805 and early 1990s. This economic 
downturn hit the service sector disproportionately and it might have been suspected 
that the strength of any association between areas typified by this type of employment 
and the governing Conservative Party might have weakened as a consequence. 
However little support for this notion can be found in the evidence of Table 6,4 as 
respondents from these areas were typically Conservative supporters throughout the 
poll period regardless of the 'new' recession, As Chapter 5 showed, the 'temporary 
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and blameless' recession did not rebound on the Government in the run-up to the 
1992 General Election, 
The distinction between the effects of the 'new' and 'old' recessions is critical in the 
analysis of the Thatcher and post-Thatcher environment of British politics, As Table 
6.4 illustrates, although the level of relative hostility to Labour among respondents 
from constituencies characterised by service sector employment was prone to 
fluctuate in terms of magnitude - as was their pro-Conservative bias - the direction of 
their antipathy towards Labour was constant. Table 6.4 reveals that the geography of 
the new recession may have diluted the relative Conservatism of these respondents, 
but also that they were never pulled into active Labour support. The jolt to the natural 
heartland of Conservative support provided by the new recession was insufficient to 
promote large scale desertion of Conservative supporters to Labour, In itself this is not 
surprising. Traditionally most floating voters flow to or from the centre parties rather 
than directly between the two main parties. The very real differences in the 
organisational strength of local parties and the existing electoral settlement in a 
constituency - with the Liberal Democrats in second place in many Southern seats -
would serve only to further complicate the picture of tactical and expressive voting 
(see Johnston and Pattie; 1991). 
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6.3 ECONOMIC ATTITUDES & PARTISANSHIP 
6.3.1 PERSONAL ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS AND REPORTED VOTE 
INTENTION 
The analysis of personal economic expectations is the prime mover in the analysis of 
variance in Conservative reported vote intention. The F-scores in Table 6.1 indicate 
that personal economic expectations regularly outperformed class and region in 
explaining the pattern of Conservative support. Moreover, the Beta values indicate 
that personal economic expectations consistently provided the greatest within group 
variance of the three co-variables in Conservative reported vote intentions. When the 
three-fold constituency type replaced the five compressed regions as the geographic 
variable, personal economic expectations remained the most important of all three co-
variables, outperfoming class and constituency type both in terms of magnitude of F-
scores and the size of the Beta coefficients (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). 
For the counterpart analysis of Labour reported vote intentions during the same 
period a similar claim cannot be made with great confidence. Although personal 
economic expectations exceeded the 0.05 threshold of statistical significance, the 
magnitude of F-values for personal economic expectations, while exceeding those for 
the five compressed regions, was usually exceeded by the F-value for class in the 
analysis of Labour support. This is perhaps unsurprising. According to the economic 
orthodoxy, optimists will vote for the Government, but pessimists face a tactical 
dilemma compounded by the vagaries of the British voting system and the variable 
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geographic pattern of organisational strength of the parties, having at least two 
opposition parties to choose from. 
The figures presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.4 reveal relative tendencies in 
Conservative reported vote intentions not absolute numbers, Hence it is feasible for 
economic optimists to become more likely to support the Conservatives in a period 
when the absolute number of them declined sharply. In fact as the Grand Means from 
Table 6.1 illustrate, the extent of Conservative support recovered sharply after the 
change in leadership in the Autumn of 1990, reaching a peak of 41 per cent of the 
electorate in December 1990, but tended to fall away slowly thereafter throughout the 
rest of the recession. 
Meanwhile, those sections of the electorate who expressed pessimism about their 
economic future were liable to exhibit a pro-Labour bias, when the effects of class and 
geography were held constant. Those respondents who were optimistic about their 
personal economic future were unlikely to support Labour - other things being equal. 
An important point to make here is that those respondents who expressed neutrality in 
their assessment of personal economic futures were also predisposed - ceteris 
paribus - to exhibit a preference for Conservatism for all polls except the rogue poll of 
October 1992. Remarkably, those sections of the electorate who were neutral about 
their personal economic prospects were only slightly less likely to eschew Labour 
support than the economic optimists. Not only were the winners prepared to back the 
Government but those who felt they would not lose under the policies of the 
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Government were prepared - ceteris paribus - to give them another chance, This 
provides further evidence of an in-built pro-Conservative (or more specifically pro-
Government) bias in the matter of economic attitudes since typically, only those 
openly dissatisfied with their economic prospects were prepared to voice oppOSition to 
the governing Conservative Party. Butler and Kavanagh (1992) and Scammell (1995) 
both point out that a consistent thread of Conservative electoral strategy was to assert 
that although the country was in recession, the economy would be much worse under 
Labour in an attempt to dissipate the anti-Government economic vote. 
Overall the trend for reported vote intentions via economic optimism and pessimism is 
consistent with the economic voting orthodoxy which includes the work of Sanders et 
al. Those sections of the electorate who felt the Government were liable to oversee a 
period of personal economic prosperity - or at least would not worsen their personal 
circumstances - would be likely to vote for the continuance of the policies that promote 
this prosperity. In short, the winners vote for continuity, the losers for change. 
Not only does the hypothesis of class, geography and personal economic 
expectations explain less of the variance in levels of Labour support than for 
Conservative support, but the impact of personal economic expectations itself also 
seems to have a differential impact upon Conservative and Labour supporters. In 
short the salience of personal economic expectations seems greater to Conservative 
supporters than it does to Labour supporters, This might begin to explain why the 
Conservative Party tend to gain from concentrating on personal economic issues in 
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General Elections - and particularly their appeal to egocentrism, and Labour benefit 
more from appeals to sociotropic sentiments (Crewe 1988, and Garrett, 1994 among 
others, have held that the Conservatives were popular despite their social agenda not 
because of it). The partisan ownership of these agendas would seem to have been 
vindicated by the 1992 General Election campaign. In 1992 the Conservatives 
concentrated on issues of taxation - and their own and their opponents' plans to 
implement tax policies. Meanwhile Labour were defensive on the question of taxation 
but were on safer ground when campaigning on sociotropic issues such as the health 
service, education and welfare. 
Clearly the problem of cause and effect need to be addressed. On the one hand, 
Conservatives seem more susceptible to appeals to their economic interests than 
Labour supporters. On the other, however, feelings towards the economy seem to 
have a significant impact upon how people vote. This leaves a conundrum: do 
economic attitudes influence voters or does partisanship affect the way that voters 
think about the economy? The more robust LOGIT analysis later in this chapter (see 
below) will go some way to solving this conundrum. 
6.4 ECONOMIC ATIITUDES AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE (The Half-Stage 
Model) 
The next phase of this analysis was the reduction of the model to its two component 
stages. The effects of class, geography (in its two forms) and personal economic 
expectations upon partisanship have already been measured. In order to assess the 
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role of both class and geography in the formation of economic attitudes, it is now 
necessary to treat economic attitudes as the dependent variable in a 'half stage 
model', and explore the effects upon personal economic expectations of class and the 
two types of geography. 
The Grand Means for personal economic expectations shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.7 
(the parameters for each model are shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.8 respectively), reveal 
that throughout the poll period, the electorate became more optimistic about the 
economy over time. They also suggest, however, that this new optimism had peaked 
and was falling again by the time of the election campaign. Nevertheless, the trend is 
clear, away from the overwhelming pessimism which characterised the beginning of 
the poll period - and particularly the last four months of the Thatcher Premiership. 
The primary point to make about the analysis of variations in personal economic 
expectations by class and the two types of geography is that the total amount of 
explained variance in levels of personal economic expectations is much smaller than 
the first analysis of partisanship by class, geography and personal economic 
expectations. The final column in Tables 6.5, and 6.7, which reveal the R2, show that 
the total amount of variance in personal economic expectations levels explained by 
the half stage model is limited. Hence the empirical evidence for the model which 
states that personal economic expectations are a function of the contextual milieux in 
which they are formed appears to be weak. If geography has a significant impact upon 
economic attitudes, it must exert influence in an indirect or unorthodox manner, The 
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LOG IT analysis presented below indicates that the form of this indirect and 
unorthodox influence might be the coincidence of geographic and other factors -
measured through interaction terms. 
Table 6.5: Tests for Half Stage Model 1; F-Va/ues and Beta Coefficients 
Personal Economic Attitudes I 
I GM CLASS REGION R" 
F Beta F Beta 
Ju,'90 -.246 31.1 .24 *0.6 .04 
.059 
Aug '90 -.150 19.5 .19 *1.5 .06 .040 
Sep'90 -.169 8.3 .13 *0.6 .04 .017 
Oct '90 -.047 17.5 .18 *1.0 .05 .036 
Nov'90 -.056 6.0 .11 *0.8 .05 .014 
Oec'90 -.051 12.6 .15 *0.7 .04 .025 
Jan '91 -.148 9.9 .13 2.5 .08 .026 
Feb'91 -.136 10.7 .14 *0.8 .04 .022 
Mar '91 -.036 S.9 .13 *1.2 .06 .020 
Apr '91 -.004 15.2 .17 *0.5 .03 .030 
May '91 .014 8.2 .13 *1.9 .07 .020 
Jun'91 .017 14.1 .17 *1.5 .06 .031 
Jul'91 .029 11.5 .14 *1.5 .06 .025 
Aug '91 -.027 10.6 .15 2.5 .08 .027 
Sep'91 .066 12.3 .15 2.4 .08 .030 
Oct '91 .376 21.6 .20 3.5 .09 .049 
Nov'91 -.033 5.B .11 *1.0 .05 .015 
Jan'92 -.053 5.2 .11 *0.4 .03 .012 
Feb'92 -.010 10.7 .15 -2.0 .07 .029 
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t: Table 6.6: Parameters of Half Stage Model 1; Personal Economic Attitudes by Region and Class 
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l:J 
-
Jul Aug Sep Oct Noy Dee Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Ju' 
'90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 
CLASS 
AB .28 .24 .11 .28 .16 .18 .17 .17 .12 .18 .09 .17 .08 
c1 .12 .12 .11 .04 .03 .06 .07 .09 .09 .12 .13 .10 .11 
c2 .00 -.09 -.02 -.04 -.06 -.01 -.03 -.05 -.02 -.07 -.06 -.01 .02 
DE -.24 -.15 -.13 -.15 -.07 -.14 -.12 -.12 -.13 -.14 -.10 -.17 -.16 
REGION 
--ScUWal -.05 .03 .03 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.09 .01 .02 -.04 -.02 .02 .01 
North .02 .05 -.01 -.03 .00 .02 .02 -.04 -.06 -.01 .05 -.02 -.07 
Mids .04 -.04 .04 .08 .08 -.06 -.06 -.01 -.02 -.01 .07 .09 .03 
Gtr L'don .02 -.08 .02 -.04 -.01 .02 .10 -.03 .03 .04 -.08 -.08 .06 
Soulh -.02 .00 -.04 .01 -.02 .02 .03 .05 .05 .02 -.04 .00 .01 
Aug Sep Oct 
'91 '91 '91 
.13 .16 .18 
.05 .09 .16 
.06 -.02 -.08 
-.17 -.15 '-.17 
.00 .06 -.13 
.03 -.03 .03 
.06 -.10 .06 
-.16 .08 -.03 
.01 .01 .04 
Noy Jan 
'91 '92 
.12 .13 
.07 .05 
-.01 -.05 
-.11 -.07 
.04 .03 
-.01 .01 
.03 -.03 
-.09 .03 
.01 -.02 
Feb 
'92 
.09 
.15 
-.08 
-.10 
-.02 
-.08 
.04 
.07 
.03 
,. 
ID 
IX) 
N 
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Table 6.7: Tests for Half Stage Model 2; F-Values and Seta Coefficients, 
Personal Economic Attitudes 
GM CLASS CTY?!: R~ 
1 F Beta F Beta 
Jul'90 1 -.246 31.1 .24 ·1.0 .04 .0591 
Aug '90 -.150 19.6 .19 ·0.0 .01 .0361 
Sep'90 1 -.169 8.3 .12 ·0.8 .03 1 .017 
Cct '90 I -.047 I 17.5 .18 ·0.3 .02 .034 
Nov'90 1 -.056 6.0 .11 *0.4 .02 .012 
Oec'90 -.051 12.4 .15 *0.2 .02 .023 
Jan'91 -.148 9.9 .14 *0.7 .03 .020 
Feb'91 1 -.136 10.7 .14 ·0.2 .02 .020 
Mar '91 -.036 8.9 .13 *1.6 .04 .019 
Apr '91 -.004 15.2 .16 4.0 .07 .033 
May '91 .014 8.2 .13 ·1.6 .05 .017 
Jun '91 .017 14.1 .17 *0.8 .03 .028 
Jul '91 .029 11.5 .15 *-2.3 .05 .025 
Aug '91 -.027 10.5 .15 ·1.1 .04 .022 
Sep '91 .066 12.2 .15 ·0.1 .01 .024 
Oct '91 .376 21.6 .19 6.3 .09 .048 
Nov'91 -.033 5.8 .11 ·0.5 .02 .012 
Jan '92 I -.053 5.2 .10 ·0.1 .01 .011 
Feb'92 -.010 10.7 .14 -2.5 .06 .027 
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Table 6.8: Parameters of Half Stage Model 2; Personal Economic Attitudes by Constituency Type and Class 
Jul Aug Sep Oct Noy Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
'90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '90 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 '91 
CLASS 
AB .28 .24 .10 .28 .16 .19 .16 .17 .13 .18 .09 .17 .08 .13 .16 
c1 .11 .11 .10 .05 .03 .06 .08 .09 .09 .12 .13 .10 .12 .05 .09 
c2 .00 -.08 -.02 -.04 -.06 -.01 -.03 -.05 -.02 -.06 -.06 -.01 .02 .06 -.02 
DE -.24 -.15 -.12 -.15 -.07 -.14 -.13 -.12 -.13 -.14 -.10 -.17 -.17 -.17 -.15 
CTYPE 
Dep/LA -.03 .00 -.03 .01 .02 .01 .00 .00 -.01 -.05 .03 .02 .01 .02 -.01 
Service -.01 -.01 .03 -.03 -.01 .01 .04 .02 .06 .10 -.06 -.04 .06 -.06 .01 
Affluent .03 .00 .01 .00 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.01 .01 .01 -.04 .01 .00 
Qct Noy 
'91 '91 
.18 .11 
.15 .06 
-.09 -.01 
-.16 -.10 
-.08 -.01 
-.01 -.02 
.07 .02 
Jan 
'92 
.13 
.05 
-.05 
-.07 
.00 
.02 
-.01 
Feb 
'92 
.08 
.15 
-.08 
-.09 
-.06 
.05 
.02 
to 
to 
N 
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6.4.1 CLASS & ECONOMIC ATTITUDES 
6.4.1.1 CLASS AND PERSONAL ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS 
Class has the expected impact upon the formation of economic attitudes, especially 
personal economic expectations. The findings of Chapter 5 which indicated a linear 
relationship between class and personal optimism are supported here. Tables 6.5 and 
6.7 illustrate the impact of social background upon economic outlooks, as the class 
variable accounts for most of the explained variance in levels of personal economic 
expectations. The fourfold measurement of class utilised here is statistically significant 
in every poll in the explanation of deviations in the level of personal economic 
expectations. Furthermore the F-values and Beta scores associated with class were 
relatively large scale indicating a deal of explanatory force and within group variation. 
This would seem to indicate that class is an essential part of the milieux in which 
personal economic expectations are formulated; hence - and contrary to the model of 
Rose and McAllister (1990) - class considerations ought to predate the analysis of 
economic attitudes. 
The pattern of relative changes in personal economic expectations according to class 
is illustrated in Tables 6.6 and 6.8. They reveal that the expected pattern of optimism 
from the highest class echelons and economic pessimism from the lowest echelons of 
the class schema held firm over the early 1990s. The most optimistic of all classes 
were respondents from Class AB, although their relative advantage declined 
throughout the series as the electorate as a whole became more optimistic. 
Conversely, respondents from the DE class were the least optimistic of all sections of 
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the electorate - ceteris paribus - although their relative pessimism was diluted by the 
general (non-specific in class terms) upturn in economic optimism after the end of the 
Thatcher Premiership and the beginning of the long campaign. 
Between these polar groups the pattern was again much as expected from the 
general hypothesis. Respondents from Class C2 were generally more peSSimistic 
about their personal economic future than the average voter; while respondents from 
the C1 Class were typically optimistic about their economic future but were 
nevertheless markedly less optimistic than their cohorts in Class AB. 
6.4.2 GEOGRAPHY & ECONOMIC A TIITUDES 
If social class constitutes part of the milieux in which attitudes are structured, and if 
geographic variation is shown to be significant in the analysis of partisanship - or 
reported vote intention, then it would be reasonable to expect that geography would 
also form part of the milieux in which the attitudes that structure partisanship are 
formed. The hypothesis under scrutiny, then, is that either of both of the 
operationalisations of geography - the five compressed regions and the three 
constituency types - ought to play a significant role in the formation of personal 
economic expectations attitudes. 
Despite the stated aim of this thesis to show that geography constitutes the context in 
which economic attitudes are formed, the initial result from the poll data damages this 
notion. In fact the null hypothesis that the five compressed regions and attitudes to the 
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personal economy are not related cannot be refuted by the separate analysis of 
personal economic expectations here. 
The analysis of personal economic expectations by regional distinctions fails to 
breach the 0.05 threshold of statistical significance on all but four occasions during 
the poll period between July 1990 and February 1992. Moreover, as Table 6.5 shows, 
even when the five compressed regions were significant the explanatory force they 
provide is tiny, their associated F-values were not high and the Beta scores were 
small. Only a tenuous link between either of the geographic schema and personal 
economic expectations could be forged (Tables 6.5 and 6.6). While region in general 
was relatively unimportant, specific regions did differ markedly from the national trend; 
regression analysis reported later in this chapter explore this in more detail. 
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Table 6.9: Tests for Major Succession Model 1 ; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, 
Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention 
-- - --
- -
GM GM CLASS CLASS REGION REGION 
Con Lbr F (C) P (C) F (l) P (L) F (C) P (C) F (L) P (L) 
Thatcher .319 .394 i123.4 .16 i107.6 .16 i24.4 .12 30.6 .14 
Mjr 1-4mths .364 .358 128.2 .20 i110A .19 25.6 .12 i29.4 .13 
Major .355 .357 6363.7 .18 i368.3 .19 i85.9 .12 i111.0 .14 
Table 6.10; Parameters of Major Succession Model 1; 
Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention by Class, Region and Economic Attitudes 
Thatcher Mjr 1-4 mths Major Thatcher Mjr 1-4mths 
CLASS Con Con Con Lbr Lbr 
AB .16 .14 .14 -.15 -.13 
c1 .05 .00 .06 -.06 -.00 
c2 -.04 -.02 -.03 .04 .03 
DE -.09 -.12 -.10 .09 .11 
REGION 
SctJWal -.10 -.10 -.10 .06 .06 
North -.02 -.03 -.03 .07 .07 
Mlds .01 .04 .04 .01 .00 
Gtr L'don .05 .07 .05 -.05 -.05 
South .06 .04 .05 -.09 -.08 
HHEGO 
Pessimist -.12 -.14 -.14 .10 .09 
Neutral .05 .04 .01 -.05 -.03 
Optimist .12 .12 .12 -.08 -.07 
HHEGO 
F(C) P (C) 
150.8 .21 
163.9 .22 
i528.0 .21 
Major 
Lbr 
-.13 
-.00 
.03 
.11 
.06 
.08 
-.01 
-.03 
-.08 
.09 
-.01 
-.08 
HHEGO 
F (L) P (L) 
195.7 .17 
61.7 .14 
202.9 .13 
R2 
Con 
.110 
.115 
.105 
R2 
Lbr 
.093 
.084 
.085 
N 
en 
N 
~ Table 6.11: Tests for Major Succession Model 2; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, 
- Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention 
. -
- - --
GM GM CLASS CLASS CTYPE CTYPE HHEGO 
Con lbr F (C) J} (e) F (l) Jl (l) F (C) Jl (C) F (l) Jl (l) F (C) Jl (C) 
Thatcher .319 .394 i122.2 .18 i107.0 .17 i29.0 .09 49.7 .12 145.7 .21 
Mjr 1-4mths .384 .358 127.4 .19 109.8 .18 27.0 .09 44.4 .12 166.7 .22 f--
.357 0114.4 i168.5 .12 i527.3 .21 Major .355 i361.6 .17 i366.4 .18 .10 
Table 6.12: Parameters of Major Succession Model 2; 
Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention by Class, Constituency Type and Economic Attitudes 
- -
- -Thatcher Mjr 1-4mths Major Thatcher Mjr 1-4mths Major 
CLASS Con Con Con Lbr Lbr Lbr 
AB .15 .13 .13 -.15 -.13 -.13 
c1 .05 .07 .06 -.06 -.07 -.07 
c2 -.04 -.02 -.03 .04 .03 .03 
DE -.09 -.12 -.10 .09 .11 .11 
CTYPE 
Dep/LA -.05 -.06 -.06 .08 .07 .08 
Service .01 .03 .02 -.05 -.03 -.04 
Affluent .04 .04 .04 -.04 -.05 -.05 
tn~EGO 
Pessimist -.12 -.14 -.14 .10 .09 .09 
Neutral .05 .04 .01 -.05 -.03 -.01 
OpJimist .12 .12 .12 -.08 -.07 -.08 
HHEGO 
F (l) Jl (l) 
i91.2 .17 
65.5 .14 
203.5 .13 
R2 
Con 
.104 
.109 
.101 
R2 
lbr 
.089 
.081 
.080 
M 
a> 
N 
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6.5 THE ACCESSION OF JOHN MAJOR 
One of the features of the time scale which the NOPINewsnight set of opinion polls 
span, is the array of political shocks that occurred during the period. Three obvious 
shocks are apparent; the Poll Tax (first implemented in England and Wales in March 
1990, the Gulf War (during the Autumn and Winter of 1990/1) and the succession of 
John Major to the Premiership (in November 1990). Any account of public opinion and 
of domestic politics during this time ought to be able to take some of these features 
into account. For the purposes of this thesis it is important not to lose focus on the 
central relationship between geography, economic attitudes and electoral behaviour, 
but a simple account of any change in this relationship due to one of these shocks -
the Major succession - may be attempted (There is a wide literature on the impact of 
'political shocks'. See for instance Sanders et at 1987, 1990, Norpoth 1987, and 
Clarke and Whiteley 1990). 
6.5.1 COMPARING THATCHER WITH MAJOR 
Margaret Thatcher's departure from the Premiership on November 22 1990 and John 
Major's succession one week later meant that the fieldwork for one poll (November 
1990) fell into the interim period between Prime Ministers. It was possible to construct 
a data set which compared the final four full months of the Thatcher Premiership, the 
first four months of Major's reign (the honeymoon period) and the rest of the Major 
Premiership until the end of the series in February 1992. 
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The Grand Means for Conservative and Labour reported vote intention shown in 
Table 6,9 reveal that the level of public support for the Conservatives increased after 
the political demise of Mrs Thatcher. Furthermore, although the initial spurt of support 
that provided by the succession of John Major (a Grand Mean of ,384 for his first four 
full months in charge is equitable to 38.4 per cent of public support for the 
Conservatives) did decay afterwards, the absolute level of Conservative reported vote 
intentions did not slip back to the nadir of the end of the Thatcher period, Labour 
reported vote intention declined after the fall of Thatcher from an average of 39.4 per 
cent to 35.7 per cent of public support (Table 6,9), It appeared, initially at least, as 
though John Major was able to neutralise a potential surge in Labour popularity in the 
run-up to the 1992 Election. This is supported by scrutiny of the parameter tables 
(Table 6.10 and 6.12) which illustrate that Major's initial electoral appeal was general 
rather than specific, boosting Conservative support in every group of social class, 
geographic location and economic outlook. 
The basic model which associates class, region and personal economic expectations 
with levels of Conservative support explains around 11 per cent of the total variance in 
Conservative reported vote intentions for the last four months of the Thatcher 
Premiership and nine per cent of the variance in Labour support (Table 6.9). A similar 
story emerges when constituency type replaced region in the parallel analysis of party 
support under Margaret Thatcher and her successor (see Table 6.11). 
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All of the co-variables in the analysis of variance of Conservative reported vote 
intentions were significant at the 0.05 level (Tables 6.9 and 6.11). Of these co-
variables personal economic expectations appears to be the primary factor in 
explaining Conservative support. It also provides the largest source of within group 
Conservative reported vote intention variance. In the Labour model however, class 
proved a more potent explanatory variable than personal economic expectations; no 
doubt due in part to the split opposition but it also points yet again to the monopoly 
over economic evaluations that the Conservatives had. 
The relative pattern of party support by class, geography and personal economic 
expectations is reported in Tables 6.10 and 6.12. People from Class AB were most 
prone to support the Conservatives in the final phase of the Thatcher Premiership, 
while Class DE were the most reluctant Conservatives. The relative support of Class 
AB actually declines after John Major's accession, while respondents from Class DE 
seemed to move further away from the Conservative Government in relative terms. 
This may mean that as well as a general increase in the overall electability of the 
Conservative Party, John Major brought with him a specific appeal to the middle range 
of social classes: classes C 1 and C2 were apparently more likely to support the 
Government after Margaret Thatcher's removal from Office. 
The relative leanings of the Labour electorate according to class, geography and 
personal economic expectations (Tables 6.10 and 6.12) were not altered by the Major 
succession, although Class DE - the most potent source of Labour support - became 
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even more sympathetic to Labour and Class AB less antipathetic to Labour after 
Margaret Thatcher's removal in November 1990. 
Geographically, Scots and Welsh respondents and those from depressed areas, were 
the most disinclined to favour the Conservative Government - whether led by Thatcher 
or Major. On the other hand, Greater Londoners, Southerners and respondents from 
areas characterised by affluence were the most likely to express a preponderance to 
support the Thatcher-led Conservative Party. Economic pessimism was an indication 
of relative hostility to Conservative support while Optimism (and to a lesser degree 
Neutrality) indicated a predilection for a pro-Conservative stance. After the Major 
succession it appears that the new Prime Minister's 'honeymoon' was clearest in the 
Midlands (Table 6.10) - a region associated with tergiversating Tories in the 1980s, 
which represented a key electoral battleground and a region where both the 'new' and 
'old' recessions had impacted. At the same time he seemed to lose some of the 
relative support of those who felt 'neutral' about their economic prospects, although 
the immediate decrease in the number of 'pessimists' may have influenced this. 
Moving on to the half stage model of economic attitudes rather than partisanship, it is 
clear that, under Thatcher, neither type of geography was able to account for a 
significant degree of variation in the level of public economic optimism (Table 6.13 
and Table 6.15). However, for the first four months of the Major Premiership the 
standard regional divide in electoral geography reappeared - with a pessimistic Celtic 
fringe, North and Midlands, and an optimistic South and Greater London (Table 6.14). 
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Constituency type failed to account for significant variation in personal economic 
expectations even during the major honeymoon period (Tables 6.15 and 6.16). 
Nevertheless, the Major succession provided the Conservatives with an opportunity to 
benefit from the re-opening of the North-South divide in economic optimism during the 
first four months of his premiership (Tables 6.13 and 6.14). The traditional heartlands 
of Conservatism were seemingly more inclined to believe that the new recession was 
either 'temporary' or 'blameless' than before the fall of Mrs. Thatcher. 
Table 6.13: Tests for Major Honeymoon Half Stage Model 1: F-Values and Beta CoeffiCients, 
Personal Economic Attitudes 
GM CLASS REGION R2 
F Beta F Beta 
Thatcher -.153 68.7 .18 *0.8 .02 .033 
Mjr 1-4mths -.093 41.1 .13 2.4 .04 .021 
Major .004 128.5 .13 *1.3 .02 .018 
Table 6.14: Parameters of Major Honeymoon Half Stage Model 1 : 
Personal Economic Attitudes by Region and Class 
Thatcher Mjr 1-4mths Major 
CLASS 
AB .23 .16 .13 
c1 .10 .08 .10 
c2 -.04 -.03 -.03 
DE -.17 -.13 -.13 
REGION 
SctJWal .00 -.02 -.01 
North .01 -.01 -.01 
Mids .03 -.04 .01 
Gtr L'don -.02 .03 .00 
South -.01 .04 .01 
298 
Chapter 6: Reported I 'ote III/el/I/ol/. ( 'lass. Geography al1d J~'(;ol1()lIIi(; Optilllislll in the J 990s 
Table 6.15: Tests for Major Honeymoon Half Stage Model 2; F-Values and Beta Coefficients, 
Personal Economic Attitudes 
GM CLASS CTYPE R2 
F Beta F Beta 
Thatcher -.153 68.7 .18 *0.5 .01 .033 
Mjr 1-4mths -.093 41.1 .14 *2.0 .02 .020 
Major .004 128.5 .13 *2.0 .01 .018 
Table 6.16: Parameters of Major Honeymoon Half Stage Model 2; 
Personal Economic Attitudes by Constituency Type and Class 
Thatcher Mjr 1-4mths Major 
CLASS 
AB .23 .16 .13 
c1 .10 .08 .09 
c2 -.04 -.03 -.03 
DE -.16 -.13 -.13 
CTYPE 
Oep/LA -.01 .00 -.01 
Service .00 .03 .01 
Affluent .01 -.02 .00 
6.6 DRAWBACKS OF THE ANOVA MODELS AND THE CASE FOR REGRESSION 
The ANOVA and Multiple Classification Analyses used in this section of the thesis 
have pointed to the broad inter-relationship between class, geography and economic 
attitudes and then vote intention. They have suggested that there is little support for 
the hypothesis that geography forms an essential part of the milieu in which economic 
attitudes are formed. A more detailed analysis which looks at the association between 
variables at a lower level (or through a finer filter - looking at regions individually rather 
than as a whole) might prove more useful in explaining the role of geography and 
economic attitudes in the voting process. 
Furthermore, the most striking asset of the NOPINewsnight data when compared to 
the British Social Attitudes data is that the poll data allows analysis based on temporal 
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considerations - a quasi-time series is possible. This data provided a host of individual 
monthly polls, each gathered within a day or two, thus eliminating the possibility of 
contamination by a lengthy delay between the start and end of surveys. A model was 
constructed comprising all the data combined from all the monthly polls, with dummy 
variables for each month of the series. 
The regression analysis used here uses a technique with two distinct advantages: 
firstly, because it treats the monthly poll data as a 'trend', it enables the fitting of time 
as an explicit dimension - thus enabling a more rigorous exploration of temporally 
specific phenomena such as the 'honeymoon period' of the Conservative Party under 
John major; secondly it benefits from much larger numbers than the twenty-two 
snapshots of public opinion obtained for the ANOVA modelling. 
So far the analysis for this thesis has suggested that although geography can account 
for significant variation in the reported vote intention of the British electorate, it cannot 
account for variation in the construction of economic attitudes. Nonetheless, the 
ANOVA modelling remains a broad sweep technique which illustrates a fair deal but 
might still leave some aspects of variation unexplained. For instance, while the 
ANOVA modelling has shown that the compressed regional schema has no overall 
effect on the construction of personal economic expectations, a more robust method 
of modelling might reveal aspects of the regional cleavage which can explain variation 
within the broader picture. In the case of geography this might be particularly 
important, for while ANOVA looks for Significant variations across all regions, other 
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methods might give a better view of what occurs in individual regions. Multiple 
regression analysis might provide this insight, it would also enable the building of an 
equation for party support. For this reason the emphasis of the rest of this thesis shifts 
from the Analysis of Variance to Regression analysis. Two types of regression 
analysis were undertaken; Ordinary Least Squares and Logistic Regression analysis. 
Moreover a regression analysis approach permitted a more detailed look at some of 
the interaction effects which the ANOVA analysis hinted were occasionally significant. 
Thus the effects of interactions between class and economic evaluations, region and 
economic evaluations, constituency type and economic evaluations, and the more 
conventional class geographic and economic cleavages could all be measured 
simultaneously with a chronological dimension designed to measure the effects of 
political shocks such as the Major succession. This, then, is the next and final stage of 
this thesis. 
6.7 DATA PRESENTATION 
The regression tables used in this chapter report the regression coefficients, standard 
error and significance levels of the independent variables. The logistic regression 
tables are similar but report the exponent of B (the odds-ratio) rather than significance 
levels. As a general rule of thumb a B coefficient which is twice the size of its own 
standard error is statistically significant. For both types of regression tables, only 
those variables which assumed statistical significance at or below the 0.1 level are 
reported. An asterisk denotes an insignificant variable. Each type of table also reports 
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the appropriate diagnostic statistics; R2, adjusted R2, standard error, F and the 
significance of F in the ordinary least squares model; original and improved 2 log 
likelihoods, improvement figures and significance tests for the logistic regression 
model. 
6,8 THE VARIABLES: 
The following variables were used in this analysis, The dependent variables 
Conservative and labour reported vote intention were dichotomised so that a score of 
1 equalled a reported vote intention for that party, a score of zero denoted some other 
outcome (including reported vote intentions for other parties, and don't knows and 
refusals), Categoric independent variables were taken and each of their categories 
was expressed as a binary dummy variable. This enabled the fitting of categoric data 
in an unambiguous fashion. 
When dichotomies or dummy variables were used, one category for each of the 
independent variables is left out of the model. The reported coefficients for the other 
categories of each variable should be seen in relation to this comparator category, 
The comparator categories were February 1992, the South of England, Affluent areas, 
Class DE and personal economic pessimism. In all cases, the comparator category 
was the most populous category of the independent variable from which it was 
constructed. The B coefficient for Conservative reported vote intention presented in 
Table 6,17 for respondents from the CEl T region (Scotland and Wales) was -.11, The 
direction of the coefficient shows that these respondents were less likely than 
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Southern respondents to express an intention of voting for the Conservative Party, 
The magnitude of the coefficient shows the intensity of this likelihood; so for instance 
the B coefficient of -.11 for the CEl T category and of -.05 for the NORTH category 
illustrated that both groups of respondents were less likely to express a reported vote 
intention for the Conservatives than the SOUTH comparator category, but whereas 
the Northern respondents were only five percentage points below the Southern 
Conservative share, the Scots and Welsh were eleven percentage pOints below the 
Southern average for Conservative reported vote intention, other things being equal. 
The relatively small size of the series - there were only 19 consecutive monthly polls 
where the personal economic expectations question was asked - effectively ruled out 
an attempt to model party support through time series analysis. Since time series 
analysis invariably involves the construction of lags and leads for independent 
variables, too much data would be lost from an already small trail of data. It was 
possible however to use a temporal variable in the regression model in order to 
assess the impact of time-related phenomena upon party support. Hence time 
remains a feature of the data series by becoming an independent variable, a monthly 
variable and, in the logistic regressions, a variable constructed from the lagged level 
of party support. 
Month: divides the 19 separate months in which the personal economic expectations 
question was asked in the NOPINewsnight series of Opinion Polls. The 18 monthly 
dummies were compared to the last poll - FEBRUARY 1992 - which serves as the 
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base month against which the impact of each poll is compared, This permitted the 
testing for particular 'period' effects in the poll series upon levels of party support and 
economic attitudes. For example much will be made of the honeymoon period of John 
Major's regime after he became Prime Minister in November 1990. 
Region: divides the five geographic regions of mainland Britain into discrete regions, 
Four regional dummies, CEl T (respondents from Scotland and Wales), NORTH, 
MIDLANDS, and LONDON were compared to SOUTH the 'baseline' group. 
Constituency Type: is a measure of the functional use of space which divided the 
British electorate into three categoric groups. Two constituency type dummies, DEPLA 
(respondents from constituencies typified by industrial depression and local authority 
housing), and SERVICE (respondents from areas characterised by service sector 
employment) were set against AFFLUENT (respondents from high status 
economically prosperous areas) which serves as the default comparator category. 
Class: is the respondent's occupational class as measured by the NOPINewsnighf 
pollsters. The schema used is the ABC1 scale leaving four class dummies CLASS AB, 
CLASS C1, and CLASS C2 and a comparator category CLASS DE. 
Personal Economic Expectations: divides the three combinations of economic 
outlooks of respondents for the next twelve months. This allows two economic 
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expectation dummies OPTIMISM and NEUTRALITY to be compared to a baseline 
variable called PESSIMISM. 
Share: This is a non-dichotomous lagged measure of party support at anyone 
monthly poll in relation to its level of support in the preceding month. The value of the 
'share' variable in any given month, is the proportion of the previous month's poll level 
of support for the party. In other words, it is equivalent to the percentage of overall 
support for th~ party lagged by one month. For the estimates of Conservative reported 
vote intention, the appropriate variable is called CONSHARE, for Labour reported 
vote intention it is called LBRSHARE. 
These 'share' variables ought to pick up any 'bandwagon' or 'boomerang' effects of the 
polls themselves as voters use the poll evidence in order to instruct their voting 
behaviour. Traditionally, opinion polls have been criticised for an in-built tendency to 
be self-fulfilling; instructing electoral behaviour rather than reflecting it. This self-
fulfilment galvanises the predicted result either as electors opt to join the winning side 
or decline to vote for their preferred party since the poll show no chance of victory. 
This alone ought to make the party share variable worthy of study; the context of the 
1992 Election makes its inclusion in the model imperative. 
According to some analysts, the polls in the run up to the 1992 General Election may 
have contributed to their own inaccuracy in this way as voters perceived a clear 
prospect of a Labour victory and reacted against it. The consequent late swing to the 
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Conservatives directly from Labour and particularly from the Liberal Democrats led 
some to conclude that the polls in 1992 were in effect 'self-falsifying' (Denver, 1994; p, 
131 ), 
6,9 LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL 1: CONSERVATIVE AND LABOUR REPORTED 
VOTE INTENTION 
The linear regression models of both Conservative and Labour reported vote 
intentions from July 1990 until February 1992 are presented in Table 6,17. All 
variables were entered into the equation but only those variables that yielded results 
which were significant to the 0.1 level are presented here. 
The linear regression model specified here explained about 11 % of the total variance 
in Conservative reported vote intention during the period July 1990 - February 1992 
(see Table 6.17). The adjusted R2 may not seem particularly high but the lack of auto-
confirmatory variables in the model, such as previous vote records, attitudes to issues, 
public approval of party leaders and strength of partisanship ought to be noted. The 
desire for parsimony meant that a model had to be constructed which was logically 
straightforward, and it was particularly crucial that this model avoided the confusion 
that some studies have introduced by mixing geographic criteria with artefacts which 
ought logically to occur as a result of geographic phenomena (see for instance Rose 
and McAllister, 1990, McAllister and Studlar, 1992). 
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The amount of variance explained by the models (shown by the adjusted R2 statistic) 
is quite low for both models - but the Conservative model slightly outperforms the 
Labour counterpart. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the sample (31,000 respondents 
spread over 20 months) and the absence of auto-correlated variables such as 
previous voting behaviour or attitudes to party policy and leaderships would not give 
cause for hope the such a model would yield a high value for R2 anyway, The slightly 
better performance of the Conservative model tends to support the claim made earlier 
that the Conservatives 'owned' the economic issues during this period - and benefited 
disproportionately from the upturn in economic optimism during the run up to the 1992 
General Election. 
6.9.1 TEMPORAL EFFECTS ON REPORTED VOTE INTENTION: THE MAJOR 
HONEYMOON PERIOD 
The premier note of interest about the linear regression model for Conservative 
reported vote intention is that the poll month itself was of limited significance. By and 
large the timing of the questions had little effect on the responses of the British 
electorate (see Table 6.17). However, there is an important exception to this general 
trend of temporal insignificance. The linear regression model shows that there was a 
significant increase in Conservative support in the month in which Margaret Thatcher 
was ousted, which lasted for the first three months of the Major Premiership. Thus the 
Major honeymoon was a distinct and identifiable phenomena and was highly 
statistically significant. However, it was also short-lived; the changeover month 
coefficient (November 1990) was only significant to the. 06 level. 
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The direction of the monthly B coefficients for the demise of Thatcher and the 
succession of Major also reveals that the change in personnel had a positive influence 
of Conservative fortunes while the magnitude of the same coefficients demonstrates 
that John Major's initial popularity as Conservative leader amounted to more than the 
simple fact that he was not Mrs Thatcher since the coefficient for the first three months 
of his Premiership were all larger than the positive coefficient gained in the 
changeover month of November 1990. 
Major's, honeymoon period was significant in terms of Conservative reported vote 
intention for only three months, falling into statistical insignificance thereafter. The only 
other polls which in themselves were significant to the 0.1 level occur at the end of the 
series and have contradictory effects of similar magnitude. October 1991 (the month 
in which both Conservative and Labour Party Conferences were held, and incidentally 
when a November election was finally ruled out) proved to be a drag on Conservative 
support - when compared to February 1992 - but November 1991 saw a turnaround in 
Conservative fortunes. It ought to be noted however that not only do these coefficients 
cancel each other out, their absolute magnitude is about half the size of those for the 
Major honeymoon period of December 1990 to February 1991. The suggestion is that 
the John Major honeymoon was short-lived; he was not much of an electoral asset 
over Margaret Thatcher in the run up to the 1992 General Election. 
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The timing of the monthly polls on the pattern of support for the Labour Party differs 
from that for Conservative reported vote intention quite substantially. Primarily it can 
be seen that only two polls towards the end of the series - October and November 
1991 - were significantly different from the comparator poll month February 1992 for 
the pattern of support for both main parties. Moreover and perhaps more surprisingly 
the Major honeymoon period which increased Conservative support between 
November 1990 and February 1991 had no discernible effect on the variance in 
Labour support during this period. Although John Major may have proved an electoral 
asset for the Conservatives, he did not apparently attract substantial support away 
from Labour - he merely neutralised their electoral appeal. 
Labour did benefit in the first two monthly polls of the economic attitudes series, in 
July and August 1990, when Mrs Thatcher's personal popularity was at its nadir. This 
makes the failure of John Major's political honeymoon period all the more surprising. 
Thereafter in only three months was the level of Labour support significantly different 
from the level in February 1992. The direction and magnitude of the coefficients 
associated with these months is uneven. Labour lost support in March 1991 but had 
recovered by October of the same year; this recovery was reversed again the 
following month, Overall, then, once the Thatcher era was over, Labour support fell to 
a steady level and did not recover significantly before the election. 
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6,9.2 REGIONAL EFFECTS ON REPORTED VOTE INTENTION: 
The familiar North-South divide in voting behaviour appears to be relevant to the 
likelihood of Conservative reported vote intention throughout the poll period between 
July 1990 and February 1992. The negative B coefficient for the CEl T and NORTH 
variables reveals that Conservative reported vote intention in these groups was 
markedly less widespread than among Southern respondents. The magnitude of the 
coefficients reveals the extent of the regional antipathy to Conservative reported vote 
intention; respondents in Scotland and Wales were the most antipathetic to the 
Conservatives, but respondents in Northern England were also less likely to express 
Conservative reported vote intention than their Southern counterparts. 
Although the CEl T and NORTH regions were shown to be significantly different to 
(and much more disinclined to support the Conservatives) than the comparator 
category SOUTH, respondents from the Midlands and London did not seem to be 
significantly different to their counterparts in the South of England in their 
preponderance to express reported vote intention for the Conservatives, Thus the real 
difference in geographic voting patterns in the run up to the 1992 Election was that 
between Northern Britain and the rest of the country not between the Midlands, 
London and the South. 
Analysis of the regional variations in labour reported vote intention in Table 6.17 
reveals that while the North-South divide in Conservative voting behaviour was a fairly 
straightforward phenomenon, for labour voting it was altogether more complex, The 
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Scots and Welsh were the least likely to support the Conservatives, They were also 
more I ikely to support Labour than were Southerners, but voters in the North of 
England - where the absence of Nationalist parties meant that the anti-Conservative 
vote was split between two rather than three opposition parties - were the most likely 
to support Labour. Furthermore, although the MIDS and LOON variables appeared 
indistinguishable from the SOUTH comparator category for Conservative reported 
vote intention, respondents in the Midlands and the capital were more likely to vote 
Labour than their Southern counterparts according to the B coefficients for Labour 
reported vote intention. 
This may be a reflection of the state of political party organisation in the regions. Thus 
while the anti-Conservative vote in the North of England was likely to transfer directly 
to Labour, in Scotland and Wales it could transfer to the Nationalist parties, 
Furthermore in parts of the South of England, opposition to the Conservatives may 
have been better mobilised by the Liberal Democrats than by Labour, whereas in the 
capital and especially in the Midlands, the electoral contest was better characterised 
by an old style two party battle between the Conservatives and Labour. Hence anti-
Conservatives in the Midlands were likely to transfer their reported vote intention to 
Labour, but in the South - and to a lesser extent in Scotland - they may have gone to a 
third party, 
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6,9,3 CONSTITUENCY TYPE EFFECTS ON REPORTED VOTE INTENTION: 
The threefold constituency type schema was significantly related to the 
preponderance of individuals to express an intention to vote Conservative between 
1990 and 1992 (Table 6.17) The B coefficients were all in the expected direction. 
Respondents from depressed areas and those typified by local authority housing were 
more disinclined to support the Conservatives than their counterparts in those 
constituencies typified as affluent. Respondents from SERVICE areas were also less 
Conservative than those in the AFFLUENT comparator group but the smaller 
magnitude in this variables B coefficient reveals that their hostility to Conservative 
reported vote intention was more dilute than those respondents from the DEPLA 
areas. 
The impact of the functional use of space on Labour support was much as expected. 
Respondents from areas characterised by depression and local authority housing 
were much more likely to identify with the Labour Party than their counterparts in the 
Affluent areas of the country. Although respondents from areas characterised by 
service sector employment were slightly less likely to express a preference for the 
Conservative Party than their counterparts in the AFFLUENT constituency type, the 
SERVICE dummy variable proved insignificant for the parallel model of Labour 
reported vote intention, Again this may be due to the vagaries of party organisation; 
the Liberal Democrats being more likely to form the real opposition to the 
Conservatives in these seats than the Labour Party. Thus although apparently 
counter-intuitive, and in comparison with affluent areas, the SERVICE constituency 
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type variable was relatively poor ground for the Conservatives. However, it remained 
far from encouraging for Labour between July 1990 and February 1992. 
6.9.4 CLASS EFFECTS ON REPORTED VOTE INTENTION: 
The effect of social class on Conservatism appears to be exactly that which was 
expected prior to this analysis (Table 6.17). CLASS DE the comparator group was 
expected to be the most hostile of all sections of the electorate to Conservatism, and 
the positive 8 coefficients for the other class dummies reveal that all other social 
classes were more likely to express a reported vote intention for the Conservatives 
than the lowest social class. Furthermore the magnitude of the coefficients shows that 
the further up the social scale one looks, the more likely it is that one would encounter 
a pro-Conservative stance. The relationship between social class and Conservatism 
appears to be almost perfectly linear. 
The expected relationship between class and reported vote intention worked equally 
well for both main parties. The higher up the social scale a respondent was, the more 
likely it was that his or her reported vote intention would go to the Conservative Party. 
Conversely Labour had its heartland of support in the lowest social strata, and 
managed to perform progressively worse in the other social classes. Once again the 
linear relationship between class and vote intention is supported by the analysis of 
support for both main parties. 
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6.9,5 PERSONAL ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON 
REPORTED VOTE INTENTION: 
A primary thrust of this thesis - that economic attitudes influence voting behaviour -
appears to be supported by the linear regression model presented in Table 6.17. 
Those optimistic about their economic future were the most prone to express 
Conservative reported vote intention, but the positive and large coefficient for those 
expressing neutral views about their own economic future were also much more likely 
to express Conservative reported vote intention than their counterparts who express 
pessimism about their economic future. Presumably those with no axe to grind with 
the Government about their economic future had no reason to vote against them. 
Whether economic neutrals merely plumped for 'the devil they know' will become 
clearer when the issue of blame is considered towards the end of this chapter. 
For economic attitudes the pattern of Labour support provided the mirror image of the 
pattern of Conservative support. Economic optimists were prone to support the 
Conservatives (in relation to the comparator PESSIM group) and were also clearly 
disposed to be anti-Labour in the parallel study of Labour reported vote intention -
when compared to economic pessimists. Furthermore, those who expressed neutrality 
in their personal economic expectations were less likely to express support for the 
Labour Party than those who were pessimistic about their own personal future. This 
would tend to suggest that the Conservative ownership of the economic dimension of 
electoral politics has positive results for them not just among voters who felt things 
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would get better for them but also among those who felt their economic prospects 
would not change. 
The next phase of this thesis is to explore the extent to which economic optimism is 
regiona"y varied, and the localised impact of these variations on party support. For 
this a model was constructed which examined economic attitudes and regional 
interactions via the LOGIT regression technique. 
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Table 6.17: The Impact of Month, Region, Constituency Type, Class and Economic Attitudes 
on Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention July 1990 - February 1992 (Linear 
Regression) 
VARIABLE 
Jul'90 (vs Feb '92) 
Aua '90 (vs Feb '92) 
Sep '90 (vs Feb '92) 
Qct '90 (vs Feb '92) 
Nov '90 (vs Feb '92) 
Dec '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Jan '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Feb '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Mar '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Aor '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Mav '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Jun '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Jul '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Aua '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Seo '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Qct '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Nov '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Jan '91 (vs Feb '92) 
CEL T (vs South) 
NORTH (vs South) 
MIDS (vs South) 
LDON (vs South) 
DEPLA (vs Affluent) 
SERVICE (vs Affluent) 
CLASSAB (vs ClassDE) 
CLASSC1 (vs ClassDE) 
CLASSC2 (vs ClassDE) 
QPTIM (vs Pessim) 
NEUTRAL (vs Pessim) 
CONSTANT 
CONID 
LBRID 
.11 
.09 
CON ID 
Beta SE Sia 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
.03 .016 .055 
.08 .016 .000 
.07 .016 .000 
.09 .016 .000 
• • • 
* * • 
* * * 
* * • 
* • * 
* * * 
• * * 
-.04 .017 .020 
.03 .017 .090 
· 
* • 
-.11 .009 .000 
-.05 .008 .000 
• * * 
• * * 
-.06 .007 .000 
-.02 .007 .022 
.23 .008 .000 
.15 .007 .000 
.06 .007 .000 
.26 .007 .000 
.16 .006 .000 
.16 0.14 .000 
Adjusted Std Error 
R2 
.11 .448 
.09 .461 
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Beta 
.04 
.03 
* 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
-.04 
* 
• 
* 
* 
* 
• 
.05 
-.05 
• 
.10 
.12 
.05 
.04 
.06 
• 
-.23 
-.17 
-.06 
-.17 
-.10 
.46 
N 
30093 
30093 
LBRID 
SE 
.016 
.016 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
• 
.017 
* 
• 
• 
• 
• 
* 
.017 
.017 
• 
.009 
.009 
.009 
.009 
.007 
• 
.008 
.007 
.007 
.007 
.006 
.014 
F 
128.0 
98.3 
Sio 
.014 
.081 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
• 
.027 
* 
* 
• 
• 
* 
* 
.008 
.007 
• 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
* 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
Sig F 
.000 
.000 
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6.10 THE CASE FOR LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
Ordinary Least Squares regression has several advantages over the ANOVA 
modelling of party support. Nevertheless it in itself is far from perfect. Greene points 
out that the error terms in this type of approach are: 
heteroscedastic in a way that depends on fJ. (1993; p. 637) 
Critically, it treats the error terms for the dependent variable as normally distributed -
an assumption which cannot be sustained for a dichotomous variable such as party 
support, where possible responses can only have the values of one (party supporter) 
or zero (non-supporter). A binary response does not run from zero to infinity and 
hence OLS estimates are likely to give biased and nonsensical estimates. To this end, 
and despite its widespread use In the modelling of party support (see for instance 
Rose and McAllister 1990), it is not a wholly satisfactory method for predicting levels 
of party support. A preferable method involves logistic regression or LOG IT modelling 
which can be used for predicting values for dichotomous dependent variables. 
Moreover since this method is more robust it ought to enable the interaction effects 
between geography and economic attitudes to be modelled with greater confidence. 
Furthermore, this type of regression analysis has the distinct advantage over least 
square variants of regression since it allows for the predictive values of the B 
coefficients to be expressed in terms of log-odds ratios which seem intuitively 
preferable. In least squares linear regression modelling it is common to predict that an 
individual could have a chance of greater than 1 (or less than 0) of following a certain 
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outcome. This is clearly senseless for modelling Government support, since an 
individual cannot have a chance of voting for a party that is equal to greater than one 
or less than zero (see also Gujarati 1992). As Greene has it the failure to constrain 
~ 'X to the zero-one interval 
produces both nonsense probabilities and negative 
variances. In view of this, the linear model is becoming less 
frequently used except as a basis for comparison to some 
other more appropriate models. (1993; p. 637) 
Some authors have attempted to rescue the linear regression model, or have 
attempted to modify it, but even in studies where its shortcomings have been noted 
the resulting estimator may have no known sampling 
properties (1993; p. 637 footnote) 
From LOGIT modelling then it is possible to arrive at estimated probabilities of party 
support for individuals that are fairly robust and as Paulson states 'more sticky' than 
for least squares linear modelling (Paulson, 1994; p. 98), in that the probabilities it 
produces make more intuitive sense at the top and bottom of the scale. 
The odds-ratios produced by LOG IT modelling represents the multiplier by which the 
constant can be combined in order to produce the final impact of the variable. An 
odds-ratio of less than one means that an event is less likely to happen; a ratio of 
more than one means that the event is more likely to happen. So for example, Table 
6.18 which shows the LOG IT models for economic optimism and pessimism can be 
interpreted in the following manner. The exponents of the B coefficients (the odds 
ratio) for personal economic optimism in July 1990 was 0.74, and 1.22 for October 
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1990. This can be interpreted that in July 1990 respondents were only 0.74 times as 
likely (and therefore less likely) to be optimistic about their personal economic future 
as respondents from the comparator poll in February 1992; while in October 1990, 
respondents were 1.22 times as likely (and thus more likely) to be optimistic than 
respondents in the comparator poll. 
6,10,1 PERSONAL ECONOMIC OPTIMISM 
As the regression models of party support have shown, geographic phenomena could 
account for some variation in the levels of reported vote intention for the two main 
parties, along with class and economic attitudes, The second phase of this modelling 
ought to measure the effects of geography and class upon economic attitudes, This 
was achieved in two ways; firstly, a LOGIT regression analysis was carried out with 
economic optimism or pessimism as the dependent variable. In this way the direct 
effects of geography upon economic attitudes could be gauged. Secondly a more 
sophisticated LOGIT model was used with party support as the dependent variable 
but the interaction terms between economic attitudes, geography and class were 
included in the equation. This permitted the measurement of indirect and overlapping 
effects between the independent variables and upon the dependent variable. 
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6.11 LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 1: THE MONTHLY MODEL OF PERSONAL 
ECONOMIC OPTIMISM & PESSIMISM 
6.11.1 EFFECTS OF MONTHLY POLLS 
The LOGIT modelling of variations in the levels of optimism throughout the 
NOP/Newsnight series of opinion polls presented in Table 6.18 reveals that the 
breakthrough in Conservative fortunes achieved by the Major succession to the 
Premiership was not reflected by an upturn in economic optimism. Moreover although 
economic optimism grew in general as the poll series progressed before falling away 
again in the comparator poll of February 1992, no simple Major honeymoon period of 
the kind visible in the Ordinary Least Squares regression models of Conservative 
support was discernible in the model of economic optimism. John Major's electoral 
strategy may have been an exercise in high-risk brinkmanship, riding a tide of 
optimism and calling the Election just as the public's economic attitudes were 
beginning to deteriorate again. 
The parallel analysis of economic pessimism in Table 6.18 shows that the likelihood 
of an individual being pessimistic about his or her personal economic future declined 
as the series progressed until April 1991. Hence in July 1990 individuals were 2.24 
times more likely to be pessimistic about their economic future than those 
respondents interviewed in February 1992. This is followed be a steady pattern of 
atrophy in the odds-ratios until respondents from April 1991 were only 1.17 times 
more likely to be pessimistic than the comparator group from February 1992. It should 
of course be remembered that as the election drew near, the electorate became more 
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optimistiC - or at least less pessimistic - about their personal economic futures. The 
Conservative victory at the April Election may be strongly related to this phenomena. 
6.11.2 EFFECTS OF REGION 
The odds-ratios presented in Table 6.18 for economic optimism reveals that the 
expected relationship between regional criteria and economic attitudes was not quite 
identical to that expected. Overall the five-fold schema was statistically insignificant. 
However, unlike the ANOVA models presented earlier, the lOGIT models permitted a 
more robust interpretation of the effect of regional location upon economic optimism. 
Thus while no overall regional effect upon economic optimism could be claimed, being 
from Scotland and Wales proved a significant drag on levels of personal economic 
optimism. The odds-ratio for CEl T respondents shows that they were only 0.90 times 
as likely to express economic optimism than respondents from the comparator group 
in Southern England. Although the wider range of regional schema had no overall 
effect on levels of optimism, specific regional effects were observed through the finer 
filter provided by the lOGIT modelling. 
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Table 6.18: Half Stage Model; The Impact of Month, Region, Constituency Type and Class 
on Economic Attitudes July 1990 - February 1992 (logistic Regression) 
OPTIM 
VARIABLE B SE 
Jul '90 (vs Feb '92) -.30 .090 
Aug '90 (vs Feb '92) " " 
Sep '90 (vs Feb '92) " " 
Oct '90 (vs Feb '92) .20 .084 
Nov '90 (vs Feb '92) " " 
Dee '91 (vs Feb '92) * " 
Jan '91 (vs Feb '92) * " 
Feb '91 (vs Feb '92) " * 
Mar '91 (vs Feb '92) .18 .084 
Apr '91 (vs Feb '92) .21 .083 
May'91 (vs Feb '92) .25 .083 
Jun '91 (vs Feb '92) .22 .084 
Jul '91 (vs Feb '92) .29 .083 
Aug '91 (vs Feb '92) .18 .085 
Sep '91 (vs Feb '92) .33 .083 
Oet '91 (vs Feb '92) 1.32 .081 
Nov'91 (vs Feb '92) .31 .084 
Jan '92 (vs Feb '92) " " 
eEL T (vs South) -.11 .045 
NORTH (VS South) * " 
MIDS (vs South) * * 
lDON (vs South) " " 
DEPLA (vs Affluent) . " 
SERVICE (vs Affluent) " • 
CLASSAB (vs ClassDE) .64 .040 
CLASSC1 (vs ClassDE) .55 .036 
CLASSC2 (vs ClassDE) .26 .036 
CONSTANT -1.45 .071 
ORIG - 2 LOG NEW - 2 LOG 
OPTIM 
PESSIM 
LIKELIHOOD LIKELIHOOD 
35363.2 
37038.1 
34302.5 
36106.8 
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PESSIM 
EXP (B) B SE EXP (B) 
0.74 .81 .080 2.24 
" .55 .081 1.73 
" .63 .081 1.89 
1.22 .35 .082 1.42 
* .30 .082 1.35 
* .22 .082 1.24 
* .56 .081 1.75 
* .54 .081 1.71 
1.20 .28 .082 1.32 
1.23 .15 .083 1,17 
1.28 " " * 
1.25 " * • 
1.33 • • • 
1.20 .24 .083 1.27 
1.40 • " • 
3.72 -.51 .092 0.60 
1.37 * * " 
" .15 .085 1.16 
0.90 * " " 
" * " " 
" " " " 
" " " • 
" * • * 
" " " * 
1.90 -.74 .042 0.46 
1.73 -.50 .034 0.61 
1.29 -.21 .032 0.61 
-.78 .069 
DF SIG IMPROVEMENT DF SIG 
30095 .000 
30095 .000 
1060.7 
931.2 
27 .000 
27 .000 
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The regional disparity between the Celtic regions and the rest of mainland Britain 
discernible in the levels of economic optimism were not replicated in the analysis of 
economic pessimism, as respondents from all regions were equally likely to be 
peSSimistic about their personal economic future. 
6.11.3 EFFECTS OF CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
The analysis of the effects of the threefold constituency type schema on economic 
optimism shows that the two dummies and the comparator category were 
indistinguishable from each other; that there was no constituency type effect. 
Similarly no statistically significant coefficients or ratios were returned for the analysis 
of the effects of constituency type on levels of economic pessimism. This was 
consistent with the analysis of optimism in the parallel LOGIT model presented in 
Table 6.18. Until interaction effects are considered no claim can be made for a 
constituency type effect on economic attitudes. 
6.11.4 EFFECTS OF CLASS 
While the effects of geographic variables on economic optimism were refined by the 
regression analysis (region was important in economic attitudes - but not every region 
was different to the others) the expected relationship between social class and 
economic optimism held true (Table 6.18). The higher up the social scale a 
respondent resides, the more likely he or she was to express optimism about their 
personal economic future. Respondents from Class AB were 1.90 times more likely to 
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be optimists than their counterparts in the comparator class DE; Class C1 
respondents were 1,73 times more likely and Class C2 respondents 1.29 times more 
likely to be optimists than those from the default category Class DE. 
The relationship between class and economic pessimism matched the expected one 
of increased pessimism with a lowering of social class. The comparator class DE were 
the most pessimistic of all respondents while Class AB respondents only half as likely 
to be pessimistiC than the comparator group, The odds ratios for Class C1 and C2 
were 0.61 and 0.81 respectively, illustrating the maintenance of a basic 'linear' 
relationship between economic pessimism and social class. 
6.12 LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 2: THE BANDWAGON MODEL OF 
PERSONAL ECONOMIC OPTIMISM & PESSIMISM 
6.12.1 EFFECTS OF CONSHARE & LBRSHARE 
The share variables are non-dichotomous measures of party support in relation to the 
level of the previous month's support. Their inclusion in this model enables the 
measurement of a 'bandwagon effect'; that voters are encouraged to favour 
successful parties. The share variables could not be included in the same model as 
the monthly variables, since they effectively measure different aspects of the same 
temporal phenomena. Their coincidence would result in severe problems of multi-
collinearity. 
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The LOGIT modelling of optimism using the CONSHARE variable, shown in Table 
6,19, proved to be insignificant statistically. The level of Conservative Party support 
(and by implication the state of Labour support too) at the previous poll thus had no 
direct role in the explanation of variance in levels of economic optimism. 
CONSHARE achieved significance in the model of pessimism, but its overall effect 
was small. The odds ratio of 1.01 translated as virtual equity with the electorate as a 
whole; the chances of predicting an individual's reported vote intention from the level 
of party support in the previous month was no more than 'evens'. 
6.12.2 EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHY 
Once again the regional analysis of variations in economic optimism shows that 
respondents from the Celtic regions were 0.90 times as likely (and hence 1.11 times 
less likely) to express optimism than the default regional variable - Southerners, For 
both optimism and pessimism, the constituency type schema failed to provide an 
insight into the variation of economic attitudes, while the relationship between class 
and optimism and pessimism was that which was expected, the higher social classes 
espousing optimism and eschewing pessimism, the lower classes favouring relative 
pessimism and being relatively disinclined to express optimism about their personal 
economic future. 
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Table 6.19: Half Stage Model; The Impact of Previous Poll Ratings, Region, Constituency 
Type and Class on Economic Attitudes July 1990 - February 1992 (logistic Regression) 
OPTIM PESSIM 
VARIABLE B SE EXP (B) B SE EXP (B) 
CONS HARE * * * .01 .005 1.01 
CEl T (vs South) -.10 .045 0.90 * * * 
NORTH (vs South) * * * * * * 
MIOS (vs South) * * * * * * 
LOON (vs South) * * * * * * 
OEPLA (vs Affluent) * * * * * * 
SERVICE (vs Affluent) * * * * * * 
CLASSAB (vs ClassDE) .59 .041 1.80 -.71 .043 0.49 
CLASSC1 (vs ClassDE) .52 .036 1.68 -.48 .035 0.62 
ClASSC2 (vs ClassDE) .22 .036 1.25 -.20 .033 0.82 
CONSTANT -1.09 .167 -.95 .163 
ORIG - 2 LOG NEW - 2 LOG DF SIG IMPROVEMENT OF 
LIKELIHOOD LIKELIHOOD 
OPTIM 33774.3 33432.2 28545 .000 342.1 10 
PESSIM 34778.9 34392.1 28545 .000 386.8 10 
6.13 LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 3: THE MONTHLY MODEL 
CONSERVATIVE & LABOUR REPORTED VOTE INTENTION 
6.13.1 MONTH 
SIG 
.000 
.000 
OF 
After considering the effects of geography and class upon economic attitudes using 
monthly poll data (the half stage model), the next step is to consider the role of 
geography, class and economic attitudes upon partisanship. The results of the LOGIT 
modelling of Conservative support by month during the period July 1990 - February 
1992, presented in Table 6.20, confirm the picture painted by the Ordinary Least 
Squares regression model of the Major honeymoon period in Conservative electoral 
fortunes. Conservative support was first swelled by Mrs. Thatcher's departure and 
was built on by the new regime as the Major Premiership was positively associated 
326 
('hop/er 6: He-jlor/ed ,'o/l' /11/('11/1011. (·Iass. (ieograplty and Fcollolllic Op/ill/islI/ in the /990s 
with levels of Conservative reported vote intention for the next three months. The 
Major honeymoon period, however, was a transient feature of British electoral politics, 
decaying after only three months. Nevertheless it should be remembered that 
throughout the run-up to the 1992 Election, support for the Major-led Conservatives 
was always higher than during the nadir of Conservative support under Mrs. Thatcher, 
and that the change of personnel in Downing Street may have been vital to electoral 
fortunes of the Conservative Party. 
Conservative support during the four months between November 1990 and February 
1992 was significantly different from the level of Conservative support in February 
1992. Thereafter only two other polls (October and November 1991) were 
substantially different from the comparator poll in February 1992 and their effects 
were contradictory. 
The parallel model of Labour reported vote intention presented in Table 6.20 also 
supports the findings of the Ordinary Least Squares regression model that suggested 
that although the Major succession had helped to revive the electoral fortunes of the 
Conservatives, it did not have the reverse effect of dampening Labour support 
significantly. At best, Major's leadership helped to neutralise Labour's electoral base. 
Indeed the only trend in the monthly dummies appears to be the benefit Labour 
accrued at the beginning of the series in July and August 1990 which coincided with 
the height of Mrs Thatcher's unpopularity, when respondents were 1.21 and 1.14 
times more likely to express an intention to vote Labour than in February 1992. The 
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rest of the monthly dummies which achieve statistical significance to the 0.1 level 
were sporadic in their incidence and have contradictory effects - two acted as relative 
drags on labour support, one boosted the relative labour advantage. 
6.13.2 REGION 
The lOGIT modelling of Conservative support presented in Table 6.20, again 
supported the classic North-South divide in British voting behaviour. Other things 
being equal, respondents from the Celtic regions and from the North of England were 
less likely to express support for the Conservatives than the comparator category 
which covers respondents in the South of England. The odds-ratios of 0.57 and 0.80 
for the CEl T and NORTH dichotomous variables illustrate the extent to which the 
propensity to support the Conservatives is hampered by living in Scotland or Wales 
and the North. The failure of the MIOS and lOON dummy variables to produce 
statistically significant coefficients or odds ratios showed that for the purposes of 
recruiting potential Conservative voters, the Midlands and the capital were just as 
fertile for the governing Party as the default SOUTH category. 
Variations in labour reported vote intention could be explained to a considerable 
degree by regional differences. Not only was the classical North-South divide in 
evidence, with the North being relatively more predisposed to labour than Scotland 
and Wales, the Midlands and London also represented more fertile territory for labour 
than the South of England. 
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The differences in the odds-ratios for the four regional dummies confirmed many of 
the findings of other studies into modern British voting behaviour. Respondents from 
the North of England were - ceteris paribus -1.86 times more likely to express a 
reported vote intention for Labour than their counterparts in the South of England. At 
the same time, Scots and Welsh were 1.55 times more likely, Midlanders 1.27 times 
more likely and Londoners 1.21 times more likely to express a preference for Labour 
than respondents from the comparator group in the South of England taking all the 
other effects in the model into account. 
It is interesting to note that the pattern of Conservative support meant that the 
Midlands and London were no different from the South, while they both provided 
Labour with a relative advantage over the South of England. This may well reflect the 
differences in the state of the anti-Conservative vote in different parts of the country. 
With the Liberal Democrats providing the effective opposition to the Conservatives in 
parts of the South, but remaining firmly in third place in much of the Midlands, the 
nuances of the anti-Conservative vote in the run-up to the 1992 election were not 
altogether surprising. 
6.13.3 CONSTITUENCY TYPE 
Constituencies characterised by industrial depression and local authority housing 
proved to be difficult recruiting territory for the Conservatives throughout the period 
July 1990 - February 1992. Table 6.20 showed that respondents from depressed 
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areas were only 0.84 times as likely as respondents from affluent areas to express an 
intention to vote Conservative. 
Meanwhile if it can be seen that DEPLA constituencies were relatively disinclined to 
support the Conservatives, those in SERVICE areas were no different from 
AFFLUENT areas in their propensity to support the Conservatives. The parallel model 
of Labour reported vote intention showed that the type of constituency in which a 
respondent resided did affect his or her likelihood to support the Labour Party. 
Constituencies characterised by industrial depression and council housing provision 
were relative hotbeds of Labour support; individuals from these constituencies were 
1.21 times more likely to support Labour than those from AFFLUENT constituencies, 
At the same time, those in SERVICE areas appeared no different from AFFLUENT 
areas in their propensity to express an intention to vote Labour. 
6.13.4 CLASS 
The expected relationship between class and Conservative Party voting - that the 
Conservatives pull support disproportionately from the highest social classes - proved 
to be a reasonable explanation of the variation in levels of Conservative reported vote 
intention. The comparator class, Class DE appeared to be the most hostile of all 
social classes to Conservative support, while respondents from classes C2, C1 and 
AB were 1.30 times, 2.10 times and 3.37 times more likely to express an intention to 
vote for the Conservatives than respondents from Class DE. 
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Conversely Labour fared best among voters from the lower social classes and worst in 
the higher social strata. Thus the comparator category - Class DE were the most 
prone of all social classes to support Labour, while those from classes C2 were only 
0.84 times as likely to support Labour. Individuals from Class C1 were just over half as 
likely to support Labour and Class AB respondents only 0.38 times as likely to 
express a reported vote intention for Labour - other things being equal - as individuals 
from Class DE. 
6.13.5 ECONOMIC ATTITUDES 
One of the major themes of this thesis - that economic attitudes have a clear effect on 
levels of party support - was supported by this regression analysis (Table 6.20). Put 
simply, economic optimists were - after considering the effects of the other variables in 
the model - more prone to express an affinity to Conservative reported vote intention 
than those who feel pessimistic about their personal economic futures. The odds ratio 
presented in Table 6.20 reveals that they were in fact 4.26 times more likely to support 
the Conservatives than pessimists ceteris paribus. The fact that this was the largest 
single odds-ratio in the model revealed the comprehensive explanatory power of 
personal economic expectations for the level of Conservative support. 
Those expressing neutral forecasts about their economic circumstances were also 
relatively likely to favour Conservative reported vote intention when compared to 
economic pessimists. The odds ratios revealed that neutrals were nearly two and a 
half times more likely to favour the Conservatives than personal economic pessimists. 
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The original thrust behind much of this research was that those who felt well disposed 
towards their own economic fortunes were likely to reward the Government at election 
times. By implication, opposition parties needed to capitalise on hostility to personal 
economic fortunes among the electorate. In short while the Government could claim 
the votes of those who 'felt good' about their economic conditions, those who did not 
would form part of the Opposition's natural electoral community. 
The LOGIT model of Labour support revealed this to be the case; those who felt 
optimistic about their economic future were less than half as likely to support Labour 
than those who felt pessimistic (Table 6.20). Those who expressed neutrality in their 
economic future were also less prone to Labour support than those who felt their 
economic position would worsen over the coming year. 
6.13.6 INTERACTIONS 
The ANOVA modelling showed that geographic variation as a whole was of limited 
use in explaining variation in the levels of optimism and ultimately reported vote 
intention. On a few occasions however, it did provide evidence of significant 
interaction terms between independent variables. In order to explore these 
interactions it was helpful to turn to regression analysis. 
Indeed, for the subject matter of the thesis, the most interesting aspects of the LOGIT 
modelling of Conservative and Labour support in Table 6.20 were the interaction 
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effects between geography and economic attitudes. In effect they provide evidence for 
an autonomous geographic cleavage in the reported vote intentions of the British 
electorate. 
While there were no significant interaction effects for the regional schema and 
economic attitudes in the model of Conservative reported vote intention, there was a 
significant interaction term between constituency type and economic optimism (see 
Table 6.20). These interactions are the crux of this chapter - and indeed this thesis -
because they illustrate how the geographic context in which economic attitudes are 
formed can remain important despite the necessary restructuring of the original model. 
They show how geography can act as the filter through which economic attitudes are 
viewed, diluting or exacerbating the trends in reported vote intention associated with 
views about the economy. The importance of these interactions terms requires a full 
explanation of how they may be interpreted. 
Each interaction effect has an independent B coefficient and associated log odds-
ratio, Where these effects are statistically significant to the 0.1 level, they are reported 
in Table 6.20. However, it is important to acknowledge that these independent effects 
are additive, and must be integrated into the main effects of the model. This 
integration gives three comparator combinations against which to judge the effect of 
the interaction. 
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Table 6,20: The Impact of Month, Region, Constituency Type, Class and Economic Attitudes (with 
Interaction Effects) on Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention July 1990 - February 1992 
Logistic Regression) 
Jul '90 (VS Feb '92) 
Aug '90 (VS Feb '92) 
--Sep '90 (vs Feb '9LI 
Oct '90 (VS Feb '92) 
Nov '90 (VS Feb '9L) 
Oee '91 (VS I'eb 'l:IL) 
Jan '91 (VS Feb '92) 
. Feb '91 (VS feb '9:.!) 
Mar '91 (VS Feb '92) 
Apr '91 (VS ;-eb '92) 
May'91 (VS Feb '92) 
-Jun '91 (vs Feb '9:.!) 
Jul '91 (VS I'eb '92) 
Aug '91 (vs Feb '92) 
Sep'l:Il (vs Feb '9L) 
Oct '91 (VS Feb '92) 
Nov'91 (VS t-eO '92) 
-Jan '92 (VS Feb '9L) 
CEl. T (VS south) 
NOR I H (vs South) 
-M/DS (VS soum) 
LOON (VS soutn) 
OEPLA (VS Affluen!) 
-seRVICE (VS Affluent) 
Cl.ASSAB (vs ClaSSUc) 
--CLASSC 1 (VS (';lassDE) 
. CLASSC2 (VS ClassDE) 
OPTlM (VS Pesslm) 
NEU I ~AL (vs pesslm) 
Interactions 
--eEL 1 BY UI-' IIM 
NVf'(IM BY OP1 
1\II10S BY 01-' riM 
-LOON BY UI-' riM 
OEPLA BY ot> riM 
SERVICE BY OPTIM 
CLASSAB BY OPTIM 
CLASSC1 BY OPTIM 
CLA'SSC2 BY OP IIM 
"'CEL T BY NEU fRAL 
NUt'( I H BY NEUTRAL 
MIOS BY Nt:':UTRAL 
LOON BY NEUTRAL 
DEPLA BY NEUTRAL 
"'SERVICE BY NEUTRAL 
"CLASSAB BY NEUTRAL 
"'CLASSC1 BY NEUTRAL 
CLASSl,;:.! BY Nt:':UTRAL 
"CONSTANT 
CONID 
LBRID 
I - 2 L L 
387771 
395877 
CONID 
B SE 
· 
.16 
.Jl:I 
.36 
.4:.! 
· 
· 
- 19 
.10 
-.57 
-.22 
-.1B 
1.u 
.14 
.26 
1.40 
.B9 
· 
-,[L 
-.21 
-.24 
· 
· 
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To show how interaction terms are interpreted, an interaction from Table 6.20 will be 
analysed in detail. Economic Optimists were much more likely to express 
Conservative support than those who were pessimistic about their personal economic 
future. The B coefficient for the OPTIM group of respondents was 1.45, the associated 
odds-ratio 4.26; hence those who were optimistic about their personal economic 
future were 4.26 times more likely to express Government support than those who felt 
pessimistic about their personal economic prospects. On the other hand, those 
respondents who resided in depressed areas with high intensity local authority 
housing were relatively disinclined to support the Conservative Government. The B 
coefficient for the DEPLA group was -.18, the associated odds-ratio 0.84; that is the 
DEPLA group of respondents were only 0.84 times as likely (and therefore less likely) 
to support the Conservative Government than respondents from AFFLUENT areas of 
Britain. The interaction effect for the combination of economic optimism and residence 
in depressed constituencies had an independent effect upon the dynamic of party 
support, - illustrated by a coefficient of -0.22. These statistics can be interpreted in the 
following manner. 
The analysis of the interaction effect of economic optimism and residence in a 
depressed constituency provided three comparator groups - peSSimists living in 
affluent regions, optimists living in affluent regions, and pessimists living in depressed 
areas. These coefficients provided the following matrix and the addition of these 
coefficients provided a new set of coefficients with associated odds-ratios:-
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. f E Table 6.21: Interaction Matnx or '0 conomlc )ptimlsts L' . IVInQ in Depressed Areas: 
Economic Pessimism Economic Optimism 
Affluent Areas 0 1.45 
Depressed Areas -.18 -.22 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative B Exp. (B) 
Pessimists in Affluent Areas -0.22 +1.45 -0.18 1.05 2.86 
Optimists in Affluent Areas -0.22 -0.18 +0 -0.4 0.67 
Pessimists in Depressed areas -0.22 +1.45 +0 1.23 3.42 
The addition of the coefficients provided the following comparisons. Economic 
optimists in depressed areas were 2.86 times more likely to express Conservative 
support than pessimists in affluent areas (the addition of the coefficients [-.22 + -.18 + 
1.45 = 1] has an associated odds-ratio of 2.86); they were less likely (0.67 times more 
likely) to support the Government than optimists in affluent areas (-.22 + -.18 = -0.40 
[Exp. = 0.67]); and they were 3.42 times more likely to express Conservative support 
than peSSimists in depressed areas (-.22 + 1.45 = 1.23 [Exp. = 3.42]). 
Meanwhile optimists in constituencies characterised by service employment were 3.46 
times more likely to support the Conservative Government than pessimists from 
affluent areas, and pessimists from service areas but were only 0.81 times as likely to 
support the Conservatives as optimists from affluent areas. If the interaction between 
optimism and service areas had been insignificant, these ratios would have been 4.26 
and 1 respectively. 
A similar interaction effect occurred with the coincidence of economic optimism and 
residence in an area typified by SERVICE sector employment. From Table 6.20 the 
following matrix of Conservative reported vote intention was constructed:-
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Table 6.22: nteraction Matrix or conomlc Jptimists Living in Service Areas: f E . 0 
Economic Pessimism Economic Ootimism 
Affluent Areas 0 1.45 
Service Areas 0 -.21 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative 8 Exp. (8) 
Pessimists in Affluent Areas 1.45 -.21 +0 1.24 3.46 
Optimists in Affluent Areas -,21 +0 + 0 -.21 0.81 
Pessimists in Service Areas 1.45 -.21 +0 1.24 3.46 
As a result of the interaction between economic optimism and residence in an areas 
typified by service sector employment, respondents were 3.46 times more likely to 
support the Government than pessimists in either AFFLUENT or SERVICE areas, but 
were less likely (0.81 times as likely) Conservatives than optimists in AFFLUENT 
regions. The geographic interactions in the Conservative model have begun to 
illustrate that when economic attitudes contradicted the general outlook of the 
surrounding area, the effect of the local environment tended to dilute personal 
economic attitudes. The economic optimism of these respondents should have made 
them pro-Government, but the over-riding local context tempered their Conservatism. 
While there were no significant interaction effects for the constituency type schema 
and economic attitudes in the LOGIT model of Labour reported vote intention, there 
was a significant interaction term between aspects of region and economic optimism. 
The following interaction matrix was constructed:-
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T bl 623 I a e : nteractlon M . f E atnx or . 0 .. L" . C I' conomlc }ptlmlsts IVlng In e tiC Regions: 
Economic Pessimism Economic Optimism 
Southern Region 0 
-.78 
Celtic Regions .44 
.23 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative B Exp. (B) 
Pessimists in Southem Region -.78 +.23 +.44 -0.11 0.90 
Optimists in Southern Region .23 +.44 +0 0.67 1.95 
Pessimists in Celtic Regions .23 -.78 +0 -0.55 0.18 
Economic optimists who lived in the Celtic regions of Scotland and Wales were 0.90 
times as likely to report an intention to vote Labour as Southern pessimists (+,23 +.44 
-.78 :: -0.11 [Exp 0.58]). In other words, the Celtic identity of these Labour supporters 
was almost as important as their personal economic outlook. This provides evidence 
for the existence of an autonomous regional cleavage, as individuals who felt 
optimistic about their personal economic circumstances but which lived in Scotland 
and Wales were nearly as inclined - ceteris paribus - to support Labour than those 
economic pessimists living in the South. Incidentally, they were also 1,95 times more 
likely to support Labour than Southern optimists (+.23 +.44 +0 :: 0.67 [Exp :: 1.95]), 
but only 0.58 as likely to support the Labour Party than Celtic pessimists (1.23 -.78 +0 
= 0,55 [Exp :: 0.90]). Once more it seems that whenever personal circumstances and 
spatial location provided voters with contradictory cues for reported vote intention, the 
geographic criteria took precedence. 
To reiterate this important point, a more detailed look at Table 6.20 would prove 
beneficial. If no interaction terms were significant, the effects of coincidental 
independent variables could be estimated by adding their respective B coefficients. 
Hence, an individual from the CELT region has a B coefficient of .44, and thus as the 
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odds ratio shows was - other things being equal - 1.55 times more likely to express 
support for labour than a Southern respondent. At the same time an economic neutral 
- who had a coefficient of -.36 - was only 0.70 times as likely to support labour as an 
economic pessimiSt. The absence of significant interaction terms allowed the Simple 
addition of coefficients to predict the likelihood of labour support among Celts who 
also happened to be neutral about their personal economic future. By combining 
these coefficients it could be ascertained that Celtic Neutrals had an associated B 
coefficient of (.44 -.36 = 0.8). The odds - ratio derived from this coefficient shows that 
Celtic Neutrals would be only 2.23 times as likely to support labour than their 
Southern Pessimist counterparts, whereas it is clear from the interaction of CEl T and 
OPTIM, that optimists who resided in Scotland and Wales were almost as likely (0.94 
times as likely) to support labour as pessimists from the South. The dynamics of the 
relationship between Celtic residence and personal economic attitudes were altered 
by the interaction terms. In short, residence in Scotland and Wales was an advantage 
for labour in the construction of - and to some extent regardless of - personal 
economic attitudes. 
Despite the apparent primacy of economic attitudes over geographic criteria which the 
ANOVA models hinted at, the interaction terms gained from LOGIT modelling 
revealed that being optimistic about one's personal economic future was watered 
down for Scottish and Welsh electors in favour of the local context in which their 
optimism was formed. The coincidence of two features which had opposite effects on 
the likelihood of Labour support in fact increased the relative chances that individuals 
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would express an intention to vote Labour; the regional criteria fought against the 
natural instinct otherwise associated with economic optimism. 
6.14 LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 4: THE BANDWAGON MODEL OF 
CONSERVATIVE & LABOUR REPORTED VOTE INTENTION 
The LOGIT analysis of Conservative support presented in Table 6.24 replicated the 
model presented above but replaced the monthly dummies with the CONSHARE 
variable which attempted to model levels of Conservative support by using the 
previous month's level of support, As such it aimed to pick up any 'bandwagon' or - as 
Denver has it - 'self-falsifying' effects in the Opinion polls during the long campaign 
between July 1990 and February 1992, 
The effect of CONSHARE upon current rates of Conservative reported vote intention 
was positive but the odds ratio produced is near to equity. The parallel analysis of 
LBRSHARE yields very similar results; the previous poll's record of Labour support is 
positively associated with the current level of reported vote intention for Labour, but 
the magnitude of this association was small, suggesting that any poll effect was 
positive (a bandwagon effect) but slight. 
The impact of geographic, class and economic attitude variables upon levels of 
Conservative and Labour support reproduced the results of the analysis which 
includes the monthly dummies. Geography explained some variation at the margins, 
while class and economic outlooks had a strong correlation with partisanship. The 
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interaction effects uncovered by the LOGIT models again showed how geography 
strengthened or diluted economic forecasts - and pointed to the existence of an 
autonomous geographic cleavage in reported vote intention (see Table 6.24). 
Table 6.24: The Impact of Previous Poll Ratings, Region, Constituency Type, Class and 
Economic Attitudes (with Interaction Effects) on Conservative and labour Reported Vote 
Intention July 1990 - February 1992 (logistiC Regression) 
VARIABLE 
CONtlBR SHARE 
CEl T (vs South) 
NORTH (vs South) 
MIOS (vs South) 
lOON (vs South) 
OEPlA (vs Affluent) 
SERVICE (vs Affluent) 
CLASSAB (vs ClassOE) 
CLASSC1 (vs ClassDE) 
CLASSC2 (vs ClassDE) 
OPTIM (vs Pessim) 
NEUTRAL (vs Pessim) 
Interactions 
CEl T BY OPTIM 
NORTH BY OPTIM 
MIOS BY OPTIM 
lOON BY OPTIM 
OEPLA BY OPTIM 
SERVICE BY OPTIM 
CLASSAB BY OPTIM 
CLASSC1 BY OPTIM 
CLASSC2 BY OPTIM 
CEl T BY NEUTRAL 
NORTH BY NEUTRAL 
MIOS BY NEUTRAL 
lOON BY NEUTRAL 
DEPLA BY NEUTRAL 
SERVICE BY NEUTRAL 
CLASSAB BY NEUTRAL 
CLASSC1 BY NEUTRAL 
CLASSC2 BY NEUTRAL 
CONSTANT 
CONIO 
LBRIO 
ORIG - 2 L-L 
36811.4 
37428.0 
CONIO 
B SE 
.02 .005 
-.57 .095 
-.23 .085 
.. .. 
.. .. 
-.16 .074 
.. .. 
1.22 .081 
.76 .071 
.26 .070 
1.38 .093 
.86 .088 
.. 
* 
* 
.. 
• * 
.. .. 
-.22 . 098 
-.19 .096 
-.22 .108 
· 
• 
· 
.. 
* * 
.. .. 
.. 
* 
.. 
* 
.. 
* 
.. 
* 
.. 
* 
.. 
* 
.. • 
-2.48 .177 
NEW - 2 L-L 
33648.2 
34928.6 
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1.02 
0.57 
0.79 
.. 
.. 
0.85 
.. 
3.39 
2.14 
1.30 
3.97 
2.36 
• 
• 
.. 
.. 
0.80 
0.83 
0.80 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
* 
.. 
.. 
* 
.. 
SIG 
.000 
.000 
LBRIO 
B SE EXP (B) 
.01 .005 1.01 
.45 .072 1.56 
.63 .069 1.88 
.22 .072 1.25 
.14 .074 1.15 
.17 .058 1.19 
.. .. 
* 
-.98 .076 0.38 
-.64 .058 0.53 
-.19 .052 0.83 
-.75 .090 0.47 
-.33 .077 0.72 
.24 .114 1.27 
* 
.. 
* 
* 
.. 
* 
.. .. 
* 
.16 .090 1.17 
.. 
* 
.. 
-.23 .114 0.80 
-.25 .091 0.78 
-.18 .085 0.84 
.. .. .. 
* 
.. 
* 
.. 
* * 
* * * 
.14 .081 1.15 
* * * 
-.25 .102 0.78 
-.17 .080 0.68 
-.13 .073 0.88 
-.57 .198 
IMPROVEMENT OF 
3163.2 
2499.5 
SIG 
.000 
.000 
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6.15 ECONOMIC APPROVAL FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S RECORD AND BLAME 
FOR THE RECESSION 
So far this chapter has illustrated how the relationship between economic attitudes 
and reported vote intention was tempered via geographic considerations. Thus the 
natural inclination of economic optimists to favour the Government was tempered if 
they happened to reside in Scotland or Wales. What is not clear, however, is why the 
context in which these attitudes were formed differed from place to place. The 
previous chapter provided a few clues to this research dilemma. The remaining aim of 
this chapter is to refine the model to incorporate the spatial variation in the extent of 
approval for the Government's economic record and the extent to which the 
Government was blamed for the recession of the early 1990s. 
A close relationship between spatial location and attitudes to the economic reality 
facing Britain in the early 1990s emerged in this analysis. The most central point here 
is that there was no 'British' economic reality - the economic reality in each locality 
was different. Two particular questions were used to highlight the dynamics of 
spatially varied party support in the run-up to the April 1992 Election. The first asked 
the state of sociotropic approval for the Government's economic pOlicies, and the 
second ascertained the extent to which the Government or world conditions were 
blamed for Britain's economic position. The first question was posed three times 
during the series of NOPINewsnight polls - and the resultant data was the combination 
of those three polls. The second question was asked only in the last poll in the series -
February 1992 - (when the approval question was absent). The analysis of these 
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questions provides evidence for the suggestion that sociotropic approval of the 
Government's economic policies was highly variable according to geography, Where 
people lived provided them with a formula for approval or disapproval for the 
Government's economic record and if approval was forthcoming, its electoral effect 
could be nullified by the geographic context. 
This section also provides evidence to suggest that the ascription of blame for the 
recession was spatially variable in a similar manner, Furthermore, even those 
respondents who felt that the Government was 'blameless' in causing the recession in 
Britain were less likely to support the Government at the polls if they lived in the 
Labour heartlands of the Scotland and Wales or the North. 
This section analyses these questions, again focusing on LOGIT regression analysis 
and the significant interactions therein, Evidence is provided to show that when 
individuals receive contradictory information about how to vote from their geographic 
location and their economic outlook, the geographic dimension often takes 
precedence. Voters who approved of the Government's economic policies and those 
who do not blame the Government for the recession, but who lived in the North of 
Britain or in depressed areas, were discouraged to express support for the 
Conservative Government in spite of their notional 'economic interests', 
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6.15.1 DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC APPROVAL QUESTION 
The pooled data from the three polls in the NOPINewsnight series where respondents 
were asked to express their retrospective approval for the Government's economic 
record are presented later in this analysis (Table 6.31). Approval or disapproval could 
occur across two dimensions - the egocentric and the sociotropic. Egocentric approval 
results from a respondent thinking that the Government's economic record was good 
for them and their family; sociotropic approval results from a respondent thinking that 
the Government's economic record was good for the country as a whole. 
The measures of egocentric or sociotropic approval are distinct from the egocentric 
and sociotropic variables used elsewhere in this thesis, which measure prospective 
expectations on economic grounds - things would get better or worse for them or for 
the country as a whole over the course of the next twelve months. Although these 
measures are not identical, respondents tended to think that Governments which are 
good for themselves were also good for the country as a whole. 
A logistic regression using the sociotropic and egocentric economic approval 
variables, dichotomous dummy independent variables was constructed. First the 
original variable was collapsed into three groups (combining those who definitely 
agreed and those who tended to agree with the statement that the Government's 
economic policy was good for them or for the country as a whole, and those who 
definitely disagreed and those who tended to disagree). Thus, three dichotomous 
variables were constructed for each dimension of economic approval: EGOGD, which 
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represented all those respondents 'Alho felt that the Government's economic policy 
was good for them and their family; EGOBD - respondents 'Alho felt the Government's 
economic policy was bad for them and their family; and EGONEUT - 'Alhich denoted a 
neutral response. These variables 'Here coded one for those 'Alho fitted the category, 
and zero for the others. The sociotropic approval of the Government's economic 
record had three similar dichotomous variables, SOCIOGD, SOCIOBD and 
SOCIONEUT. For both approval dimensions, the comparator variable comprised 
those 'Alho felt the Government's economic policy was a source of disapproval. All 
respondents 'Here represented by one positive score and two zero scores in these 
families of variables. 
16.15.2 MODEL BUILDING STRATEGY 
T'MJ sets of analyses 'Here undertaken. The first tracked all the main effects and 
seventy-five interaction effects (the vast majority of 'Alhich were inSignificant). This led 
to a great deal of 'noise' in the model as the interaction terms swamped the main 
effects. To construct a more parsimonious model a second analysis was carried out. 
This second method contained only those interactions that the fuller model had 
suggested were statistically significant to the 0.1 level. The tables presented here are 
derived from the second set of data analyses. 
Once again the logistic regression analyses for Conservative and Labour reported 
vote intention display the B coefficients, standard errors, and the associated odds-
ratio. The latter 'Alhich allow a more rational interpretation of the effect of variables 
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upon the dependent variable than the B coefficient. A blank cell denotes that an item 
was omitted from the analysis - an interaction that was significant for Conservative 
reported vote intention in the fuller model may not have been significant in the parallel 
Labour analysis and would thus have been left out of the more parsimonious Labour 
model. An asterisk denotes that a variable or interaction betvveen variables failed to 
reach the accepted level of statistical significance at the 0.1 level in the parsimonious 
model. 
16.15.3 MAIN EFFECTS 
The LOGIT model (Table 6.25) included the independent variables encountered in the 
preceding LOGIT models for region, constituency type, class and personal economic 
expectations, plus the new independent variables for sociotropic and egocentric 
approval for the Government's economic record. The dependent variables were the 
familiar dichotomised versions of Conservative and Labour reported vote intention. 
The main effects of the LOGIT modelling of economic approval and reported vote 
intention repeated many of the results of the earlier models for reported vote intention 
and economic attitudes. Regional criteria, constituency type, class and personal 
economic expectations all produced similar pockets of Government and OppOSition 
support identified in the preceding analysis. For this reason, discussion will centre on 
the new dimension of this analysis - the introduction of economic approval as an 
independent variable - and the interactions between independent variables in the 
model. 
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Table 6.25: The Impact of Region, Constituency Type, Class, Personal Economic 
Expectations and Sociotropic and Egocentric Economic Approval of the Government's 
Policies (with Interaction Effects) on Conservative and Labour Reported Vote Intention, July 
1990 - February 1992. (Logistic Regression) 
CONID LBRID 
VARIABLE 8 SE EXP (8) 8 SE EXP (B) 
GEL T (VS :soum) -0.04 143 0.58 v LJ .1 ~!:! 1.26 
NOt-< I H (VS ~outh) · · 0.01 .126 1 .ti f 
MIU:S (VS :south) · · O.:.l:.l .122 1.24 
lUUN (VS ~outh) · · UAf .1JU 1.63 
Ut:t-'LA (vs Affluent) -v.27 126 0.76 V.Jo .U!:!f lA2 
:st:t<vIGE (VS ATTluent) . · · . . 
ISS, IH (VS I,.;laSS DE) U.!:!!:! .L'-1 '-. tits -U. ts1 .129 V.40 
ISS :1 (VS class UI::.) 0.58 .113 1.78 -0.41 .11J U.66 
__ ISS( 2 (VS Class UI::.) 0.45 .110 1.51 -0.18 .093 V.ts4 
OPTIM (VS r'esslm) U.O!:l 111 1,{!:l . 
NEU I t-<Al (VS r'eSSlm) UA!:> U!:!O 1.!:> f . 
SOCIO<3U (VS Soclobad) 1.!:!L' 1:20 o ts1 -V. ts f .100 OA2 
SOCNI::.U I (vs Soclobad) 0.92 134 2.50 -064 104 U.5J 
-EGOGD (vs (I::.gobad) 1 9U 122 oJU 
t::<3UNt:U I (VS t::gobad) 103 .140 2.80 -0.61 .144 U.54 
Interactions 
._ I:SY EGOGD -V.tlo .289 OA2 
I:S Y E:<30NI::.U I -0.94 .~97 0.39 
CL. l~ BY :SUCIU<3U U.of .~!:lf 1. !:!o 
CLAtiSAI:S I:SY ::;uCNEU I u.ro .J14 L.V1 
CLA:S::;C1 BY 1::.<30<3U -U.9J 276 U.4U 
Cl ASS( 2 BY I::.<3U<3U -U. ts!:! .:.lo!:l OAl 
SOCIO<3U I::lY t:<3UljU -V!:!!:I .Lf4 UJf 
SOGNEU I I::lY I::.GUGU -076 .JoJ UAf 
GEL 1 I:SY I::.GONEUT 0.40 .L4V 1.!:>U 
CLASSC1 I::lY I::.GONEU I -0.66 .LJts U.5:.l 
Cl ASSAH I::lY SOCIOGU -1.24 .J4ti U.L!:! 
OP11M I::lY SOCIOGU -0.59 .L05 U.55 
NEUTKAl I::lY :SUCIUljU -0.63 .:.l10 U.5;.1 
NUt< I M BY :SUCNt::UT -V.Jo . :.l11 U.rU 
ut-' IIM BY SUCNI::.U I -UA!:! .:.lo!:! U.61 
NI::.U I t-<AL BY SUCNI::.U I -U.OU .199 U.6U 
CUN:siANT -;.1. UO .140 UAL .1U!:l 
ORIG - 2 LOG NEW - 2 LOG DF SIG IMPROVEMENT DF SIG 
CONID 
LBRID 
LIKELIHOOD LIKELIHOOD 
5926.2 
5727.2 
3838.6 
4784.6 
347 
15 .000 
15 .000 
2087.6 
942.6 
5 .004 
13 .000 
Chapter 6: Reported Vote Intention, Class, Geography and Economic Optimism in the 1990s 
16.15.3.1 SOCIOTROPISM 
The new dimension that this analysis of the economic approval dataset allows is the 
study of approval for the Govemment's economic record in both sociotropic and 
egocentric terms. Indeed in the model of Conservative and Labour reported vote 
intention, the Govemment approval ratings proved to be the largest of a" the main 
effects. 
The effects of sociotropic approval of the Govemment's economic policies were large 
- witness the size of the exponents and the extent of the B coefficients (which 
represent the slope of the gradient) in the regression model (Table 6.25). The most 
obvious feature of the introduction of economic approval variables to the regression 
model is the amount of explanatory force the disaggregations within this schema 
appear to have. The B coefficients and associated exponents outperform the 
covariables in the model. Therefore, those respondents wtlo felt that the 
Govemment's economic policy was good for the country as a wtlole were 6.81 times 
more likely to express support for the Conservative Govemment than were those 
respondents wtlo felt the Govemment's economic policy was 'bad for the country as a 
wtlole'. Even those wtlo remained neutral about the Govemment's economic record 
were two-and-a-half times more likely to express a Conservative reported vote 
intention than those in the comparator group. Conversely, those who felt that the 
Conservative's economic policy was good for Britain, and those wtlo were neutral in 
their economic approval rating were significantly less likely to identify with Labour than 
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those who felt the Government's economic policy was harmful to the country as a 
whole, 
The popular perception of the 1992 General Election was that it was won and lost on 
egocentric issues such as taxation. It is certainly true that the Conservative party 
manifesto and advertising campaign was centred on egocentric issues - one poster 
memorably made a direct appeal to egocentric voters by proclaiming "Labour's tax 
bombshell: You will pay £1250 more tax a year under Labour" (Crewe & Gosschalk; 
1995 p. 53) - but these figures show that in the run-up to the 1992 General Election 
voters were at least as motivated in their reported vote intention, by their sociotropic 
appraisal of the Government's economic record as by their egocentriC one. The 
coefficients derived from sociotropic economic approval match those for egocentriC 
economic approval in the Conservative model and actually outstrip them in the Labour 
reported vote intention model. This would seem to suggest that although the Labour 
Party was right to concentrate on 'sociotropic' issues, such as the NHS and welfare 
rights, in order to maximise votes, the public perception that the Conservatives only 
profited from appealing to the self-interest axiom might be wide of the mark since the 
Conservatives apparently fared as well from their voters societal approval as from 
their personal approval. However a cross-tabulation of sociotropic approval by 
personal approval reaffirms the popular perception (see Table 6,26 below), Nearly 70 
per cent of those who approved of the Government's economic policies on sociotropic 
grounds also approved on egocentric grounds. Hence it is likely that the Conservative 
supporters who felt the Government were 'good' for them also felt that the 
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Govemment was 'good' for the country as a whole. On the other hand Labour 
supporters were seemingly more inclined to divorce their sociotropic and egocentric 
approval ratings - and as the regression analysis showed - if the two came into 
conflict, tended to vote with their sociotropic perception rather than their egocentric 
evaluation (Table 6.25). 
16.15.3.2 EGOCENTRISM 
The importance of public endorsement for the Govemment's economic record is 
confirmed by the analysis of egocentric approval (Table 6.25). Those who felt that the 
Govemment's economic policy was 'good for them and their family' were almost seven 
times more likely to report a preference for the Conservatives, and those who were 
unable to decide whether the Government's economic policy was personally beneficial 
or detrimental were nearly three times more likely to do so, than those who felt the 
Government's policy was 'bad' for them and their families. In the parallel model of 
Labour reported vote intention, those who gave neutral responses were a little more 
than half as likely to express support for Labour as those who felt the Govemment's 
economic policy was harmful to them personally. Statistically there was no difference 
between those respondents 000 benefited from the Government's economic policy 
and those Yklo felt damaged by it. This confirms that the personal economy was the 
realm of the Conservative Party OOile Labour had its heartland among voters who 
stressed the importance of sociotropism rather than egocentric policies. 
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Nevertheless, it should be remembered that there was much overlap between those 
respondents who felt that the Govemment's policy was good or bad for them and good 
or bad for society as a whole. Sixty-nine per cent of those who felt that the 
Govemment's economic policy was good for the country as a whole also felt that the 
policy was beneficial to themselves and their family, while 88 per cent of those who 
felt that the Govemment's economic policy was bad for the country as a whole felt that 
it was also detrimental to themselves and their family (Table 6.26). 
Table 6.26; Approval for the Government's Economic Policy; Sociotropic Approval by Egocentric 
Approval. 
The Government's Good Egocentrically Neutral Egocentrically Bad Egocentrically 
Economic Policies are: 
Good 69% 15% 17% 
Sociotropically (1077) (234) (260) 
Neutral 14% 49% 37% 
Sociotropically (121) (434) (328) 
Bad 05% 7% 88% 
Sociotropically (104) (157) (1885) 
16.15.3.3 INTERACTIONS 
As was the case with the earlier logistic regressions, it is the interactions in the 
economic approval model that reveal the role of geography in the construction of 
voter-party ties. A full model which specified 75 possible interactions between the 
dichotomous explanatory variables was 'trimmed down' for the sake of parsimony -
and a curtailed model which fitted only those interactions which were significant in the 
full model was constructed. The analysis presented here is the result of the 
parsimonious model of economic approval. 
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16.15.3.4 CONSERVATIVE INTERACTIONS 
The interrelationships between explanatory variables that are independently 
significant in the Conservative model of economic approval and reported vote 
intention are dominated by interactions with social class. However, some of the 
interactions do not seem to occur in the expected direction. In particular, the 
coincidence of being a member of Class AB and not disapproving of the 
Government's economic policy - egocentrically or sociotropically - might be expected 
to produce a distinct boost for the Government (1.90 + 0.99 = 2.89 [Exp = 17.99]). In 
reality, however, wnile the expected relationship holds for the sociotropic endorsement 
or neutrality of the Government's economic policy, it is diluted wnen members of Class 
AB also extend egocentric endorsement (1.90 + 0.99 - 0.86 = 2.03 [Exp = 7.61]). It 
may be that the main effects of egocentric approval and neutrality and membership of 
Class AB are so unambiguous that it would be remarkable if the interaction between 
them produced an even bigger pro-Government bias. Nonetheless, this statistical 
quirk is hard to explain. 
16.15.3.5 LABOUR INTERACTIONS 
With the exception of sociotropic approvers from Class AB, the interaction terms from 
the Conservative economic approval model are insignificant in the Labour economic 
approval model (Table 6.25). In fact the most startling facet of the Labour model of 
support and economic approval is the geographic dimension. It sho\NS how geography 
was important in determining partisanship over and above its effect in the main model. 
When two explanatory variables with different effects on the propensity of an 
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individual to support labour interact, it is the geographic effect that comes out on top. 
This implies that the geographic context is important when individuals receive 
contradictory information from their geographic location and their personal economic 
outlook, Thus when respondents from the CELTIC regions ( a positive impact on the 
propensity to report a vote intention for labour) also express neutrality on the 
egocentric impact of the Government's economic policy (which usually has a negative 
effect on labour reported vote intention), the result of this interaction is to provide an 
relative boost to labour. From Table 6.25 it is possible to produce the following 
interaction matrix; 
f E Table 6.27: Interaction Matrix or conomlc )ptlmists . 0 . L' . IVInQ In Celtic Regions: 
Economic Pessimism Economic Optimism 
Southern Region 0 -0.61 
Celtic Regions 0.23 0.40 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative 8 Exp. (8) 
Pessimists in Southern Region 040 + 0.23 - 0.61 0.02 1,02 
Optimists in Southern Region 040 + 0.23 + 0 0.63 1,88 
Pessimists in Celtic Regions 0.40 - 0.61 + 0 -0.21 0.81 
This matrix reveals that CELTS who express neutrality on the question of egocentric 
approval for the Government's economic record are 1.02 (0.4 + 0.23 - 0.61 = 0.02 
[Exp 1.02]) times more likely to support labour than Southerners who feel they 
personally suffer from the Government's economic policy, 1.88 times more likely to 
favour labour than Southerners who were neutral about the personal consequences 
of the Government's economic record, and 0.81 times as likely (and thus less likely) to 
support labour as Celtic respondents who feel the Government's economic policies 
have a detrimental effect on their personal fortunes. It was through the interaction 
effects that the full value of the logistic regressions became apparent. Given the stress 
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on egocentric economic evaluations, it is remarkable that Celts who were neutral 
about their personal economic futures were more likely to support Labour than 
Southern pessimists, 
Similarly, the negative effects on Labour support of expressing sociotropic neutrality (a 
B coefficient of -064) were tempered by the coincidence of these feeling with living in 
the NORTH of England. The following interaction matrix was constructed:-
Table 6.28: Interaction Matrix for Sociotropic Neutrals Living in Northern Regions: 
Sociotropic Disapproval Sociotropic Neutrality 
Southern Region 
° 
-0,64 
Northern Region 0,51 -0,35 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative B Exp. (B) 
Disapprovers in South -0.64 + 0.51 - 0.35 -0.48 0.62 
Neutrals in South -0.35 + 0.51 + 0 0.16 1,17 
Disapprovers in North -0.64 - 0.35 + 0 -0.99 0,37 
Thus respondents from the NORTH who also expressed neutrality about the 
sociotropic effects of the Government's economic policy were 0.62 times as likely to 
vote Labour as Southerners who feel that society as a whole suffers from the 
economic policy of the Government, 1.17 times more likely to favour Labour than 
Southerners neutrals and only 0.37 times as likely to support Labour as Northerners 
who felt the Government's economic record was bad for the country as a whole. The 
advantage Labour gained from neutrals in the North as opposed to neutrals in the 
South show that the primary relationship in this interaction was clearly geographic and 
not economic. 
354 
Chapter 6: Reported I 'ole IlIlellllO/1, ('lass, Cieugrophl' al/d I:'(,o//o/llic Opti/llis/ll in the J 990s 
6,16 BLAME FOR THE RECESSION 
A critical feature of the central thesis under investigation here - that voters use 
their economic perceptions to frame their voting behaviour - is that the reward-
punishment axiom may be important in the construction of economic attitudes, 
Moreover the geographic concentration provided by this thesis offers some hope 
that the milieux in which the reward-punishment axiom is constructed may be 
spatially varied. It has been shown that voters who held the Government 
responsible for their deteriorating position withheld their support in the 1992 
Election, and that certain regions of mainland Britain were more likely to hold the 
Government responsible and consequently withhold their support than others (see 
Pattie & Johnston 1995). 
Using the 'blame for Britain's recession' question from February 1992, first used in 
Chapter 5, the public perceptions of Government and world responsibility for 
economic adversity were analysed within a model of reported vote intention. 
The expectation here was that voters in certain regions - subjected to a long-term 
socialisation about the 'arms length' nature of Government control and the primacy 
of the market would be less inclined to blame the Government for the recession of 
the 19905 and as a consequence more forthcoming in their support for the 
Conservatives. This might also explain the apparent reluctance of the Southern 
regions and Service areas to punish the Government in the run-up to the General 
Election of 1992; their relatively weakened position during the 'new recession' 
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would be irrelevant to their voting patterns if they failed to hold the Government 
responsible for the creation of this weakness. If respondents did not blame the 
Government for their impoverished position, they were unlikely to punish them 
electorally. 
This theory of spatial variation in ascription of blame for the recession was 
supported by the analysis in Table 6.29 Thirty-nine per cent of respondents from 
Scotland and Wales thought that the Government were a 'great deal' to blame for 
the recession, only twenty-six per cent of Southerners felt similarly. Furthermore 
whereas thirty-seven per cent of Greater Londoners were willing to say that the 
Government was only 'a little' or 'not at all' to blame for the British recession, only 
twenty-six per cent of Northerners and twenty-one per cent of the Scots and 
Welsh were as willing to absolve the Government of responsibility for the 
recession. 
Table 6.29 The Extent of Government Responsibility for Britain's Recession by Region: February 
1992 
Scot/Wales North Midlands Gtr London South 
Great Deal 39 37 28 28 26 
Fair Amount 38 35 37 35 40 
A Little 15 19 25 26 24 
Not at all 6 7 10 11 9 
DKlNA 2 1 1 0 1 
In order to analyse attitudes to responsibility for the recession and their 
consequent effect on voting behaviour, these categories were disaggregated into 
dummy explanatory variables suitable for regression analysis and added to the 
familiar controls for class, geography and economic optimism (See Table 6.30). 
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For Government responsibility, those who held the Government greatly 
responsible (GVBGTDEAL), fairly responsible (GVBFAIR), and a little responsible 
(GVBL TL) were compared to the default group of respondents who felt the 
Government could be absolved of blame for the recession altogether 
(GVBNOTAL), For the responsibility of world conditions for the recession in 
Britain, those who felt that world conditions carried a great deal of responsibility 
for the recession (WORGTDEAL), were fairly responsible (WORFAIR), and a little 
responsible for the recession (WORL TL) were compared to the default group of 
respondents who felt that world conditions were not at all to blame for the 
recession in Britain (WORNOTAL), 
357 
Chap/er 6: Nep()r/et/ I 'o/l' 11I/l'1/1/()1/. ( ·Iass. (ieogl'llphy and Fc()nolllic Op/ill/islI/ in /he J 990s 
Table 6.30: The Impact of Incidence for Britain's Recession, Region, Constituency Type and 
Personal Economic Expectations (with Interaction Effects) on Conservative and Labour 
Reported Vote Intention, February 1992. (Logistic Regression) 
VARIABLE 
GOV I tjLAM~ l;j I U~AL 
GOV I t:;LAM~ FAIR DEAL 
GOV I t:;LAM~ LITTLE 
WCUNu:::;dLAME GT LJ~AL 
WCUI\ju;:,dLAM~ t-Alr< 
WCUl'lu;:,cLAMc LI I I _E 
CeL I (VS South) 
NUr< I H (VS South) 
MIOS (VS SOUth) 
LDON (VS :::;OUth) 
DEPLA (VS ATTlUent) 
SERVIC~ (VS Affluent) 
C ASSAR (VS Classllc) 
CLASSC1 (VS ClassOE) 
Cl ASS( 'L (VS ClassOE) 
ut" IIM (vs PeSSlm) 
N~U fRAL (VS t"eSSlm) 
lnteractlons 
(;;VI:;t-AIR tjY :::it:.r<VICE 
GVtjLl L I:;Y SERVICe 
WUr<L;; I UL I:3Y CLASSAI:; 
Wur<~AIR I:3Y <ss <K 
WUr<L I BY CLAS:::iAI:; 
WUr<L TL BY CLAS:::iCL 
GVI:;L TL BY WUr<t-AIR 
GVBLI L I:3Y WORLTL 
WOR(;; I UL t:H CEL I 
WORG I UL I:;Y NORTH 
WORG I UL I:;Y LOON 
WORt-AIK t:;Y NUr< I H 
WORFAIR t:;Y ~~. <sst:l 
Wur<~AIK t:;Y ~~ •• SSl / 
CONSfANT 
CONID 
LBRID 
ORIG - 2 LOG 
LIKELIHOOD 
1798.8 
1843.4 
CONtO 
B SE 
-J.!:ll .Jl f 
-~.~1 Jfo 
-u.e4 .:le4 
1.Uo .joU 
103 380 
U.old ;;SeB 
-066 .L40 
-
-u.Je LU! 
-U 82 4UU 
2.66 907 
u.38 11:1/ 
U.I:IU .3U1 
0.80 'L06 
0.06 185 
U.tll Aol 
1.19 524 
-2.26 .947 
-1.69 1:123 
-2UI:I .966 
-u.e'L Aof 
-U 1 !:I Al j 
NEW - 2 LOG 
LIKELIHOOD 
1245.7 
1408.1 
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UA3 
:l.~U 
2.81 
1. Id!:l 
0.52 
u.ol:I 
UA4 
14.24 
1040 
'LAo 
2.35 
1.94 
'L26 
3.Lf 
0.10 
0.19 
U.12 
UA4 
DF SIG 
17 .000 
17 .000 
LBRtD 
B SE EXP (B) 
:.U~~ 3.60 1/. r'd 
~.U~ .30!:l 7.96 
1.34 040 f 3.Bl 
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-0.92 .3LO U.4U 
-
-
- -
-
. 
-
-
. 
- -
U.04 1f9 1.72 
-
. 
-1 13 .~:l3 0.32 
-1 lU .~30 0.33 
-U. ~11 .210 0.40 
. 
-
- -
-1.34 .003 U.20 
-1.03 .000 0.2U 
1.48 .ouo 4.3ts 
1.12 .490 J.ur 
1.71 .521 5.51 
0.59 .341 1.Bl 
0.59 .334 1.BO 
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-1. tsU .43U 
IMPROVEMENT OF SIG 
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.000 
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6.16.1 MAIN EFFECTS 
6.16.1.1 GOVERNMENT TO BLAME 
The logistic regression analysis shown in Table 6.30 follows the expected pattern 
according to the reward-punishment axiom of voting behaviour, Those 
respondents who felt that the Government was culpable for creating Britain's 
recession were - ceteris paribus - significantly less likely to support the 
Conservatives than those voters who absolved the Government from blame. This 
relationship is massively supported by the analysis of those respondents who felt 
that the Government were greatly responsible for the recession. This section of 
the electorate was nearly eighteen times more likely to support Labour and fifty 
times less likely to support the Conservative Government (with an exponent of .02) 
than those respondents who felt that the Government had not caused the 
recession. Moreover as the continuum of Government blame is pursued, the 
extent of hostility to the Government and affection towards the Labour opposition 
strengthens proportionally. The pattern of hostility to the Government - and of 
support for the official Opposition - is altogether consistent with Hibbing and 
Alford's version of the reward-punishment axiom (see Chapter 1). Those who 
blame the Government for economic misfortune punish them - those who absolve 
them of responsibility are more likely to express Government support. 
6.16.1.2 WORLD CONDITIONS TO BLAME 
Once again the expected pattern between responsibility for the recession and 
intended voting pattern is upheld by the analysis of respondents perceptions of 
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world conditions and their impact upon the British recession. Those who ascribe 
much blame for the downturn in the British economy to the condition of the world 
economy (and by implication absolve the Government of responsibility) are most 
likely to support the Conservative Government. Those who thought that the 
contribution of world conditions to the British recession was negligible were more 
likely to support the Labour opposition and less likely to express a Conservative 
reported vote intention. 
Table 6.31: Responsibility for Britain's Recession, Government Blame by World Conditions to 
Blame; F b 1992 e ruary 
Government Government Government Government 
Blame; Gt Blame; Fair Blame; A Blame; Not 
Deal Amount Little at all 
World Conditions 18 32 33 17 
Blame; Gt Deal 
World Conditions 31 41 21 7 
Blame; Fair Amount 
World Conditions 41 38 17 3 
Blame; A Little 
World Conditions 53 24 13 8 
Blame; Not at all 
Those respondents who thought that world conditions caused the British recession 
tended to absolve the Government of blame for the recession to a greater degree 
than those respondents who absolved world conditions from responsibility for the 
recession (see Table 6.31), While only eight per cent of those who thought that 
world conditions were 'not at all' responsible for the recession also thought the 
Government was 'not at all' to blame, fifty three per cent thought that the 
Government should shoulder a 'great deal' of responsibility, However this appears 
to be an issue which disadvantaged the Government, since they stood to lose 
much more than they could gain, Whereas seventeen per cent of those who felt 
that world conditions were 'a great deal' to blame for the British recession felt that 
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the Government could be absolved of responsibility for the recession in 1992, 
eighteen per cent thought the Government were also a 'great deal' responsible for 
the recession. 
6.16.1.3 OTHER MAIN EFFECTS 
The LOGIT analysis of blame for the recession and reported vote intention 
reaffirms many of the findings of earlier analyses (Table 6.30). The effects of 
region, constituency type, social class and personal economic expectations are -
by and large - the same identified in the analysis of reported vote intention. For 
this reason, this section will concentrate on the interaction terms between 
independent variables in the analysis of geography, blame for the recession and 
reported vote intention. 
6.16.2 INTERACTION EFFECTS 
Once again the most revealing aspect of the logistic regression model is the 
interaction terms between independent variables. As before, the results presented 
here are the outcome of the second set of analysis which included only those 
relationships shown to be significant to the 0.1 level in the initial analysis. 
The significant interactions in the Conservative reported vote intention model 
concern the incidence of blame for the recession, either attributed to the 
Government or to world conditions. The interactions which deal with Government 
blame are also associated with SERVICE constituencies and it is interesting to 
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note that when GVBFAIR and GVBL TL interact with living in a constituency 
associated with service sector employment, it is the influence of the geographic 
criteria which dominates the interaction effect. 
The following interaction matrices were constructed for SERVICE with both 
GVBFAIR and GVBLTL:-
Table 6,32: Interaction Matrix for Respondents who hold the Government 'A Fair Amount' Responsible 
. S ' A for Britain's Recession LIving In ervlce reas: 
Government Blame; Not at all Government Blame; Fair 
Amount 
Affluent Areas 0 -2,21 
Service Areas -0.82 0,81 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative B Exp, (B) 
Govt Absolvers in Affluent Areas -2.21 - 0.82 + 0,81 -2,22 0,11 
Fair Amounters in Affluent Areas -0.82 + 0,81 + 0 -0.01 0,99 
Govt Absolvers in Service Areas -2.21 + 0,81 + 0 -1.40 0.25 
Table 6.33: Interaction Matrix for Respondents who hold the Government 'A Little' Responsible tor 
Britain's Recession Living in Service Areas: 
Government Blame; Not at all Government Blame;A Little 
Affluent Areas 0 -0.84 
Service Areas -0,82 1,19 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative B Exo. (B) 
Govt Absolvers in Affluent Area -0.84 - 0.82 + 1.19 -0.47 0.63 
Little Blamers in Affluent Areas 1.19-0.82+0 0.37 1.45 
Govt Absolvers in Service Area~ 1.19-0.84+0 0.35 1.42 
The incidence of Government blame would normally be a drag on Government 
support, while residence in an area associated with SERVICE sector employment 
would be a boost (with the ascription of a fair amount of blame to Government -
2.21 - 0,82 = -3.03 [Exp = 0.05] and with little blame -0.84 - 0.82 = -1.66 [Exp 
0.19]). When the effects combine with a significant interaction effect, the result is 
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a relative bonus for Conservative fortunes - in that the interaction effect reduces 
the anti-Conservative bias associated with Government blame (with odds-ratios of 
0.11 and 0.63 compared to people who absolved the Government of blame 
completely and lived in AFFLUENT areas, respectively). That is that the 
geographic criteria has dominated the interaction effect. 
This is a critical finding since it shows how the geographic filter operated in the 
run-up to the 1992 Election. The geographic context was able to over-ride or dilute 
the contradictory messages individuals received from economic evaluations. In 
this case, the punishment the Government might have expected from being held 
culpable for the recession was significantly reduced when the individuals who 
blamed the Government also lived in part of the Conservative electoral heartland -
constituencies dominated by service sector employment. 
The combination of blaming both the Government and world conditions for 
Britain's recession produces a significant drag on the level of labour support. In 
other words, when the national and international perspectives coincide, the effect 
of the international view takes precedence. 
The combination of regional characteristics with blame for the recession reveals 
the domination of the geographic context in all measures of labour reported vote 
intention. For instance the following interaction matrix was constructed for CELTS 
who felt that world conditions were greatly responsible for Britain's recession:-
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Table 6.34: Interaction Matrix for Respondents who hold World Conditions' A Great Deal' Responsible 
for Britain's Recession Living in Celtic Regions: 
World Conditions Blame; World Conditions Blame; 
Not at all Great Deal 
Southern Region 0 -1.51 
Celtic Regions 0 1.48 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative B Exp. (B) 
World Absolvers in South Regions 1.48 - 1.51 + 0 -0.03 0.97 
Great Dealers in Southern Region 1.48 + 0 + 0 1.48 4.39 
World Absolvers in Celtic Regions 1.48 - 1.51 + 0 -0.03 0.97 
CELTS who felt that world conditions a 'great deal to blame' for Britain's recession 
were nearly as likely (0.97 times as likely) to support labour than the Southerners, 
and CELTS, who felt that world conditions were not at all to blame. This is 
contrary to the original message derived from the main effects of the labour 
reported vote intention model which stressed that blaming world conditions for the 
recession was likely to be associated with Government support and a decreased 
propensity to support the labour opposition. Similar results are obtained by the 
coincidence of living in the North and the capital and the extension of a 'great 
deal' of responsibility for the British recession to World conditions. 
Table 6.35: Interaction Matrix for Respondents who hold World Conditions 'A Great Deal' Responsible 
, L" 'N rth R for Britain's ReceSSion IVlng III 0 ern eglons: 
World Conditions Blame; Not World Conditions Blame; 
at all Great Deal 
Southern Region 0 -1.51 
Northern Region 0 1.12 
COMPARATOR GROUP Coefficients to add Cumulative B Exp. (B) 
World Absolvers in South 1.12-1.51+0 -0.39 0.68 
Great Dealers in South 1.12+0+0 1.12 3.06 
World Absolvers in North 1.12-1.51+0 -0.39 0.68 
Northerners who held world conditions greatly responsible for Britain's recession 
were 0.68 times as likely to support labour than those who absolved world 
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conditions from blame and who lived in either the SOUTH or the NORTH. They 
were 3.06 times more likely to support the Labour Party than those who held the 
world recession to be the root cause of the British recession and who lived in the 
South. In short, a clear geographic cleavage in voting according to the incidence 
of blame was evident. This is all the more remarkable since the main effects 
showed that the effects of geographic region per se are insignificant in the Labour 
model. Meanwhile, those respondents who felt that world conditions were 'fairly' 
responsible for the recession were more likely to support the Labour party if they 
also lived in the North of England, or were members of CLASS C1 or CLASS C2. 
In short the geographic context of the interaction terms dominated the direction 
that the interaction effect had, so much so that it often had the effect of magnifying 
the geographic effect on increased levels of Labour support. Once more, the 
interaction terms in the model have illustrated how the effects of geography are 
filtered by the electorate. The direct effects of the reward-punishment axiom could 
be cancelled or over-ridden by the residual contextual effects of geography. The 
incidence of blame was less important in determining voters' partisanship than 
where they lived. 
6.17 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter has explored the relationship between class, geography, personal 
economic attitudes and reported vote intention in the 1990s. It has shown that the 
relationships between class and reported vote intention and between economic 
optimism and reported vote intention identified in the 1980s (see Chapter 4) were 
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upheld in the new recession of the 1990s. It has also shown that although weaker 
than the other causal variables, geography was also associated with variation in levels 
of reported vote intention. During this period the Conservative Government relied 
heavily on support from areas characterised as AFFLUENT but that compared to the 
1980s the strength of Conservative support in areas typified by service sector 
employment had diminished. This suggests that the new economic reality of the 1990s 
had altered the electoral environment and well as the economic environment. 
The ANOVA modelling in this Chapter supported the preliminary findings of Chapter 5 
- that no general association between geography and levels of economic optimism 
existed. Nevertheless it did allude to significant interaction effects between levels of 
optimism and geographic factors, which suggested that the relationship between 
geography and economic attitudes might be more complex than the ANOVA 
technique could explain. The need to look at these relationships through a finer filter, 
and at the component categories of the geographic variables rather than as a single 
factor was obvious. The regression modelling provided this additional information. 
The multiple Ordinary Least Squares regression and the LOG IT regression modelling 
confirmed that class, economic attitudes and geography all played significant roles in 
explaining variations in reported vote intentions in the 1990s. They also showed that 
temporal considerations were important, clearly identifying John Major's electoral 
honeymoon period and the subsequent steady decay in Conservative support 
thereafter - although Conservative support never returned to its experienced under tha 
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last months of Margaret Thatcher's premiership. There was no evidence for a 
significant bandwagon effect since knowing the level of party support for one month 
was of little assistance in predicting an individual's reported vote intention in the next, 
For the most part Conservative support was apparently based on egocentric values. 
Labour Party support tended to be determined by sociotropism. The 'ownership' of 
these issues was confirmed by this chapter. Moreover while Conservatives seemed to 
think that what was good for them was also good for the country, significant numbers 
of Labour supporters were intending to vote Labour in spite of the economic self-
interest. How egocentric and sociotropic issues mixed was largely a matter of 
socialisation and geographic milieux. 
A key finding in this Chapter was provided by the regression modelling which revealed 
the spatial variation in levels of economic optimism and pessimism. The detail of the 
regional analysis rather than the general schema was important here. Hence living in 
Scotland or Wales proved a significant drag on levels of personal economic optimism. 
This relationship became even clearer when the interaction terms between geography 
and economic attitudes were considered. 
There are two research conundrums here, Firstly it is necessary to explain why 
electors in the Celtic fringe were more pessimistic about their economic future than the 
rest of the country during a recession which had its biggest impact in the South. 
Secondly, it is necessary to approach why living in Scotland or Wales should prove a 
367 
Chapler 6: Reporled I 'ole /111 el/l 101/. ('lass. (;eugmph.l' and Fconolllic OplillllSII/ in lite 1990s 
drag on economic optimism, but living in industrially impoverished regions of England, 
say the North, did not. Scotland and Wales, with their heavy reliance on the public 
sector, suffered markedly from the industrial decline on the 1980s - but may not have 
done so more than the industrial North (and the North did not benefit from the oil 
industry in the late 1970s). Scotland and Wales are however, nations rather than 
regions and there may be an element of national grievance - rather than regional 
differences - being picked up here. On the other hand, it is worth bearing in mind that 
just because it hit hardest in the South, the 1990s recession did not impact on the vast 
majority of Southern electors - with long-term memories of the pre-1979 period, many 
Southerners could still be sanguine about their economic futures with secure jobs and 
homes likely to be worth more than they had been fourteen years ago. Furthermore 
the industrial decline of the 1980s hit the Celtic fringe so hard that it may have meant 
that the change in geographic marginalisation of the 1990s was 'too little, too late' to 
alter the relative optimism of the Scots and Welsh. Finally, and most importantly here, 
although only the CEl T region significantly differed from the SOUTH comparator for 
the analysis of economic optimism or pessimism, there was more geographic variation 
in other economic attitudes - notably the ascription of blame for the receSSion, and 
approval for the Government's policies, and when spatial variation occurred in all 
economic attitudes it mirrored the pattern of the 1980s geographic economy rather 
than the one associated with the new recession - suggesting that the 'temporary and 
blameless' recession had a limited impact. 
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Approval for the Government's handling of the recession was spatially variable. Again 
this variation reflected the economic geography of the 1980s rather than that of the 
1990s. The Northern regions were associated with disapproval, the Southern regions 
with approval. This was repeated in the analysis of responsibility for the recession -
the ascription of blame to the Government or world conditions. Here electors in 
Northern Britain were more likely to hold the Government responsible than their 
counterparts in the South; conversely Southerners were more likely to hold world 
conditions responsible for Britain's economic recession. Furthermore there was a 
progression of importance in economic attitudes; in terms of impact on voting 
intentions, economic optimism or pessimism was the least forceful of all three 
economic attitudes, responsibility for the recession the most explanatory. The 
regression analysis confirmed that these relationships stood after socio-economic 
characteristics, and other economic attitudes, had been held constant, and that they 
had an independent effect on voting intentions - an autonomous regional cleavage 
based on context not composition. Further, the context that appeared important was 
the 19805 geographic divide not the one associated with the new economic recession. 
This indicated that electors had a long-term memory of economic disadvantage or 
were reacting to long-term socialisation patterns rather than short-term economic 
marginalisation. This of course, opened up the way for the Conservative Government 
to benefit from the re-opening of the more traditional North-South cleavages in 
attitudes and voting behaviour - shown in Chapter 5 - which prefaced their electoral 
victory in 1992. 
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The exploration of interaction effects between independent variables showed how 
geographic variation may have influenced economic attitudes in the 1990s. Hence the 
Celtic regions, the North and depressed areas were associated with a reluctance to 
express support for the Conservative Government, while economic optimists were 
typically pro-Conservative in their reported vote intentions. However, when these 
factors coincided the most likely outcome was that the regional characteristics would 
overcome individual economic evaluations in predicting how an individual would 
behave. Thus Scots and Welsh optimists were significantly less likely to support the 
Conservatives than Southern pessimists; respondents from depressed areas who 
were personally optimistic about their economic future were still more prone to support 
Labour than pessimists who live in AFFLUENT areas. In short under certain 
conditions the regional cleavage defeated the challenge from the economic cleavage, 
This chapter and the preceding chapter have concerned themselves with the 1990s 
recession. They replicated one of the core findings of the chapters which dealt with 
the 1980s recovery period. Geography accounted for some variation in partisanship 
but less in economic evaluations. This conundrum was eventually solved in this 
chapter by recourse to the geographic milieux in which economic attitudes are formed, 
Furthermore people thought about economic issues in different ways; egocentric 
issues (hOW individuals thought of themselves and their families) did not vary greatly 
spatially but sociotropic evaluations (how individuals thought of society as a whole) 
varied greatly according to where individuals resided, and did so according to the 
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familiar North-South geographic divide. The local cultural issues that this raises ought 
to be a vibrant item on any further research agenda. 
The geographic-economic interaction effects highlighted in this chapter were the most 
revealing aspect of the whole thesis. They showed that how an individual decided to 
vote was largely shaped by what they thought of the economy - through personal 
economic expectations, egocentric approval or disapproval of Government policies, 
sociotropic approval and the question of responsibility for economic recession. 
Conservative support was largely motivated through egocentric issues, Labour 
support through sociotropic issues. However, the extent to which optimism or 
pessimism, approval or disapproval, blame or absolution could be discounted was 
spatially variable. Northerners who approved of the Government's economic policies 
were less likely to back the Government than their Southern counterparts; Scots and 
Welsh voters who felt the Government were not culpable for the British recession 
were less inclined to express support for the Government as a result of their local 
context; individuals from areas typified by service sector employment who were 
pessimistic about their personal economic future were less likely to turn on the 
Government than their counterparts in the North. The economy - geography 
interactions illustrated that an autonomous regional cleavage was an important part of 
the socialisation milieux that framed an individuals' partisanship in the early 19905. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Implications and Future Research 
Agenda 
7,1 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
The findings from the 1980s presented in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis 
do much to confirm much of that which is already known about the state of party 
support and attitudinal structure in that decade. However, there are also some 
very interesting new findings which add to existing knowledge about the 
relationship between geography, economics and voting behaviour. 
The first thing to say is that the empirical research on the Election years of the 
1980s revealed a growing spatial division in partisan support. Moreover there 
was a tendency for the spatial variation in economic attitudinal structures to grow 
over the same period. Individuals residing in the South of the country were 
typically more sanguine about their economic future, and more satisfied with the 
current set of economic circumstances, and much more likely to support the 
Conservative Government, than their counterparts in the North of the country -
who were typically pessimistic, dissatisfied and anti-Conservative - other things 
being equal. It is the findings of the inter-election period however, that remain 
the crux of the matter for the 1980s research. 
An important finding from the 1980s recovery period was that the spatial 
variation in economic attitudes was at its peak when the population as a whole 
was at its most optimistic. The height of the Lawson boom was also the height of 
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the North-South divide; the South was experiencing rapid growth, the North was 
still in deep recession. As a consequence it was also the height of the 
geographic variation in the unemployment forecasts of voters; when the chances 
of an individual securing a job were very different in different parts of the 
country. The most optimistic sections of society were concentrated in the 
Conservative heartlands, the most pessimistic sections of society formed the 
bedrock of Labour support through the 1983-9 period. 
Crewe has written of Thatcherism as "the crusade that failed"; the social agenda 
of Thatcherism was, he claims, never very popular with the electorate despite 
Mrs. Thatcher's three Election victories (1988; p. 35-40). This thesis suggested 
an added dimension to this failed ideological crusade; that the doctrine of 
Thatcherism - and indeed the Conservative Party itself - were not very popular 
with large sections of the electorate in non-election years. Hence sections of 
society from which the Conservatives could recruit in election years, were likely 
to exhibit hostility to the Conservatives in the intervening years. 
The phenomenon of tergiversating Tories is one of the core findings of this 
thesis. Some of the most fervent anti-Conservative sections of SOCiety in the 
inter-election periods of the 1980s, would dilute their hostility or become pro-
Conservative in Election years. Electors in the Midlands and Greater London, 
and voters who were employed as foremen or supervisors were in the forefront 
of tergiversating Toryism in the 1980s. If this phenomenon could be repeated in 
other economic circumstances, then it might represent the blueprint for electoral 
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success in otherwise unpromising conditions. If the Conservative Government 
could swing key groups of the electorate behind them in the run-up to an 
Election, then this might begin to explain their surprise success in 1992, 
particularly if short-term economic interests could be subverted by the long 
memories and long-term socialisation patterns of Conservative voters. 
Tergiversation, then, might present a pattern for future Election success. Indeed, 
this thesis suggests that the familiar class and geographic variations of the 
1980s were reasserted towards the end of the long-campaign leading to the 
1992 Election, and that the Government could have benefited from the renewed 
differences in personal economic optimism. 
For the most part there was little spatial variation in egocentric economic 
evaluations, whereas the spatial variation in sociotropic evaluations was 
substantial. That is, individuals' interpretations of society were more likely to be 
influenced by the context in which they lived than their judgements of personal 
matters affecting themselves only. This suggests that - as Pattie and Johnston 
have recently stated - individuals think separately, and think differently about 
personal and social issues (see Pattie & Johnston 1995). Furthermore, the 
spatial variation in sociotropic issues mirrored the spatial variation in party 
identification. After controlling for class, individuals were more likely to reflect 
local and personal conditions in their attitudes and support for the Government 
than they were to reflect personal circumstances. Moreover, where spatial 
variation in economic attitudes was present, it tended to reflect the 19805 
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economy rather than the 1990s economy. In other words, the attitudinal 
differences in public perceptions of the economy according to geography were 
associated with the North-South divide rather than the dynamics of the new 
recession of the 1990s. 
Throughout the two periods of study, it was clear that the two main parties had 
distinct electoral territories where they could appeal to a baseline of support. For 
the Conservatives this centred around an appeal to egocentric issues, for 
Labour it was sociotropism. The models presented here performed better for 
explaining variance in Conservative support than Labour Party support - and not 
merely because there was a split opposition in Britain. This all points to the fact 
that throughout the 1980s and the 1990-2 period, the Conservatives staked a 
considerable claim of "ownership" on the personal economy; whether they are 
still able to do this after Britain's enforced exit from the ERM in November 1992 
is another matter, and one which future research should concentrate on. 
The research into the long campaign leading to the 1992 General Election, 
revealed some essential findings. One of the most immediate findings was that 
John Major's electoral honeymoon was very short, his accession to the 
premiership successfully transformed Conservative fortunes in the polls - and 
there is some evidence to suggest that he neutralised potential Labour support -
but only for the first four months of his leadership. Conservative support fell 
thereafter, and the monthly coefficients in the logistic regression analysis were 
insignificant, suggesting that by the time of the Election, his accession to the 
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leadership was no real advantage. This in turn raises interesting questions about 
whether Conservative fortunes would have recovered under the old leadership, 
was it possibly that Mrs. Thatcher could have won the 1992 Election for the 
Conservatives? 
Nevertheless, there was a spurt of economic optimism towards the end of the 
poll period. The Conservatives seem to have benefited from the upturn in the 
electorate's optimism a few months later - even if John Major was incidental to 
its rise. The key to the renewed optimism, however, may have been - as Chapter 
5 showed - that it marked the renewal of the 'old' divides of the 1980s rather 
than reflecting the new recession of the 1990s. The Conservatives were able to 
convince enough of their 'natural' support from the 1980s that they were the best 
option in 1992. 
Indeed the Conservative victory in 1992 might have followed the blueprint for 
tergiversating Tories outlined in the empirical results from the 1980s, The rise in 
economic optimism and the resurgent gulfs in economic evaluations according to 
class, regional and constituency type suggest that the Government were able to 
exploit the return to the fold of various groups of key electors. For this scenario 
to be feasible in the real and unusual recession of the 1990s, the long-term 
socialisation patterns of voters would have to be strong enough to overcome 
short-term economic interests - since the tergiversators would have had to 
include many voters at the sharp end of the new recession, There were two 
factors which made this scenario plausible, Firstly the geographic context of the 
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long-term socialisation of Southern voters - which included faith in the market 
and job security - contradicted the evidence of the new recession. Secondly, the 
tendency to ascribe the recession as both 'temporary' and 'blameless' was 
particularly marked in the South of the country. All of this evidence pOints to a 
case for Conservative victory in 1992. 
The functional geographic divisions (geographic model 2) tended to fare less 
well in explaining variation in party support and attitudes than the standard 
regional schema (geographic model 1). This was particularly true of the period of 
the 1990s recession, suggesting that the geographic divide in British psephology 
was based on regional foci rather than the type of constituency in which a 
person lived. Voters who were not themselves worse-off were more likely to 
exhibit sociotropism or favour Labour support if they lived in Scotland, Wales or 
the North than if they lived in the South of England. Coupled with the mis-
specifications in the Rose and McAllister model of a lifetime of learning, this 
would tend to suggest that it was local context rather than composition which 
gave geography its impact on electoral behaviour and attitudinal structure in the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
The apparent (although not actual) failure of the initial model of geographic 
variation in economic attitudes in both decades was only a temporary setback. 
The logistic regression models in the last chapter - and the interactions therein -
suggested real evidence for the existence of an autonomous regional cleavage 
in attitudinal structure and party support. 
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7.2 IMPLICATIONS 
Although the geographic context had a sizeable impact throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, it is important to note that the geographic variation in voting 
intentions and economic attitudes in the 1990s took the economic dynamics of 
the 1980s, rather than those of the 1990s as their cue. 
Since 1992, however, a number of factors have coincided which might have 
corrupted the Conservative blueprint for electoral success suggested in this 
thesis. Since Britain was forced out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 
September 1992, public opinion seems to have undergone a sea-change. The 
Conservatives have found it difficult to come to terms with public hostility to their 
economic programme, and it appears that the Labour Party has overcome its 
traditional obstacle in the economic competency questions in polls. The in-built 
advantage the Conservatives gained from concentrating on economic issues 
have been diminished, at least in the short-term. After the Conservatives were 
forced to put up taxation rates (including imposing Value Added Tax on domestic 
fuel) it is hard to envisage "Labour's Tax Bombshell" being so potent an electoral 
image in 1996 or 1997. 
In 1992, the Conservative Government benefited from the perception of the 
1990s recession as temporary and blameless - a view which was particularly 
potent in the Conservative heartlands of the South. However, despite modest 
economic improvement since 1993, the public have appeared reluctant to 
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express any 'feel good factor' since the 1992 Election. Moreover poll evidence 
has shown that the problems of the early 1990s may prove more resilient than 
the Government might have hoped; the economic dislocation caused by the 
recession might not be temporary after all, and the Government may no longer 
be seen to be blameless as a result. This might present the Conservative 
Government with a huge electoral problem in the next General Election, if the 
public have indeed realigned their economic evaluations after the crises of late 
1992. 
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
It is important to note that the geographic interactions are unique; the significant 
interactions associated with social class did not have the same type of effects as 
the geographic interactions. In other words, geography was able to overcome 
contradictory economic evaluations, social class was not. Moreover in the final 
analysis, geographic context was capable of eclipsing economic interests: being 
a Celt was more pertinent to voters than approving of the Government's 
economic record or feeling optimistic about the sociotropic or egocentric future. 
This is the triumph of the contextual basis of the geographic thesis, and the 
evidence for it is consistently shown in Chapter Six. 
This raises questions of locally based identities. Why do people from different 
regions feel and behave differently? Is the local context in say the North, so very 
different to that in the Midlands or the South? More work will have to be done on 
this, and which will certainly benefit from narrowing the focus of local identity 
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(the context of any local identity might well be much smaller than the simple five-
fold schema presented here). An obvious opportunity exists for more qualitative 
research into the local context of political attitudes, which could prove instructive 
for the way voters frame their core aUitudinal structure. It may be that certain 
areas have a particularly strong local identity (the nations of Scotland and Wales 
are obvious examples, but so too are regions such as Yorkshire, Lancashire or 
Essex) and as a consequence are more cohesive communities promoting more 
unitary attitudinal structures. 
Taylor (1979), Denver and Halfacree (1992) and McMahon, Heath, Harrop and 
Curtice (1992) have investigated the phenomenon of the migration rates of 
voters. By and large they have concluded that migration flows are far too small 
to account for regional variation in voting patterns; and migrants tend to be self-
selecting and self-cancelling. It could still be, however, that information about 
migration might provide an indication of the extent of cohesion within a 
community, since an area with a static population might be a reflection of close 
community ties. Regional Trends data (1995) and evidence from the 1991 
census supports the speculative case that Northern areas appear more cohesive 
than Southern regions. Figure 7.1 and the regional maps of migration (Figures 
7.2 and 7.3) show the extent of population movement within mainland Britain. 
These representations of the proportions of the population who have left their 
region of residence in the year between 1992 and 1993, incomers who had 
moved from their place of residence within the year prior to the 1991 census, 
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and incomers who had migrated to their current residence from another district, 
another county, or between Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England all 
show a marked - and similar - geographic skew. The maps clearly show that 
migration was concentrated in the South of the country (the Oil industry in the 
North notwithstanding). Figure 7.2 shows all residents who were at a different 
address on census night in 1991 to twelve months previously. If a line were 
drawn from the mouth of the Avon to The Wash, the regions below this line could 
be said to be in the vanguard of migration. However, this map may reveal little 
other than the state of the housing market since movement within districts is 
included. A better measure of community cohesion is provided by Figure 7.3. 
This map shows migrants who had moved to a new district, county or country 
within the United Kingdom. Again a crude line could dissect the general pattern 
of differential migration rates - this time from the Avon to the Humber, revealing 
a marked geographic divide. Above this line less migration occurred and many of 
the 'old style' Northern cities (such as Glasgow, Greater Manchester, 
Merseyside and South Yorkshire) are clearly visible at the bottom of the 
migration scale. Once more the only exception to this general pattern appeared 
to be associated with the oil industry in Northern Scotland, which required a 
constant in-flow of employees. Below the Avon-Humber line, much more 
migration was visible. A North-South divide in migration levels, and perhaps in 
communal cohesion, clearly exists. This information provides support for the 
need for further research into locally based identities. 
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The fact that there were markedly fewer migrants in Northern areas than in the 
Southern areas would tend to support the theory that the former are more 
cohesive communities and are likely to have stronger local identities. 
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Figure 7.1 Regional Migration (Leavers) 1993, as a Proportion of Population (Source: Regional 
Trends 1995, 30) 
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This is of course only preliminary evidence of the local identity thesis, but is an 
obvious item on a future post-thesis research agenda. At the same time material 
from the 1991 Census suggests that the incidence of migration between regions 
might provide a key for understanding regional identities. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 
both show that areas with static populations tend to be concentrated in 
traditional Labour heartlands, the vast majority of migration (the Scottish Oil 
industry notwithstanding) occurs beneath an imaginary line drawn from The 
Wash to the mouth of the Avon. Further work into the nature of localised 
identities and regional voting patterns and attitudinal structures would be 
illuminating. 
The central feature of this thesis concerns the inter-election geographies of 
economic attitudes and party support. An obvious method of extending this 
analysis is to follow up and expand the individual level analytical model. While 
preparing this thesis for submission, a new publication appeared which pOinted a 
possible path for future research. Price and Sanders (1995) use individual level 
data to model party support in the inter-election periods of 1979-87. Their model 
includes individual characteristics, individual economic perceptions, individual's 
regional context, objective economic conditions and monthly dummies. Crucially 
however, they fail to scrutinise geographic interactions. Moving from the 
parsimonious model presented in this thesis to a fuller model of party support 
would be an advance, but the crucial geographic interactions should be 
included; Price and Sanders look only at the interaction effects associated with 
economic perceptions (1995; p. 467). 
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Price and Sanders also confirm one of the core findings of this thesis - that 
sociotropic evaluations provide a better indication of an individual's reported 
vote intention than egocentric evaluations. However, they only consider the 
personal economic expectations poll question. Clearly much work could be done 
to isolate the relationship between expectations and other economic attitudes 
such as economic competence, responsibility and approval for Government 
policy. This research has indicated that during the 1990-2 period, the geography 
of economic responsibility and economic approval were more crucial to 
understanding variations in Government support than the more orthodox 
economic expectations question. Further research to discern this relationship in 
other times and in different political and economic contexts would prove 
illuminating. The post-election era should be particularly ripe for future research 
- particularly if the events of Black Wednesday 22 September 1992 (which 
culminated in Britain's enforced expulsion from the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
of the European Union) produced the sea-change in political opinion that all 
polling evidence conducted since has suggested. 
7.4 EVALUATION 
This research has shown that over two very different time periods, with distinct 
political and economic contexts, the geographic setting was relevant to the 
incidence of party support. In particular it has established themes about the 
pattern of Government support in inter-election periods. 
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The aggregate level data used for the 19805 reaffirmed much of the existing 
knowledge about the geographic context of electoral behaviour, but also added 
to the understanding of the pattern of fluctuation among Government supporters 
in non-election years. More work could be done on the nature of partisanship -
perhaps splitting groups of partisans according to the intensity of their party 
identification, and the concentration on aggregate data necessarily constrained 
the implications of the findings. 
The individual level analysis of the 1990s provided this thesis with a much 
improved chance to estimate the chances of an individual supporting a party 
under certain circumstances. The less constrained nature of individual level 
analysis could provide a way forward for research into party support, and the 
extension of the model remains an obvious item for future research. Moreover 
the geographic context in which an individual resided appeared to exert a critical 
influence on his or her chances of supporting the Government or holding specific 
economic attitudes in the early 1990s. However, this research could only assert 
about the nature of the geographic context and several challenges are still to be 
met. This thesis has shown compressed forms of geographic and functional 
regions to be significant but it is possible that the geographic context is 
internalised via an even smaller scale by individuals (for instance, a reference 
group of streets, towns or city conurbations may form the vital milieu, rather than 
the regional or functional schema used here). Understanding the exact nature of 
the geographic context remains a research aim for electoral geography. 
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Appendix I 
British Social Attitudes Questions 1983-9 
Now I would like to ask you about two of Britain's economic problems -
inflation and unemployment. 
First, inflation: in a year from now, do you expect prices generally to have 
gone up, to have stayed the same, or to have gone down? 
Asked in:-
UMFC Question Asked 
1983 Yes 
1984 Yes 
1985 Yes 
1986 Yes 
1987 Yes 
1989 Yes 
Second, unemployment: in a year from now, do you expect unemployment 
to h h t d th the gone down? ave gone up, to ave s aye e same, or 0 av 
INFFC Question Asked 
1983 Yes 
1984 Yes 
1985 Yes 
1986 Yes 
1987 Yes 
1989 Yes 
Looking ahead over the next year, do you think Britain's general industrial 
pe rf "11 " t h th d cline? ormance WI Improve, s ay muc e same, or e 
INDYFC Question Asked 
1983 Yes 
1984 Yes 
1985 Yes 
1986 Yes 
1987 Yes 
1989 Yes 
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Do you think that British Industry is more efficient than it was five years 
I ff"" t b t th ? ago, ess e IClen, or a ou e same" 
EFFCYL5Y Question Asked 
1983 No 
1984 No 
1985 No 
1986 Yes 
1987 Yes 
1989 Yes 
And do you think that, in five years' time, British industry will be more 
ff" " I ff"" t d t b tthe same? e IClent or ess e IClen com2are o now, or a ou 
EFFCY5FC Question Asked 
1983 No 
1984 No 
1985 No 
1986 Yes 
1987 Yes 
1989 Yes 
Over the last ten years, do you think that poverty in Britain has been 
" "d " t" t b t th level? Increasing, ecreasln-.9., or s ~ln...9. a a ou esame 
POVL10Y Question Asked 
1983 No 
1984 No 
1985 No 
1986 Yes 
1987 No 
1989 Yes 
And over the next ten years, do you think that poverty in Britain will 
d t t th I I? Increase, ecrease or sa J a e same eve" 
POV10FC Question Asked 
1983 No 
1984 No 
1985 No 
1986 Yes 
1987 No 
1989 Yes 
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Appendix 
Looking back over the last year or so, would you say your household's 
income has fallen behind prices, kept up with prices, or gone up by more 
th . ? an prrces. 
FAMYLY Question Asked 
1983 No 
1984 Yes 
1985 Yes 
1986 Yes 
1987 Yes 
1989 Yes 
And looking forward to the year ahead, do you expect your household's 
income will fall behind prices, keep up with prices, or go up by more than 
. ? prrces. 
FAMYFC Question Asked 
1983 No 
1984 Yes 
1985 Yes 
1986 Yes 
1987 Yes 
1989 Yes 
If you stay in this job, would you expect you wages or salary over the 
coming year to rise by more than the cost of living, rise by the same as the 
t fr' . b I th th t fr' ? cos 0 IVlng, or rrse )y ess an e cos 0 IVln~.
WAGEFC Question Asked 
1983 Yes 
1984 Yes 
1985 Yes 
1986 Yes 
1987 Yes 
1989 Yes 
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Appendix 11 
ewsmgj 0 erles: ons I uency NOPIN ht P 11 S· C n a S mpling Frame 
Langbaurgh Hexham 
Sunderland North Easington 
Stockton North Hartlepool 
Sheffield Hallam Shipley 
Hull West Sheffield Heeley 
Huddersfield Leeds East 
Doncaster Central Colne Valley 
Leeds North West Wakefield 
Grantham Gainsborough & Horncastle 
Chesterfield Derby South 
Leicester East Leicester South 
Leicestershire N.W. Rugby & Kenilworth 
Cambridgeshire S.W Cambridge 
Bedfordshire S.W. Herts. North 
Suffolk Central Suffolk South 
Srentwood & Ongar Castle Point 
Southampton Itchen Portsmouth North 
Berkshire East Henley 
Hampshire East Guildford 
Folkestone & Hythe Aldershot 
Crawley Dartford 
Gravesham Tonbridge & Mailing 
Sevenoaks Mitcham & Morden 
Croydon North East Eltham 
Sutton & Cheam Norwood 
Old Sexley & Sidcup Orpington 
Greenwich Enfield North 
Wan stead & Woodford Hornchurch 
Tooting Hayes & Harlington 
Brentford & Isleworth Reigat!t 
Plymouth Devonport Plymouth Sutton 
Gloucester Wiltshire North 
Devizes Honiton 
Weston-Super-Mare Poole 
Gower Caerphilly 
Swansea East Newport East 
Cardiff North Cardiff South & Penarth 
Meriden Stoke on Trent South 
Stafford Aldridge-Brownhills 
Wolverhampton North East Walsall South 
Coventry South East Staffs. South East 
TheWrekin Shrewsbury & Atcham 
Rossendale & Darwen Wirral South 
Wirral West Chorley 
City of Chester Stretford 
Worsley Preston 
Denton & Reddish Tatton 
Liverpool West Derby Wigan 
Dundee West Dunfermline West 
Edinburgh East Edinburgh Central 
Gordon Perth & Kinross 
Glasgow Govan Paisley South 
Stirling Kilmarnock & Loudon 
Dumfries Glasgow Hillhead 
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